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Australian National University, Australia
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Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University
Kyoto University

Forward

2019 marked another prolific year for TU CAPS conference. There were academics, researchers, and students from different universities in the Asia-Pacific region. The theme of this conference is *“Pacific Rim in the Next Decade”* which gave us an opportunity to exchange our research with invited guests, academics, and students from across the world. We had various conference sessions such as a concordance conference session, Mainland Southeast Asian Integration Workshop as well as an Australia Panel on Security issues in Indo-Pacific as organized by Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University. Additionally, there were areas such as Myanmar, Russia and also on Telecommunication Development Policy in the Asia-Pacific.

As for post-graduate students, we have students particularly from Graduate School of Asia-Pacific studies, Waseda University, including Kyoto University, Aichi Gakuin University, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, Ministry of Higher Education, Science, Research and Innovation, Thailand, Institute for Continuing Education and Human Resources, Thammasat University, and Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, as well as our MAPS programme, Thammasat Institute of Area Studies. This exciting event welcomed more than 90 participants from 20 countries around the world.

We were honoured to have Tan Sri Dr. Rebecca Sta. Maria, Executive Director from APEC Secretariat and Dr. Denis Hew, Director of Policy Support Unit, APEC Secretariat, as panelists for a panel on APEC: Bogor Goal 2020 and Beyond. This is in line of a preparation for Thailand to be a host of APEC meeting in 2022.

We are looking forward to TUCAPS next year in order to provide a platform for academics, researchers, and graduate students to share ideas and present their research work on Asia-Pacific region as well as networking.

Suphat Suphachalasai

Director of Thammasat Institute of Area Studies

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The Role of US Public Diplomacy in the Transformation of US-Vietnam Relations: A Constructivist Analysis

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The paper seeks to explain the evolution of US-Vietnam relations from former adversaries into cooperative partners and explore the role of US public diplomacy in Vietnam along the rapprochement process between two countries. The significance of the study lies in the fact that most studies mainly rationalized US-Vietnam relations through a rationalist approach and paid negligible attention to ideational factors that can affect their foreign policy behaviors. Besides, the exercise of US public diplomacy in Vietnam in the post-war period has been under-researched. Hence, the paper will illuminate on the nexus between ideational factors and soft power in affecting the dynamics of US-Vietnam relations through a holistic constructivist lens. Based on the analytical framework and data synthesis of two case studies including the phase from post-war era to normalization (1975-1995) and post-normalization to partnership (1995-2016), the paper argues that the wielding of US public diplomacy in Vietnam paved the way for the improvement of US-Vietnam relations by transforming the perceptions of both states toward each other and continuously encouraging more positive reciprocal social interactions between two states. In this regard, the ideational structure based on domestic and international norms that both states follow have constituted US and Vietnam's identities and interests toward each other, leading to the changes in their foreign policies to advocate cooperation. Simultaneously, this positive developments in their foreign policy behaviors eventually lead to more US public diplomacy allocated to Vietnam and generate more positive interactions

1. Introduction

With the growing importance of mutual peace and prosperity, soft power has incrementally become more significant in American foreign policy to “win hearts and minds” abroad. Indeed, the US has remained one of the prominent countries in using soft power to facilitate positive

collaboration¹. Given the high ranking of US soft power, it is interesting to examine how the US can attract and persuade other nations, especially those that used to have deep-seated animosity toward the US. One of the countries that can exemplify the effective deployment of American diplomacy to gain soft power is Vietnam, which has become one of the pro-American countries despite its previous hostility against the US (Burghardt, 2006). In this regard, the transformation of US-Vietnam relations from former adversaries into cooperative partners have raised the question on the role of US public diplomacy in Vietnam along the rapprochement process between two countries.

2. Problem Statement:

Due to the historical conflicts and contrary ideologies between two nations, the case of US public diplomacy in Vietnam outstands as an interesting case to explore the influence of soft power in driving their positive foreign policies toward each other.

However, in contrast to the well-documented studies on US public diplomacy in Vietnam during the Viet Nam War, academic works on US public diplomacy in Vietnam in post-war period remain scarcely researched. Additionally, while the existing literature mainly centers on policy implications or applies rationalist approach in explaining US-Vietnam post-war relationship, the constructivist orientation has not attracted equivalent attention. Recognizing the relevance of constructivism in explaining the impacts of public diplomacy on foreign policy change, it is worth testing the feasibility of constructivism in analysing US public diplomacy and its impact on the flourishing US-Vietnam relationship.

Hence, the findings will fill the gap of existing literature on US public diplomacy in Vietnam during post-war period and make empirical contribution to evaluate the influence of US public diplomacy in the evolution of US-Vietnam relations through a constructivist approach.

2.1. Research Objectives:

The objectives of this study are to:

¹According to "Soft Power 30 Report" – an internationally well-recognized annual index of soft power by Portland Communication and USC Center on Public Diplomacy, US ranked No. 4 in terms of soft power ranking worldwide.

- 1) Explain the shift in US-Vietnam ties from former adversaries into new partners
- 2) Explore the significance and limitations of US Soft Power in transforming US-Vietnam ties from confrontational into cooperative

2.2. Research Questions:

Main Research Question:

- 1) How did US-Vietnam ties shift from confrontational into cooperative relationship?
- 2) What is the role of US public diplomacy in the shift of US-Vietnam relations from adversaries into partners?

Sub Research Questions:

- 1) What are the changes of US public diplomacy in Vietnam before and after normalization?
- 2) What are the domestic and systemic ideational factors that shape the social interactions of the US and Vietnam before and after normalization?
- 3) What are the changes in identities and interests of the US and Vietnam through their social interactions before and after normalization?
- 4) What are the changes of perceptions and foreign policy behaviours of the US and Vietnam toward each other before and after normalization?
- 5) Why did US public diplomacy continue to be promoted in Vietnam?

3. Literature Review:

The literature synthesis is categorized into three main themes: the concept of soft power and public diplomacy, the applicability of constructivism in soft power and foreign policy analysis (FPA), and the US public diplomacy in Vietnam.

Firstly, as a reverse concept of hard power which relies on coercive tactics such as military forces, payments, and economic sanctions, soft power was conceptualized by Nye (2004) as a nation's utilization of cooperative activities, with three main sources including culture, political values, and foreign policies, to attract and persuade other countries to adopt its policy goals as their own. While hard power is monopolized by states, soft power involves both state and non-state agents in transmitting the flow of ideas from one country to another, thereby influencing international relations as a whole (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1979; Hays,

1994; Meyer & Jepperson, 2000; Wendt, 1987). However, soft power tends to be a long-term projection with unpredictability since it is uncertain whether the targeted country will reciprocate or be susceptible to another nation's ideas (Chong, 2004; Vyas, 2006).

In making a distinction between public diplomacy and soft power, it is worth understanding their close relationship in which “public diplomacy is one of soft power’s key instruments” and “public diplomacy means yielding soft power” (Melissen, 2005). This difference between public diplomacy and soft power was coincided with Nye (2008) who indicated that “public diplomacy is an instrument that government uses to mobilize resources of soft power to communicate with and attract the public of other countries, rather than merely their governments” (Nye, 2008, p.95). Likewise, regarding the US, Peter van Ham suggested that “public diplomacy is an essential tool to win over the hearts and minds of foreign audiences, and to convince them that their values, goals and desires are similar to those of the US” (Van Ham, 2005, p.48). Gilboa (2008) was more specific in indicating that public diplomacy is presented as an official policy translating soft power resources into action. Put it another way, public diplomacy is a means while soft power is an end. Similarly, Nye pointed out, “public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth” (Nye, 2008, p.95). Therefore, it can be understood that public diplomacy in its various tools can help promote a nation’s soft power and also serves as a mechanism to leverage soft power resources. However, it is a must that the resources used in public diplomacy (which may be culture, values, policies or institutions) should be attractive to foreign publics; otherwise public diplomacy cannot achieve its desired outcomes to build states’ positive image abroad and promote soft power (Nye, 2008).

Secondly, the relevance of constructivism in soft power and FPA is based on three main reasons. The first reason is that constructivism emphasized on the capabilities of intangible power and ideational factor – the essence of soft power – in determining states’ foreign policy (Copeland, 2000). Additionally, it is in line with soft power and FPA in considering both state and non-state actors; and both systemic and domestic variables in determining states’ foreign policies (Behraves, 2011; C. Brown & Ainley, 2005; Reus-Smit, 2009). Another reason is that it can explain the change in international system through the exchange of norms and values by

soft power and the change in foreign policy-making as a result of states' social interactions (Hopf, 1998; Nia, 2011; Wendt, 1992).

Finally, the existence of US public diplomacy in Vietnam had its roots from the Vietnam War under the modernization of South Vietnam, in which the US invested in government-sponsored technological and cultural exchanges to assure that South Vietnam would be a capitalist and democratic state (Menebhi, 2014). However, several documents indicated that the projection of soft power in Vietnam is a failure due to the US lack of cultural awareness of the indigenous Vietnamese (Masur, 2004; Wright, 2009).

Interestingly, in parallel with the normalization of US-Vietnam relations, US public diplomacy has showed signs of remarkable achievements. In terms of cultural attractiveness, American norms and values enjoy a favourable perception from Vietnamese audiences (Diplomacy, 2005). Additionally, the US has remained the top favourite destination for Vietnamese students (Robbins, 2013). Regarding political values, although Vietnam did not follow Western liberal democracy, it did follow US-led economic model transforming from a central planned economy into a state-led free market economy with Western capitalism in disguise (Albert, 2019). Considering foreign policies, US public diplomacy manifests a growing prominence of cooperative efforts in the fields of diplomacy, trade and security (C. T. Nguyen, 2015). Overall, the accomplishment of US public diplomacy in Vietnam is the positive perception from both Vietnamese government and public (Bouton & Holyk, 2011; Burghardt, 2006; Devlin, 2015; "Global Indicators Database," 2017; Mann, 2002).

4. Methodology

The study will employ qualitative and retrospective research through document analysis with data extracted from primary resources such as government documents of the US and Vietnam; and secondary resources including books, relevant dissertations, academic journals and articles from available online databases.

The analytical framework (Figure 1) is a combination of both concept and theory. While public diplomacy will serve as the conceptual framework to explore the US deployment of public diplomacy toward Vietnam, holistic constructivism – considering both domestic and systemic

ideational environments in shaping foreign policy (Nia, 2011), will be utilized to shape the theoretical framework to explore the rationale of US public diplomacy in Vietnam and explain US-Vietnam foreign policy change toward each other. Some concepts in the framework will be explained as follows.

From constructivist approach, states' relations are determined by their shared norms and ideas which concurrently constituted states' identities and interests toward each other. Hence, the framework adopts Wendt (1999)'s classification of three cultures of anarchy called Hobbesian culture (enmity), Lockean culture (rivalry), and Kantian culture (friendship) to identify the nature of states' relations, particularly the ideational structure between states.

Besides, since this ideational structure also co-constitutes and co-determines actors' identities and interests, it is worth illuminating different types of identities and interests under constructivism. Regarding states' identities, while "corporate identity" refers to internal human, material, ideological, or cultural characteristics that make a state what it is, "social identity" refers to "the meaning an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others" (Wendt, 1994). Through the lens of holistic constructivism, the normative or ideational structures at both domestic and international levels continuously influence identity formation and serve as the catalyst for both corporate and social identities to interact with each other. Concerning states' interests, Wendt (1999) also classifies national interests as "physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem". Since the research only investigates US-Vietnam post-war relationship, physical survival and autonomy are out of the research scope. While "economic well-being refers" to "the maintenance of the mode of production in a society and the state's resource base", "economic self-esteem" means that a state "need to feel good about itself, for respect or status" (Wendt, 1999, pp.235-236).

There are three key variables as follows:

Antecedent Variables: US Public Diplomacy to Promote Soft Power

- Culture
- Political Values
- Foreign Policy


Independent Variables: Interaction & Cognitive Interpretation between US and Vietnam

- Ideational Structure (Shared norms/ideas/values, Structure of US-Vietnam relations)
- Actors (US/Vietnam identities and interests)

Dependent Variables: US-Vietnam Foreign Policy Behaviours

- US and Vietnam’s perceptions toward each other
- US and Vietnam’s foreign policy change
- Us and Vietnam’s advocacy of bilateral cooperation

Figure 1. Analytical Framework for the Analysis of US Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Vietnam



Source: Based on Wendt (1999) and Nia (2011)’s notions, the framework was established and proposed by the author

The scope of the study is from 1975 to 2016 with two case studies: (1) US-Vietnam Relations from Post-war Era to Normalization (1975-1995) and (2) US-Vietnam Relations in Post-Normalization Era (1995-2016). The reason behind this scope is because these two case studies

represent two different historical contexts that can give an insight into US public diplomacy in Vietnam. While the first case represents the situation when two countries were still under tension after engaging in two-decade warfare with the US economic and political sanctions on Vietnam, the second case demonstrates the period after US-Vietnam normalization with noticeable achievements in their diplomatic relations with the formulation of comprehensive partnership.

Based on the framework and the scope, the thesis hypothesizes that US public diplomacy in Vietnam affects the social interaction and cognitive interpretation of US and Vietnam toward each other, transforming the ideational environment that they are in from Lockean culture (Rivalry) into Kantian culture (Friendship). Simultaneously, this transformation in anarchic cultures co-constitute and co-determine with the formulation of both US and Vietnam's identities and interests, both of which are also intertwined. As a result, US and Vietnam's behaviours such as their attitudes or actions are shaped. Specifically, these behaviours include the changes in their perceptions toward each other, their foreign policies, and their advocacy of cooperation.

5. Case Study on US-Vietnam Relations from Post-War Era to Normalization (1975-1995): Transition from Lockean Culture to Kantian Culture

5.1. US Public Diplomacy to Promote US Soft Power

Throughout the two-decade post-war period, the presence of US public diplomacy in Vietnam remained minimal since hard power dominated the majority of the entire period with the US economic sanctions and political isolation on Vietnam (Robbins, 2013). It was not until after the end of Cold War, that the appearance of US public diplomacy in Vietnam started to become observable.

5.1.1. Culture

With regard to culture, the US soft power in Vietnam started with educational exchanges under the government-funded Fulbright Student Programs, with the first batch of Vietnamese students in 1991-1992 academic year; and non-Fulbright institutional partnerships such as the collaboration of Harvard University and the University of Economics, Ho Chi Minh City; the

sponsorship of the State University of New York (SUNY), Buffalo for English-as-a-second-language (ESL) training; and the collaboration between Hanoi Medical University and the University of Arizona's College of Medicine. Particularly, from 1991 to 1995, the number of Vietnamese students under the Fulbright Student Program continued to grow, making Vietnam the largest Fulbright program in Asia back then (Abuza, 1996). From American perspective, educational exchanges like the Fulbright Student Program served as political facilitators which helped facilitate diplomatic ties since "it was a way of maintaining contact and also a mechanism to get to know the Vietnamese educational community" (Abuza, 1996, p.624).

For Vietnam, educational exchange with the US came at the right time when Vietnam had just renovated its policy and was in need of acquiring new knowledge and improving its higher education, including raising academic standards and training its population to meet the workforce demand of its transitional economy (Duong, 2009). Besides, Vietnamese side viewed those exchanges as "serving as a quasi-official channel to the US" with direct ties to the US government (Abuza, 1996, p. 624). In other words, it can be regarded as a win-win situation when both sides can benefit from these graduates since most of them are government officials and decision-makers who can be important facilitators in US-Vietnam bilateral relationship.

5.1.2. Political Values and Foreign Policies

In reference to political values and foreign policies, US soft power coming from these two pillars remained minimal since both countries had not reconciled with each other until the end of this period. However, the shift of Vietnam from a planned economy inherited from socialist bloc into a "socialist-oriented market economy" in the 1986 Doi Moi Reforms might come from its awareness of the advantage of the US-led capitalist system in bolstering the economic growth. Even though the influence of the US to Vietnam in this transformation was not direct and obvious, it shows that the US was one step further in spreading its ideas and values of capitalism and free-market economy in Vietnam. On the other hand, in terms of foreign policy, the offer of the roadmap with a four-phase time frame for normalization in 1991, the official lift of economic embargo on Vietnam in 1994, and the official normalization in 1995 were typical examples of US softened policies toward Vietnam.

5.2. Interaction and Cognitive Interpretation between the US and Vietnam

The two-decade post-war period mostly witnessed negative perceptions from both states toward each other, followed by adverse foreign policies that impede the normalization process. However, the final period of the case study showed sign of positive perceptions from both sides. Along the analysis, both systemic and domestic normative environment have influence on the US and Vietnam's perceptions toward each other to be confrontational or cooperative.

5.2.1. Ideational Structure

In the 1975-1986 period, the ideational structure of both states at systemic level falls under Lockean culture due to their shared negative perceptions and confrontational behaviours shown through the failed attempts to reconcile. Indeed, the US and Vietnam disagreements on POW/MIA and war reparation aid issues and the Sino-American collusion against Vietnam over the Cambodia issue amidst Vietnam's declined relations with China can exemplify the negative perceptions from both sides (Chanda, 1986; Simons, 1997). One explanation for this animosity was due to the lingering war mentality and post-war resentment from both sides (V. T. Nguyen, 2008). At domestic level, both states persisted on their own internal ideals with Vietnam's upholding Marxist-Leninist ideology while the US endorsing anti-communist sentiment, leading to the hostile relationship.

On the other hand, the 1986-1995 stage witnessed a sign of a gradual transition toward Kantian culture in their ideational structure at systemic level with initial positive perceptions shown through the incremental progress toward normalization. Specifically, from 1986 to 1991, there were negative interactions between the US and Vietnam demonstrated through Vietnam's frustration over the US sluggishness and indifference in response to Vietnam's active cooperation in Cambodia and POW/MIA issues (V. T. Nguyen, 2008). However, in the 1991-1995 period (after the end of Cold War), there appeared positive interactions from both sides to finalize the normalization. This was demonstrated through Vietnam's impending entry into ASEAN in the same month in 1995 that provided the incentive for the United States to finally recognize Vietnam (Womack, 2010). Concurrently, at domestic level, the 1986-1995 experienced the change in the internal normative environment in both states toward "new thinking". While Vietnam renovated its "old thinking" – pure Marxist-Leninist ideology – toward

open-door policy in 1986 with Doi Moi Reforms, the US started to refrain from advocating anti-communism in 1991 with the end of Cold War and promoted international engagement instead of isolationism afterward (H. H. Le, 2013; M. T. T. Le, 2013). Thanks to the shift in their domestic ideas, the US and Vietnam started to have positive perceptions toward each other, thereby becoming more cooperative for rapprochement.

5.2.2. Identities and Interests of the US and Vietnam

In terms of corporate identity, the US corporate identity revolved around its self-identification as a superpower and its regime type as a democratic country. This self-identification has been consistently demonstrated throughout the US foreign policy to introduce democratic liberal system and capitalist free-market economy to Vietnam since the outbreak of Vietnam War until their normalization in 1995. By contrast, Vietnam's corporate identity comprised of its self-identification as a revolutionary or reformist state and its regime type as a communist country. Vietnamese self-identification as a revolutionary or reformist state can be seen through its long struggle for independence under Marxist-Leninist ideology and its pathway to renovated socialism after the 1986 Doi Moi Reforms, a step toward reviving the impoverished economy after the collapse of Soviet Union (Morley & Nishihara, 2016). Moreover, its regime type as a communist country had been the intrinsic political system of Vietnam since the end of Vietnam War. Even though the 1986 Doi Moi Reforms did bring about political and economic renovation, the communist ideology remained as the guiding principle of the whole country (Thayer, 2015).

In regard to social identity which is constituted through the interactions and perceptions between states, while the social identity of the US in relation to Vietnam was the leader of a Free World vs an aggressive Communist Vietnam, the social identity of Vietnam in relation to the US was an independent revolutionary Vietnam vs an imperialist US. These identities are formed due to their contradictory ideologies during the early post-war period. However, with the transformation of its national identity from a member of socialist camp into a member of ASEAN-based identity, Vietnam become more strategically important to the US as a part of ASEAN, leading to the final normalization with the US.

With reference to the US and Vietnam's interests toward each other, economic well-being and collective self-esteem exist in the interests of both sides. For economic well-being, it is obvious that as a reformist state, Vietnam seeks the economic reorientation toward a free-market economy and the lift of US embargo to save the devastated economy at home and promote economic development. As the leader of a Free World based on market economics, the US also share the interest in gaining economic benefits from fostering trade with Vietnam, starting with the business groups which were aware of Vietnam's potential market and played an active role in calling for the normalization (H. H. Le, 2013).

For collective esteem, which refers to the need to feel respected, each country pursued their own policy in gaining collective esteem. For the American side, as the powerful but defeated side in the Vietnam War, the US aimed to have the upper hand in the negotiations of normalization with Vietnam by taking advantage of its influential role in most international institutions to isolate Vietnam from international community (V. T. Nguyen, 2008). Besides, by accusing Vietnam of invading Cambodia, the US also promoted its collective self-esteem by backing China and Khmer Rouge to fight against Vietnam (Simons, 1997). Additionally, the wielding of US soft power in Vietnam during the 1991-1995 period also showed US interest in collective esteem by using its attractiveness in culture and education to improve its national branding in Vietnam.

For the Vietnamese side, as the weaker but victorious side and a revolutionary state, Vietnam was "dizzy with its success" and tried to gain collective esteem by consistently asking the US to pay war reconstruction aid without realizing that Vietnam was in need of US-VN normalization more than the US (V. T. Nguyen, 2008). Besides, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was justified by Vietnam as an act of humanitarian responsibilities to put an end to genocide carried out the Khmer Rouge regime. After Vietnam's 1986 Doi Moi Reforms, Vietnam's reorientation of foreign policy toward open-door policy "multilateralization and diversification", which seeks to befriend with all countries, starting with Vietnam's rapprochement with neighbouring countries and its entry into ASEAN, did improve the image of Vietnam in international community (H. H. Le, 2013; Tung, 2002, 2007).

5.3. Behaviors of the US and Vietnam

Apparently, the negative perceptions caused US-Vietnam confrontational behaviours while positive perceptions resulted in their cooperative behaviours since 1991. It should be noted that it was also during the 1991-1995 that the US started to utilize softened policy toward Vietnam through educational exchange, removal of embargo, and normalization as means of soft power to slowly reconcile with Vietnam. Indeed, US soft power was welcomed by Vietnam due to its timeliness and potential benefits for Vietnam's national development. Within this context, the positive change at both systemic and domestic levels paved the way for both sides to have positive perceptions toward each other, and thus become more cooperative. Along this interaction, since soft power seems to be one of the main tools that the US used in order to persuade Vietnam to cooperate and follow American ideas and values, it is expected that the more that US soft power existed in Vietnam, the more positive the Vietnamese perceptions of the US. As a result, there are more efforts from both sides to foster US soft power in Vietnam in the following period.

6. Case study on US-Vietnam Relations in Post-Normalization Era (1995-2016): Toward Kantian culture

6.1. US Public Diplomacy to Promote US Soft Power

Compared to the previous case study, the presence of US public diplomacy in Vietnam during the post-normalization period has become more prevalent than ever with the involvement of both states (through government-to-government exchanges) and non-state agents (through people-to-people ties such as non-governmental organizations, private groups and individuals) in the enhancement of American image in Vietnam.


Indeed, after their memorable milestone of the 1995 reconciliation, Vietnam has become one of the pro-American countries, proven by the Vietnamese government's regarding US as one of the key partners while the majority of Vietnamese prefer the US - 84% of Vietnamese respondents holding a favourable view toward the US in Pew Research Center's 2017 Global Attitudes Survey (Burghardt, 2006; "Global Indicators Database," 2017; Mann, 2002). This coincided with the research by Bouton and Holyk (2011) who investigated Asian perceptions of American soft power and proved that the US enjoyed positive perceptions among Vietnamese population in terms of its culture and civilization, namely technology, education,

popular culture, and cultural values such as individual freedom and equality. The ample examples of US soft power including culture, political values, and foreign policies will be demonstrated below.

6.1.1. Culture

Culturally, the American cultural attractiveness in Vietnam during post-normalization can be shown through the popularity of American education and culture in Vietnam. For education, there are more US-sponsored programs (Fulbright Program, Vietnam Education Program, Military-to-military training program, The Peace Corps) and institutional partnerships between the US and Vietnam (especially the establishment of Fulbright University Vietnam). Hence, the US enjoyed the sharp rise of Vietnamese students attending schools in the US. In 2016, according to the annual Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange by the Institute of International Education's (IIE), there were 21,403 students from Vietnam then attending schools in the US, thereby making Vietnam the 6th leading country of origin among international students in the US and representing Vietnam's 16th straight year of growth as a sender of students to the US (US Embassy & Consulate in Vietnam, 2017). The US has consistently remained in top favourite overseas study destinations for Vietnamese students. According to the report by Vietnam's MOET at Vietnam-Europe Higher Education Forum in 2016, the US ranked the 3rd, only behind Japan and Australia, among countries that have the most Vietnamese students (VietnamNet, 2016).

Figure 2. Number of Vietnamese Students Studying in the US (2000-2016)



Source: International Student Data from the Open Doors data portal (accessed in November 11, 2019).


Besides, American culture remained its popularity proven by the proliferation of Hollywood films (both blockbusters and TV series), American music (especially pop and hip hop), and American brands (KFC, Pizza Hut, Starbucks, Subway, Domino’s Pizza, McDonald’s, etc.) within Vietnamese society (M. Brown, 2013; TuoiTreNews, 2018). In order to promote its soft power through cultural products and boost Vietnamese public engagement, especially Vietnamese youth, the US government implemented cultural diplomacy through the operation of the Public Affairs Sections of the US Embassy in Hanoi and the US Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City (Alvin Bui, 2016).

6.1.2. Political Values and Foreign Policies

For political values and foreign policies, while the impact of US public diplomacy in Vietnam’s political values remained modest, its influence in reference to foreign policies flourishes with remarkable milestones in economic (business-to-business), political and security (government-to-government), and people-to-people cooperation.

Among all spheres of US foreign policies toward Vietnam, economic ties, from both state-to-state and business-to-business cooperation, appeared to be the most dynamic and successful pillar with a wide range of economic stimulation initiatives to bolster their trade and investment links at both bilateral and multilateral levels. As can be seen from Figure 3, US-Vietnam bilateral trade has skyrocketed from \$451 million in 1995 to nearly \$52.2 billion in 2016, within which US exports and imports to Vietnam were worth over \$10 billion and \$46 respectively. In 2016, Vietnam became the 13th largest exporter to the US and the 37th largest importer of US commodities (Doan, 2019). At multilateral level, the US also showed cooperative foreign policies toward Vietnam within the framework of regional and international US-supported existing institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, EAS, WTO, and TPP. Despite some trade disputes from time to time, Vietnam has embraced most of US foreign policies within these multilateral frameworks as long as they can foster Vietnam's economic integration. Indeed, the most drastic example would be when Vietnam accepted the US invitation to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) - a strategic policy instrument in the economic pillar of US pivot to Asia (Deprez, 2018).

Figure 3. US-Vietnam Trade in Goods (1995-2016)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade (“Trade in Goods with Vietnam,” 2019)

For defence cooperation, although it is arguable that military might is obviously a source of hard power, sometimes a well-run military can actually enhance a country’s soft power. Indeed, the case of military-to-military cooperation and training, especially for non-traditional security issues, also represents a source of soft-power behaviour (Nye, 2011). In the similar vein, the two-decade US-Vietnam defence cooperation is no exception because the military-to-military collaboration and training that US offered to Vietnam has contributed to improve the US image and gradually restore the US attractiveness in Vietnam. In this aspect, the American slowly yet steady military-to-military cooperation with Vietnam was another example of US public diplomacy in Vietnam, representing government-to-government cooperation and transnational networks at both bilateral and multilateral level.

From only one area of cooperation in the recovery of US POW/MIA personnel, the US-Vietnam defence ties transformed into a full-fledge relationship with more bilateral and multilateral cooperation in both traditional and non-traditional security issues. The hallmark of the US-Vietnam security ties was high-level military exchanges over maritime security. The impetus for the enhancement in defence cooperation has been attributed to the increasing

convergence of US and Vietnam strategic interests over China's assertive actions in Asia (Thayer, 2017; Vuving, 2017).

To illustrate, the tension arising from China's deployment of the HD-981 oil platform in Vietnam's EEZ significantly strengthened US-Vietnam maritime security cooperation by reaching agreement on cooperation between two Coast Guards and cooperation on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in 2013. That same year Secretary of State John Kerry visited Vietnam and announced a \$18 million assistance package to improve the country's ability to conduct coastal patrol, search and rescue, and disaster relief operations (Tuan & Thuy, 2016). Since 2013, there has been an accelerated tempo of high-level dialogues between two nations over this issue and Vietnam has showed their welcome for the presence of US Navy in South China Sea and US-Vietnam naval exchange activities. The recent most historic step is Obama Administration's lift of the decades-long embargo on lethal arms sales to Vietnam despite many concerns that Vietnam's worsening human rights record with high level of dissent suppression failed to prove its commitment in improve the situation (Kurlantzick, 2016).

The US-Vietnam security cooperation also expands to multilateral level in which Vietnam's ASEAN membership and its UNSC non-permanent membership laid the foundation. At multilateral level, the two countries now cooperate closely in the areas of maritime security and domain awareness, peacekeeping, environmental security, search and rescue, disaster response, and military medicine (Trung, 2009).

Additionally, even though people-to-people cooperation, including mainly culture and non-traditional security areas, was not the forefront in US foreign policies toward Vietnam but it has gained more and more momentum since President Obama's presidency. In fact, it was underscored as one of the three main pillars that US-Vietnam partnership should be built up on, along with business-to-business (economic ties) and government-to-government (security relations), since three-leg or tripod structure was considered to sustain a sturdy and well-balanced relationship (Siracusa & Nguyen, 2017). To specify, because culture aspect has been covered above, this section will focus on people-to-people foreign policies through non-traditional security cooperation, namely humanitarian assistance and environment and energy.

The US humanitarian assistance to Vietnam has been on a steady rise, particularly in health and war legacy issues. The US engagement in Vietnam's public health has proven to be relatively successful and progressive with their conclusion of two five-year agreements on health and medical science cooperation, respectively in 2006 and 2013. Two main areas that constitute US engagement on Vietnam's health sections includes fighting against HIV/AIDS and combating pandemic and tropical diseases. Besides, in response to Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA issues, the US started to cooperate with Vietnam in Agent Orange and Demining issues. For example, the US sponsored programs to address the harmful side-effects of Agent Orange in Vietnam, including environmental and unexploded ordnance (UXO) remediation (Hiebert, Nguyen, & Poling, 2014; Trung, 2009).

In response to Vietnam's insufficient efforts to achieve long-term environmental preservation and energy security, the US has committed to help Vietnam in both aspects. USAID is the main US government agency in implementing programs to assist Vietnam along its path toward sustainable development. USAID focal programs revolve around renewable energy, climate change mitigation, adaptation, disaster risk reduction, combating wildlife trafficking and biodiversity conservation. Notably, considering only the USAID's activities in Vietnam, the USAID's environmental engagement in Vietnam constitutes one of its broadest renewable energy and climate change adaptation programs in the world (Hiebert et al., 2014).

6.2. Interaction and Cognitive Interpretation between the US and Vietnam

The two-decade post-normalization period opened a new chapter in US-Vietnam relations with the broad-based proliferation of US public diplomacy in Vietnam. This induced more positive perceptions from both states toward each other and resulted in more positive foreign policies that can enhance and deepen their bilateral ties. Under the influence of US public diplomacy in Vietnam, their interactions and perceptions toward each other became more positive, as evidenced by their growing mutual trust and understanding at both systemic and domestic normative environments.

6.2.1. Ideational Structure

At the systemic level, the social interactions by both states shaped their behaviours toward each other to become cooperative. It should be noted that even though the rise of China did serve as the catalyst for a closer US-Vietnam relationship, it was not the decisive factor as US

engagement in Vietnam was not purely to counter-balance China. The main factor for their deepening relations lies in their growing favourable perceptions toward the other amid challenges in an uncertain geopolitical landscape.

In the 1995-2008 period, their ideational structure witnessed a gradual progress toward Kantian culture due to their initial positive perceptions and cooperative foreign policy behaviours, starting with economic cooperation as the foundation for security ties. Subsequently, the 2009-2016 stage witnessed a sign of an expeditious transition toward Kantian culture in their ideational structure rapidly transforming into more cooperative with substantive development in defence cooperation, together with the blooming in economic relations. As a result, these increasing and deepening positive interactions and perceptions led to their cooperative behaviours. The most typical examples are the official establishment of a comprehensive partnership in 2013 and the lift of arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016.

At domestic level, due to their ideological disparity, both states persisted on their own internal ideals with Vietnam's upholding socialist Marxist-Leninist ideology while US endorsing liberal democracy and capitalism with free-market principle. These divergences caused their scepticism toward each other and prolong the progress in reconciling and advancing their relations. Particularly, the US frowned upon Vietnam's human rights record and non-market economy status, whereas Vietnam doubted that US growing soft power in Vietnam might jeopardize its regime legitimacy by "peaceful evolution". Nevertheless, with the growing positive interactions, both sides became more tolerant of their differences and advocates more cooperative bilateral activities.

6.2.2. Identities and Interests of the US and Vietnam

Compared to the previous case study, the corporate identity of US and Vietnam remained unchanged. The US self-identification as a superpower can be seen through American leadership in the creation and extension of US-centered international system in which American values and ideas are promoted to other countries to build a more advanced world (Walt, 2011). Furthermore, in its relations with Vietnam, it is evident that the US regime type was a democratic country which often criticized Vietnam for the undemocratic actions such as violation of human rights, restrictions on freedom of speech, restrictions on freedom of

expressions, suppression of civil society, etc (P. Nguyen, 2018). For Vietnam, after adopting new integrationist thinking and no longer expressing assertive patriotic resistance against foreign interference based on revolutionary ideals, Vietnamese corporate identity transformed into an ethno-cultural nationalist state, harmonized with renovated socialism and ASEAN regionalism, but still maintained communist regime (N. D. Nguyen, 2010).

Remarkably, regarding social identity which is constituted through the interactions and perceptions between states, both sides during this period considered the other as potential partner. By virtue of their growing mutual trust and understanding, their social identities toward each other witnessed a transformation from old adversaries into new partners whose share mutual interests in ASEAN regional stability and common concerns of China's assertiveness in South China Sea issues (Albert, 2019). This can be seen from their flourishing bilateral ties and bolstering cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels.

From American perspective, its partnership with Vietnam appears to be part of its strategic adjustments to maintain its influence in Asia, noticeably with Obama's Pivot to Asia Pacific, to rebalance toward Asia because Vietnam possessed a geostrategic position in Southeast Asia, played an proactive role in ASEAN, and shared mutual interests in economy and regional security with the US (Tuan & Thuy, 2016). For Vietnam, the growing cooperation with the US is considered to be a catalyst for Vietnam to integrate further into global economy and build partnerships with major powers to bolster its foreign policy of independence and self-reliance, escape from China's economic orbit, and play a more influential role in regional diplomacy (H. T. Le, 2017).

However, it should be noted that although the changes in Asia's geopolitical landscape with mutual concerns over a rising China were the catalyst for a substantive deepened US-Vietnam relationship, the decisive factor that got them aligned more closely was their accumulation of shared efforts in nurturing positive attitudes toward each other, particularly through narrowing down the areas of mistrust and promoting mutually built trust. In other words, US-Vietnam increased cooperation, particularly during Obama administration, should not be interpreted simply as a realist counterbalance in the narrow context of a rebalance to Asia against China (Hiebert et al., 2014; P. Nguyen, 2018; Tuan & Thuy, 2016).

Concurrently, their shared identities as partners also shaped their interests in economic well-being and collective self-esteem. Economic well-being can be exemplified through the vibrant interactions from both sides in promoting bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. Vietnam's economic interests in its relation with the US manifested also in how Vietnam used its leverage of having US-Vietnam BTA to conclude other FTAs which considerably fuelled its robust economic growth, transforming Vietnam from a low middle-income country into a middle-income one with consistent GDP growth approximately 6-7%. The most recent example is Vietnam's ambition in join US-led trade agreement TPP, which is predicted to further boost its economic reforms toward international integration (Deprez, 2018; M. T. T. Le, 2013; V. T. Nguyen, 2008). On the other hand, the US also considered Vietnam as a promising destination for trade and investment flows given its strategic location. This is proven by the exponential rise in US merchandise trade in Vietnam, increasing more than 100-fold from 1995 to 2016, and the influx of US investment in Vietnam.

For collective self-esteem, which refers to the need to feel respected, both countries became cooperative toward each other because both sides want to gain collective self-esteem at both regional and international levels. For the US, a better relationship with Vietnam helped the US to improve its international image since it can represent the success of US soft power in a country with historical conflict and ideological disparity with the US. From the above analysis, the US gained admiration from Vietnam through its increasingly broad-based wielding of soft power toward Vietnam through economic, security, and diplomatic cooperation at government-to-government, business-to-business, and people-to-people levels (Siracusa & Nguyen, 2017). From Vietnamese perspective, the interest to gain collective self-esteem navigated Vietnam to reconcile and deepen its relations with the US. As can be seen, Vietnam reinforced its regional and international position through its growing substantive bilateral ties with the US, starting with economic cooperation as the foundation and further advancing with security collaboration (Tuan & Thuy, 2016). Besides, Vietnam integrated into US-supported institutions, namely ASEAN, APEC, EAS, TPP, UNSC, etc., as a way to gain more leverages not only in economic development but also in dealing with uncertainty in geopolitical landscape, especially amid the rise of China (P. Nguyen, 2018; Trung, 2009).

6.3. Behaviours of the US and Vietnam

Since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1995, the US and Vietnam have made great strides in advancing bilateral relations, achieving substantive development in their relationship. In the words of Secretary of State John Kerry, no other two countries “have worked harder, done more, and done better to try to bring themselves together and change history and change the future” (Lee, 2015). Indeed, using US soft power in Vietnam, both sides have looked beyond their past and looked forward to the future, thereby mutually constructing reciprocal positive perceptions which result in cooperative foreign policies. It is worth considering that US public diplomacy also contributed to these positive interactions since US public diplomacy has attract both Vietnamese government and public to admire its American norms and values, paving way for more positive interactions between both sides. Reversely, more positive interactions between both sides also lead to the growing prevalence of US public diplomacy in Vietnam.

7. Conclusion

Throughout the two case studies, it appears that US public diplomacy in Vietnam became more wide-ranging with diverse activities in terms of culture and foreign policies. Culturally, there are more governmental and non-governmental educational programs, American cultural products, and cultural exchange activities performed by the US to increase public engagement, focusing on Vietnamese youth. Besides, US foreign policies toward Vietnam also became softened and more cooperative, revolving around the sustainable three-leg structure including economic, security, and people-to-people ties, all of which also represented government-to-government, business-to-business, and people-to-people cooperation. Notably, among three main sources of US public diplomacy, political values remained as the least influential source in Vietnam. It is because despite Vietnamese general public’s favourable view toward the US political system, both states remained divergent in political their ideologies and gradually respected their differences in political systems.



Under the influence of US public diplomacy in Vietnam, their interactions and perceptions toward each other became more positive, as evidenced by their growing mutual trust and understanding at both systemic and domestic normative environments. Indeed, even though their internal ideational environment showed their ideological differences which strained their

relationship, both sides have made progress to find more common ground and to become more cooperative.

Figure 4. Key Findings from Two Case Studies

US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO PROMOTE US SOFT POWER IN VIETNAM		
Aspects	Case Study 1: Post-war to Pre-normalization (1975-1995)	Case Study 2: Post-normalization to Partnership (1995-2016)
Culture	<p>Education: Government-funded educational exchanges (Fulbright Program)</p>	<p>Education: - Government-funded programs (Fulbright Program Vietnam Education Foundation Military-to-military Training Peace Corps) - Institutional partnerships (Fulbright University Vietnam)</p> <p>Culture: - American cultural products (pop culture) - Cultural diplomacy activities at the American Center</p>
Political Values	<p>There are no empirical data showing Vietnamese favorable view of American political values but due to two states' hostility toward each other, it can be implied that their negative perceptions toward the US were more prominent.</p>	<p>Although the Vietnamese government still remained as a communist regime, American values of liberal democracy enjoyed by general public.</p>
Foreign Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Road map - Lift of trade embargo - Normalization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political Security Relations (government-to-government) - Economic Ties (business-to-business) - People-to-people Links (people-to-people)

US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO PROMOTE US SOFT POWER IN VIETNAM		
Aspects	Case Study 1: Post-war to Pre-normalization (1975-1995)	Case Study 2: Post-normalization to Partnership (1995-2016)
		- Lift of lethal arms sales embargo
Agents	State - Leader-to-leader dialogues	State: - Leader-to-leader dialogues - High-level visits & negotiations Non-state: - Business groups (MNCs) - NGOs (humanitarian assistance: POW/MIA + Agent Orange issues & educational institutions) - Education Institutions
INTERACTIONS & PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN US AND VIETNAM		
Ideational Structure	From Lockean Culture (Confrontational) to Kantian Culture (Cooperative) - 1975-1986: Hostile Relationship => Lockean Culture (Confrontational) - 1986-1995: Pathway to Reconciliation => Transition to Kantian Culture (Cooperative)	Toward Kantian Culture (Cooperative) - 1995-2008: Closer Interactions => Gradual Progress Toward Kantian (Cooperative) - 2009-2016: Deepening Ties => Expeditious Progress Toward Kantian (Cooperative)
Identities & Interests	Corporate Identity: - US: superpower + democratic - Vietnam: revolutionary + communist Social Identity:	Corporate Identity: - US: superpower + democratic - Vietnam: ethno-cultural nationalist (renovated socialism + ASEAN regionalism) + communist Social Identity:

US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO PROMOTE US SOFT POWER IN VIETNAM		
Aspects	Case Study 1: Post-war to Pre-normalization (1975-1995)	Case Study 2: Post-normalization to Partnership (1995-2016)
	<p>Both sides consider the other as adversary</p> <p>US & Vietnam Interests</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic Well-being - Collective Self-esteem 	<p>Both sides consider the other as potential partner => Comprehensive Partnership in 2013</p> <p>US & Vietnam Interests</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic Well-being - Collective Self-esteem
Foreign Policy Behaviours	<p>Confrontational Foreign Policies => Prolong normalization process</p> <p>Negative Interactions</p> 	<p>Cooperative Foreign Policies => Reach substantive development in bilateral ties</p> <p>Positive Interactions</p> 

Overall, acknowledging the long-term influence of US public diplomacy was welcomed by Vietnam due to wide-ranging potential benefits for Vietnam’s national development. Within this context, the positive ideational change at both systemic and domestic levels paved the way for both sides to have positive perceptions toward each other, and thus become more cooperative. Along this interaction, it is true that their convergent interests amid the evolving strategic circumstance, particularly the rise of China, brought them closer but the paramount factor for their bilateral dynamics lie in their growing mutually constructed positive perceptions toward each other. These can be clearly seen through the spill over effects of the flourishing economic relations in the substantive development of their progressing security ties, the regular high-level visits, and their active participation in ASEAN-led activities.

Evidently, all of these fruitful outcomes in their bilateral relations resulted from the wielding of US soft power toward. In other words, US public diplomacy in Vietnam played a principal role in bolstering US-Vietnam relations, persuading Vietnam to cooperate and follow American ideas and values. Although US public diplomacy still has its limitation in exerting political values in Vietnamese governments, American values of liberal democracy was favoured by most of the Vietnamese public. Hence, it is expected that the more that US public diplomacy existed in Vietnam, the more positive the Vietnamese perceptions of the US and vice versa, leading to more efforts from both sides to consolidate and substantiate US public diplomacy in Vietnam.

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Enhancing Free Movement of Skilled Labour in ASEAN: A Case Study of Cambodian Nurses

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In response to the shortage of nurses worldwide, global health authorities have consistently called for the regulation of the migration of health professionals. A regional response to this phenomenon is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Nursing Services (MRA-NS) which facilitates the 'free flow' of nursing services within its Member States (AMS). This study seeks to understand how Cambodian nurses would benefit from the MRA-NS by considering its current state. The purpose of the study is to present the perceptions of two key stakeholders – individual nurses and decision-makers – on the movement of nurses. In order to explain the Cambodian case, this research employs a survey questionnaire to explore the perspectives of Cambodian nurses with key informant interviews to elicit the opinions of policy and decision-makers. The thesis utilizes a review of scholarly literature and online migration databases. It is a descriptive and exploratory research with a qualitative analysis approach. Based on the research, the author argues that it is still too early for Cambodian nurses to gain any significant benefits from the MRA-NS. This is due to institutional constraints and nurses' low self-efficacy. There are three potential levels where improved support for nursing migration can be achieved: i) nurses' improved competence and job-seeking skills; ii) an enabling regulatory environment for Cambodian nurses to be well-informed about aspects of working abroad; and iii) enhancing regional cooperation and harmonization of employment standards.

Keywords: *intra-ASEAN, Cambodian nurses, foreign nurse, MRA-NS, policy, job market, migration, perspectives, skilled labour movement, cooperation, harmonization.*

1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to (i) investigate how the Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Nursing Services (MRA-NS) actually benefits Cambodian nurses in terms of their mobility for work within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and (ii) to push for policy implementation in order to promote free movement of skilled professionals, inclusive skills development and harmonization the export of Cambodian nurses within ASEAN region.

In the advent of globalization, the migration of health workers has become a universal phenomenon which in turn became a global public health priority (IOM, 2017; WHO, 2017). Specifically, nurses are said to be on the move both within their home countries and across borders for several reasons. Among those, employment is identified as the primary reason (Kingma, 2006). In fact, the IOM stated, ‘...movement of persons from one state to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment’ (Glossary on Migration, 2011, p:62). Meanwhile, the World Health Organization (WHO) illustrated the term ‘health workers’ as “all people engaged in actions whose primary intent is to enhance health” (WHO, 2009). Among others, health workers refer to doctors, nurses, and midwives (WHO, 2016).

The demand for healthcare professionals has been increasing over the past decades and has led to a rise in their migration. Aging population, birth rate, coupled with unhealthy diet and habits leads to increased healthcare demands (Deloitte, 2015; Solidiance, 2018). Nurses are the position most in demand in the healthcare sector. It was estimated that the global ‘needs-based shortage’ of health care workers is about 17.4 million in 2013, of which 9 million are nurses. In Southeast Asia alone demands 6.9 million from the total estimated numbers of 2013 and this expected to increase to 12.2 million by 2030 out of 17.4 million of global shortages (WHO, 2014; Buchan et al, 2019). Hence, the WHO and its development partners have recognized the rise in migration among healthcare professionals around the world as a phenomenon worthy of looking into (Buchan et al., 2017; WHO, 2016; Aluttis, 2014).

Regionally, the movement of health professionals has become a priority for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) governments, of which Cambodia is a member. One of ASEAN's ambitions is the economic integration, enshrined in its second pillar, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) where the region will transform into a single market and production base. Part of AEC's core objectives includes "free movement of skilled labour" where nursing is one of eight professions governed by a separate Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA). Hence, provisions for "skilled labour" as of now limited to the following eight professions (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015).

Table 1: MRAs of eight skilled professionals recognized in ASEAN

No.	Name of MRA	Date	Place
1	MRA on Engineering Services	9 December 2005	Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
2	MRA on Nursing Services	8 December 2006	Cebu, Philippines
3	MRA on Architectural Services	19 November 2007	Singapore
4	Framework Arrangement for the Mutual Recognition of Surveying Qualification	19 November 2007	Singapore
5	MRA Framework on Accountancy Services	26 February 2009	Cha-am, Thailand
	Subsequently amended as MRA on Accountancy Services	13 November 2014	Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar
6	MRA on Medical Practitioner	26 February 2009	Cha-am, Thailand
7	MRA on Dental Practitioner	26 February 2009	Cha-am, Thailand
8	MRA on Tourism Professionals	9 November 2012	Bangkok, Thailand

Source: ASEAN Service Report 2017, 30.

Through MRAs, ASEAN Member States (AMS) may recognize the quality of education and professional experience for these eight professions. If realized, all identified skilled people, including that of nurses, would be able to move freely within the ASEAN region. In turn, this would help professionals expand their career opportunities within the region (AEC Blueprint 2008).

At the fruition of the AEC, considerable attention reveals in the research fields on ASEAN MRAs on health sector have increased (medicine, dentistry and nursing). In them, several studies focus on the effectiveness of implementing MRA-NS and its importance role in boosting free movement of nurses in ASEAN. Findings point fingers at protectionism as a problem caused by disparities of each country's rules and regulations, healthcare development standard as well as qualification among health professionals in ASEAN (Koy 2016; Yoshifumi, 2015, Matsuno, 2016, Develyn, 2017, Yupin and Joko, 2015, Lockyer, 2015). However, there has been little research done to understand the perspectives of individual Cambodian nurses and relevant leaders from both public and private institutions who involved in managing health workers workforce.

Looking at the domestic dilemma, Cambodia is still struggling in having adequate health workers to serve its 16 million people. Shortages of health workforce in Cambodia have been an extreme problem since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 (Son and Witter, 2016). The problem remains vital for the country's health sector in education, administration as clinical backdrop (Fujita et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2019; Peat, 2013), furthering to the issues of 'undocumented' health personnel and skilled mixes (Sakunrai-Doi et al., 2014; NEA, 2018; Law et al., 2019; Tim & Heng 2014). The development of healthcare in Cambodia began with 45 surviving doctors (20 of those subsequently left the country), 26 pharmacists, 28 dentists and 728 medical students (Suy et al., 2017; So and Witter, 2016; International Council of Nurses 'ICN' 2017). Consequently, former student with 7-12 years of general education, were invited to join the rebuilding of the Cambodia health care system soon after 1979, while

doctors, experienced nurses and midwives were stationed at the state, provincial hospitals (So and Witter, 2016).

In recent years, there are noticeable increases in nursing programs at various well-established universities and private hospitals in Cambodia. Without regard to the increase in hospitals, health facilities and available educational programs for aspiring nurses did not live up to producing a sufficient healthcare workforce (So and Witter, 2016; Annear *et al.*, 2015). Even though there is a surplus of nursing graduates from private schools, this has only impacted the health staffing deficits to a small extent due to “uncertain standards” on the completion of its education (Law *et al.*, 2019).

The MRA-NS, which is the central focus of this thesis, was signed in 2006 by the economic ministers of ten ASEAN members. No surprise why the MRA-NS is being pursued. In Cambodia, nurses account for 46% of nearly 20,000 total health workers employed by Cambodia’s health ministry in 2012 (WHO, 2015; Suy *et al.*, 2017). According to Pachanee and Wibulpolprasert (2008), negotiations on MRA-NS have moved faster than the MRA on Medicine (2009) and the MRA on Dentistry (2009). Some AMS have already taken unilateral or bilateral approaches to obtain their own interests even before the signing of MRA-NS. Singapore, for instance, has made a unilateral decision recognizing qualified health workers from Myanmar and Thailand in order to cope with its internal shortages. Meanwhile, Indonesia and the Philippines were ‘aggressively’ negotiating bilaterally to facilitate the external movements of their health professionals.

Despite the fact that migration of health workers has long been a hot topic globally, Cambodia’s situation is that “there is little or no migration of health workers to or from other countries” (Annear *et al.*, 2015). So far, factors indicate movement of health personnel within the country, mostly from rural to urban areas and higher paid is the main reason (Chhea *et al.*, 2010; Matsuno 2009). Unexpectedly, Kanchanachitra *et al.*, (2011) was able to collect statistics of intra-ASEAN health workers work in the countries’ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Among AMS, while the Philippines, a champion of exporting nurses to these countries, surprisingly, there are 1,119 Cambodian nurses and 669

doctors also appearing on the same list. It can be concluded that the migration of Cambodian nurses is an unavoidable matter that will only grow.

After all, this study therefore determines that Cambodian nurses' working in ASEAN through the MRA framework will be more advantageous than disadvantageous. They will develop skills, experience working with different cultures and earn higher wages. Furthermore, their skills will be transferred to the domestic workplace upon their return. However, this study also predicts that the challenges of implementing the MRA-NS remain unless the policy implementation and collaboration between AMS is strong – nurses can enjoy their movement for work in ASEAN.

1.1 Problem Statement

In Cambodia, the Ministry of Health (MoH) is now in charge of approving the operations of nursing schools and nursing curricula along with the National Exit Examination for new graduates of nursing (JICA Report 2017). Another important institution in the nursing profession is the Cambodian Council of Nurses (CCN), which is responsible for i) developing the Code of Ethics for Nursing in Cambodia; and ii) holding nurses' performance accountable to its standards (CCN Website). Once registration with the CCN is done, Cambodian nurses can have broader access to job opportunities in the ASEAN single market – ten countries with over 600 million people.

To become a nurse students can choose the following: i) Primary Nursing program in 1-year (*this program is currently demolished as does not meet the ASEAN MRA-NS standards, according to the CCN*); ii) Associate Degree in Nursing program in 3-year (ADN); and iii) Bachelor on Sciences of Nursing (BSN) program in 4-year of study (Koy, 2013). No master and doctoral degree in nursing education in Cambodia, which reflects the quality of the country's nursing education (Koy, 2016). Despite the fact that the 4-year BSN program only recently began in 2008, 2013 produced the first cohort of bachelor nursing students as graduates (WHO, 2014: Human Resources for Health – Cambodia's Country Profiles).

As part of the move with the AEC, the ambiguous motive of the Cambodian government is not only to serve the domestic demand but part of the regional economic integration. Particularly, the MoH considers the implementation and facilitation of MRA-NS as an opportunity that will potentially boost both the public and private health labour markets (SHP 2016-2020).

The Cambodian health market is expanding over time and has a wide variety of providers. Two-thirds of public health staff also works privately (World Bank, 2013d). Non-governmental organisation run health facilities and charitable hospitals also provide services. As healthcare services are persistently demand, health facilities keep growing and that adequate health professionals are equally needed. The total number of health staff for the public sector employed by the MoH was 18,096 in 2008 and has jumped to 20,954 in 2015 (HSP 2016-2020). Among 20,954 health personnel, 46% of nurses were employed nationwide (WHO, 2016). For health facilities in the private sector, the 3,755 in 2009 increased to 8,488 formal private providers in 2015 (pharmacies are not included). Despite unavailability of data indicating the size of the health workforce working at these private providers, the number of the nursing-care room has been increased from 758 in 2009 to 3,392 in 2015 (HSP 2016-2020).

Zooming into policy responses for the sustainability of international migration of health workers, Buchan *et al.*, (2019) suggested health leaders and policymakers “to view the health workforce as an investment rather than a cost.” They further stated that “health is labour intensive, but investment in the health workforce can be an economic multiplier” (Buchan *et al.*, 2019). In fact, the migration of nurses has been viewed as an opportunity to scaling up the domestic talent pool and to expand the career potential for its nursing graduates. For example, a policy promoting international nurse placement programs by the Chinese government with Singapore and Saudi Arabia (Fang, 2007; Matsuno, 2009).

Cambodia can absorb benefits from the migration of its skilled labour workforce. The bigger question is how ready the country is, or whether it is “still in the early stages of managing labour migration” (IOM Report, 2010). Since the migration of health workers is “inevitable in

an increasingly globalised world economy,” as advised by experts, policymakers need to recognise and plan ahead in responding to the current and future dynamism of health worker migration (Zarocostas, 2006; Owusu, 2017).

While the MRA-NS was signed 13-year ago, facilitation of the free flow of intra-ASEAN nurses remains a work “in progress” (Jurje & Lavenex, 2014; ASEAN 2009). At the minimum, initiative on nursing registration is on the move. As reported by Funkunaga (2015), 55 intra-ASEAN nurses were registered as foreign nurses in other AMS (Brunei Darussalam: 50, Vietnam: 5). Singapore appears to have high numbers in registered nurses, with 5,400 intra-nurses were registered and 2,200 enrolled at the Singapore Nursing Board. Still, these records did not expressly link to the MRA-NS. If MRA-NS works, nurses would be able to move for work freely. This would help them to expand their career opportunities within ASEAN and ultimately transfer their new skills and knowledge to Cambodia upon their return. Joko and Yupin (2015) recalled that MRA is not only for nurse migration physically, but also for knowledge and information transfer for best practice – these solely comply with the objectives of MRA-NS.

However, there is no sufficient data on whether Cambodia is addressing international mobility of health workers, despite the country’s health care system and services’ gradual improvement (WHO 2014). Thus, it is unclear how widely nurses migrate for work abroad and to what extent it inspires Cambodian nurses and additionally whether they are aware of how their skilled professional is not only just local, but also the regional and world job market. The available studies show very little knowledge on both the emigration and immigration of nurses in Cambodia.

Migration of Cambodian nurses is an unavoidable matter that will only grow albeit the internal shortages of health workforce at the public health sector. This study explores a specific problem about labour migration in ASEAN context, which has direct implications on the health sector in one of the poorest ASEAN countries, like Cambodia. It will also document collaboration and harmonization among the AMS and finally add new research to the existing studies and provide evidence to inform policy-makers in the Cambodian government.

2. Research Objectives

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how MRA-NS benefits Cambodian nurses. In particular, the study aims to look at two realms: the mobility of Cambodian nurses for work within ASEAN and to advocate for policy implementation in order to promote freer flow of nurses, inclusive skill development and harmonization of exporting Cambodian nurses to ASEAN.

This thesis hopes to help the Cambodian society in terms of preparing its citizens that are working in the healthcare industry in how to benefit from the determined ASEAN policy. Moreover, it will be able to shed light and provide an understanding to the unequal development across Southeast Asia and how the region can brace for a united holistic growth where no country is left behind.

3. Research Questions

By looking at the current situation of the nursing industry in Cambodia, the study wishes to answer, 'How would Cambodian nurses benefit from the MRA-NS? The following *sub-questions* will also be discussed:

1. From their personal views, what are the motives and challenges Cambodian nurses encounter under the MRA-NS framework?
2. What does the Cambodian government need to do to successfully enable Cambodian nurses to migrate for work in ASEAN?
3. What policy changes or improvements are needed for Cambodian nurses to have better access to medical jobs within ASEAN?

4. Literature Review

4.1 MRA-NS Working System and Challenges

Previous studies by Yoshifumi, (2015), Rynhart, & Chang, (2014) and Yukie (2014) explained that there is no significant amount of mobility among Cambodian nurses despite the presence of MRA framework in Cambodia, similar to some ASEAN Member States (AMS) except Singapore and Malaysia (Sarah & Adam (2014); Dovelyn and Guntur (2017); Virya, K. (2015). On an

individual state level, the Cambodian Council for Nurses (CCN) was created in 2007; a year after MRA-NS was signed by the AMS. The role of this institution is to develop the Code of Ethics in Nursing in Cambodia in order to regulate the nursing education system, and to observe all of its work performances and compliances of the Codes of Ethics (CCN, 2019).

Nevertheless, the progress and process of how Cambodian nursing profession has been registered under the MRA framework has been covered in the literature, particularly those authors who wrote on the matter of MRA-NS like Law et al., (2019), Joko & Yupin, 2015; Koy, 2015; Dovelyn & Guntur (2017); and Yoshifumi, 2015).

Given the research problem identified in this thesis, difficulties in implementing the MRA prove to be a continuous challenge due to the fact that each AMS have different education as well as migration systems and standards. Therefore, each AMS was encouraged to revise its domestic regulations and policies to effectively match and comply with the ASEAN eight MRAs agreement framework (Chia, S.Y., 2013; Sugiyarto and Aguinas, 2014).

Aside from differences in regulation, another influential factor pointed out by the same authors is protectionism that prevalent in most AMS which causes the slowing down of mobility. In particular, the issue of losing jobs to foreigners by not protecting local nurses (Yoshifumi 2015, Yupin, 2015, Koy, 2016; Law et al., 2019; ADBI, 2014). While ASEAN MRAs are being implemented, various forms of restrictions in some countries transpired. In fact, cross-sectorial quantitative restrictions are common in the Mekong region countries. In Vietnam for instance, limits on the number of full-time foreign workers in a firm is set to three percent, while Thailand caps the number at five foreign workers per firm. Cambodia on the other hand sets its restrictions to ten percent (Manning and Sidorenko, 2007). Such figures of quantitative restrictions are not limited only to the healthcare sector. They also limit foreign hospitals to establish themselves in the local market, as they are unable to recruit sufficient local health workers with the necessary level of skills (Yeoh et al., 2014).

4.2 Diversity of Social Cultural Dimensions

Another factor that causes an ineffective implementation of the MRA-NS which in turn slows down the process of mobility of nurses is the diversity of social cultural dimensions (Yoshifumi, 2015, Matsuno, 2016, Dovelyn, 2017, Yupin and Joko, 2015, Virya, 2016). Inside this factor

includes three aspects which are distinct in education standards among the different nationals, disparities in the level of development within the ten AMS and overall general cultural differences. These authors gave strong emphasis on cultural differences in their studies. The focus matters involved languages, religious background and demographics within ASEAN. This aspect has been raised by the authors, explaining another barrier to slow down the implementation of the ASEAN MRAs.

4.3 Beneficiary and Competitiveness V. Brain Drain to Brain Circulation

The benefits to be received and the competitiveness of the healthcare industry should also be considered. The previous studies by (Yoshifumi, 2015, Yukie, 2014, Matsuno, 2016, Sakurai-Doi et al. 2014, Develyn, 2017; Kanchanachitra et al., 2011), demonstrate general benefits of nurse migrants. First is that the host countries gain increased productivity and efficiency, supplemented by a list of regionally qualified individuals. Second, countries of origin would be able to benefit from the new skills brought in by nurses when they return home, while remittances thus help their own economy, as well as reducing poverty and unemployment rates. Lastly, individual nurse migrant would be able to learn new skills and gain working experience which in turn will improve his or her living conditions and conditions for their family members at their country of origin. Their contribution to the country of origin is not only reducing poverty, socioeconomic but the building of quality of human capital among their family members.

The transforming concept of brain drain to brain circulation was identified in the following literature. This matter has been widely understood particularly that the sending country loses their most valuable skilled workforce, the receiving country increases productivity. This can become a political agenda point (Tim & Heng, 2014), while at the loss and the gains are not well managed beforehand by taking into account of qualified professionals also sees the value of regional job market (Matsuno, 2016, Develyn, 2017, Manning, 2007). The ability to see better opportunities outside their borders should be taken as an investment opportunity rather than a losing game. A number of studies reveal both negative and positive effects. The negative effects are mainly brought about by mismanagement of the labour force (ADBI, 2014). In the case of Philippines for example, Matsuno refers to a report that the negative impacts that its

healthcare system is facing is due to the lack of doctors and nurses because they have left the country. In this case, over 3,000 private clinics and public hospitals were closed down.

A number of scholars have argued that the brain drain phenomenon may have positive aspects which are important to be included in this chapter of the study. They similarly agreed on the hypothesis of the 'beneficial brain drain' model is where prospects of migration to a developed country to seek greater employment, income and professional career opportunities create incentives for the population remaining at home will lead to an increase in their investments in human capital to the level at which the human capital supply losses to emigration are offset by the gains in migration-induced investments at home (Stark, 2004; Stark et al., 1997, 1998; Vidal, 1998; Mountford, 1997; Beine et al., 2001, 2003; Khwaja and Scaramozzino, 2003; Kuhn and McAusland, 2006). Among them, scholar Beine conducted various studies on the topic of skilled labour migration in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2006.

The ultimate conclusion out of all those studies confirms the initial findings where it says that emigration of educated persons positively and significantly induces additional investment in human capital, and this, in turn, has a positive impact on economic growth in the developing countries (Jackson, 2005). The shift from brain drain to brain gain appeared in various terms such as 'knowledge transfer', 'knowledge exchange', and 'knowledge circulation' (Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer and Brown, 1999). It was viewed as beneficial by Harris and Schmitt, 2011). People who cannot adjust or are not successful in their host country will either go back to their home country or go to another to continue their profession. Therefore, "human capital may increase in the source country even in the presence of Brain Drain". Furthermore, the two authors explain that skilled workers who immigrated to another country can provide the means for foreign direct investments since they know their home country better than the foreign workers there.

4.4 Nurse Migration Theories with Push and Pull Factors

Push and pull factors are also used in discussing migration issues. The concept is still popular in migration literature, including the migration of nurses and other health professionals. However, there were few researches only that have been done on the case of Cambodia.

According to Haour-Knipe (2008), health worker migration often starts with internal mobility from rural to urban areas or from the public to the private sector and then moves to countries of increasing levels of development. Hence, the process of movement will start from within, or intra-state before it will become inter-state. In this regard, Massey et al., (1993) suggests that individual rational actors decide to migrate because of a cost-benefit calculation that leads them to expect a positive net return from the chosen movement. Hence, a huge factor in the decision is usually monetary, major reason reasons in pull factor and the demand of qualified skills of individual migrants. According to Massey, these theories suggest that people move to geographical spaces where they can be most productive, based on their skills.

4.5 Case Study: Filipino's Nurse Migration

An important part of the reviewed literature is to also look at the case of another healthcare professional exporting country within the region. The Filipino healthcare contingent often migrates to countries like Saudi Arabia, the US, the UK, and the United Arab Emirates (Philippines Overseas Employment Administration). Unlike other ASEAN countries, the Philippines' nursing curriculum has been modelled after US nursing programs since the time of previous colonial rule and made it possible with English speaking ability. Being able to speak English allowed them to easily get jobs in the global job market (Matsuno, 2009). As a result, the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) remits almost US\$8 billion annually, which is equal to 10% of the Philippines' GDP (Philip, M. et al., 2004). Such income can improve the economic status of migrant families while also having a positive effect on the Philippines's infrastructure development and ultimately made them become a new "new hero" for the country (ILO-WP.236, 2006).

Apart from the above positive aspects, Filipino nurses' migration also encounter crucial downsides. For instance, the recent upsurge in the demand for nurses abroad and opportunities for permanent emigration to the US resulted in Filipino doctors retraining as nurses in order to seek overseas employment as nurses (ILO-WP. 236, 2006). Roughly 2,000 and 3,000 doctors in 2001 and 2003 were retrained as so-called nurse medics. These nurse medics sought to take advantage of opportunities open to nurse migrants.

The experience in the Philippines illustrates the complex interactions between global demand and domestic supply and demand (ILO-WP. 236, 2006; Philip, M. et al., 2004). Consequently, the Philippines thus hampered by its low capability to employ the new nurses inside their country it has now produced a surplus. A survey of 200 public and private hospitals found that administrators had little difficulty recruiting nurses with less than a year's experience, but had more difficulty recruiting experienced nurses, particularly in private hospitals, which offered lower wages on average than did public hospitals (Perrin ME, et al., 2007). This remarkable challenge that the Philippines faced from the loosing of a large proportion of the nursing workforce to other countries led to the closing down of 10% of 2,500 public hospitals in the country due to the lack of doctors and nurses. Likewise, private hospitals and clinics faced the same problem due to 1,000 out of 1,700 hospitals are reported to have closed down (Matsuno, A. 2009).

4.6 Conclusion

The implementing MRA-NS remains working 'in progress' on domestic regulations. Most studies recommend that the AMS pushes harder on the implementation of MRAs. It is said that this should be done through an important consideration, increasing collaboration and information sharing (Law. et al., 2019; Guntur and Develyn, 2014; Chia, 2013; Yoshifumi, 2015, Matsuno, 2016). Majority of the studies have similarly reasoned that what motivates health workers to migrate in another country include opportunities to develop their profession, career advancement, and improved quality of life. Studies about benefits and competitiveness have demonstrated the connection between productivity and efficiency supplemented by skilled professional like qualified nurses. Issues involved culture diversities in ASEAN were also identified. Evident on cultural differences i.e. language and religious background among ASEAN nations gives insights on policy preparedness in facilitating the free movement of workers. The ultimate goal is to build harmonization in ASEAN community via understanding and accepting the needs based on such differences.

5. Methodology

5.1 Research Design

This is a descriptive and exploratory research with a qualitative analysis approach. In order to analyse two-sided perspectives (nurses and decision-makers) over the implementation of MRA-NS, the author utilizes mixed methods: survey questionnaire of practising nurses and nursing students (hereafter called 'Nursing group') and interview of selected policy and decision-makers as well as leaders of public and private institutions who are in charge of domestic labour force and nursing education as well as nursing professional field (hereafter called 'Informant group').

For the survey, the designed questions of the Nursing group is to access their general knowledge, perspectives, and working experience involves MRA-NS and also to understand level of their satisfaction/motivation on free access to the regional job market. Five following groups of nursing individuals include (1) Cambodian nursing students (public and private); (2) Cambodian practicing nurses who are working in Cambodia (public and private); (3) Cambodian practicing who works under MRA-NS in other 09 ASEAN countries; (4) Intra-ASEAN nurses who work under MRA framework in Cambodia; and (5) Cambodian nurses who quit nursing profession.

For the interview, the fundamental aims of interviewing Informant group is to measure the effectiveness of the implementation of MRA-NS and to further understand the level of obstacles and the influence on the successful implementation of the project. There are seven Key informants were selected based on their high level positions within public and private entities involved in nurse education and qualification, employment, migration/labour force and also their involvement in ASEAN affairs.

5.2 Research Implementation

The survey employs questions (on average 20 questions, both Khmer and English) prepared by the author and is conducted using Google Forms. Before the survey link was sent to the Nursing group, it was tested beforehand for structures and wording with approximately ten colleagues familiar with the nursing profession. It took participants approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. To handle the survey, the author first submitted letters and other necessary documents (Khmer and English) to both public and private health institutions and universities located in Phnom Penh city.

Ethically, since the survey address health professions, it is required that the author seeks approval from the National Ethics Committee for Health Research (NECHR) of Cambodia's health ministry. After receiving approval from the NECHR, the author then revisited some of those public and private health institutions/facilities to hand in the 'Approval letter' form the ministry and arrange the conduct of the survey. Followed-up via phone calls, emails, and personal visits have been made. Additionally, to recruit participants the author directly contacted with respondents and asked them to further connect with others Nursing group, where names, contact information of their graduate mates or colleagues were given to extend the size of participations in the survey. Moreover, with the active support from some friends in Cambodia, the author was able to send out the prepared key messages as well as the survey link (via media outlets i.e. Facebook private message and Gmail accounts) to the targeted groups, especially practising nurses who are working at the private hospitals/clinics and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

On the conduct of in-depth interviews, the author request each of the Informant group was done via submitting letters and email expressing purpose with pre-set questions. The interviews were executed face-to-face in the workplace of each individual Informant group located in Phnom Penh, previously scheduled by visiting, phone calls, emails, text/voice messages to the contact persons and/or the person to be interviewed depending on their

availability. Exceptionally, an interview was conducted in Bangkok, Thailand due to the time constraint.

5.3 Data Collection

Collection of data from both the interview and survey was performed throughout July to October 2019, with the use of intentional sampling, considering as inclusion criteria: individual nursing group for the survey and leadership role from the public and private institutions involved with labour and nursing migration are for the interview. The survey questionnaire is not for comparing between the completed groups due to the use of different measurement tools (different questionnaires were based on the various backgrounds of participations consist in the Nursing group). An empirical modelling was used for this focused group in order to explore the perspectives of regional job market for nurses and to examine the dynamics as well as implication of the overseas/cross-border mobility of nurses. As a result, the total respondents to the survey are 139 and the details are listed in the table below:

Table 2: Nursing group (participant affiliations)

Group No.	No. of Part.	Description of the Five Nursing Group	From (workplaces/universities)
1	61	Cambodian nursing students (public and private universities/schools)	Two universities – one public (University of Health Science) and one private (University of Puthisastra)
2	68	Cambodian practicing nurses (those working for public hospitals and those who are working for private hospitals or work at their own clinics)	Some participants are from the public hospitals – one in particular is ‘Khmer-Soviet Friendship Hospital’. The rest of participants are from the private hospitals/facilities and NGOs.
3	N/A*	Cambodian practicing who works under MRA-NS in other 09 ASEAN countries	N/A
4	02	Intra-ASEAN nurses who work under MRA framework in Cambodia	N/A
5	08	Cambodian nurses who quit the nursing profession and are currently working outside of the health sector	N/A

Notes: *Not applicable/available

For the interview, there were 07 interviewees was accomplished – each took between 30 to 40 minutes. The table below is a list of Key Informants who participated in the interview:

Table 3: Informant group (participant affiliations)

No.	Name of Interviewee	Institution/Department	Position
1	H.E. Sok Siphana	The Royal Government of Cambodia	Advisor
2	Dr. Touch Sokneang	Human Resource Department, MoH	Director
3	Mr. Un San	Cambodian Council for Nurses (CCN)	President
4	Ms. Ouch Cheachanmolika	National Employment Agency (NEA), MLVT	Deputy Director General
	Mr. Kea Sereyvuth		Consultant
5	Mr. Chhum Khoeun	Department of Standards and Curriculum, TVET-MLVT	Deputy Director
6	Mr. Ouk Savuth	Department of Employment and Manpower (DEM), MLVT	Deputy director
7	AndreaBurke Ryan	Nursing Network Faculty and Nursing Department, University of Puthisastra (UP)	Dean/Head of Department

Of seven interviews, two were made in English (interview with government advisor and head of nursing faculty at private university) and the rest were made in the Khmer language. Six out of seven interviews were recorded, transcribed and subsequently translated from Khmer to English. One interview record was made as observation notes, not via audio recording, as requested by an interviewee. On another separate note, there were *two* interviewees from NEA-MLVT: one was a Deputy director General and another is a consultant. The semi-structured interview technique was applied. Selection of portions contains in the interview

transcripts will be used in the thesis for quotations, citations, fragments of the accounts of the interviewees.

5.4 Scope and Limitations

The author was unable to have Cambodian nurses working in other ASEAN countries complete the survey due to the *privacy concerns* of the employers abroad. The absence of accounts in this group makes it impossible to reveal Cambodian nurses' experiences of living and working abroad and also to understand how they were treated under MRA-NS as well as their future plans on returning home.

Future research should therefore include the viewpoints of Cambodian nurses working abroad, since their experience will be valuable for the development process of the nursing profession in Cambodia. An in-depth interview with intra-ASEAN nurses would be useful to dig into the insights of their experience of being engaged in the MRA-NS framework. Most importantly, the researcher will be able to find out how those intra-ASEAN nurse were hired and under which national bodies of the host country the hiring took place. Lastly, a full research would have also required travel in different ASEAN countries which was not feasible in the time frame I faced. This gap should be closed in a follow up study based, which might be sponsored by a government body or NGO(s).

5.5 Ethical Issues

The survey project was submitted to the National Ethics Committee for Health Research (NECHR), MoH, and the request was approved. Throughout the period of the data collection process, the consent of the participants and the Informed Consent Term were requested, following the norms of *No. 213 NECHR*, which deals with the guidelines involving health research. In order to guarantee identity confidentiality, the names of the participants were not included in the survey questionnaire, followed by possibilities for participants to disregard the survey, to skip questions, to edit and delete their responses if later participants lost interest in the providing information via filling in the survey form. The ethic of interview is a separate

set of guideline guided by Mero-Jaffe (2011). One interviewee among seven Informant group refused the use of audio recording. Thus, observation notes were made instead of transcription of his interview.

6. Findings and Analysis

How the MRA-NS benefits Cambodian nurses is the central point of this thesis. The author hopes to help the Cambodian society prepare its citizens, particularly nurses that are working in the healthcare industry, to benefit from the established ASEAN single market. This study employs survey questionnaires for various nursing groups and in-depth interviews with a group of selected key informants.

6.1 Survey of the Nursing Group

The result of the survey presents views of 139 participants named as the Nursing group, who participated in the four out of five groups of the survey questionnaires. The author unable to cover a survey of one group, which is the Cambodian nurses who are currently working in other nine ASEAN countries as it initially intended.

The result from the survey has demonstrated that many Cambodian nurses are interested to work under the framework of MRA-NS and also to work abroad in other ASEAN countries. Most of them are motivated by the opportunity in personal capacity building, financial benefit, and better work environment. Among the three answers, building their personal capacity stands the top choice. Such accounts demonstrate how resilient of individual nurses could be in building their professionalism in nursing through valuing education and skills in the nursing profession. In sum, they valued building of personal capacity more than financial benefit or better work environment.

Most importantly, many of them have very limited knowledge about MRA-NS in general (down from existence of MRA-NS, criteria of being qualified, up to the benefits under this framework).

This by itself, indicate a lack of clear information and management and/or limited dissemination by the national nursing authorities.

6.1.1 Result from Cambodian nursing students (public and private schools)

Based on the responses from the 61 Cambodian nursing students in Phnom Penh capital (See, APPENDEX-1), 80% have thought of working abroad but 77% never heard about the MRA-NS, while 80% do not even know the criteria of being recognized as qualified a nurse under the MRA-NS. Similarly, when asked if the students know what the benefits are for Cambodian nurses under the MRA-NS – 76.4% say “I don’t know”. When asked about what additional professional skills they would like to develop to improve their employment potential in the regional job market, interestingly only 39 out of 61 respondents responded and their chosen answer was in favour of nursing skills.

There is a high hope on the effective implementation of the MRA-NS. 75% of nursing students says that they are interested to work under the framework of MRA-NS. However, information about accessing the job market must improve – 61% of nursing students say “I don’t know” how to access the regional job market for nursing services, with 39% saying that they know and over 82% out of 39% choosing means to look for job via “Internet online sources”; 24% via “Relevant authorities”; 17% via “Personal connections”.

Ideally, about 80% of Cambodian nursing students are interested both in working under the MRA-NS as well as exploring work experience abroad. However, they proved to have very little about the MRA-NS. Since the purpose of the survey is to allow nursing groups raising their voices, their comments seem to reflect the overall result of nurses having limited knowledge about the MRA-NS and this indicates a lack of information.

6.1.2 Result from Cambodian nurses (work in Cambodia)

This group represents the highest number of participants among the other three. Accounts were given by 68 Cambodian practicing nurses who are working in Cambodia in public and

private hospitals, NGOs, and clinics (See, APPENDEX-2). There are more than 65% of respondents who are working in public hospitals. The responses reveal that 46% of them are satisfied with the salary, while 37% are not. However over 50% intend to switch between working with the public and private hospital or NGOs, with 81% choosing “Personal capacity building” as the reason. When asked if they ever thought of working abroad, 68% say “Yes”. However, 68% of respondents say they don’t know how to access the regional job market and almost 50% raise a concern about language when working abroad. Most importantly, 68% of respondents say they never heard of MRA-NS and almost 88% are unaware of its benefits. Additionally, while 81% would seek a job through “Internet online sources” 43% would do through “Personal Connections” and less than 10% refers to “Relevant national authorities”.

While some respondents commented that MRA-NS “is a great way to exchange technical expertise in promoting more successful nursing services” (*Cambodian nurses, comment #9*), others suggested as follows: “Should promote more of mutual recognition arrangement of nurse in the ASEAN single market” (*Cambodian nurses, comment #2*). Concerns over the readiness of Cambodian nurses were also raised: “...MRA-NS is great. But Cambodians [are] not ready yet... due to the limit of professional skills, social and foreign language...many Cambodian will lose job. So, I don't want [this framework] right now and [we] may need a long time to develop our human resource” (*Cambodian nurse, comment #12*).

6.1.3 Result from Cambodian nurses who quit the nursing profession

There are eight Cambodian nurses who quit the nursing profession and are currently working outside of health sector who provided some accounts through the survey (See, APPENDEX-3). Selected accounts show that 50% are not satisfied with their salary and low income was the major reason for them to quit the nursing profession. While 62% of them thought of working abroad, however, 57% never heard about MRA-NS.

To further understand their future work life, a question on resuming the nursing profession was asked. 50% of them responded that they do not wish to resume their nursing profession.

However, “income wise” has been clearly expressed and therefore indicated as the main motivation to bring them back to work in the field of nursing. Another encouraging tool comes from the backing from family and the state.

6.1.4 Result from intra-ASEAN nurses (work in Cambodia)

There are only two participants who completed the survey: one from Brunei and another from Myanmar (See, APPENDIX-4). Despite this small number it would be incorrect to conclude that there are limited numbers of intra-ASEAN nurses in Cambodia. As mentioned above, privacy concerns of the private hospitals are most likely the cause preventing participation of a larger group. Nevertheless, accounts given by this specific group are particularly significant because they reveal the nurses’ experiences of living and working abroad and also help to understand: how they were treated under MRA-NS; their future plans on returning home; and how they expect to be treated after their return.

Among two respondents, one of the two was hired under the condition of MRA-NS while the other one was hired by a company. When asked why they chose Cambodia as their current working place, gaining “New experience” is their chosen answer and the prospect countries for their future movement after Cambodia: one chose Laos and the other chose Singapore. The two respondents learned about their current jobs: one via “Online sources” and one via “Personal connections”. Interestingly, when asked about what are the benefits of working in Cambodia, one chose “Financial benefit” and the other one chose “Better work environment. One respondent scaled 80% showing that MRA-NS benefit their current employment status by providing “some administrative support,” and another has answered with an unintelligible abbreviation, unfortunately.

6.2 Interview of Informant Group

Overall, the general outcomes of the interview, particularly on how the MRA-NS benefits Cambodian nurses lies on the preparation process substantially on the registration and recognition of qualification at the domestic levels. The interviews display clear inherent

problems of the MRA-NS as well as barriers of implementation. Despite expressing optimistic views towards the free movement of skilled labour – both sending and receiving, some challenges and concerns have also raised by the relevant authorities of the Cambodia government.

6.2.1 Views of Decision-makers on Sending and Receiving Skilled Workers

From the Cambodian government side, important answers regarding expectations MRA-NS are including job creation, exchange skills, filling the gaps of needed skills among AMS and improving living conditions of the Cambodian people and thus generating benefits from the ASEAN economic integration (H.E. Sok Siphana, Mr. Chhum Khoeurn; Mr. Ouk Savuth; Mr. Un San, Dr. Touch Sokneang). Similarly, through this expectation, it means also the ability of Cambodia nurses working abroad and transferring money to their families.

6.2.2 Benefits of MRA-NS

The Cambodia government have always proved its commitment to facilitate the free movement of nurses through contributing to a numbers of achievements lies in preparation stage. Many legal and policies documents have been produced, together with setting up specific bodies to responsible on the nursing regulatory; nursing education and registration have evidently developed. Because of the MRA-NS, attention to better quality of nursing education is ensured. For instance, the 1-year primary Nursing program has now eliminated. According the CCN, the MoH has decided to do so as this program does not meet the ASEAN MRA-NS standards. Through this tremendous effort, nursing curriculums have now been amended with the aim to have equivalent quality health education, hence, high standard of health services to integrate into the ASEAN's competitive world.

6.2.3 Challenges and Concerns over Employment Security

Clearly, the MRA-NS framework has a good intention to meet the interests of intra-ASEAN migrant nurses, with most importantly ensuring their qualification standards. However, the

problem is the implementation stage. First of all, the overall knowledge of MRA-NS appears to be low and the free movement of nurses should be properly recorded. The three key institutions: Cambodian Council for Nurses (CCN); Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training (MLVT); and Ministry of Health (MoH) have similar knowledge that the MRA-NS is in working progress. All seven key informants personally learned that nurses mobilized internally and externally but have no official records on their movements. Except the accounts from the government advisor, H.E. Sok Siphana, the rest of key informants have raised similar concerns over the lack of data management capacity in their respective institutions i.e. data system managing of the movement of labour and/or nursing workforce both inflow and outflow.

Once again this demonstrates that all relevant government institutions in Cambodia do not have a reliable data basis about migrant workers (inflow, outflow) in general but also no data basis about MRA and nurses migration. If they do not have a data basis it becomes clear: a) they cannot make a proper assessment about MRA-NS; b) they cannot implement a proper management of MRA-NS. This of course could change in future. That means when Cambodia is really well equipped (qualification, education of nurses) it can send big numbers of nurses to other ASEAN countries under the MRA-NS framework. This is still a work 'in progress,' unfortunately. Because (i) education of nurses in Cambodia has still many shortcomings (interview of Ms. Andrea, private university); (ii) Cambodian government lack the management structure, organization (not even a data base is available).

There is an innovative idea by MRA of free movement of labour that all stakeholders could benefit (Mr. Ouk Ravuth, MLVT). But for Cambodia as one of the poorest ASEAN countries the benefits are far more difficult to achieve comparing to the rich ASEAN countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei), because if the poor countries open the labour market, even high skilled nurses tend to go to the higher paid jobs in richer countries. This is a problem of brain drain to be considered. Plus, Cambodia has currently only one nurse for more than 1,000 people.

One can argue that on the other hand Cambodian nurses who work abroad can benefit by qualification and in general for the society by transferring income to their families, bring back

to the country of new skills they learned from their work abroad, and the saving they made help them some of them become entrepreneurs or build their own small enterprises. To that end, all these financial benefits are not only helping themselves, their family members but assisting the country to fight against poverty in Cambodia (Interviews of H.E. Sok Siphana, Government advisor).

On the health sector, a very thoughtful answer from the MoH and a head of human resource for health workforce shows fear of brain drain but also acknowledged that migration of health workers seems to be unstoppable as people would go for higher paid. In her view, she says: *“I do not like the idea that we should send our workers to work abroad. We should increase our human resource productivity to strengthen our health care service to serve the people in our country. But, we cannot resist this trend...[for instance] high salaries [can be their motivation]”* (Dr. Touch Sokneang, MoH).

While MoH does not have data system to manage our human sources, the three key departments of MLVT raised the same problem in managing the general country’s labour workforce. That means the whole MRA is ‘flying in the dark’ as far as nobody exactly knows how many Cambodian nurses are working abroad in ASEAN countries and therefore how seriously the possible brain drain is.

6.2 Argument

The results from survey of the Nursing Group and interview of seven Informants, the author argues that the benefits to Cambodian nurses from the MRA-NS have as yet been minimal due to institutional constraints and nurses’ low self-efficacy.

A. Nurses’ low self-efficacy (ability and confidence)

The benefits to Cambodian nurses from the MRA-NS have as yet been minimal due to institutional constraints and nurses’ low self-efficacy. Overall, the result of the survey demonstrates that Cambodian nurses are having i) limited knowledge on MRA-NS but

interested to work under the system; ii) they are concern over the lower education standard, lack of experience, language barriers, working far from home and losing jobs to foreign experienced nurses if the MRA-NS is fully implemented at this stage; and iii) however, their primarily intention for them to go work abroad is for their capacity building, while financial aims stands the second (self-resilient).

It is clear that personal knowledge and motivation for Cambodian nurses to work abroad is implausible. Despite the fact that international migration of health personnel – especially nurses – is a long-standing phenomenon, this is not visible to Cambodian nurses based on the outcomes of the survey of this study. First, many of them did not know the regional job market as an option that is planned by the ASEAN leaders. Second, competency matter though education and practicum standards. Third, improved information sharing as stated in the MRA-NS, in particular on job market at the regional level as well as up-to-date info on MRA-NS is another important factor to keep the framework remain relevant. Cambodian nurses seek skills development and better pay. However, concerns over language, qualification, facing legal issues, and lack of experience were raised. Cambodian nurses seek skills development and better pay. However, concerns over language, qualification, facing legal issues, and lack of experience were raised.

The above temptation can be assumed that Cambodian nurses are of their self-resilient versus, however, low self-efficacy. Improved self-confidence and trust on domestic health regulations is the forefront target to build on. Furthermore, good collaboration between the ASEAN health authorities in order to bargain/count on education and clinical practice is very plausible i.e. the bridging program between Cambodian and Thailand (Koto-Shimada et al., 2016).

B. Institutional constraints

Problems often raised and/or issues raised in accounts are: i) Lack of a clear database of nursing migration; ii) lack of management resources in the Cambodian government bodies in

charge of MRA-NS; iii) limited financial and technical resources to operate institutional bodies as well as conduct promotion activities on MRA-NS.

One primary reason is that the capacity of domestic health system is not strong enough to be trusted by its local patients because of institutional constraints. Only 15% of Cambodian patients use public health services and over 70% prefers to use private health facilities and those who are healthier would choose to take their treatments at the neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore or Malaysia. Meanwhile, density of health workers in Cambodia appears at the lowest level even comparing with the CMLV countries (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam). On the funding issue, the Cambodia's health expenditure is much lower comparing to those in other nine ASEAN countries. Nursing education, on the other hand, appears to be limited in allowing private universities to take control on competency-based curriculum for their own nursing schools. In addition to the perception of being a nurse is both low pay and play a second/assistant role to the doctor – all these caused a dramatic decline in nursing enrolment in most recent years.

Last but not least, there is not sufficient policy infrastructure to support the emigration of Cambodian nurses and organize their repatriation in a way that benefits them and/or the Cambodian health system. This is a serious problem affecting the investment by the private universities in Cambodia and leads to a consideration of closing down nursing faculty if there is no progress being made.

As stated above, nursing migration has become a popular phenomenon and issues encompass management of healthcare professionals are remain heated debates at the global level down to individual country around the world. Many may argue that allowing Cambodian nurses to leave and work abroad will further reduce its domestic healthcare quality that is still so much to be improved. This ultimately brings the country's health care un-saveable. This is very likely to be true given that Cambodian government seems to ignore the fact that migration of nurses is inevitable if it not sooner, it will be later. Finally, it is clear that emigration of Cambodian nurses generates both negative and positive impact given level of attention and well-

preparedness by RGC and many nurses are being informed about general aspects in working abroad.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

The hypothesis presumed that MRA-NS will benefit Cambodian nurses in terms of their having opportunities to have better pay and develop skills which they will bring back to their home country and help improve the country's healthcare quality. What the study found is that for various reasons it is still too early for Cambodian nurses to gain any significant benefits from the MRA-NS. There is no sufficient infrastructure to support the emigration of Cambodian nurses and organize their repatriation in a way that benefits them and/or the Cambodian health system. Currently migration of nurses from Cambodia is unregulated and not systematically supported; this is more detrimental than beneficial for the nurses' professional development and job satisfaction.

Based on the result of the research, the minimal benefits from the MRA-NS to Cambodian nurses at this stage is due to institutional constraints and nurses' low self-efficacy. The author offers three potential levels where improved support for nursing migration can be achieved: i) nurses' improved competence and job-seeking skills; ii) an enabling regulatory environment for Cambodian nurses to be well-informed about aspects of working abroad; and iii) enhancing regional cooperation and harmonization of employment standards. Putting it in other words, the author determines that enhancing the three key points – they are:

1. Preparing appropriate strategies for sending and receiving migration of skilled labour could benefit overall by the MRA agreement in the longer run. Besides having appropriate policies in place, attention to dissemination of such policies is identically important.
2. Creating friendly environment for skills development as well as promoting job market for nurses: i) Embracing the enthusiasm of nurses to continue to learn could increase enrolment at nursing schools; ii) Building partnership will build trust in the nursing profession; and iii) Integrating knowledge of job seeking both within and outside of Cambodia as early as possible to the students even during their high school education. The government should also encourage the improved building of nursing clinical and practicum skills, language ability, promoting access to regional job market as well as

knowledge on social and cultural sensitivity. While some of mechanisms should be initiated by the government, the rest falls to the individual nursing students and professionals in pursuing their own competencies.

3. Maintain strong collaboration with AMS: To a better access of MRA-NS and job market for nurses as well as any other skills, is installation of a single website for ASEAN.

Lastly, the Cambodian government, particularly national nursing authorities should embrace the resilience of its health workforce. It is because although 'building personal capacity' has been chosen by many respondents followed by financial benefit, ultimately the skills they gained will definitely build their financial status in the future. Hence, while taking in consideration of inadequate nurses in the country, creating a friendly environment for nurses to access wider job market are equally importance to be addressed. Otherwise, the popularity of nursing enrolment will continue to decline. This required health leaders to join hand with development partners, including private sectors (nursing schools and hospitals/clinics) building trusts in the nursing profession.

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Trans-Local Government Collaboration as an Approach for International Development Assistance: The Saemaul Globalization Project in Balincaguing Village, Philippines

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The implementation of development programs in rural areas has continued to be one of the most problematic responsibilities for international assistance and development agencies around the world. Neoliberal development policies have failed to resolve the urgent problems of reducing inequality and eradicating poverty, while current trends in international development assistance are yet to obtain sustainable and beneficial results. Consequently, a non-traditional instrument for international development assistance has drawn attention for researchers and policymakers. This approach is characterized by the active involvement and collaboration of local governments from around the world, otherwise known as ‘decentralized development cooperation’ hereinafter, ‘trans-local government collaboration’. At the very core, this paper aims to examine this approach through the case study of the Saemaul Globalization Project (SGP) in Balincaguing village, collaboratively implemented between the provincial government of North Gyeongsang, South Korea, and the municipal government of San Felipe, Zambales, The Philippines. The SGP is a comprehensive rural development project that originates from South Korea’s Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement), promoting sense of ownership and self-reliance among the beneficiaries. In terms of the provision of livelihood opportunities, construction of infrastructures, capacity-building, and skills and technology transfer, the project is deemed as a success during its implementation from 2012 to 2016. Hence, this paper hypothesizes that the successful implementation and administration of SGP in Balincaguing village is a result of the effective trans-local collaboration between the local governments of North Gyeongsang and San Felipe. With the success of SGP in Balincaguing village, this paper suggests that an effective trans-local government collaboration is a supplemental approach for international development assistance and a determining factor in the successful implementation of development programs in rural areas.

Keywords: Local government, collaborative governance, international development assistance, Saemaul Undong, rural development

1. Introduction and Problem Statement

One of the most challenging and problematic responsibilities not only for state governments and domestic institutions, but also for international development agencies is the implementation and administration of development programs in rural areas. In this age of uncertainty and insecurity, neoliberal development policies have failed to resolve the urgent call of reducing inequality and eradicating poverty. At the same time, current and traditional trends in international development assistance are yet to obtain sustainable outcomes with long-term benefits. As a result of the decreasing efficiency and diversification of traditional international development and foreign aid mechanisms, non-conventional actors and instruments have emerged in the scene. Jain and Yoshida (2003) stated that the landscape of foreign aid has rapidly shifted and evolved from a two-tiered system comprised of the central governments and international organizations to a multi-tiered system involving non-conventional development partners such as the local governments.

Aid extended by local governments to international development assistance, formally known as “decentralized aid”, has increased from USD 800 million in 2002 to nearly USD 2 billion in 2015 according to the OECD-DAC. Although the ODA of local governments only accounts for 2% of the global bilateral aid, 18 out of 30 countries from the OECD-DAC are engaged in ‘decentralized development cooperation’. According to OECD, the aid contributed by local governments consists of an extensive variety of activities ranging from small projects through cultural co-operation and exchange. Despite the limited amount of aid in numbers, the OECD affirmed that local governments can make significant contributions in international development assistance in terms of transferring know-how experiences and expertise in local administration to its counterpart (OECD, 2005). However, Perez (2018) pointed out that despite the growing importance of aid activities from local and regional authorities, analyses and

debates pertaining to such phenomenon remain limited in the literature of development policy.

At the very core, this research aims to examine this non-conventional approach of international development assistance through the collaboration of local governments from different countries. In particular, this paper cites the case of the collaboration between the Provincial Government of Gyeongsangbukdo (hereinafter referred to as North Gyeongsang), South Korea, and the municipal government of San Felipe, Zambales, Philippines, in the implementation of the Saemaul Globalization Project (SGP) in Balincaguig village, Philippines. The creation of Saemaul pilot village in the Balincaguig was successfully implemented from 2012 until 2016 in terms of the provision of livelihood opportunities, construction of infrastructure projects, capacity-building, and skills and technology transfer. Hence, this paper hypothesizes that the successful implementation and administration of the SGP in Balincaguig village is a result of the effective trans-local collaboration between the provincial government of North Gyeongsang, South Korea, and the municipal government of San Felipe, Zambales, The Philippines. With the success of SGP, this paper suggests that an effective trans-local government collaboration is a supplemental approach for international development assistance and a determining factor in the successful implementation of development programs in rural areas.

2. Literature Review

Several studies have been carried out concerning the impact and efficiency of traditional instruments for international development assistance, ODA for instance, and doubted its ability to foster development and economic growth. Arndt et al. (2010) recognized that foreign aid remains a key tool for augmenting development initiatives particularly at the microeconomic level, but not at the macro perspective. Seemingly, Gulrajani (2015) argued that the world remains to discern international development assistance as a 'failure' in the elimination of poverty which led to organizational reform among aid donors. With these in mind, Sumner and Mallett (2013) claimed that there has been a revolution in the landscape

of foreign aid wherein goals, players, and instruments are evolving and rapidly shifting to non-conventional approaches such as the involvement of local government authorities.


Although cross-border partnerships in regions with adjacent territories have been a common practice in terms of building diplomatic and economic relations, trans-local government collaboration has emerged as a new trend for development assistance fostering and yielding favorable outcomes both for donors and recipients. Looking for alternatives, Hafteck (2003) reported that traditional donors have turned to local governments as project managers of grassroots development since they possess in-house expertise and know-how experience in terms of decision-making in the local level. Meanwhile, Nganje (2015) has recognized the rising prominence of non-state and sub-state actors in global affairs captured through the perspective of 'complex of interdependence' by Keohane and Nye (1997) in which contemporary international affairs is characterized by a combination of traditional relations of states and a network of trans-governmental exchanges involving diverse cast of actors.

For instance, European countries are known for incorporating cross-border relationships through cross-border regions, often called as Euroregions, or "Euregio". Such cross-border initiative and governance is common for the European Union (EU) member states (Pikner, 2008). In Asia, Khon Kaen City in Thailand and Nanning City in China have formally signed a friendly partnership since 2002 to promote cultural and educational exchanges between the two cities (Fenglian and Narrot, 2017). A study published by Nakamura et al. (2011) also stated that local governments in Japan, particularly prefectures and cities, have been actively involved in international environmental management with local governments in Asian developing countries (Nakamura et al., 2011).

3. Theoretical Framework

To measure the effectiveness of trans-local government collaboration and determine its influence in the successful implementation of the SGP, this paper utilizes the ‘Model of Collaborative Governance’ by Chris Ansell and Alison Gash (2007). Collaborative governance is a mode of governance that brings multiple stakeholders together in common forums which facilitates two-way communication and consensus-oriented decision-making.

Figure 1 Model of Collaborative Governance by Ansell and Gash (2007)



Based on the theoretical model developed by Ansell and Gash (2007), collaborative governance has four broad variables – starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership, and collaborative process. The starting conditions pertain to the preliminary causes and antecedents that may either initiate or discourage the collaborative process to happen. Facilitative leadership pertains to the process of bringing the stakeholders together and getting them engaged in a collaborative spirit. The institutional design refers to the basic rules and protocols for collaboration which are significant to the procedural legitimacy of the process.

Meanwhile, the collaborative process is considered as the core of the Theoretical Model of Collaborative Governance. Ansell and Gash (2007) identified the key variables of the collaborative process: (1) face-to-face dialogue, (2) trust-building, (3) commitment to the process, (4) shared understanding, and (5) intermediate outcomes.

The face-to-face dialogue refers to the “thick communication” between the stakeholders. Effective collaboration is possible if there is a direct dialogue between the participants. Second, absence or lack of trust among the participants is a common starting point for collaborative governance. Ansell and Gash (2007) stated that an effective collaborative process is facilitated by leaders who recognize the necessity of trust-building. Third, effective collaboration requires commitment to process and dedicated participants who are willing to abide by the rules and protocols and the implementation guidelines. Fourth, shared understanding refers to the ‘common mission’, ‘common ground’, ‘common purpose’, and ‘common objectives’ of the collaborators. The last critical variable of the collaborative process is the intermediate outcomes which consist of the “small wins” and initial benefits that dictates the iterative cycle and recurrence of the collaboration.

4. Methodology

This research has utilized exploratory qualitative case study approach. This paper opts for a qualitative research design since studying the implications of the collaboration between the key actors and institutions can be best understood using a method that will produce bias-free, open-ended, and clear interpretative outcomes. Moreover, a case study approach is expected to stimulate and develop new research in support of the limited amount of literature available regarding the topic of this paper.

The target population of this paper is determined through non-probability sampling since the participants of this study are individuals selected purposely based on their role and influence in the collaboration. The criteria for the selection of the participants are based on their direct

involvement, roles, and responsibilities in the collaboration for the project. A semi-structured interview and focus group discussion (FGD) was conducted with the key actors and project facilitators of the collaboration. The setting or the locale of the study is primarily based in Balincaguing village, the location of the project.

For the data presentation and analysis, this paper has applied comparative qualitative analysis and content analysis. For the data presentation, the responses of the interviewees are summarized and presented in table format to identify the similar and dissimilar factors and conditions which highlight their input and commitment to their collaboration towards the project. Meanwhile, content analysis is used to interpret the conducted interviews. Overall, the data analysis is expected to generate conclusions for the study.

5. The Saemaul Globalization Project in Balincaguing village

The Saemaul Globalization Project (SGP) is originated from the *Saemaul Undong* (New Village Movement) which is a community-driven development program initiated during the 1970s in the Republic of Korea. The *Saemaul Undong* (SMU) is a successful model of rural community development initiated during the administration of President Park Chung Hee and considered as the driving force in South Korea's rural development and growth (Asian Development Bank, 2012). In the 1990s, the movement has started to get attention from other developing countries with the desire of learning the experiences of South Korea who had a successful transition from a poverty-stricken community to an industrialized economy. The heightened interest of the international society regarding the experience of South Korea in SMU resulted in the creation of different rural development projects patterned after the movement.

As part of the globalization of the movement, several government institutions and agencies have participated in implementing rural development projects in other countries. The provincial government of North Gyeongsang is one of the participating institutions which conducted training programs inside and outside South Korea for the recipient countries. Since

2005, the provincial government implemented the SGP which is aimed at the creation of pilot villages, development of self-reliance in the community, local governance as the basis of effective and sustainable implementation, and localization of SMU through research institutes (Heo and Lee, 2016).

The village of Balincaguig, located in the municipality of San Felipe, Zambales province, is the first recipient of the Saemaul Globalization Project (SGP) in the Philippines. The major economic source of the village is agriculture while basic utilities include electricity distributor, public water system, and transportation vehicles such as tricycles and motorcycles. The main occupation of the populace is farming, and rice is the major agricultural product followed by corn, sweet potato, and vegetables. According to the research published by the College of Social Work and Development from the University of the Philippines, 76% of the total number of households in Balincaguig is living below the poverty threshold with an annual income lower than 109,680 PHP (approx. 2,129 USD) in 2015. A survey conducted by Vallejos et al. (2016) stated that 33% or 15 of the 46 household-respondents earn less than 20,000 PHP (approx. 388 USD) annually. Among the major problems identified by the people of Balincaguig are lack of job opportunities, insufficient irrigation system, disaster risks management, lack of health facilities, food insecurity, and lack of capital for farming (Vallejos et al., 2016).

The projects initiated through SGP are implemented for five years. The projects collaborated by the Saemaul Globalization Foundation (SGF), Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), and Balincaguig villagers started in 2012 with the construction of community hall, library, kindergarten, and piggery. The formation of local Saemaul Organization was also established villagers attended Saemaul training with the guidance of six dispatched volunteers from South Korea. In 2013, the expansion of drinking water wells, construction of village roads, installation of public toilets, pig breeding, and organic fertilizing were among the projects collaborated by the villagers and the volunteers. In 2014, cow banking was added to the

projects initiated by the Foundation. In 2015, organic farming was introduced and computer education for the villagers was offered. In the last year of implementation in 2016, the water supply system was developed further, more farming techniques were introduced, and training in sewing was held. Finally, the project was successfully completed at the beginning of 2017. A total of 25 South Korean volunteers were dispatched in Balincaguig village for five years. Table 1 summarizes the projects implemented through SGP in Balincaguig village.

Table 1. *List of Implemented Saemaul projects in Balincaguig village*

Year	Projects or Activities
2012	Construction of community Hall, construction of library and kindergarten, pig breeding, formation of Saemaul Organization and conducting Saemaul training
2013	Expansion of drinking water wells, paving village roads, installation public toilets, organic fertilizer and breeding earthworm projects, pig breeding, formation of Saemaul Organization and conducting Saemaul training
2014	Paving village roads, installation of public toilets, organic fertilizer and breeding earthworm projects, pig breeding, cow banking projects, introduce organic farming, formation of Saemaul Organization and conducting Saemaul training
2015	Paving village roads, installation public toilets, organic fertilizer and breeding earthworm projects, introduction of organic farming, offering of computer education, formation of Saemaul Organization and conducting Saemaul training
2016	Drinking water supply development, farming technique education, organic fertilizer and breeding earthworm projects, introduction of organic farming, sewing training, formation of Saemaul Organization and conducting Saemaul training

Source: Saemaul Globalization Foundation (2017)

6. Trans-Local Government Collaboration between North Gyeongsang and San Felipe

In the selected case study, the variables in the Theoretical Model of Collaboration by Ansell and Gash (2007), such as the starting conditions, collaborative process, institutional design, and facilitative leadership, correspond in the implementation of the Saemaul Globalization Project (SGP). It has been identified that the implementation of SGP is classified as a collaboration as per the criteria of the theoretical model. SGP is a public policy-oriented program designed to develop the rural village of Balincaguig in the Philippines. Most importantly, the implementation of SGP is participated by different actors consisting of private institutions, public agencies, and local government units, and the village citizens as non-state actors.

6.1 Facilitative Leadership: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Actors and Institutions

The facilitative leadership is equated to the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the key actors and institutions and their direct involvement in the collaboration. In line with this, semi-structured interviews and focus-group-discussion (FGD) were conducted with the key-informants settled in San Felipe and Balincaguig village, Philippines. Meanwhile, online interviews were facilitated with the representatives from the Saemaul Globalization Foundation (SGF) and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA).

Table 2. *Key Institutions and Actors in the Implementation of SGP*

Institution	Name of Key- Informant(s) Interviewed/Consulted	Role/Function	Responsibilities
Municipal Government of San Felipe) Zambales, Philippines(Atty. Carolyn S. Fariñas	Municipal Mayor (2016 – 2010)	Engaged and participated in different leadership training and seminars organized by the provincial government of North Gyeongsang; Acted as the main communication channel and mediator between the Korean volunteers and Balincaguing villagers

	Mr. Conrado Aldaba Jr.	Project Coordinator	Coordinated with the SG Officials and KOICA leaders in the provision of livelihood opportunities and infrastructure projects
	Mr. Rowel Villanueva	Social Worker	Coordinated with the Korean volunteers in the implementation of social development projects and leadership training
Balincaguing village Saemaul organization	Mr. Napoleon Domingo	Village Captain (2016 – 2012)	Shared the lessons learned/acquired during the training in South Korea to constituents; Motivated and empowered the citizens to participate in the implementation of SGP

	Ms.CynthiaAbdon	Village Captain (2018 – 2016)	Issued evaluation and progress report; Monitored the livelihood projects
	Mr.JesseDansalan	Village Captain (– 2018 present(Post-implementation monitoring and evaluation; Update SGF about the sustainability of the project from 2017 onwards
	Ms.EvelynFarala	Leader, Balincaguing Women's Association	Ensured that Balincaguing women are well-represented and take part in the operation of the projects
Provincial Government of North Gyeongsang)South Korea(Hon.KimKwanYoung*	Provincial Governor (2018 – 2006	The“ brain ”in the expansion of SGP to developing countries; Spearheads the overall process of SGP implementation

Saemaul Globalization Foundation) SGF(Mr .Lee Kyung Bok	Project Manager	The“ arm ”in the expansion of SGP; Examines potential Saemaul pilot village; Publish research about the evaluation of SGP in Balincaguing village
	Mr .Park KyungSoon	Volunteer	Execution of development projects; Cultural exchange with the villagers
Korea International Cooperation Agency) KOICA(Mr .Son Tae Kyun	KOICA Team Leader for the Philippines ((2016-2012	Monitored and evaluated the collaboration between SGF and Balincaguing villagers; Served as the facilitative actor in terms of consensus-building, mediation, and nonbinding arbitration

*Source: Arirang Special M60 - Kim Kwan-yong Interview (Arirang TV, 2015); Author’s interview with the key-informants

6.2 Institutional Design for the Collaboration

The institutional design corresponds to the ground rules and protocols in the collaboration of the participants. As highlighted in the facilitative leadership among the participants in the SGP, the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the collaborators were made effective through the guidance of the institutional design. Based on the interviews with the key actors, the collaboration for SGP was effective due to the completion of tasks and enforcement of implementation rules. Mr. Lee Kyung Bok stated that the collaboration was successful due to the comprehensive understanding of each participant on their roles and responsibilities in the project (Lee, 2019). Likewise, Mayor Carolyn Fariñas stated that all the participants from the highest to lowest tier were properly informed with the protocols and procedures of the collaboration (Fariñas, 2019). Most importantly, there was no overlapping of responsibilities as the participants were concentrated in their designated roles during the collaborative process.

6.3 Starting Conditions: Motivations behind the Partnership

The incentives of the collaborators to participate in the implementation of SGP are highlighted dually. On one hand, the Provincial Government of North Gyeongsang, in coordination with SGF and KOICA, were motivated to sponsor the collaborative governance in SGP due to the globalization of Saemaul Undong, the campaign to share the development narratives of South Korea to developing countries, and exchange of intangible resources such as cultural exchange and governance legitimacy. On the other hand, the municipal government of San Felipe and the villagers of Balincaguig were driven to participate in the collaborative governance due to the pre-existing economic situation of the village. Balincaguig is the poorest village in the municipality of San Felipe before the arrival of the SGP. Additionally, the leadership of former Mayor Carolyn Fariñas has significantly ignited the collaboration and stated, “if you really want to improve your community, you really need partners. You can’t always rely on your own fund, it will always be lacking. There are just so many partners along the way. They will discover you and will support you” (Fariñas, 2019).

6.4 Collaborative Process in the Implementation of SGP

The collaborative process represents the implementation phase and procedures in the planning, negotiation, operation, and evaluation of the SGP. In the implementation of SGP, it has been determined that the collaborative process is cyclical or iterative, rather than linear. The project was conducted for 5 years with cycles of preparation, planning, decision making, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. In consideration of the successful implementation of the project, this study uses the variables of the collaborative process as the measurement indicators of the effective collaboration between the key actors. This study highlights the face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to the process, shared understanding, and intermediate outcomes observed or performed in the implementation of the project.

6.4.1 Face-to-Face Dialogue

Communication is at the heart of collaboration and face-to-face dialogue is the most fundamental indicator of effective collaboration. This includes regular meetings, gatherings, and discussions among the project participants and facilitators. In the case of SGP, this study considers the number of formal meetings, informal gatherings, and other modes of discussion between the key actors by consulting on the minutes of the meetings and other related documentation. According to the interview with the project participants, the face-to-face dialogue is divided into committee meetings and open forums. On one hand, committee meetings were participated by the top and mid-tier collaborators such as the government officials from San Felipe, SGF volunteers, and KOICA leaders. On the other hand, the open forums were attended by all the involved actors in the implementation including the Balincaguig village leaders and citizens. Figure 2 highlights the committee meetings and open forums conducted in the implementation of SGP.

Figure 2. *Open forum with Balincaguing villagers (left); Committee meeting with Saemaul leaders (right)*



Source: Fariñas (2019)

6.4.2 Trust-Building

As far as SGP is concerned, trust-building is measured based on the perceived relations and satisfaction among the key actors. The interviewees were individually asked about their perception and satisfaction while working with the other participants in the collaboration. In terms of perception, the interviewees were given two options: positive or negative. Meanwhile, the satisfaction rating is based on three choices: highly satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied. Based on the feedback of the interviewees about their perception and satisfaction in the collaboration of SGP, the government officials of San Felipe, Balincaguing village leaders, and Korean volunteers have recognized the process positively and all were highly satisfied in the cooperative management and administration of SGP. Table 3 summarizes the response of the interviewees.

Table 3. *Perception and Satisfaction of the Interviewees in the Collaboration for SGP*

Key Actor	Perception	Satisfaction
Atty .Carolyn S .Fariñas	Positive	Highly Satisfied
Mr .Conrado Aldaba Jr.	Positive	Highly Satisfied
Mr .Rowel Villanueva	Positive	Highly Satisfied
Mr .Napeleon Domingo	Positive	Highly Satisfied
Ms .Cynthia Abdon	Positive	Highly Satisfied
Mr .Jesse Dansalan	Positive	Highly Satisfied
Ms .Evelyn Farala	Positive	Highly Satisfied
Mr .Lee Kyung Bok	Positive	Highly Satisfied
Mr .Park Kyung Soon	Positive	Highly Satisfied

Source: Author's interview with the key-informants

6.4.3 Commitment to Process

Aside from trust-building, commitment to the process is a challenging indicator to measure. In consideration of SGP, this study highlights the performance of the tasks of the key actors as an indicator of commitment to process. It is measured based on the responsibilities executed by the stakeholders and the functions they have performed in the negotiation, planning, implementation, and evaluation of the project. The performances of the members of the collaboration are monitored by each actor. To ensure that there is a commitment among the participants, a system of checks and balances was employed. Each actor checks the performance of other members to make sure that the institutional guidelines are strictly followed and power/resource imbalances are prevented. The engagement level of the collaborators is measured on their task performance.

6.4.4 Shared Understanding

Shared understanding refers to the common mission, ground, purpose, aims, and objectives among the participants in the collaboration. In the case of SGP, the commonalities among the key actors refer to the improvement of aid effectiveness, self-reliance, achievement of sustainable growth, active participation, and generation of livelihood opportunities. As Mayor Carolyn Fariñas stated, the citizens of Balincaguig are known to be laidback, poor, and lacking in motivation, but the arrival of the Koreans made a huge impact on the mentality and perception in life among the villagers. Meanwhile, Ms. Cynthia Abdon mentioned that before the implementation of SGP, women in the village are only limited to household opportunities. In the arrival of the project, women were given different income-generating jobs such as sewing, waterlily weaving, organic farming, and the like. At the same time, Mr. Jesse Dansalan mentioned that gambling is a popular leisure activity for the villagers before the implementation of SGP, most especially during the non-farming seasons of the year, but the provision of livelihood projects from the Koreans changed the recreational endeavors of the Balincaguig people into more productive and income-generating ventures.

6.4.5 Intermediate Outcomes

The intermediate outcomes refer to the initial benefits observed and earned in the collaboration that dictated the success of the project. The key actors were asked about the gains and assistance they have attained in the implementation of SGP which motivated them in their continuous pursuance in participating in the project. According to an interview with Mr. Rowel Villanueva, the initial benefits he obtained during the first years of the implementation of the project pertains to the leadership training of SGF and the value formation of self-help, diligence, and cooperation. As a social worker, he gained experience in conducting social development projects not only in the Philippine perspective but also from the Korean setting. Meanwhile, Mr. Napoleon Domingo affirmed that the reason for his continuous collaboration in the project is not because he is mandated to do so but rather his willingness to help Balincaguig village develop under the leadership of SMU. As a volunteer, Mr. Park Kyung Soon

stated that his engagement in the collaboration is a life fulfillment and experience that cannot be replaced by any material possession.

7. Analysis

7.1 Application of the Theoretical Model of Collaborative Governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007)


The Theoretical Model of Collaborative Governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007) corresponds to the the collaboration that took place in the implementation of the Saemaul Globalization Project (SGP) in Balincaguig village, Philippines. The starting conditions that generate the collaboration refer to the globalization of SMU and the pre-existing socio-economic condition of Balincaguig. These antecedents served as the motivation and grounds for the trans-local government collaboration of North Gyeongsang and San Felipe to pursue.

The facilitative leaders in the collaboration are composed of the municipal government of San Felipe, Balincaguig village leaders and residents, SGF, KOICA, and the provincial government of North Gyeongsang. These key actors and institutions are the enablers and catalysts of the collaboration and the project proponents and managers of SGP. The institutional design of the collaboration for SGP pertains to the ground rules and protocols and implementation guidelines that allowed and authorized the collaborative process. The rules and protocols are in the form of formal documents such as Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

In terms of the collaborative process, the face-to-face dialogue refers to the formal meetings, informal gatherings, and open forums among the members of the collaboration. Trust-building in the implementation of SGP is measured based on high satisfaction and positive perception of the project facilitators. Commitment to process is assessed through the performance of tasks and responsibilities among the stakeholders. The shared understanding pertains to the commonalities and values learned and acquired during the collaboration. The intermediate outcomes include the initial benefits and gains of the project participants which determined

the recurrence of the collaboration after a series of monitoring and evaluation. In the application of all the variables of the Theoretical Model of Collaboration by Ansell and Gash (2007) in the trans-local government collaboration of North Gyeongsang and San Felipe towards the implementation of the SGP, figure 3 illustrates the operational framework of the study.

Figure 3. *Trans-Local Government Collaboration in the Implementation of SGP in Balincaguing (Rollo, 2019)*



Source: Author's depiction of the collaborative governance for the SGP in Balincaguing

7.2 Outcomes of the Collaboration

Among the outcomes that contributed to the participants of the collaboration are capacity-building in terms of skills, knowledge, equipment, and other resources; active participation and collective empowerment; and the formation of the Saemaul spirit.

Firstly, the capacity-building for SGP is a two-way setting not only participated by the Koreans but also the Filipinos. On the one hand, the Korean volunteers, KOICA leaders, and SGF officials have offered capacity-building to Balincaguing villagers through leadership training, seminar, provision of livelihood opportunities, and construction of infrastructure projects. On the other

hand, the Filipinos have provided cultural exchange with the Koreans and also legitimize the application of SGP to developing countries. Although the capacity-building attained by the Koreans and Filipinos are short-term and characterized by technical assistance, its scope is multi-dimensional. Among the activities shared in SGP are training and education, capital resourcing, strategic planning, and fiscal management.

Secondly, the active participation and collective empowerment are other favorable outcomes in the successful implementation and effective collaboration for SGP. In the post-implementation of SGP, Balincaguig villagers have transformed from passive recipients to active participants of development projects. Although the SGP in Balincaguig has been concluded, the flow of projects sponsored by national government and LGUs have been continuous. Compared before, the Balincaguig villagers are now partners of development and they have been maximizing and utilizing the projects for the benefit of the community.

Thirdly, exporting the *Saemaul Undong* values is the main goal of the facilitation of SGP in developing countries. The values of self-help, diligence, and cooperation are the guiding principles of the project. It is stated that the unique characteristic of SGP compared to other rural development projects is the spiritual reform brought by the SMU values to the project beneficiaries. The *Saemaul* spirit has provided ideological guidance among the participants of the collaboration. The “can do” mindset was endorsed through SGP and has encouraged consistent thinking of optimism towards the achievement of goals for the project. Moreover, the SMU values have converted the selfish, self-defeat, and helpless behavior of the villagers.

8. Findings

8.1 Evaluation of the Collaborative Governance

In evaluating the collaboration for the implementation of SGP in Balincaguig village, an assessment and limitation of relationships, processes, and outcomes are considered. In this study, the measurement indicators of effective collaboration are based on the Theoretical

Model of Collaborative Governance by Ansell and Gash (2007). Based on the data collected, the factors in the effective collaboration in the implementation of SGP are (1) face-to-face dialogue, (2) trust-building, (3) commitment to process, (4) shared understanding, (5) intermediate outcomes.

One measurement indicator for effective collaboration among the participants is face-to-face dialogue. Based on the interviews, all of the respondents stated that there was an adequate amount of committee meetings and open forums among the participants of the collaboration. It has been found that the discussions were inclusive and participated by the involved actors from the top to lowest-tier such as the government officials of San Felipe, SGF and KOICA leaders, Korean volunteers, and Balincaguing residents. In addition, the interviewees stated that despite the varying frequency and spontaneity of the meetings and gatherings, the overall implementation of SGP was successful. It is revealed that the forums and gatherings were effective communication channels among the participants of the collaboration to identify the projects to be implemented and to assess the impact and issues of SGP.

In this study, trust-building is measured based on the satisfaction and perception of the collaborators. In accordance with the interview and focus group discussions (FGD), it appears that the project participants are highly satisfied with the collaboration and perceive the project positively. All of the respondents recognized the importance of trust as a long-term commitment throughout the 5-year implementation of SGP. With these in mind, the collaboration of SGP is considered effective due to the trust among the participants characterized by a strong bond, commitment, and relations among the participants.

Commitment to the collaborative process is measured based on the executed responsibilities and performed functions in the implementation of SGP. The tasks are sub-divided into four critical components: planning, negotiation, implementation, and evaluation. Based on the performance task outline of the project participants, the collaboration for SGP is effective due

to the usage of checks and balances system. Through the system, each member was able to monitor and evaluate the commitment of other members.

Another critical factor that is vital in the evaluation of the collaboration for SGP is the shared understanding among the project proponents and facilitators. It is revealed that the collaboration is effective due to the common mission, ground, purpose, aims, and objectives that guided the key actors in the successful implementation of the project. Due to shared vision, ideology, and strategic direction in the implementation process, the collaboration went smoothly and favorable outcomes were generated.

The intermediate outcomes signify the continuous flow of the collaboration. It has been found that the initial benefits of the collaboration for SGP made the overall implementation of the project continuous and cyclical. According to the interviewees, the benefits and gains from the collaboration are both in material and ideational forms. The material gains consist of the infrastructures and livelihood opportunities while the ideational benefits pertain to the Saemaul Undong values of self-help, diligence, and cooperation learned by the project recipients.

8.2 Limitations of the Collaborative Governance

Although the collaborative process in the implementation of SGP is successful, there are challenges and limitations which in some way threatened and restricted the cycle of collaborations to pursue. The interviewees highlighted such difficulties as follows: (1) overlapping priorities, (2) lost of interest due to the demand for instant benefits, (3) miscommunication due to language barriers, (4) cultural differences.

Overlapping of priorities became inevitable among Balincaguing residents since aside from participating in the implementation of SGP, they also have to attend to their primary source of income. Aside from their occupation, some of the villagers have no time to participate in the collaboration due to multiple household responsibilities.

Lost of interest due to demand for instant benefits also influenced the initial participation and non-participation of the villagers. There were some Balincaguing residents who lacked enthusiasm in the collaborative process since they demand immediate outcomes due to their pre-existing economic situation. However, the latter years of the implementation of SGP were participated by the villagers regardless of their priorities and multiple responsibilities.

The interviewees particularly the Balincaguing village leaders and citizens also noted that there are differences in language and culture which made the project implementation slightly complicated. It is found out that English is not the first language of all the participants of the collaboration. Some of the Korean volunteers and Balincaguing villagers cannot converse in English. Meanwhile, in terms of culture, Koreans are known to be hands-on and meticulous in their work ethics. On the contrary, Balincaguing residents are laid back and lacks dynamism due to their economic conditions. Despite such complications, the other actors made efforts to resolve the barriers and acted as mediator between the volunteers and the villagers.

9. Conclusion

At the very core, this study aims to examine a non-traditional approach of international development assistance in the form of trans-local government collaboration. In particular, this paper cites the case of the implementation of the Saemaul Globalization Project (SGP) in Balincaguing village collaborated by the local governments of North Gyeongsang, South Korea, and San Felipe, The Philippines. The SGP is successfully implemented from 2012 to 2016. The collaboration of the project participants is measured based on five critical variables: face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to process, shared understanding, and intermediate outcomes.

Based on the analysis and findings, the successful implementation and administration of SGP is influenced by the effective trans-local government collaboration of North Gyeongsang and San Felipe in terms of the following: (1) constant and consultative communication through

adequate number of formal meetings and open forums, (2) positive perception and high satisfaction among key actors in the collaboration, (3) commitment to perform of tasks and functions, (4) value formation and common understanding, and (5) the initial gains and benefits from the project which made the collaboration iterative and cyclical. With these in mind, it is concluded that an effective trans-local government collaboration is a supplemental approach for international development assistance and a determining factor in the successful implementation of rural development programs.

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A Roller Coaster Ride: A Case Study of Indonesia-Australia Bilateral Relations in 1999-2002

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Geographically, Indonesia and Australia are neighbouring countries. Both countries strengthen their relations by conducting active cooperation in many sectors. However, various threats can result in the estrangement between the two countries as well. By this reason, Indonesia-Australia relation commonly has been illustrated as a roller coaster ride by some scholars. With that, this study aims to explore and analyse the factor behind volatility phenomena of Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations during 1999-2002. Also, this research will mainly focus on some significant events that showed the dynamic between Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations. Therefore, this paper will use the neoclassical realism by Gideon Rose to examine the factors behind the unstable relation for both countries. To provide a comprehensive analysis, the author conducted a literature study on relevant previous research, government report, books, and Indonesia-Australia government speeches. In 1999 and 2002, undeniably, the East Timor crisis and the Bali bombing have brought these two countries relations into miserable. Australia, as the country upholds the human rights value, criticized the Indonesian government towards military aggression in East Timor. Meanwhile, Indonesia accused the Australian government has involved supporting the East Timor separatism movement from Indonesia's sovereignty. Despite the conflict among them, the Bali bombing 2002 that resulted in victims from both parties has just turned Indonesia-Australia relations from enemy to be friends. This can be seen through their cooperation in combating terrorism in the region. Lastly, the leader perceptions will be assessed further in this study by using Indonesian perspective.

Keywords: Bali bombing, East Timor crisis, neo-classical realism, Indonesia-Australia relation, Roller-coaster ride

1. Introduction

Indonesia's relations with its southern neighbours have complicated by both domestic considerations and international events. These complicated relations were caused by several existing events such as the Bali atrocity in 2002 and the East Timor crisis that have both positive and negative implications on Indonesia-Australia relations. The erratic pattern of the two countries undeniably is classified as a volatile relationship. At a certain period, the relations seemed very friendly, cooperative, and mutually supportive. However, in other periods, the relationship turned into tension, mutual suspicion, and lack of friendship. For this reason, Colin Brown (1999) argued that Indonesia-Australia relations could be illustrated as a roller coaster.

Guided by this notion, it is interesting to examine the main factors behind the complicated relation between Indonesia and Australia during the East Timor crisis and the Bali atrocity in 2002. Therefore, this study seeks to examine Indonesian-Australian relations from a neoclassical realism perspective. In the end, this research aims to provide a systematic explanation by examining the two events as empirical indications in Indonesia-Australia relations.

2. Hypothesis:

By applying Neoclassical Realism theory, this research argued that a roller coaster phenomenon regarding Indonesia-Australia relations is influenced by the interactions between domestic level factors, namely leader perceptions, and the international system. Moreover, during the East Timor tension, Australia was seen as a severe threat that intervenes Indonesian domestic problem and created tension between the two countries. Meanwhile, after the Bali bombing 2002, Indonesia's state behaviour towards Australia has changed because Indonesia's was under threat due to the terrorist attacks in the domestic level. From these points, this research assumed that a roller coaster ride phenomenon in Indonesia-Australia relations are caused by converging and diverging of national interests between the Indonesian leaders and Australia.

2.1. Research Objectives:

The objectives of this study, as follows:

- 1) To identify Indonesia's foreign policy priorities with regards to President Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati perception that affect Indonesia-Australia relations.
- 2) To explain the implications and the future relationship between Indonesia-Australia that showed the positive and negative implications for both country relations.
- 3) To add perspectives on the debate on Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations
- 4) To fill the gap in the existing literature that could not capture the dynamic relations between the two countries.
- 5)

2.2. Research Questions:

This research will be guided by the main research question below:

- 1) What were the factors that determine Indonesia's foreign policy under President Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati? In turn, how did Indonesia's foreign policy have an impact on its bilateral relations with Australia?

3. Literature Review:

The writer has reviewed a precise amount of literature concerning this study. Therefore, the existing perspectives on Indonesia-Australia relations during 1999-2002 could be divided into two scholar groups, which are The East Timor tension and the Bali Bombing I.

The first group, Kusuma (2015), Chalk (2001), and Smith (2004), have conducted research and focused on analysing Indonesia-Australia diplomatic relations during East Timor. By pointing the realist approach, Kusuma (2015) pointed out that "national interest" was the main reason why Australia has experienced a shift of interest in East Timor. Therefore, he continuously argued that commercial purpose in particular oil in the Timor gap was the reason for Australia's support over East Timor's independence. Also, within this group, Smith (2004), used a historical approach by explaining Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations post-1945, post-East Timor, and post-Bali bombing. His main statement asserted that Indonesia is essential and highly valued for Australia. From this sense, Australia needs to maintain its relationship with Indonesia for the stability in the region. Therefore, Indonesia blamed Australia for the intervention in the East Timor tension that affected Indonesia's sovereignty. For this reason, Smith (2004) argued that the East Timor case had altered the relationship between the two countries. Therefore, another approach has been taken by Chalk to explain Indonesia-Australia during the East Timor

crisis. By using a constructivist approach, Chalk (2001) primarily explained that Indonesia had become the main priority guided for Australian foreign and security policy. Also, Indonesia was the most important regional partner during the Paul Keating era. However, Chalk (2001) found that Australia's intervention towards east Timor was caused a significant problem for Indonesia- Australia relations. For this reason, he noted that in order to rebuild the two countries' relations, the value of "honest" must be considered as the essential character in this bilateral relationship.

Moreover, the second group, Kearens (2012), Shara & Tri (2016), and Sherlock (2002), emphasised their study on Indonesia-Australia relations after Bali atrocity in 2002. Under the liberalist approach, Kearens's study focused on Australian Foreign Policy against Indonesia, which concerns the first Bali Bombing in 2002. Therefore, she discovered that there are two factors determinants Indonesia-Australia relations, namely, external and internal. This two- factor determined Australia's behaviours in making counter-terror policies against Indonesia in the form of a ruling government and Australian public opinion. By analysing several variables such as the ruling government variables and the leader characteristic variables under PM John Howard administration, Kearens (2012) found that the Bali attack has led the two countries to conduct good relations because the Australian government still has a considerable fear of regional security conditions. Therefore, Shara & Tri (2016) provide another article within this category by offering a liberalist approach to explain Indonesia-Australia relations. They asserted that Indonesia-Australia relations are one of the most critical diplomatic relations in order to defend the nations as well as Indonesia-Australia's people from the violation of terrorists. From this point, these two countries must conduct cooperation or establish an organization to solve this global terrorist problem. In line with Kearens (2012) and Shara & Tri (2016), Sherlock (2002) asserted that Bali's bombings would become a problem and at the same time as an opportunity for Indonesia in order to strengthen the relationship with the Australian government. Thus, he sees that Australia and Indonesia have a mutual problem with terrorism. And this is the reason why the cooperation of both countries is needed.

All in all, several existing works of literature based on a case study above have shared essential values on the Indonesia-Australia relations topic. However, such studies are unable to explain the transition from the downturn to the improvement of Indonesia-Australia relations during 1999-2002. In consequence, the author aims to fill the gap in the existing literature to explain


a roller coaster ride phenomenon on Indonesia-Australia relations by providing a different perspective under neo-classical realism approach.

4. Methodology

This study used a descriptive-qualitative method that aims to provide a comprehensive analysis by interpreting primary data from government documents, government reports, documents, and publications. Also, this research used secondary data such as books, academic journals, news, and other data, which is relevant to explain this study (Wyse, 2011).

Furthermore, regarding the theoretical framework (see Figure 1, next page), the author applied the Neoclassical Realism theory, which coined by Gideon Rose (1998). Neoclassical Realism was the first theory developed by Gideon Rose in his article entitled "Neoclassical Realism and Theory of Foreign Policy" in 1998. This theory is a new view resulting from a combination of classical Realism and neo-realism. Different of the two, Neoclassical Realism focuses on the international system (factor external) and domestic circumstances (internal factors) as well as complex interactions between both in influencing government policy (leader perception).


Figure 1. Theoretical Framework



Source: Neoclassical realist theory for international politics (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009)

In attempting to apply the neoclassical realism theory in this study, the author redraws the framework as follows:

Figure 2. Application of the Neoclassical Realist in this Study



Source: Author's own analysis and interpretations

As can be seen the figure in the previous page, the author divided the variables into two sections in shaping the analysis of President Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati towards Indonesia- Australia in this research. These variables are:

- ┆ Independent Variable: International system, domestic factors.
- ┆ Cognitive Variable: the Indonesian leader's perceptions.
- ┆ Dependent Variable: Foreign policy formulation, implementation, policy response, and outcomes that impacted Indonesia's relationship with Australia.

Therefore, to understand and explain Indonesian foreign policy to Australia, this study will use the additional concept in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon. The concept of national interest, survival, and security as state vital goals to construct a state's foreign policy have been offered by Webber and Smith (2002). Webber and Smith (2002) continuously argued that these three factors could be elaborated into three contexts: the first context is the international system focusing on power hierarchy. The second context is focusing on government components that can shape a state's foreign policy, such as the leader and its regime, as well as bureaucrats. Lastly, another factor that can be incorporated state foreign policy formation is domestic context such as national identity, economy, political, security situation in the domestic level. This factor is used by the states to determine their position in the international context. All in all, this theory is useful to employ in this study to understand the volatile factors of Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations.

5. Analysis and Discussion

a. President Habibie's Perception towards International System and Foreign Policy

Back when he was elected as the Indonesian Vice President in March 1998. Habibie was appointed by President Suharto to strengthen Indonesian relations with foreign countries in terms of technology as well as economic development. For this reason, in some opportunities, President Habibie mentioned that President Suharto was his former political teacher due to his political career began during the new order era. Consequently, both domestic and international, are sceptical of his ability to lead Indonesia's democratic transition. As stated by one of Indonesian activist from the University of Indonesia (Swasono, 1998):

“Habibie is part of the Suharto regime, [and] although he promised to make changes in the electoral laws, we are sceptical that he will make any real changes in the system”

(Masalah Keabsahan: Pemerintahan Rawan Instabilitas pp 221-235)

With this position, this research noted that President Habibie came to power with a weak legitimacy power from the domestic level. Also, the weak legitimacy for Habibie was indicated by the weak support from both sides domestic and international. First was from the elite political group, the military, and pro-reform activists, and second was from international

community from the United States, Australia, and IMF also was high regarding human rights violations, in particular, the East Timor issue (He, 2007).

Moreover, the source of the weak legitimacy in the domestic caused by the monetary crisis in 1997 that has shaped President Habibie's national interest. With that, under his administration, the focus and objectives of Indonesia's foreign policy were to rebuild Indonesia's economics by conducting diplomacy to attract investment from foreign countries and assistance from the International community. To achieve these goals, Habibie prioritized to restore Indonesia's image in the eyes of the international community by focusing on resolving the East Timor issue as a part of democracy and the human rights agenda.

b. President Habibie's Foreign Policy and Its implications on Indonesia-Australia relations: Misperceptions among the Leaders?

As has been discussed above, in order to tackle domestic problems, Habibie relied on the International community support economic recovery agenda after Indonesia was hit by the Asian financial crisis 1997. However, the International community has spotlighted and actively criticized the Indonesian government that cannot find a solution for the human rights crisis in East Timor. The emergence of pressures from the international community was mainly from the IMF, the United States and Australia forced Indonesia to issue policies to accommodate the aspirations of the people of East Timor. In response, Habibie gave two options, which were autonomy and referendum for East Timor problem solutions to solve Indonesia's problems once for all. As Dewi Fortuna Anwar, the Indonesian secretary for foreign affairs under President Habibie administration asserted:

“As part of his strategy, Habibie hoped to strengthen his democratic image at domestic and international community by resolving the East Timor issue once and for all.”

(Anwar, 2000)

However, this study argued that these options have become a starting point of Indonesia's volatile relations with Australia. On December 19, 1998, in a quite controversial step was taken by the Australian government, PM Howard sent a letter to President Habibie. Primarily, this letter provides a recommendation to President Habibie regarding a long-term solution to the

East Timor problem. Howard suggested that Indonesia needed to build a review mechanism of autonomy as the French way of handling its former colony in New Caledonia. Specifically, Australia recommends the referendum option to be implemented just after the implementation of broad autonomy for several years. However, this letter from John Howard made Habibie offended and angry. As he expressed in the interview with ABC News for the program The Howard Years in November 2008 (ABC, 2008):

"I was angry reading his letter [Howard]. In his letter, he [Howard] suggested that I need to solve East Timor conflict by following French way of handling its colonies in the Pacific. He [Howard] continuously suggested that, we had to prepare for 10 years or whatever and after that gave them independence. So as soon as I read that letter, I was offended."

(President Habibie, ABC interview, November 28)

Given this notion, this research would like to assert that this letter generated misperception and misunderstanding of President Habibie in interpreting PM Howard's letter. Therefore, based on PM Howard and President meeting (AU.gov, 1999), this study noted that Australia's foreign policy was ambiguous as PM Howard played dualism in his attitude over the East Timor crisis. In one side, to maintain Australia's diplomatic relations with Indonesia, he reasserted his commitment to support East Timor as a part of Indonesia. Temporarily, PM Australia also reaffirmed his commitment on democratic values to upkeep self-determination for East Timor people. Hence, Australia's role on INTERFERET mission also was other factors that created volatile Indonesia-Australia relations. President Habibie perceived the ambiguity of Howard's foreign policy over East Timor as an action that intervenes in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Undeniably, this has led to Australia-Indonesia relations at its lowest point in three decades. Besides, the impact of this incident was quite severe, leading to the rise of the demonstration movement against the Australian government, in the majority of Indonesia's cities (Jemadu, 2006). Therefore, it also affected collaborative programs created by Indonesia and Australia as the former Indonesian president and the Australian Prime Minister created. One of the important ones was the signing of the Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation Agreement (AMS) in 1995 that President Habibie decided to abrogate this agreement with Australia.

c. **President Wahid's Perception towards International System and Foreign Policy**

Indonesia's foreign policy under President Wahid focused on restoring Indonesia's image in the eyes of the international community, and economic recovery had to be prioritized in his national agenda. Therefore, in this case, President Wahid, as head of state as well as head of the Indonesian government, took the role and became the dominant diplomat in determining the identity of Indonesia's foreign policy at the time. This attitude can be shown as he spent 23 of the first 40 days of his reign term for a diplomatic tour (Shambazy, 2010). However, under his administration, there was no significant relation with Australia (DPRD, 2012). This was caused by some of the attitudes taken by President Wahid can be an indicator of a shift in the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy as planned, strengthening relations with Israel. This attitude was conveyed by Wahid after a few days when he was appointed as the president of Indonesia. Also, another breakthrough was delivered when he shaped his ideas about forming alliances strategic Indonesia-China-India. This idea was conveyed together with his visit to several countries in Asia, and it was known as "Looking towards Asia" foreign policy (Smith, 2000). From this point, it can be argued that there was a shift in Indonesia's foreign policy from Western-centrism to Asia-centrism. With that, Wahid's orientation strategy for Indonesia's dignity and economic recovery interest is more depended on Asia that lead to stagnancy on Indonesia-Australia relations.

d. **President Megawati's Perception towards International System and Foreign Policy**

Under President Megawati, Indonesia's foreign policy was reflected from her speech as she mentioned "*conducting the free and active foreign policy, recovering state's and nation's dignity and returning the trust of foreign countries, including international donor institutions and investors, to the government*" (Younce, 2001). President Megawati also added that the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy which was mainly '*recovering the state's and nation's dignity and returning the trust of foreign countries*', must also pay attention to the following matters; '*Recovery and efforts to maintain the stability of our national security and defence*'. She continuously noted that we [cabinet] do need a practical, highly disciplined system as well as security apparatus, which was under the control of the government but still inspired by the people's aspiration (Sukma, 2004). Therefore, at the beginning, President Megawati's priority was to establish good relations with neighbouring countries, especially with the ASEAN region. This attitude was done in implementing a free and active foreign policy,

which was her top agenda to solve the domestic problems in terms of economic, security, and defence (Yuniarti, 2010).

Nonetheless, Megawati's foreign policy was shifted due to some existing events such the 9/11 incidents and most importantly the Bali atrocity in 2002. According to Vermonte (2003), the issue of terrorism had placed Indonesia in a complicated position. On the one hand, various opportunities for cooperation, especially related to combating terrorism, provided an opportunity to strengthen Indonesia's position and role in the eyes of the international community. However, on another mission, the government's way of dealing with the development of terrorism returned the security approach in domestic. From this point, this research argued that these two events, which were the 9/11 Terrorist attacks and Bali Bombing I have shaped President Megawati's perception toward her national interest. The effect of the Bali Bombing 2002 imposed President's Megawati to set counter-terrorism policy as one of her top agendas in order to gain foreign countries' trust as her main agenda.

e. President Megawati's Foreign Policy and Its implications on Indonesia-Australia relations: Converging Interest?

As has been discussed in the previous section, the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia experienced a major crisis during President Habibie and East Timor crisis. East Timor, one of the former provinces in Indonesia under Indonesia's annexation, released from the Republic of Indonesia and voted for independence in 1999. Indeed, the release of East Timor had tremendous implications for relations between Indonesia and Australia due to misperception and misunderstanding among the leaders. However, like a roller coaster, Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations could be in the ups position. With that, this study argued that during Megawati administration, there was significant improvement on Indonesia-Australia relations. This improvement was proved by two factors: first Howard's diplomatic visit to Jakarta and second the Bali bombing in 2002.

On August 13, 2001, the Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, visited Indonesia at the invitation of President Megawati. He was also the first world leader to make a state visit since Megawati served as President of the Republic of Indonesia (Manne, 2004). During the meeting, the two leaders also reaffirmed their strong desire to improve relations through various collaborations in various fields. As Megawati asserted in her speech (AP Archive, 2015):

"We are really confident that the relationship between Indonesia and Australia will be more realistic, rational, and stronger in the future."

(Megawati Speech during Howard's Visit in Jakarta)

In response to that, Prime Minister Howard emphasized his objectives to visit Jakarta by looking mutual interest agreement for both countries. As Howard told reporters that relations with Indonesia had entered a new phase "of what I might call positive realism." He also asserted (CNN, 2001):

"In my discussion with President Megawati we both I think struck a tone of realism. We both want a good relationship, we recognise there have been some differences in the past, but importantly there is a great deal of residual good will, there is a common interest, there is a recognition of the closeness of our two countries geographically and therefore strategically and I certainly am encouraged from my first meeting with her that Indonesia's new president wants a good relationship with Australia"

(PM Howard's Press Conference during his visit in Jakarta)

Guided by these two leaders' speech, this study noted that mutual interest or positive realism was the first step to restore Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations after East Timor crisis. Therefore, this positive realism between Indonesia-Australia relation was reflected after the Bali atrocity. a year after the 9/11 event in the United States, a similar incident happened to Indonesia. This incident specifically occurred on the island of Bali on October 12, 2002, namely the bombing of Paddy's Club, which was located close to the Sari Club in Kuta, Bali. According to Ganewati Wuryandari (2016) this Bali's attack had a broad impact on all aspects in Indonesia such as the socio-economic, political stability, and domestic security. Also, this terrorist attack also has killed 88 Australians that travelled in Bali.

Moreover, in fact, both Indonesia and Australia never imagined that a terrorist attack like this would happen to Indonesia, as Megawati asserted *"This Bali atrocity, should be a warning to us all that terrorism is a real threat,"* (BBC, 2002). More than that, PM Howard saw this incident as a transnational crime and as a serious protection for national security and stability of both countries. Therefore, PM Howard really understand that this kind of transnational crimes would

be affected Australia if there were not action be taken. Also, it might become the main challenge for the government to deal with in the future. As he mentioned (AU.gov, 2002):

“I think there is a limit, you can have international agreements but in the end every country has got to do within its own borders what is necessary to confront and deal with the terrorist challenge.”

(PM Howard, Press Conference October 25, 2002 in Mexico)

Given that, this study points that both leaders between Indonesia-Australia have the same perception towards terrorism as the threat and the big challenge for the two countries security. According to Sherlock (2002) the Bali atrocity has increased the signal of both government to conduct cooperation. Consequently, cooperation between Indonesia and Australia was essential to do as an effort to protect national security and the people of Indonesia and Australia from terrorism. As Prof. Dewi Fortuna Anwar of LIPI reaffirmed that:

“When there are non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, we can see a common threat that supports converging interests between Indonesia and Australia.”

(D. Fortuna Anwar, personal interview, September 6, 2019)

From this point, it can be argued the collaboration between Indonesia-Australia in countering terrorism was caused by mutual interest among the leaders. Further, Prime Minister Howard sent the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and both governments formed a joint investigation with *Densus 88* to inspect the Bali Bombing I case. Therefore, The Australian Federal Police (AFP) was the most significant foreign agencies involved in the investigation (more than 80 personnel), and soon became the closest working partner for the Indonesian police.

6. Conclusion

To conclude, the reality of the changes in the international and domestic environment has led to new perspectives in Indonesia's foreign policy. Guided by the neoclassical realist framework, this research was able to identify Indonesia's foreign policy through the discussion and analyses under President Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati's perceptions towards the International system in attempting to tackle domestic problems. Therefore, the perception of President Habibie has shaped starting by domestic and international factors, which were the

Asian Financial Crisis 1997 and East Timor issue. To deal with these issues, President Habibie tried to rely on the International community, such as the IMF and its shareholders, to solve the economic problem in Indonesia. However, the East Timor crisis could be argued as the main challenge for President Habibie to get this support. It was caused by the international community, such as the US and Australia have spotlighted and sharply criticized the human rights abuses in East Timor.

Nevertheless, under President Habibie's administration, it is proved that the East Timor crisis as the main problem of Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations. Three factors resulted in negative implications in Indonesia-Australia, namely Howard's letter and Howard's ambiguity policy over East Timor. First, a controversial letter from John Howard offered a recommendation for Habibie to follow a French way to solve its former colonial problem. However, Habibie felt offended, yet mad because Howard's suggestion showed that Indonesia was colonialist East Timor. Hence, undoubtedly, Howard's letter has influence Habibie to provide "self-determination rights" for East Timor whether the East Timor people chose to be independence from Indonesia or choose to integrate with autonomy privileges.

Second, the ambiguity of Howard's policy over East Timor, which exposed his attitude of whether to support East Timor as a part of Indonesia or support the referendum. Lastly, Australia's role during the INTERFERET mission to stabilize East Timor has shown that Howard has a national interest in this issue. With that, President Habibie gave a response to terminate the cooperation with Australia and criticized that Australia had to interfere with Indonesian domestic affairs.

Moreover, even there was no significant improvement in Indonesia-Australia relations under President Wahid. However, under President Megawati, the 9/11 incidents and the Bali atrocity in 2002 has become the main factors for Indonesia-Australia to cooperate in countering terrorism in the region. Both President Megawati and Prime Minister Howard agreed that terrorism is a new threat to the country's security. With that, it showed there were converging interests under positive realism by both countries to conduct cooperation further. Through the Joint Investigation and Intelligence Team, the Indonesian National Police and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have formed an anti-terror intelligence agency. This collaboration aims to uncover the causes of the Bali bombing terror | by sending 46 officers

to assist the investigation of the Indonesian police and assist in tracking down the Bali bombers. Overall, this section showed that Indonesian leader perceptions had driven a favourable implication in Indonesia-Australia through their foreign policy or national interest priorities.

All in all, the implication of Indonesia's foreign policy under President Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati has shown a complicated phenomenon towards Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations. Although there was no unclarity of Indonesia-Australia relations during President Wahid administration due to his focus mainly looking towards Asia, but Indonesia's foreign policy under President Habibie with East Timor issue and President Megawati with Bali atrocity 2002 directly had implications that lead volatility on Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations.

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Technology Transfer: A Case Study of Brunei Aquaculture Firms

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This paper aims to answer the enigma on the inability of local firms to receive and diffuse the technology transfer from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Joint Venture (JV) companies. To examine such issues, the process of technology transfer across Brunei aquaculture firms is therefore studied. The importance of the study remains on the ground condition of being under-researched. While numerous literatures have discussed technology transfer, minor research exists on 'how' technology is transferred especially in aquaculture, let alone be in Brunei Darussalam. This qualitative research, therefore, investigates the process whether it is intra-firm, licensing or/and international technology transfer and the problems that hinder the process through case studies to the local firms, JV and FDI firms in Brunei aquaculture sector. For a thorough understanding of the issue, an explanation of the development and current situation of aquaculture technology are also discussed. Following the results, recommendations and suggestions are put forward for future improvement, management, and development.

Keywords: Technology Transfer, Intra-firm, Licensing, Interfirm, International Technology Transfer, Foreign Direct Investment, Joint Ventures, Aquaculture,

1. Introduction

Hydrocarbon, a long-time source of wealth and one the “unexpected treasures” of Brunei, has backfired when it has become a source of demotivation for other industries to develop. The curse of ‘Dutch disease’ has resulted in resources to be left pristine and under-utilized. To undo the curse, diversifying the economy with the strategy to be in the position of Global Supply Chain (GSC) is formulated specifically in fisheries GSC. Brunei, whose sea is six-time larger than the size of its land, pristine and unexploited resources has made aquaculture industry to be promising (Oxford Business Group, 2016). However, to be in the GSC, the government have set the year 2035 productions goal to 269,377 metric tons which needs 17 percent of annual growth per year (Department of Fisheries, 2016, 2019b). Which sustainable fisheries practices of aquaculture surface as the sustainable practice to provide dynamic production and development.

Nonetheless, as a consequence of overspecialization on hydrocarbon, other technology advancements, particularly on aquaculture, were under-developed. With circumstances of comparative advantage on technological capabilities, it has resulted in the aquaculture industry to be less progressive due to lacking advanced technology readiness for high productivity. As the solution to such issue, FDI, JV and Transfer of Technology (TOT) are set to be the key strategies for the development of Brunei aquaculture industry, with the expectation that spillover effect to local firms and the industry would occur through the process of interfirm technology transfer (Kementerian Sumber-Sumber Utama dan Pelancongan, 2017; Mariani Sabtu, 2018).

Driven by these key strategies, it is found to be engaging to explore the process of the transaction of technology transfer across Brunei aquaculture firms along with the factors that might influence the transferring process to local firms.

2. Problem Statement

Lacking readiness in technologies and know-how is identified to be the main issue faced by the local firms in Brunei. Thus, to tackle this issue, a bottom-up approach to how technology transfer is transferred to firms is studied. The process of technology transfer of intra-firm, licensing and international technology transfer is among the process discussed in the context of this research.

a. Research Objectives

The research aims to understand the reason behind the inability of local firms to infuse the technology transferred from FDI and JV and to support such objective, the process of technology transfer across Brunei aquaculture firms of FDI, JV, and local firms are also being assessed.

b. Research Questions

Therefore, to accomplish such objective, these questions are raised to have a better understanding of the issue.

Main Research Question

- 1) What are the factors that challenge the ability of local firms to receive and diffuse technology transfer from Foreign Direct Investment and Joint Venture?

Sub Research Questions

- 1) What is the development and the current situation of aquaculture technology utilized in Brunei?
- 2) How TOT is transferred across Brunei aquaculture firms?
- 3) What are the problems encountered by firms when transferring technology?
- 4) What are other possible approaches to facilitate the TOT to the local firms?

3. Thesis Statement

Thesis statement offered in this research is; Readiness of the local firms and Brunei overall, to receive and diffuse the technology transfer are the important factor that can deter the use of advanced technology across Brunei aquaculture local firms, while JV is the mechanism for firms to acquire advanced technology easily

4. Literature Review

Although technology transfer is increasingly and extensively discussed as a field of study, the discussions are still found to be lacking regarding the process of 'how' technology is transferred. Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention, this research is the first that explores technology transfer in the scope of Brunei aquaculture firms.

Firstly, the concept of technology transfer is first to be reviewed to grasp the definition and understanding of the characteristic of TOT. Baranson (1976) defined, TOT, is transferring of the firm's ability to manufacture product or process to the recipient in another country. This is echoed and made clear by Khan, 2011 and; Sofian, 2012, that TOT is a package, responsible in transferring not limited to just equipment or hard technology but also the 'know-how' or soft technology of transaction of skills, management, marketing, customer services, and organizational structure. Nonetheless, most important remarks are shouted by Shiwattana (1991) and Maskus (2003), the concept of technology transfer also inclusive of its success,

which depends on the recipient's capability and ability to learn and absorb technology transferred to be applied to production purposes.

Second to that, to justify the first literature, channels of transfer also being reviewed to emphasize the focus of this field. Which this focus tends to be identified as the gap for this study. According to Smith (1995), UNCTAD (2001), Sofian (2012) and Diaconu (2014), FDI is the most crucial channel agency to accomplish technology transfer. Types of technology transferred, hard and soft technology were widely discussed.

Thirdly, the literature on public policies - effort to transfer is further dwell to strengthen the arguments of this research. A study by Sung and Plein (1997) has pointed to the State's crucial role that could determine the pathway of technology transfer, whether to flourish or decline. This study also highlighted four variables that influence TOT which is being applied to shape the framework of this research. In the same vein, Sofian (2012) has supported such claims by taking the success cases of Thailand and Norway backed by the state's prioritization on policies attracting investment TOT and its success is due to the policy's investment on human capital to absorb the technology transferred for spill over effect. Nonetheless, policies pointed out were limited to the surface and did not further address the policies on the process of technology transfer at the firm level.

Lastly, Brunei technology transfer trend and pattern is reviewed and proven to be under-researched. According to Sofian (2012), the justification pointed out to the less transparency on investment policy and promotion of technology transfer is not publicly exposed. According to ERIA AND OECD (2014), Brunei placed below average on the overall score for technology and technology transfer among all ASEAN nations. This report has provided insights into the situation of technology transferred; however it fails to mention the process of how technology is transferred. Nevertheless, there is only one literature that studies technology transfer as a case study to five Brunei-Japan JV firms, but the scope of the research was to study the cultural aspects and absorption level of technology transferred.

Therefore, after an extensive and thorough review of works of literature, there are massive gaps that needed to be addressed. This extensive literature has failed to mention the process

of transfer to firms, whether the transfer to be in the form of intra-firm, licensing or even international technology transfer, which this issue is also echoed by Smith (1995).


5. Methodology

This qualitative research is conducted by the collection of primary and secondary data. Accumulation of primary data is gathered in the form of government documents and publications and in-depth interviews with firm owners, academic experts, and government officials. Secondary data of newspaper and journal articles are also gathered to complement and support this research.

To clarify, this study is guided by a research framework that the author has formulate a framework based on the Technology Transfer Analysis, the works of Smith (1995), Sofian (2016) and Plein and Sung (1997) to achieve the research objectives (refer to Figure 1). Three variables have been set as main variables of this research—process, factors and firms' decision. These three variables are used to with aims to answer the research questions and achieved the objectives.

This process of technology transfer is shaped using the process of technology transfer and further discuss it using the case study as mentioned in the methodology section. Intrafirm, international technology transfer, licensing and interfirm technology transfer are the four processes of technology transfer that will be investigated.

Figure 1: Process of technology transfer across Brunei aquaculture firms



Source: Author's own framework based on the works of Smith (1995), Sofian (2016), and Plein and Sung (1997)

Nonetheless, for the purpose of better understanding, brief concepts or definition of these processes are offered. In the context of this research, intra-firm technology transfer refers to the transfer of technology or know-how from parent company in their home country to its subsidiary company in foreign market—which in this case is subsidiary company in Brunei.

While as for international technology transfer, in this context it refers to local firms whom transfer their technology or know-how via importation, whether it is in the form of equipment or laborer with no bondage with any firms and are independent while transferring such technology or know-how.

As for licensing, technology is transferred by local firms from other firms via license or agreement. Whereas, interfirm technology transfer is the transfer of technology or know-how

from one firm to another firm which in this research, interfirm process on the technology and know-how from FDI and JV to the local firms is expected to occur.

6. Scope and Limitations

Due to time constraint of this research, scope and limitations are applied in this study. The scope set in this research is only to study the transfer of technology to local firms from FDI and JV. This specific scope is set to answer the ability of firms to receive and diffuse the technology, which process of 'how' technology transfer is studies across Brunei aquaculture firms—Local firms, JV and FDI. Identifying the process, they opt when transferring the technology.

In addition, limitations on access to primary sources is included. In this context, it refers to the firms. Therefore, this study is only able to study nine firms—four local firms, four JV firms and one FDI firms.

7. Current Situation of Brunei Aquaculture Technology

High-advanced technology is the key to generate high productivity to reach a production goal of 269,377 metric tons by the year 2035 to ensure Brunei's position in the Global Supply Chain (GSC). From the data collected, the industry is exposed to both conventional and modern technology (refer to Figure 2). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy to highlight that most of the modern technology is largely transferred through the channels of FDI and JV.

With the use of these technology, and widespread use of conventional farming within the local firm owners, as of the year 2019, 17 percent of annual production growth is needed to achieve the 269, 377 metric tons of production by the year 2035 (Department of Fisheries, 2016; Department of Fisheries, 2019).

Figure 2: Types of technology operated in Brunei aquaculture industry

Category	Culture System
Marine Shrimp Culture	Recirculating Aquaculture System
	HDPE Pond Liners
	Mechanical Feeding System
Marine Fish Cage Culture	Offshore Cage Culture using High – density Polyethylene (HDPE)
	Inshore Cage Culture using Wooden Cages
Crab Culture	Recirculating Aquaculture System (RAS)
	Vertical Farming

Source: (Department of Fisheries, 2019a)

8. Government Role in Aquaculture sector and TOT to the industry

Mentioned intensively, government role is the backbone of technology transfer whether to flourish or to decline (Sung & Plein, 1997). Therefore, government role in this context is DOF, is discussed to investigate the factors that challenges the ability of local firms to receive and diffuse the technology from FDI and JV.

Being authoritarian in nature, government needs to build a road of strategy and support for the entrepreneurs or firms in order to thrive. From data gathered, a total of five assistance were offered by DOF for the benefits of firms. Those five supports compromises:

1. Government subsidies
2. Technical assistance
3. Providing technical advisory and monitoring support
4. Giving support in facilities and license
5. Roles in technology transfer to aquaculture industry

Government subsidies are further divided in rewarding of farm sites (Zohrah, 1996), which according to Mariani in Azaraimy (2018), a total of 18,000 hectares of offshore aquaculture sites are allocated for operation. This area is awarded to local firms, while it was on leased for JV and FDI operation.

Technical assistance offered include the assurance of water quality and survey of sites selection that is suitable for such species of fish to grow (Department of Fisheries, n.d.). According to informant from DOF, temperature, type of water, the salinity of the water is the that things can affect the growth of certain species.

Following the assistance of providing technical advisory and monitoring support, the government step-in by providing workshops for local entrepreneurs to be more proactive and progressive for the firms' development. For monitoring support, Mobile Technical Unit (MTU) is set up to monitor the up-to-date situation of firms and to report any emergency cases such as storms that have destroyed the farms, fish mortality due to diseases and other factors which under these circumstances, emergency measures to identify the disease caught by the fish and compensation is provided by the government for local firms to start over a new harvest.

Subsequent to that, DOF have provided fast-track for local firms' operation with support on facilities and licenses. The support services include supply of electricity, portable water is made available, and assists in obtaining licenses for foreign workers.

Finally, yet importantly, Ministry of Primary Resources and Tourism (MPRT) is responsible in securing technology transfer to the industry by the signing of JV and FDI operation in Brunei. Interfirm technology transfer from FDI and JV to local firms is expected to occur. As facilitation of procedures on monitoring TOT, few procedures were applied: -

1. Sustainable and supports environmental protection;
2. Fulfill the halal requirement of the fish feed and;
3. Support the implementation of Good Practices that ensure compliance on the basic requirement for safety, hygiene, and quality standard

Nonetheless, it is clear that there is absent of specification on what technology to transfer, how to transfer and ways for local firms to receive it. Thus, as a result, JV and FDI companies mainly perform the transfer through contract farming.

9. Importance of TOT to the industry

a. Research and Development and Knowledge creation in The Aquaculture industry

Knowledge creation is crucial in contributing to productivity in the workforce. Thus, to justify the importance of technology transfer to the industry, research and design (R&D) and knowledge creation are analyzed. Data gathered has pointed out to the low R&D and the considerably young vocational institution of IBTE in knowledge creation has created a gap in the invention and innovation of aquaculture technology which are the two important elements for absorption and diffusion of technology transferred. R&D in Brunei are mostly non-fisheries and aquaculture related, the loophole found is promotion on R&D investment is not well prioritized compare to promotion on business investment.

As for knowledge creation, IBTE being the sole knowledge creation agency in Brunei offering a one-year aquaculture and fisheries course, due to some limitations in terms of staffs and considerably young vocational program—only five intakes as of now from the year 2015 until 2019, they are only able to focus on the foundation of the theoretical knowledge and practical skills in handling aquaculture processes (IBTE, 2019). IBTE's main goal is to produce workforce for the industry and meeting the demand of workforce by the FDI and JV firms. Thus, elements of innovation and invention of aquaculture technologies remains limited, thus it is proven that TOT to the industry is vital for the industry further development.

b. Road to Global Supply Chain


To emphasized on the importance of TOT to the industry, it is wise to stress on the goal of Brunei in diversifying its economy by positioning themselves in the Global Supply Chain (GSC). As being said, in order to achieve such goal, Brunei fisheries production need to produce 269,377 metric tons by the year 2035, and 17 percent of annual growth is needed to achieve year 2035 goals (Department of Fisheries, 2016; Department of Fisheries, 2019).

With Brunei current situation on lack of two important agencies that can invent and develop technology for high productivity, TOT therefore is proven to be essential for Brunei to locate themselves in the GSC.

10. Process of TOT to Firms

This section explains the different processes of TOT to Brunei aquaculture firms. There are four different process of TOT to firms, namely intra-firm, licensing TOT, international TOT and Interfirm TOT (Refer to Figure 3). However, it is important to highlight that there are only three processes that occur across Brunei aquaculture firms—intra-firm, licensing and international technology transfer.

Figure 3: Different Process of Technology transfer firms



Source: Author's formulation of process of technology transfer to Brunei aquaculture firms based on own analysis of the data collection

Case studies of the firms are conducted to study the process of TOT. From the data obtained, the process of TOT is different between FDI, JV compare to the local firms. The superiority of FDI and JV in technological and know-how is usually transferred from the parent company via the process of intra-firm technology transfer. This readiness in technology and know-how has made them be the provider of technologies, that the industry expected a signifying technology spillover effect to occur.


In contrast to local firms, small in size has made them dependent on an external source of obtaining technology (Hassink, 1996). Lacking readiness in technological and know-how, they are inclined to depend on external sources and be recipients of technology via the process of licensing TOT and International TOT. However, interestingly, they do have an option to access technology from FDI and JV to be transferred via interfirm (firm to firm), but this was not the case of technology transfer happening across Brunei local firms. While, interfirm

technology transfer in the first place is the key strategy of the government expected to occur for technology spillover effect to take place.

11. Access Mechanism to Technology Transfer: Local firm's refusal

Lack of readiness in infrastructural and skills has resulted in local firms to seek for means to transfer technologies. As discussed, licensing and international technology transfer are the preferred process of the local firms in obtaining technology. As mentioned above, TOT from FDI and JV can be accessed from the process of interfirm TOT through contract farming, and it is included as part to access to technology transfer for the local firms. Therefore, from the analysis of data collected, access mechanisms to technology transfer can be divided into two, categorized into contract farming and ground zero (refer to Figure 4).

Figure 4: Local firm's access mechanism to technology transfer



Source: Author's own analysis on local firm's access mechanism to technology transfer

In the context of this research, contract farming refers to local farmers to have gained access to technologies and know-how from FDI or JV through an agreement. The benefits of this mechanisms, local farmers have gained access to supply of fish fry from the FDI or JV hatchery, technical support, knowledge, guidance to solve problems especially when dealing with fish diseases and business model as set by JV or FDI companies to ensure success (Golden Corporation, 2015; Hiseaton, 2019; Nur Nabai, 2017) The production is then bought back by JV and FDI companies at an agreed price as stated in the agreement.

Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, contract farming is not a preferred choice of the locals to transfer technology. From the above mechanisms, ground zero is becoming a trend for the

local firm's operation. Which they tend to prefer TOT via licensing and international technology transfer to build their firms from the ground.

12. The Rationality of Firm's Decision

The cornerstone that hinders the local firms to receive and diffuse the technology transfer for spillover effect from FDI and JV can be further divided into external and internal factors. Both these factors are identified to influence the local firm's decision to rather operate their firms from ground zero instead of clinging on the FDI and JV through contract farming approach.

External factors compromise of government roles and taxation on transfer procedure. Government roles are found to be beneficial for local firms to operate from ground zero more than contract farming. With ground zero operation, government support will be in terms of awarding large aquaculture sites which they tend to fully utilize it by applying conventional farming which obvious justification of cost is clarified in the internal factor below. Other than that, fast track for obtaining foreign workers license, qualified to receive subsidies, and compensation were also granted for local firms in any case of emergency.

As for taxation, it was found that this issue became the barrier for local firms to cling on FDI and JV which they will eventually have to obtain such technology which is taxable. Thus, this has become major concerns for local firms, which most decide to operate their firms from ground zero with the use of conventional farming.

Deviate to internal factors, the corresponding factors pointed out to the willingness to transfer, absorption of technology, capabilities to transfer and nature of technology, as elaborated in the framework of this research (refer to Figure 1).

Willingness to transfer focus on the compliance of JV and FDI in sharing their technology and know-how. Initially, the process of technology transfer from JV and FDI is found to be confined within just the company, transpired because the transfer only occurred in the approach of contract farming. Therefore, contract farming appears to be the fundamental issue that triggered the local firms to operate their firms from ground zero. The fact is, they believe contract farming made them be bound to strict commitments set by the FDI and JV

companies. Local firms perceived the situation as if they are merely being 'used' as channels by FDI and JV companies to secure their production output, instead of receiving and transfusing the technology and know-how to the firms. Thus, it is a sufficient ground to say the extent of willingness to transfer is 'anchored' by the means only transferring the technologies and know-how through the method of contract farming.

Other justification laid on the ground of local firms' capability to transfer. Insufficient capital investment and human capital are the concerns of these capabilities. The cost of investment is being emphasized heavily by local firm owners, in which uncertainty on the return of investment is identified to be the source of the persistence on the application of conventional farming techniques.

That being the case, the third driver on the absorption of technology also determined the popularity of ground zero options within the local firms. Their concern when adopting new technology is their ability to absorb knowledge and skills. Their concern again rests on the risk of utilizing high-advanced technology, which requires skilled workers that they are sure their line of the workforce is not able to absorb. Therefore, to avoid this risky situation of job mismatch, this has justified their reasons to prefer ground zero of the conventional farming operation.

The final factor laid on the nature of technology itself. Feasibility to transfer technology is raised as an issue. Convenience is highlighted as part of the benefit of ground zero because it enables local firms to customized conventional technology to fit their comfort. Moreover, the nature of conventional technology is less-hassle since most of the resources can be obtained in Brunei itself. Unlike the transfer of technology which in this case of contract farming, the unfamiliarity and hassle of importation process are identified to be the barriers, unappealing towards the local firm's owners.

In conclusion, based on the interview sessions, it can be said that the firms can transfer new technology to their firms, but they refuse to such changes as they are hesitant about the absorption of such technologies. Uncertainty to the change is the main argument, that ground zero is better. As ground zero is convenient to obtain, cheaper, wiser, and most importantly

able to give assurance to the local firms, contrary to the condition of investing in new technologies and know-how with no assurance that it will be a return of investment.

13. Conclusion and Recommendation

In conclusion, intra-firm, licensing, and international technology transfer are the processes of how TOT is conducted across Brunei aquaculture firms. However, interfirm TOT process between FDI and JV to local firms is possible to take place through contract farming. Nonetheless, that is not the case for Brunei. This inability of local firms to transfer and diffuse the technology is due to the refusal of local firms to receive the technology for their firm's operation. Merely being 'used' by FDI and JV, uncertainty and hesitancy to shift to new technologies are the main analysis that has been found. External and internal factors is the driving force that influence such decisions. External factors—government roles and taxation of transfer procedure—and internal factors—the willingness of JV and FDI to transfer, ability to transfer, the capability to transfer, and the nature of technology.

With the situation of Brunei experiencing the wide utilization of conventional farming technology and less on the application of intensive farming techniques, low R&D and insufficient knowledge creation and the essential to locate themselves in the GSC have justified that TOT is important for the industry development. However, hesitancy on the ability to adapt to the technology and the return of investment are the main concerns of the local firm owners.

Nonetheless, to provide assurance and exposure to the TOT to be well-received by local firms, there are few proposed recommendations and policies to ensure the success and diffusion of the technology transfer. Firstly, to improve the current situation of TOT to Brunei aquaculture local firms, it is substantial for the government to establish comprehensive requirements and regulations to guarantee the JV and FDI TOT to be conducted. The government needs to provide specific details on what to transfer such as equipment to transfer, knowledge on handling the operation, business management and operation, engineering skills, and others. This is to assure the maximization of the opportunity to be achieved.

Secondly, given the fact that technology transfer is inclined to be well accepted via training and workshop compare to contract farming, thus for local firms to be well exposed for application and utilization of intensive modern technology, it is a wise strategy to implement policies that encourages training and workshop to put into practice. This training not only acts as a theoretical and practical base for entrepreneurs to be exposed and it is encouraged for training also offers the road or way for local entrepreneurs on how to transfer or obtain such technology, either by licensing or others. By this, it can be seen as 'less hassle' towards the local firm owners to shift and adapt to new intensive technologies and assurance is expected to build up as success cases are proven.

Thirdly, it is significant for the government to establish a Technology Transfer Agency to facilitate and supervise the TOT process. This agency is expected to act as a bridge in ensuring the transfer of new technology from the universities and large firms (FDI and JV) to the local firms. Through this agency, technology transferred can be diffused, resulting in more innovation and new technologies will be invented.

To justify the third recommendation, the strategy in knowledge creation needs to be strengthened. For short term strategy, the existing vocational institutions need to boost their roles, not only in operating aquaculture but also to implement invention and innovation in aquaculture technology. This can be done by having a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with other overseas fisheries institutions. As for long term strategy, the expansion of knowledge creation is crucial for the development of the aquaculture industry itself. Universiti Brunei Darussalam (UBD) and Universiti Teknologi Brunei (UTB) are both the well-known institutions on its engineering faculties. Therefore, for TOT to diffuse, the knowledge creation institutions are required to live up to its role by offering courses and faculties, specifically in fisheries and aquaculture. By having this, innovation can grow and enable the transferred technology to serve its purpose in the receiving countries.

Lastly, the government needs to be progressive in promoting and emphasizing on the R&D investment. The government needs to be proactive not only in attracting business investment but also be specific to favor and attract the R&D investment, specifically in fisheries and

aquaculture. To justify this, R&D is the foundation in technology and stable human capital development to provide the high-skilled workforce for the industry's productivity.

As a final remark, technology transfer is a promising prospect for the development Brunei aquaculture industry, if technology transfer is fully utilized. Nonetheless, currently, it is still missing its backbone of 'recipient's assurance', R&D and knowledge creation, to be able to receive, diffuse the technology transfer for further innovation and invention for wide application towards production purposes.

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Sustaining the Blood Brothers' Relations? Indonesia's Settlement on the Issues of Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Malaysia

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Filling the lack of research of Indonesian women migrant domestic workers (MDW) in the foreign policy realm, this paper explores Indonesia's efforts to protect its MDW in order to discover the reasons behind the stagnancy of MDW settlement in Malaysia by using the Realist perspective. Since Konfrontasi, the turbulent relations between the so-called 'blood brothers' have intensified the sensitivity on various matters, making the issues of MDW remain as a thorn in the relations despite the relatively good term in the present day. Based on such circumstances, this paper hypothesizes that Indonesia has to be cautious and vigilant in dealing with this matter as it might disrupt its prioritized national interest, which is the bilateral cooperation in other sectors. In this regard, this paper traces back the brief history of Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral relations and its current development to learn the underlying conditions before examining the costs and benefits of the policy alternatives that could be taken by Indonesia on this matter. The obtained information from the interviews with Indonesian officials stationed in Malaysia is then analyzed through the Realist lens to figure out its congruence with the hypothesis that has been proposed.

Keywords: Migrant Domestic Workers (MDW), Indonesia-Malaysia Relations, Realism, Foreign Policy, National Interest

1. Introduction

Domestic work remains as a major occupation taken by Indonesian women migrant workers in Malaysia, which has become their main destination country (BNP2TKI, 2018). The activities have generated huge benefits for both Indonesia and Malaysia, but cases of abuse and mistreatment have been continuously happening due to the inexistence of proper regulations that forces Indonesia and Malaysia to rely on the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). First concluded in 2006, it has received endless criticisms on its lack of concrete protection measures despite the amendment made in 2011 to end the moratorium imposed since 2009 (Malahayati, 2015). In the present day, the sending of

Indonesian women migrant domestic workers (MDW)² proceeds by using the MoU which has expired in 2016 and not yet renewed.³

The background of Indonesia-Malaysia relations as ‘blood brothers’ in the Southeast Asia region has made this issue becomes more intriguing to be examined further, especially when *Konfrontasi*, the conflict that has severely damaged their relations in the past, could even trigger the establishment of ASEAN (Narine, 2002, p. 12; Wey, 2016).

2. Problem Statement

Although the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia experienced several ups and downs post-*Konfrontasi*, currently the two countries are in a relatively good term (Liow, 2008; Parameswaran, 2018). To settle the issues of MDW, Indonesia has been carrying out bilateral negotiations. Yet, there has not been any significant improvements, presumably due to its national interests’ prioritization. While the prolonged process continues, the number of MDW who become victims on the field persists.

a. Research Objectives

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the possible reasons behind the stagnancy of the settlement on MDW issues in Malaysia from Indonesia’s point of view by describing the measures that have been taken by Indonesia, the possible policy alternatives, and also its current direction of foreign policy.

b. Research Questions

In order to fulfil the objective above, this paper is guided by the following research question: “Why does Indonesia hesitate to take assertive measures towards Malaysia in order to protect MDW?”

² The term MDW used in this paper specifically refers to Indonesian women migrant domestic workers who work in Malaysia unless stated otherwise.

³ Interview at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 29 July 2019.

3. Literature Review

In order to address the importance and the gap of this issue, this paper categorizes the reviewed literature into three themes: MDW, Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral relations, and Indonesia's foreign policy.

The importance of MDW issues has attracted the attention of scholars, resulting in studies of MDW from various perspectives, such as culture, gender, and foreign policy. Chin (1998) argues that the segregated nature of MDW is caused by “the patriarchal-class environment”. Such a boundary is said to be ‘dimming out’ the domestic sphere, putting it aside as the economic development agenda of the country continues to be pushed. The age of Chin’s classic work indicates that the issue has been going on for decades. Yet, it remains unsettled until the present day. Meanwhile, Elias (2013) through her feminist perspective points out the classification of MDW into the vulnerable group that is in constant need of protection from the state, which has been portrayed as masculine. The gender-based point of view also emphasized the commodification of women where the state sees women as tradable commodities internationally, echoing Chin (1997).

Furthermore, Setyawati (2013) argues that both bilateral cooperation and MoU between the origin and destination countries remain important and relevant despite the domestic efforts made. Yet, there has not been much literature on MDW that discusses the foreign policy side. Thus, this paper aims to fulfill the gap by bringing the issue to the state level, where the main policies are made. Also, the Realist perspective utilized in this paper makes it possible to see the issue in a bigger picture of the Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral relations, which in this context is affecting the settlement process itself.

It then leads to the second literature theme: the ups and downs of Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral relations. According to Liow (2008), Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral relations have been experiencing more strains than harmony despite the fact that they are ‘blood brothers’. He argues that *Konfrontasi*—with the “*Ganyang Malaysia!* (Crush Malaysia!)” slogan—is the turning point for the relations to go downhill. However, Wardhani (2008) argues that the relations improved when Suharto and Mahathir came into power post-*Konfrontasi* before the heightened tension was back as they stepped down.

Liow (2008) further argues that during the disputes, each side most of the time showed the tendency to put the blame on the other party for the failure on resolving the problem. Also, Wardhani (2008) elaborates on how *Konfrontasi* tends to be brought up as a reminder of ‘a bitter betrayal’ to their kinship and closeness in the past. Across the literature reviewed on the bilateral relations, the issues of MDW were mentioned, but there has not been literature that discusses deeply on the unavoidable connection between the history and the current settlement process.

The review on the last theme, which is Indonesia’s foreign policy, provides an understanding of the underlying foundation and the brief development of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Hatta (1953) lays the foundation of Indonesia’s foreign policy, stating that the country aspires to preserve international peace. It understands the importance of stability for economic development, which one of the ways is by initiating good relations with the neighboring countries. Despite the occurrence of *Konfrontasi* just a decade after its establishment, the underlying principles of Indonesia’s foreign policy could not simply be neglected as those persist to serve as the basis for the current direction of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Weatherbee (2005) emphasized how Indonesia has been trying to ‘undo the damage’ after since in order to comply with its principles.


In regard to the specific issues of MDW, Elias (2013b) argues that although both countries are concerned, the lack of substantial improvement remains. She pointed out the limited availability of literature that specifically examines these issues, especially on the Indonesian side. Thus, this paper attempts to contribute through the focus on Indonesia’s foreign policy.

4. Methodology

This qualitative research analyzed the issue through a Realist perspective. The data processed in this paper were gathered from the semi-structured interviews conducted in the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur and Indonesian Consulate General in Penang, Malaysia. However, the identity of the respective interviewees is not disclosed in this paper to prevent future implications. In addition, the data obtained from various online newspapers and official websites were also utilized to support the analysis.

According to Allison (1971, p. 4), one could predict a state's choice or what it would have done through the calculation of the rational decisions that could be done in a particular situation through a rational action model. Mingst & Arreguin-Toft (2017, p. 164) came up with the following figure, which is applied in this paper to explain the findings.


Figure 1: The Rational Model of Indonesia's Rational Decision on the Settlement of MDW Issues in Malaysia Decision Making



Source: Mingst & Arreguin-Toft (2017, p. 164)

Figure 2 below provides the guideline for the analysis as the rational model of decision making offered in the previous section has been applied to the case. The explanation for each stage of the process is discussed in sequence throughout the following sections.

Figure 2: The Application of Rational Model of Decision Making to Indonesia’s Foreign Policy on the issues of MDW in Malaysia



Source: Author’s interpretation based on Mingst and Arreguin-Toft (2017)

5.1 The Stagnancy of Indonesia-Malaysia Bilateral Negotiation on MDW Issues

As the MoU was expiring in 2016, Indonesia immediately requested a renegotiation through the draft proposal for the new MDW arrangement. However, until the interview was conducted in July 2019, Malaysia has not yet responded by proposing its counter draft. According to the interviewee, the reason is that Malaysia has been working on a common guideline that regulates all MDW in Malaysia, which includes MDW from other sending countries. Despite the stagnancy for three years after the MoU expiration, the interviewee claimed that both parties could not yet agree on the ‘*middle way*’ that accommodates their interests, instead of merely

blaming the delay to the Malaysian side.⁴ However, it is recently reported that the two governments are expected to conclude the new agreement by the end of 2019 (Septiari, 2019).

5.2 The Goal: Better Protection of Indonesian MDW in Malaysia

Both the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Manpower are the main stakeholders in the MDW issues. It has been agreed that the main goal is to ensure the dignity and safety of MDW during their employment abroad. In this matter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible to determine the safety of the destination country, including issuing the advice on moratorium when it is deemed necessary.⁵

To achieve a well-protected MDW in Malaysia, the Indonesian side believes that Malaysia with its capacity as the state should be involved further in the domestic settlement, including its law and implementation. The interviewee emphasized the importance of the dispute settlement mechanism in this matter as the unclear framework tends to make the Malaysian side nullifies the case if the MDW involved is the irregular one. It needs to be improved since the case shall remain open as long as there is an employment relation formed despite the MDW status.⁶

5.3 Policy Alternatives for the Settlement of MDW Issues in Malaysia

This paper came up with three possible options that could be taken by Indonesia in this matter based on what Indonesia has done and is currently doing. The first option is for Indonesia to choose the diplomatic way through bilateral negotiations. The second option is for Indonesia to implement a second moratorium on the sending of MDW to Malaysia. As for the last option, it is for Indonesia to impose economic sanctions on Malaysia. Further explanations are elaborated in the next section.

⁴ Interview at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 29 July 2019.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

5.4 Costs and Benefits Analysis of Indonesia's Policy Alternatives on MDW Issues

5.4.1 Bilateral Negotiations

Understanding the history of the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia through the Realist perspective, it shall be noted that the prevention of conflict reoccurrence is important for the state's survival. In this case, reflecting to *Konfrontasi* and the following conflicts after, it is rather necessary to avoid any conflict that would end up costly for both parties.

Indonesia and Malaysia conduct the annual bilateral meetings through the Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) where various issues are being discussed and evaluated, including the issues of MDW. Specific follow-up meetings are usually carried out after. However, recently the prolonged negotiation process has got more tangled with the establishment of *Sistem Maid Online* (SMO) which unilaterally established by the Malaysian Immigration since 2018 to decrease the recruitment fee by allowing the employers to hire the prospective MDW directly.⁷

Although choosing the option of bilateral negotiations could prevent harmful damage to the relations, it comes costly in terms of time. During those spent time, the cases on the field continue to increase. The high number of MDW who stay at the missions' shelter waiting for their case to be settled surely requires daily logistics provided by the Indonesian government. Another cost that Indonesia has to bear is that the impossibility to avoid power relations in the negotiation itself, knowing Malaysia's stronger bargaining power due to its position as the host with all the sovereignty on its domestic settlement regarding this issue.

However, the sacrifices could come in handy as there is a high chance for the bilateral relations to be sustained. From that point, further cooperation in other sectors could emerge and strengthen. Indonesia did not have to wait for a long time to enjoy the benefit. Aside from the mushrooming bilateral cooperation, Indonesia managed to proof its closeness by having Siti

⁷ Interview at the Indonesian Consulate General in Penang, Malaysia on 25-26 July 2019 and the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 29 July 2019.

Aisyah, the Indonesian who was involved in the murder case of North Korea's Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia in 2017, to be freed from any charges in 2019 while Doan Thi Huong, the Vietnamese who was involved along with her, proceeded with the trial until being freed two months later (Ellis-Petersen, 2019a, 2019b).

5.4.2 Second Moratorium

The Indonesian Ambassador to Malaysia Rusdi Kirana proposed another moratorium on the sending of MDW in September 2017 during the meeting with the Indonesian Consul Generals stationed in Malaysia (Rezkisari, 2017). The moratorium plan blew up at the beginning of 2018 after the death of Adelina Lisao, an MDW in Penang who was severely abused and mistreated by her employers (Septiari, 2018). Although it arose in coincidence with the enactment of SMO, no official statement could be found regarding that.

Imposing a second moratorium could cost Indonesia the job opportunity loss for prospective MDW who mostly originated from poor regions. They could have earned nearly five times higher than the salary they could get in Indonesia, but they were forced to remain living below the poverty line (Renaldi, 2018). If they insisted to go through the irregular lane, the cost Indonesia must bear increased as their status tends to be more vulnerable to malpractices, which in the end it is the state who is responsible for them. In addition, the possibility of remittance loss could harm Indonesia as it depends on MDW's contribution. The cost would be bigger if Indonesia implemented the moratorium not only on the sending of MDW but also on the formal migrant workers to Malaysia, as what the interviewee mentioned that they once planned to do so in order to intensify the threat to the Malaysian side.⁸ On top of that all, the moratorium would create turbulence to the relations.

However, according to the interviewee, a moratorium is not the final decision on this issue as it is being implemented to provide leverage for the stagnant negotiation process.⁹ From the first moratorium, Malaysia should have learned how it affected its side. Previously, Malaysia decided to shift towards Cambodia to supply MDW, but the same incidents happened. Cambodia then followed Indonesia's step and stopped sending its MDW in 2011 (Hierofani,

⁸ Interview at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 29 July 2019.

⁹ *Ibid.*

2016; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Responding to the second moratorium threat, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister delivered his regret with “aggrieved at learning” (Today Online, 2018), while the Malaysian Ambassador to Indonesia Datuk Seri Mohamed Hashim suggested that more intense discussions among the two governments shall be conducted instead (Bernama, 2018).

5.4.3 Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions are the other possible option that Indonesia could take as a more assertive approach. In fact, Indonesia imposing economic sanctions on Malaysia is not something new as it once did during *Konfrontasi*. Such an event was able to highlight Indonesia’s position in the region through its size and ‘disruptive potential’ until today (Narine, 2002, p. 12; Wey, 2016).

Choosing the option of economic sanctions would direct more towards a lose-lose situation instead, especially when the economic ties between the involved parties are considerably strong. It would not merely hit the state level but goes immediately into the lower level, for example, disrupting financial flows which could be costly for the trade activities and heighten the risk of the businesses’ continuity. Not only harming the economy, but it might also generate a domino effect by sparking political instability as the ‘injured’ parties go against the government (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007). Indonesia supplies mineral fuels and oil to Malaysia as its top commodities worth approximately US\$3.19 billion (Trading Economics, 2019), which definitely is not a small amount to be sacrificed. The imposing of economic sanctions also opens the possibility for Malaysia to retaliate as its self-help measure instead of responding to the signal sent by Indonesia through the sanctions. Aside from harming both Malaysia and Indonesia’s own economy, economic sanctions could also be a boomerang to Indonesia in terms of international relations. The damaged relations with Malaysia are only part of it. Learning the lesson from *Konfrontasi*, Indonesia’s aggressiveness has costed the halt of economic assistance from the IMF and the United States during that time (Kupchan, 2010).

After all the costs Indonesia has to pay, the possibility for Indonesia to be able to gain benefits from it, in fact, is not that high. If things go accordingly to what Indonesia intended to, such measures could generate intensive pressures on Malaysia to settle the MDW issues through the necessary measures as requested—concluding the agreement, provide better and

concrete protection for MDW, and most presumably domestic labor law reform regarding MDW. However, the biggest goal remains difficult to achieve when such harm has been done (Doxey, 1980). Despite the low possibility for Indonesia to achieve its main goal through this alternative, such a harsh measure and sacrifice would not only attract the Malaysian government's attention and its citizens but definitely the international world towards Malaysia and its offending policies. At the same time, Indonesia's firmness on its stance would be able to enhance its image as it insists to uphold a certain principle, which in this context is the MDW's right to be able to work abroad safely and dignified (Doxey, 1980).

5.5 Best Outcome at the Least Cost: Proceed with the Bilateral Negotiation

According to the findings from the recent development of the issue, Indonesia's current stance is to proceed with the bilateral negotiation as the best policy with the least cost. The decision aligns with its current national interest aside from merely based on the costs and benefits derived out of each possible option. In this context, it fulfills Indonesia's interest to preserve international peace and good relations with its neighbors. In addition, it also aligns with Indonesia's view that peace and stability are essential to support the economic development of the country (Hatta, 1953). Most importantly, *Konfrontasi* has provided a great lesson for Indonesia not to repeat the same aggressiveness that resulted in devastation for the country itself and shifted the ground of the Southeast Asia region.

Indonesia's aspiration has been reflected consistently through its current foreign policy direction. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the main agent who implements it, clearly stated on its strategic map and goals that Indonesia aims to increase its international presence, participation, and influence. Also, to enhance its leadership in the region, living up its *primus inter pares* status in ASEAN. From its cooperative stance, eventually, Indonesia will be able to maintain its good image internationally (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019b, 2019c). Furthermore, Indonesia has emphasized its principles in bilateral cooperation, that it would not intervene in the other party's domestic affairs, reject the use of coercive measures, and uphold the consensus in decision-making (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019a). Therefore, based on those statements, this paper argues that the most assertive measure Indonesia could take in this issue is limited to the level of the moratorium as imposing economic sanctions would not align with its national interests.

Another reason behind Indonesia's decision could be explained by the close relations between the two countries that have been showcased across various occasions recently. Indonesia is the first Southeast Asian country that Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad visited after he got back into power. Such a visit from the PM himself provides a symbolic statement despite the challenges that remain between the two countries. PM Mahathir has been rather generous with his remarks for the 'blood brother' by emphasizing their status as the 'closest neighbor' and how close the kinship between them is (Parameswaran, 2018). The growing closeness was further emphasized through President Joko Widodo's visit to Malaysia in return (PresidenRI, 2019). It is then perceived as an opportunity for Indonesia to be maximized to push the agenda of concluding a new agreement on MDW. In addition, it is also affirmed by the interviewee that PM Mahathir has displayed more willingness to settle the MDW issues from the roots and currently reviewing the common guideline for further steps. His initiative to invite various stakeholders and observers in the decision-making process is also greatly appreciated by Indonesia, which has been included as an observer.¹⁰

The fact that Indonesia has been seen as a natural leader in the region and its clash with Malaysia in the past that became one of the reasons for ASEAN's establishment could further risk the stability in the region itself if Indonesia ever chose to take the coercive way. It is also being argued that after more than six decades of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, both countries shall move on to the new level of interaction by attempting to suppress any kind of unnecessary sparks and make use of the closeness to gain benefit from it (Kartika & Sinatra, 2017).

5.6 Indonesian MDW Issues in Malaysia: Questioning Its Prioritization

Based on the interviews and the data gathered, it has been repeatedly claimed that Indonesia always prioritizes MDW and their protection is the state's responsibility. However, the fact on the field could not really provide convincing proof that Indonesia has been doing so. The continuous flow of criticism from scholars and activists towards the Indonesian government

¹⁰ Interview at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 29 July 2019.

on this issue stresses it further. Thus, it is necessary to re-examine such a claim in order to evaluate the real priority for Indonesia's foreign policy.

The Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs listed the excellent service and protection of Indonesian citizens and legal entities abroad as the **fifth strategic goal** it aims for in the period of 2015-2019. Its position on the list raised further questions about the state's priority on the protection of MDW which falls under the category. To provide a clearer understanding, the complete list is as follows, translated from the original version in Bahasa Indonesia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019c):

1. Strong maritime and border diplomacy;
2. Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN;
3. Indonesia's increasing participation in international affairs;
4. Strong economic diplomacy;
5. Excellent service and protection of Indonesian citizens and legal entities abroad;
6. High-quality foreign policy;
7. Strong national support and commitments on foreign policy and international agreements;
8. Effective monitoring of diplomacy outcomes.

Indonesia inclines to show its strong stance on defending MDW when it comes to high-profile cases. Statements such as the planning of moratorium and President Joko Widodo's plan on stopping the sending of MDW to all destination countries after the continuous death of MDW are some of the examples (The Jakarta Post, 2015). However, President Joko Widodo's remarks on MDW in Hong Kong in the following year has sparked criticism regarding the protection of MDW in general. He was seen to be ignorant of his own people due to his 'advice' on not to create frictions over '*small things*' (DW, 2017). The contrasting statement makes the prioritization of the issue became unclear once again as at the same time it displayed Indonesia's concern about its image and relations with other countries, which eventually determines their further cooperation, especially in the economic sector.

President Joko Widodo has been seen to be keener in settling Indonesia's domestic affairs instead of international affairs. The tendency seems to continue for his second term, emphasizing Indonesia's economic development (Sukma, 2019). The economy has been his

main focus through the attempts to invite more foreign direct investment (FDI) by boosting Indonesia's economic diplomacy (Bhaskara, 2019).

Indonesia believes that stability is the key to economic development. In regard to that, Indonesia has set it to be one of its core national interests (Sukma, 2019). For that reason, it is unlikely for Indonesia to risk the relations with Malaysia on the settlement of MDW issues as any damage to the relations has a high possibility to cause turbulence to both domestic and regional stability.

5. Conclusion

The stagnancy of the bilateral negotiations on the settlement of MDW issues in Malaysia has raised questions on the real hindrance behind it, especially the question on Indonesia's hesitant stance to take a more assertive measure in protecting its own nationals. Began with the assumption that the state carries out its decision based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits from the possible policy alternatives, this paper has concluded several findings.

The closer relations between Indonesia and Malaysia recently has become one of the reasons why Indonesia decided to proceed with the diplomatic way in settling this matter despite the lengthy process and the continuous flow of MDW who are being abused and mistreated. Indonesia has learned from its history, particularly from *Konfrontasi*, that assertive measures could not only harm both sides and damage their bilateral relations but also generate a domino effect on the stability of the Southeast Asia region in general. The instability would then be disadvantageous to Indonesia's economy as the country has been prioritizing its economy first although at the same time it claimed to be prioritizing MDW protection. Thus, Indonesia would not risk the stability that is essential for its economy by taking assertive measures on settling the MDW issues in Malaysia.

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A Study of Japan's ODA to Myanmar Agriculture: A Case Study of the Agricultural Extension Human Resource Development Project

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The findings of the study indicate that change of mindsets of farmers contributes to a greater extent, to success in implementation of the project and that there are serious challenges which influence and hinder them from continuing the Japanese agricultural practices and techniques. It can be concluded that Agricultural Extension Human Resource Development Project (AEHRD) provides satisfaction and has positive impacts on the grass roots in Myanmar although it is not a perfect accomplishment. Although Myanmar is mainly an agriculture country and rice is the staple food, development of rice industry is not much improved. Myanmar has excellent potential for global food security as it has many favourable conditions to increase agricultural products. By means of Japan's ODA to Myanmar, JICA implemented the AEHRD Project in collaboration with MAS in two villages in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta Region and conducted extension trainings from 2008 to 2010. This paper evaluates the impact of the agricultural aid programme to Myanmar grass-roots specifically the delta region, applying Service Quality Model (Parasuraman et al – 1991) and JICA's impact evaluation approach. Data are collected through in-depth interview to agriculture extension staff and participant and non-participant farmers as well as responsible official from Myanmar Agriculture Service (MAS). Data obtained from MAS, JICA and information from official websites are also included in this study.

Keywords: *Japan, ODA, Agriculture, Extension, Myanmar*

1. Introduction

Myanmar is developing country and its agricultural sector is the major sector where 60 % of the GDP of the country come from and employing 65 % of the work force of Myanmar. Rice is the major crop which covers 60 % of cultivated area in Myanmar and other crops such as pulses, groundnut, sugarcane, beans and sesame also cover other 40 % of cultivated area. Rice grows mainly in the regions such as Yangon, Ayeyarwaddy, Thanintharyi, Rakkhine and Mon. The agricultural sector of Myanmar provides 30 percent of the country's GDP and the Government of Myanmar regards agriculture and its associated industries as the most important sector for economic development. The Government of Myanmar also pursued human resource development for agricultural development through training centers and higher education institutions and is promoting measures to build up the agricultural human resource development organizations. Myanmar needs high techniques and skilled expertise for agricultural sector development. As agriculture sector is the most important sector in Myanmar, agricultural education, training, research and extension should be prioritized. In the process of improving the agricultural sector, conducting training, offering education programs are vital to the development of human resources.

The Government of Japan has been implementing cooperation projects for improvement of all-round development of Myanmar for many years. Japanese assistance to Myanmar covers various areas including - Assistance for improvement of the livelihood of people; - the development of Agriculture and Rural - Assistance for ethnic people in Myanmar - Disaster prevention - Health care, social welfare - Strengthen the Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Project and partnership with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

1. Significance of the study

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effectiveness of Japan's ODA to Myanmar agriculture, with a case study of the Agricultural Extension Human Resource Development Project, which is developed to educate farmers with a purpose to cultivate high-yield quality

crops in every season. This training was jointly organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation of and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

2. Research Questions and Research Objectives

The research questions are

How Japan's ODA, the Agricultural Extension Human Resource Development Project, initiated by JICA, is perceived by farmers in Zalun township in Myanmar and how it is effective to them in terms of their needs, technical skill and cultivation methods.

The objective of this research is

- to investigate the success of the Agricultural Extension Human Resource Development (AEHRD) project by JICA

3. Literature Review:

In literature review, Development perspective, Aid Effectiveness, Recipients' Perspective and Myanmar and agriculture development were discussed. Foreign aid has been a controversial topic and debates for scholars to discuss and consider for quite a number of years. Since some of the programs of foreign aid have been criticized for benefiting the donor countries themselves than the recipient countries, scholars have been analysing and evaluating aid and its effectiveness. There is no definite right or wrong answer to these opinions. It depends on the context and perceptions of the recipients. Whatever it is, ODA exists due to the needs of the recipient countries. It is better to have a look at the perspective of development.

From development perspective, most studies claimed that foreign aid has engaged in the support of the development projects, boosting national budget and debt relief and that it leads the developing countries to middle income status. Omer and Yazuz, (2013) mentioned that foreign aid, in general, is promoted as a necessity for the assisting of economic development in the least developed countries. Radelet (2006) claimed that the purpose of foreign aid is to encourage economic growth, support food consumption and other materials,

strengthen education, health, environment or political system and help stabilize an economy after economic shocks.

There are many arguments and discussions in literature about achieving aid effectiveness for the recipients. According to S Burall, D Roodman (2006), different donor organizations or agencies have different goals or achievements for the aid they provide. The achievements can be in various ranges from economic growth, achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), other social indicators, promotion of trade, policies reform through foreign policy objectives, protection of human rights and so on. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, aid effectiveness is “the extent to which a development intervention has attained or is expected to attain, its relevant objectives efficiently and in a sustainable way.”

Most of the literatures in this area usually make research based on the donor points of views. According to Lin T.C (2000), the donor countries effectively convey its power to the recipient countries by assisting foreign aid. That is also the answer to why donors have used foreign aid as a tool of showing their influence on the recipients.

Foreign aid or Official Development Assistance has the general objectives of assisting and promoting the development of economy and social welfare of the developing countries. However, according to Griffin (1970), it would be very naïve to assume that major object of foreign aid is economic by pointing out that the motives might be to change the level of material well-being of the recipient countries political or social way.

The recipient countries welcome foreign aid in a view that the generosity of the donor countries and has lighter burden than the commercial loans in general. The donor has the perception that the recipient government acknowledges its obligation to return the favor to

the donor when opportunities arise. The experience of economic development of the recipient is also important factor in determining donor's aid commitment.

Myanmar pursued the economy development by means of socialist economic planning system for about a quarter of a century. Before 1980s, the country has suffered a negative growth rate and low productivity in producing sectors. Due to these negative occurrences, the Government of Myanmar restructured economic policy and reform in other areas such as agricultural sector and industrial sector. In the late 1980s, the economy of Myanmar has maintained steady growth and has influenced by agricultural with the rice as the main export product. Agriculture sector is the basic in the national economy of Myanmar where 75 % of total populations of Myanmar reside in rural areas and engage in agriculture and livestock industry. According to statistic data in 2000, 36% of GDP came from agricultural sector, 35% of total export earnings and employed 63 % of the labor force.

Foreign aid has been criticized for using the benefit of the donor countries rather than the recipient countries. Some suspect that there are always intentions behind every aid assistance program. Thus, it can disturb the aid effectiveness of the whole aid program. Some scholars mentioned that aid can be effective when the recipient countries have better policies in managing aids.

4. Research Methodology

This study will use qualitative approach to answer the research question. The qualitative method is employed to explore the meanings of people's word (Brockington and Sullivan, 2003). The main research question of this thesis is "How Japan's ODA, the Agricultural Extension Human Resource Development Project, initiated by JICA, is perceived by farmers in Zalun Township in Myanmar and how it is effective to them in terms of their needs, technical


skill and cultivation methods.” As this thesis will find the opinions of the farmers on Japanese ODA to Myanmar agriculture, qualitative method will be used.

Moreover, this research will be using SERVQUAL (Service Quality) model for measuring customer satisfaction with service quality. In this research, the satisfaction and expectation of Myanmar farmers towards the Japan’s ODA will be measured based on the SERVQUAL (Service Quality) model.

According to Gefan (2000), service quality is the subjective comparison that customers measure between the quality of the service that they want to get and what they receive. According to Gronroos (2000), the quality of service is subjectively perceived by customers during the interaction with a firm. What happens and perceived by customers’ evaluation of service quality. Service quality is a concept that has encouraged considerable interest and debate in the research literature because of the challenges in both defining it and measuring it with no consensus emerging on either (Wisniewski, 2001). Landrum et al. (2007), defined service quality as a comparison between consumers’ expectations and their perceptions of the service they receive.


To answer the research question for this paper, Service and Quality (SERVQUAL) model is used as a framework. SERVQUAL model measures customer satisfaction with service quality and factors influencing on customer’s perception. It was originally developed in 1985 by Parasuraman et al. SERVQUAL is based on the “GAP model” of service quality, which facilitates quantification of the gap between customers’ expectation of a service and their perception of the actual service delivered.

Figure 2: Relationships between Service Quality and Customer Satisfaction



Source: Parasuraman (Brady et. al 2002)

Figure 3: The conceptual framework



Dependent Variable

Source: author's compilation, based on Service Quality Model

Based on Service Quality Model, words of mouth communication, analysis of personal needs and local needs, experience and implementation of the project as well as termination mode of the project will be taken as independent variables. They will indicate the dependent variable, perception of ODA.

5. Japanese ODA and Agriculture Extension in Myanmar

There are various projects for the all-round development of Myanmar conducted by Japan through ODA and agencies. A case study is a research approach which is established to study the in-depth of a complicated issue in real-life situation. As a case study of this research, the Agricultural Extension Human Resource Development Project by JICA in Myanmar is chosen.

The Study Site is in Maryland and Kyone Kha Mon villages in Zalun Township of Ayeyawady Division of Myanmar. Farmers and extension workers in that area were still weak in agricultural technology. To conduct necessary training for farmers and extension workers, farmer education camp was built in Mary Land Village with the financial assistance from JICA.

The Official Development Assistance of Japan is administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and its goal is to help the developing countries with supplies, advanced technology and other forms of assistances. Japan has been assisting the ODA to all countries in Mekong Region as well as members of ASEAN since 1967. There are two elements of Japanese ODA in Myanmar, strengthening human capital and hard infrastructure, have interacted with the principle of promoting peace and democracy. Japan's ODA consists of objectives, policies and priorities according to its revised Charter. Its first objective is to devote to the peace and development of the international community by safeguarding its own security and prosperity.

Farmers should get an easy access to practical technologies and useful information about farming techniques and farming administration and make use of these technologies in their farms for sustainable agricultural development. However, there are many difficulties for individual farmers to do research on new farming techniques and developing their own farms.

Thus, for efficient agricultural technology development and its effective extension for farmers, research institutions and extension service organizations were developed.

In Myanmar, agriculture extension was started when the Department of Agriculture was established in 1906. The activities such as demonstrations, distributions of pamphlets, discussions to disseminate the improved technology, distribution of pure seeds, fertilizer, agrochemicals and improved implements were carried out by the department. In 1972, the Agriculture and Rural Development Corporation was joined with the Department of Agriculture to form the new organization known as the Agriculture Corporation. In 1989, Agriculture Corporation was renamed as Myanma Agriculture Service (MAS) and became the major institution for extension of many crops grown in Myanmar.

Agricultural research and agricultural extension service should be promoted with the aim of farmers to gain and share information and knowledge on farming technologies and new farming methods. In giving agricultural extension service, extension specialists are the ones who teach extension staffs on the knowledge and techniques regarding the extension services and extension staffs are the one who teach farmers directly on extending new ideas, new technology, things and tools through extension services. In other words, extension staffs should change the farmer's thinking as well as introduce new farming practices/technologies to improve their farming techniques.

Extension specialists should design implementation plan of agricultural extension service from the study solution. Extension specialists should train extension staffs using demonstration farm on new technologies. In Myanmar, many extension activities are being implemented for individual farmers or farmers' in extension camp.

6. An analysis of agricultural extension human resource development project (AEHRD) in Myanmar

The Agricultural Extension Human Resource Development Project was developed to train new specialists to respond to regional needs for farming expertise. The training was mainly provided by the Central Agriculture Research and Training Center of Myanmar which is situated in Helgu Township of Myanmar with the help of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which has been working on retraining specialists. The project was signed on 2007 and the total amount of ODA spent for this project is 160 million yen which included the infrastructure development to support the training. The project was implemented from April 2008 to April 2011. The executing agency is Myanmar Agriculture Service (MAS) which is the division under the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation of Myanmar.

According to data from JICA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese ODA contributes in Myanmar agricultural sector by technical assistance or grant aid especially to the grass roots. Through this project, JICA aims to nurture human resources (researchers, leaders, farmers) who could contribute to the development of agriculture in the target areas.

The Japanese experts educate extension staff locally as well as abroad in terms of new techniques, and practices through classroom and on-site training. Local lectures were conducted at CARTC in Helgu Township and on-site trainings were conducted at pilot testing sites in Mary Land and Kyone Kha Mon Villages in Zalun Township. They also visited participating paddy fields in these two villages from time to time. The goal of the project is to train farmers to produce high-yield, high-quality crops in every season and to acquire advanced agriculture techniques.

The training for the Model Extension staff who would conduct Extension training courses and teach farmers was managed by the Central Agriculture Research and Training Center (CARTC), which is located in Zayatkin, Helgu Township in Yangon Division. The extension staffs are from the Extension Division of Myanmar Agriculture Service (MAS). Trainees to attend Model Extension Specialists were chosen by the Myanmar Agriculture Service (MAS) from among

Agriculture Extension Staff. They are trainers to farmers in their respective regions, towns and villages.

Short training courses (two weeks each) were offered within the project duration of two years. In the first four courses, there were 31 extension staff from 31 States and Divisions. In the fifth course, there were 50 from 31 States and Divisions. Every state and division has extension staff who have a clear mandate to work with farmers to improve the yields of many different crops. These Extension Staff who were trained as Model Extension Specialists conducted the extension courses to farmers in their respective areas.

For the pilot site for this AEHRD project. Maryland and Kyone Kha Mon villages in Zalun Township of Ayeyawady Division of Myanmar were chosen. Farmers and extension workers in that area were still weak in agricultural technology. To conduct necessary training for farmers and extension workers, farmer education camp was built in Mary Land Village with the financial assistance from JICA.

For the extension trainings to farmers, farmers were selected based on

1. Farmers who own the land
2. Farmers who are willing to adopt new techniques
3. Farmers who grow only paddy
4. Farmers by generations
5. Farmers whose yield is much lower than average (by calculation of yield

per acre)

Extension services were conducted to farmers in Kyone Kha Mon village and Mary land village from April 2009 to December 2009. The trainings were how to make foliar fertilizer, how to measure PH, how to produce a certified seed to make method of compost using EM solution, how to use tobacco solution for plant production, how to distinguish helpful insects from pests. There were demonstrations to farmers. As an example, extension activities were

conducted at education camp in Mary Land by Mr.KATO from JICA and Myanma Agriculture Service (MAS) on June 8, 2009. 70 farmers from Zalun Township were invited to Mary land extension camp. Mr.KATO's taught lectures on "Good Yield from good puddle paddy soil" and "how to select good seeds". Daw Yee Yee Myint, extension specialist of Zalun taught "how to make tobacco solution for plant protection" and "how to make organic fertilizer by using EM". The second instance of extension service is on Aug 24, 2009. 87 farmers from Zalun Township attended the training. Mr.Sanada demonstrated "classification of pests and beneficial insects". Daw Yee Yee Myint, extension specialist of Zalun demonstrated "how to use insect checking board on the field".

These extension activities were monitored by the project team. They visited Kyone Kha Mon and Mary Land village once a month. They discussed with extension workers and farmers on the farming progress and practices. The interviewee farmers said that demonstrations are more interesting and effective for them than the lectures.

The project fund includes the building for the education camp in Mary Land Village as well. The building as Knowledge Centre which appeared out of Japanese ODA still exists in Mary Land Village and is still in use. The Model farming fields were situated near the farming camp and the participant farmers owned those fields. However, the model farming fields could no longer be observed as the project time is a little distant and besides the time when data were collected for the research is neither growing season of rice nor pulses. It is the period waiting for the harvest of rice.

In 2010 rice growing season, most farmers from Mary Land Village and some farmers from Kyone Kha Mon Village used Japanese method in their farms: land preparation, seed selection, making fertilizers, using pesticides, using transplanting method instead of broadcasting and so on. In the study, among 26 interviewee farmers, 20 farmers grew rice using Japanese methods that year.

7. Findings

7.1. Benefits of participating farmers in AEHRD project

Farmers have various reasons for participating in the project. According to the data collected from the interviews, the AEHRD project is the first program that they have ever collaborated with foreigners. It can be deduced from the interview that AEHRD project is the only project that enhances their knowledge on agriculture apart from Myanmar Agriculture Service (MAS). Sometimes, there are private companies or associations that come to these two villages just to advertise their farm machinery or to sell chemical fertilizers or pesticides.

The distinctive feature of the AEHRD project is the extension service from farmers to farmers. Farmers who have had a chance to attend extension training would relay their knowledge to their fellow farmers. The extension service from farmers to farmers may be either formal or just the discussion in village gathering as well as words of mouth communication.

7.2. Change of Mindset

Farmers' knowledge, beliefs and thoughts about farming practice have changed to some extent due to the AEHRD project. They received information, guidelines and demonstration and reacted to them. They learnt some innovative methods on agriculture and applied the most relevant information for them. In other words, farmers developed the better mindset and beliefs. They realize the need to change their farming practice to a more market driven approach for food security and to increase their income.

At present, almost all farmers seem to maintain the conventional ways, not in changing mind set as a large part of farmers continue to produce rice in the conventional way. From interview data, it was found that the cost and benefit were imbalance, for instance, the use of EM Bokashi does not provide as much yield as the use of strong chemical fertilizers. Moreover, it

is time-consuming to make this kind of organic fertilizer. Farmers who use chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides gain more yield than those who followed project methods.

As Myanmar has vast lands, fertile soil and plentiful availability of fresh water and sunshine which are favourable conditions for abundant production of crops, agriculture should be the large-scale commercial sector which supports national economy, provides employment, generates exports and enhances national and world food security. Most importantly, it must provide a sustainable way of life for the majority of rural communities and the grass-roots in Myanmar. From interview data, it can be concluded that most farmers have to put up with the high cost of growing and low labour availability, little information on markets and lack of warranty on price of rice. They included saying that they are often short of support services apart from MAS.

There should be more agricultural assistance and policies which will enable farmers to promote organic agriculture and markets which will give higher price if farmers produce rice which is free of any chemical fertilizers or pesticides. Farmers express that they are willing and that they are much more capable of making the changes to get the best out of the rich natural resources of Myanmar land if they receive adequate support and feasible directions not only from local authorities but also from foreign aids.

8.3. Evaluation of the ODA project

8.3.1. Comparison between Conventional and Japanese Method

It is observed that planting rice in Myanmar traditional method and in Japanese method each has its own strengths and weaknesses.

Japanese method aims at producing more yield, but it was described by farmers that there was little difference in the yield. Moreover, Japanese method is more labor-intensive and thus, more costly. As the planting steps are extremely thorough and need a lot of care, it may seem

complex to Myanmar farmers and are not practical in their domestic circumstances. Besides, their training period is limited and there are few extension staffs from MAS in case they need help.

Myanmar traditional method has no precision in most of the steps, even in choosing seeds. The interviewee farmers mentioned that they sowed seed from their own harvest or from another farms, rather than purchasing seed as recommended in the Japanese Method or MAS, giving reason on poor transportation and communication. There was no overall stand uniformity. They chose the variety they prefer and if the neighboring farms grow different types, the varieties got mingled. In consequence, it may lead to varietal degeneration in the area although they removed off-types or abnormal types of rice plants.

The distinctive strength of Japanese method lies in the objective of AEHRD Project - to train farmers to produce high- yield, high-quality crops in every season and to acquire advanced agriculture techniques. In conducting interviews, farmers were asked if they want technology, money or farm machines. Almost all interviewee farmers said that they want advanced technology rather than financial aid or machines. They said that most of them are in debt and have to sell all their harvested paddy immediately after harvesting at whatever price it is, generally low prices. Later, they have to buy back rice at a higher price for their family consumption. So, they mentioned that they didn't want financial aid as it may make them deeper in debt. They emphasized that only technology which enhances the yield of rice and which reduces the cost can help them in the long run. Therefore, the objectives of AEHRD project meets farmers' needs

One of the most influencing factors that motivate farmers to practice new method is the profit they need to earn for daily survival of the family. The yield of rice increased in Japanese method, but it was just average. In conventional method, average yield per acre is 65 baskets, whereas in Japanese method 75 baskets. There is only a slide increased. The farmers found

that the Japanese method encourages the growth of the plant more than the yield of the rice.

By looking at the information gathered from the interviews, it is found that growing rice in traditional way is less costly than the Japanese method. The project has increased farmers' knowledge of quality crops and advanced agriculture techniques. However, they mentioned that they cannot apply the trainings of Japanese method the following years because most farmers are using stronger chemical fertilizers and pesticides, regardless of the food safety, and have good yield. When rice is sold, the same price is paid either it is the product of Japanese method or not. Although they cannot extend the practices, they still extend their knowledge and experience of Japanese training which is environmentally friendly and which provides healthy organic food.

Table 1: Total Cost of participating farmer (4 acres land holder)

No	Particular	Conventional		JICA Method		Difference
		Cost per acre	Cost for 4 acres	Cost per acre	Cost for 4 acres	
1.	Land Preparation	\$47.08	\$188.32	\$63.75	\$255	
2.	Seed	\$51.67	\$206.68	\$13.33	\$53.32	
3.	Transplanting	\$12.5	\$50	\$62.5	\$250	
4.	Harvesting	\$35	\$140	\$41.66	\$166.64	
5.	Input	\$47.91	\$191.64	\$100.83	\$403.33	
Total cost			\$776.64		\$1128.29	- \$351.65

Source: author's own compilation, based on the source from CARTC

The above table shows the statistical data gained from CARTC that compares the total growing cost per acre of conventional method and Japanese method and the earnings of farmer who

owns 4 acres of land. It can be concluded that farmers who grow rice in Japanese method have to invest more money in their pilot sites. But there is not much difference in the yield as it is learnt from the interview that new method affected more on the growth of the plant rather than the yield. Farmers also mentioned that the stronger the plants grow, the more pests they attract. So, they needed to cost more on stronger chemical pesticides.

Table 2: Earnings of participant farmer (4 acres land holder)

Methods	Yield Per acre	Production (4acres)	Price per kg	Total earning	Net Profit (earning – cost)
Conventional	1358.5kg	1358.5 x4= 5434 kg	\$0.25	5434 x 0.25 =\$1358.5	(1358.5 - 776.64) =\$581.86
JICA Method	1567.5kg	1567.5x4= 6270 kg	\$ 0.25	6270x0.25 =\$1567.5	(1567.5- 1128.29) =\$439.21

Source: author's own compilation

Table 3: Earnings of participating farmers who owns lands the most (28 acres)

Methods	Production Per acre	Production (28 acres)	Price per acre	Total earning	Net Profit (earning – cost)
Conventional	1358.5 kg	1358.5 x28= 38,038 kg	\$0.25	36,038x0.25= \$9509.5	9509.5 - 5436.66 =\$4072.84
JICA Method	1567.5 kg	1567.5 x 28 = 43,890 kg	\$0.25	43,890x 0.25= \$10,972.5	10,972.5 - 7897.96 = \$3,074.54

Source: author's own compilation

Looking at statistics from Table 2 and Table 3, it is distinct that a farmer's income depends on the size of his land holdings. Using Japanese method increases the yield and so, it seems that the farmer who owns many acres of farmland can enjoy much more profit. However, it was not so as his cost in growing rice also increased. The rate of return of the most landowner farmer (28 acres) and that of the least land owner farmer is the same (39 %).

8.3.2. Cost vs. Benefit

Table 4: Rice Growing (farmer of 4 acres holding)

Method	Land(acre)	Cost	Total production	Earning	Profit
Conventional	4	\$776.64	5434	\$1358.5	\$581.86
Method Japanese	4	\$1128.29	6270	\$1567.5	\$439.21
Method					

Source: author's own compilation

The results of the costs and returns for the rice farmer who owns 4 acres are presented in table 4. It shows that when applying Japanese method, the cost of rice production was \$1128.29. The total earnings were \$1567.5 and the profit was \$439.21. The average yield per acre was 1567.5 kg. The average rate of return was 39%. The implication of this result is that rice farmer realized a return of \$109.8 for every 1 acre of his rice production. Therefore, it seems that rice farming, using Japanese method is profitable and advantageous.

Table 5: Rice growing (farmer of 28 acres holding)

Method	Land (acre)	Cost	Total production	Earning	Profit
Conventional Method	28	\$5436.66	38,038	\$9509.5	\$4072.84
Japanese Method	28	\$7897.96	43,890	\$10,972.5	\$3,074.54

Source: author's own compilation

8.3.3. Farmers' Cost of Living vs. Earnings

According to the data from Central Statistical Organization, Myanmar, the price of freshly harvested wet paddy ranged from \$ 5 to \$ 5.8 during 2009 to 2011. In terms of rice growing in new Japanese method, farmers earned only 39% profit for their effort regardless of the number of lands they own, either large or small. Monthly basic household expenditure of average 5 family members is \$ 75.52 (Central Statistical Organization, Myanmar- Fiscal year 2010-2011). When deducting annual household expenditure, small landowner farmers even show deficit in their income. Therefore, it can be said that rice growing using new method is not a gain for them.

Table 6: Farmer's household Expenditure

Farmer's Income		5 member-household Expenditure		Balance
Acres	Profit	Monthly	Yearly	
4	\$439.21	\$75.52	\$75.52x12= \$906.24	- \$467.03
28	\$3,074.54	\$75.52	\$75.52x12= \$906.24	\$2,168.3

Source: author's own compilation

Statistics for household expenditure is taken from Central Statistical Organization, Myanmar and Zalun Township General Admission Office (2010-2011) fiscal year. Traditionally, Myanmar people practices extended family type and the family size of interviewee farmers range from 5 members to 11. The family which consists of the least number in the interview (5) is taken as an instance for calculating household expenditure.

The rate of return (thirty-nine percent) is not a good indicator for successful farming practice and worthy profession as there is deficit in balance after deducting household expenditure. Only if the rate of return increases to above 50%, it is a good sign and the best incentive for farmers to continue practicing JICA's method.

The growing of second crop after harvesting paddy such as pulses and sunflowers help in filling up their household expenditure. Most of them grow betel vine – consumed mostly in Asia as betel quid or in paan or as medicinal leaves- in their home garden. To increase profit, a farmer may decrease the use of fertilizers, pesticides and numbers of farm workers, as well.

For the least land holder farmers, their rice growing is simply a deficient business. Most farmers like them are often in debt and they usually borrow money from friends, family members like parents and some from moneylenders.

Interviewee farmers emphasized on saying that they would not be worried about the price of the rice if they had a good yield. In conventional way, although there is less yield, there is also less cost and less labour. For example, traditional method to sow the seeds is direct seedlings and so it needs less labourers than Japanese method which is Transplanting. Farm laborers even did not want to be hired for transplanting fields. By looking at the model farmers who have pilot sites by Japanese method, words of mouth will spread to their fellow farmers and then to others who will follow their practice if only the model sites could prove more

advantageous evidence. The farmlands grown in Japanese practice can no longer be seen in these two villages.

9. Conclusion

Almost all the interviewees are farmers by generations. Most farmers produce two crops per year. Rice is the major crop, mostly grown during the monsoon and other crops are produced during the cool and dry seasons. The study also shows that rice is not the profitable crop for farmers in the study areas. They depend on green gram and black gram which generate higher profits as they are less costly to produce and labor use is lower. These two crops are widely produced in the Delta region like Zalun Township as second crops.

The interviewee farmers mentioned that little difference was found between the yields in Myanmar conventional and Japanese methods. They have to depend more on second crops and garden vegetables. By Japanese method, the yield increases but only slightly. Their earnings or profit do not show much increase in new practice as it demands more human labor cost. Moreover, there is labor shortage in many rice growing areas since young and middle age people, especially males, migrate to cities like Yangon and Mandalay as well as to foreign countries for better job opportunities and easier lifestyle.

The project failed to prove part of its objective such as increasing yields or reducing labor requirements to Myanmar farmers. At present, almost all participant farmers return to the conventional ways. They have not maintained Japanese method or continued to use Japanese practices once the project had finished. Farmers do not carry out the new method anymore as it has no assured long-term use. They will adopt and continue to practice the new method only if it responds to their immediate needs. In other words, it is essential for them to see the direct benefit to themselves in the short term. These benefits are usually in the form of increased or more assured yields, higher incomes or the reduced labor use.

Japanese practices require relatively large investments of time and money. A farmer needs to undertake the additional work involved but he cannot see an immediate benefit. Moreover, some Japanese practices and techniques require modification and adaptation so as to apply to local conditions. For instance, it takes time for land preparation and nursery beds preparation. In addition, it is difficult for uneven lands to transplant in rows and to use transplanting guides. One of the priorities of interviewee farmers is to gain safe earnings for their families and so, they return to conventional method which they think is more advantageous to them in terms of cost and benefits.

Since AEHRD Project is only a short-term project, it may prove ineffective. However, the project has shown farmers' change of mindset to produce healthy food and to minimize using human labor. A certain part of the AEHRD project fails to meet the objective whereas it is a success in another. The successful implementation of the project is people's participation, their commitment and cooperation among all participants. There was active and eager participation of farmers for effective implementation of AEHRD project while the project was in progress. Findings from the interviews also indicate that Myanmar farmers have positive perceptions towards the AEHRD project.

The aim of AEHRD project is to train farmers to produce high-yield, high-quality crops in every season and to acquire advanced agriculture techniques. The data obtained from the interviews indicate that the project has increased farmers' knowledge of quality crops and of advanced agriculture techniques although they cannot extend the practices of Japanese method the following years.

AEHRD project has shown farmers' change of mindset to produce healthy food and to minimize the use of human labor. In conducting interviews, almost all farmers mentioned that they would like to have advanced technology rather than financial or mechanical aid because only technology can help them in the long run. Therefore, it can be concluded that AEHRD

Project fulfils part of its objective - to train farmers to produce high-yield, high-quality crops in every season and to acquire advanced agriculture techniques. If farmers are supported by finance and long-term programs, they will attain more worthwhile achievements.

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Harvesting Gold from Neighbors' Golden Years: A Case Study of International Retirement Migration in Tagaytay City, Philippines

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This paper aims to explore how international retirement migration to the Philippines creates employment opportunities in the healthcare industry. The significance of this study lies on the fact that while the majority of Filipinos could not picture the country ever becoming a destination for foreign nationalities with unemployment, poverty, and poor infrastructure as some of the main drivers to emigrate, the same reasons could make good pull factors for a certain market. In particular, opportunities in international retirement migration could be explored--tapping retirees who want lower prices, cheaper healthcare, and abundant labor supply. With neighboring countries' rising cost of living, expensive housing, and less children in the household to share the responsibility of looking after their elderly, this paper argues that the Philippines stands to benefit from the economic opportunity that may come from the ageing population of more developed economies. Qualitative in nature, this paper looks at facilitators and actors at the structural and agency levels. Tagaytay City is purposely selected for this case study as it is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the country and is increasingly becoming known as a retirement destination. With foreign retirees instead of Filipino health care workers leaving the country to work abroad coming to the Philippines, this could be a game changer for Filipino medical and allied field professionals considering the employment opportunities that may come about in the healthcare sector being a viable alternative that locals could turn to, to stay with their families in their homeland and still make a living.

Keywords: Ageing Population, International Retirement Migration, Employment Creation

1. Introduction

The Philippines has a widespread culture of emigration where moving abroad is common, even encouraged, and seen as an opportunity to live a better life. Accordingly, international labor migration has been a major feature of the Philippines for the past decades and a sizeable number of Filipinos emigrated in the quest of temporary work or permanent settlement elsewhere. Most Filipinos could not picture the country ever becoming a destination for other nationalities because of unemployment, poverty, political instability, security, and poor infrastructure as some of the main drivers for Filipinos to leave home.

In the recent years, however, opportunities in international retirement migration to the Philippines is something that is being explored and the government has since then been trying to tap retirees who have the means to migrate to a tropical destination coupled with relatively lower prices and cost of living-- enticing them with undemanding barriers in terms of visa deposits and age hurdles (Philippine Retirement Authority). Though the numbers are still relatively small, Filipino authorities note that arrivals from China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan are the most numerous (Philippine Retirement Authority, 2015) —as they escape their more expensive economies that continue to consume their retirement savings and offer limited opportunities to further build and grow their pension (Morales, 2016). Literature suggest that many of them have already chosen to pursue retirement overseas in order to benefit from cheaper health care and still experience a relatively better quality of life.

For the ageing population with their elderly having retirement savings that are insufficient and being subjected in environments with continuous rise in terms of cost of living, expensive housing, and less children in households to share the responsibility of looking after them, as is the case in most developed economies, the Philippines could be a retirement haven-- with the same phenomenon opening up new market opportunities for various sectors in the country.

1.1 Research Objective

The overarching objective of this paper is to describe the employment opportunities created by international retirement migration to the Philippines, particularly for Filipino medical and allied field professionals in elderly care.

1.2 Research Scope and Limitations

With the research objective to describe the employment opportunities created by international retirement migration to the Philippines, particularly for Filipino medical and allied field professionals in elderly care, the respondents of this study include the local government unit represented by the Tagaytay City Government; the government agency represented by the Philippine Retirement Authority; care homes within Tagaytay City; nurses and caregivers in their mid-20s to early 30s working in care homes within the City; and Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in their mid-20s to early 30s engaged in care professions.

A case study approach for Tagaytay is purposely selected as it is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the Philippines and is increasingly becoming known as a retirement destination. In this regard, the findings of this study may or may not be generalized to the whole of the Philippines and to other cities. Likewise, with the nurses and caregivers in their mid-20s to early 30s who are at the early stages of their professional careers, findings may not be generalized to all care professionals as different age cohorts and career levels could tell a different story and introduce variations in terms of motivations and decisions. Furthermore, with time and resource constraints as major obstacles, it may contain less conclusive data than those of other researchers who could spend time with the subjects and cover more ground and respondents for longer periods.

2 Literature Review

The review of related literature is categorized into two themes: the rise of international retirement migration and the new trend of international retirement migration. Likewise, this

study encompassed the role, mandate, and efforts of the Philippine Government to maximize the opportunity that international retirement migration brings to the Philippines.

2.1 The Rise of International Retirement Migration

Advances in the information, communication, and transportation technologies have resulted to an increasingly interconnected and globalized and interconnected environment. This has drastically changed the world—impacting everyday life. Infrastructures that enable travel have improved and airline tickets that were unreachable to the majority in the past have become widely affordable to the general public. Horn and Schweppe (2017) recognize these advances and noted how travels and movement flows between countries are no longer as unusual and reserved to the elite. The elderly is not exempted from these developments and in this regard, the same increasing trend in widespread mobility even in retirement and old age has been on the rise.

Coined as international retirement migration, it was in the 1990s that research in the field emerged. It primarily focused on lifestyle migration that was particularly prevalent among Northern European retirees, especially to Spain. At the time, the elderly do not essentially permanently move their residence. Instead, they periodically move between their countries of origin and destination frequently (Gustafson, 2008; Horn and Schweppe, 2017; O'Reilly, 2000). Several studies suggest that the people who opt to retire overseas are those with an income level that is above average. In this regard, the immigration of older and generally relatively wealthy population groups is seen as an efficient form of foreign direct investment that makes an important contribution to the development of the destination country or region (Dixon et al, 2006 as cited in Husa et al., 2014).

2.2 The New Trend of International Retirement Migration

In the recent years, variations in terms of international retiree destinations have emerged. In contrast to the former typology and flow of lifestyle migration, the core characteristic of the new mobility trends conveys the decision to move as the elderly's way to relieve themselves of pressures and problems—including financial limitations due to low pensions, diminishing

retirement savings, social anxieties, and elderly care requirements. (Bender et al., 2014; Horn and Schweppe, 2017; Toyota and Xiang, 2012).

Zooming in within the Asian region, this retirement migration flow has become prevalent as triggered by the increasing longevity in East Asia (Kim & Thang, 2016). This situation raises the demand for the care of the elderly population, including healthcare workers, pensions, health insurance, and long-term medical care. In this regard, a number of studies focusing on the growing influx of retirement migrants, particularly in the area of Chiang Mai, Thailand (Shibuya, 2008), and to Malaysia (Ono, 2008) were explored.

One recent and significant research by Toyota and Thang (2017) considered how governments, especially those of the destination countries, still perceive retiree migrants in general as high-value consumer markets. Contrariwise, these modern-day international retirees perceive themselves as practical individuals that decide to move to maximize their limited resources and live more efficiently in less developed economies where living costs are lower (Toyota and Thang, 2017). This supports Bender et al. (2017)'s argument that as opposed to the contemporary lifestyle migration, recent international retirement migration developments are often driven by the elderly's problems and constraints, both socially and financially.

2.3 An Opportunity for the Philippines

Within Southeast Asia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia have become attractive destinations for long-stay tourists and retirees not only from affluent countries in the West but also from neighboring East Asian countries. The economic importance of this flow is validated by the fact that several governments in the region as well as economic developers have increasingly begun to promote their countries as ideal retirement destinations. Consequently, the Philippine government acknowledges this rising opportunity and has thus created the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). The Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA)'s mandate is to gain attraction and provide assistance to foreign nationals to foster retirement and investment to the Philippines, particularly through land and real estate. Complementarily, the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) partners with

government efforts via the Department of Tourism in line with promoting the country as a tourist and retirement haven. In this regard, entry to the Philippines and retirement visa application processes have been made easier to make the country more amenable for prospective international retirees. Moreover, a surge in establishment of retirement institutions and care facilities have been evident in the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Cebu, Laguna, Pampanga, and Subic—catering to elderly patients of various nationalities: American, Canadian, Chinese, and Japanese among others for long-term care.

With the inception of the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA), the Philippines has made it clear that it wants to grow its retirement industry and has thus made it highly accessible for foreigners around the world. Permanent residency is relatively easy to obtain, and it comes with a multitude of incentives ranging from duty-free importation of household belongings to being able to work or own a business. The government means to do all these by offering retirees the best quality of life in an attractive retirement and investment package through the Special Resident Retiree Visa (SRRV). So far, the Special Resident Retiree Visa (SRRV) program has had great success in attracting new residents with the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) reporting to have issued 27,000 Special Resident Retiree Visa (SRRV) so far to citizens of 107 countries. Of those new residents, 38% were Chinese, 27% were Koreans, 10% were Japanese, and 6.5% were North Americans (Henderson, 2018). This increasing reputation of the Philippines as one of the preferred retirement destinations in the world bodes well for the creation of local opportunities that cater to the international market (Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), 2016).

3. Methodology

This paper is qualitative in nature with the aim to describe employment creation in the local healthcare industry in the context of the ageing population and international retirement migration to the Philippines. The paper thus narrows down the variables to three primary actors: (1) retirees seeking healthcare outside their country; (2) providers in destination countries willing to offer the service; and (3) facilitators linking and enabling the first two—the public the private sectors. Moreover, to understand the rationale, visions, motivations,

experiences, and perspectives of the different facets that revolve around the creation of employment opportunities in the context of international retirement migration and elderly care in the Philippines, this research analyzes the findings into structural and agency levels.

At the structural level, the foundation, infrastructure, and guidance set up by the facilitators are looked at. While at the agency level, investment, consumption, and trade exhibited by the actors are reviewed. Participant observation and interviews of key informants from the Tagaytay City Government, retirement home, retirees, and Filipino nurses and caregivers based locally and abroad were conducted. Secondary data were drawn from published and unpublished sources including the Philippine Retirement Authority's annual reports, government websites, survey results, press interviews, working papers, journals, and articles.

4. Findings

4.1 Key Findings

The facilitators—national government, local government, government agency, and private sector, appear to not have a systematic and unified vision and mandate towards promoting the Philippines as a retirement destination to international retirees. Though the Philippine Retirement Agency has its roadmap, this study finds that it is not supported by the local government which in turn, does not create a local business climate that incentivizes the private sector to invest in the industry. Accordingly, despite Tagaytay City notably ticking off all the requirements that retirees look for in a place of destination, the industry's development over the years in the vicinity has not yet proved itself to be as enticing and as lucrative a business venture as it is thought out to be. Retirement homes that cater to the ageing population and international retirees, at least those in Tagaytay, are not yet abundant as it seems to be more of an endeavor for a noble cause. Nevertheless, they serve as training ground for medical and allied care professionals.

Figure 4.1: Findings at the Structural Level





Figure 4.2: Findings at the Agency Level




This addresses the objective of this paper to describe the employment and opportunities creation for Filipino medical and allied field professionals in the context of the ageing population and international retirement migration. The phenomenon does open up opportunities for the locals. However, it appears that, at least in the case of nurses and caregivers, they only use the opportunity as a springboard to advance their personal and professional growth. With medical and allied care professionals staying only in the country to bank on experience, their goal is still to move and work overseas.

2.4 National Government - Government Agency

Since its inception, the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) has transformed from a venue and avenue for vendors and services to a promoter of a comprehensive global framework for retirement planning. Its retirement visa product line includes: (1) SRRV SMILE Option, where visa deposit is simply deposited for end of term obligations; (2) SRRV Classic Option, where visa deposit is convertible into property investments; (3) SRRV Courtesy, which caters to former Philippine-based diplomats and former Filipinos; and (4) SRRV Human Touch, which caters to ailing retiree- applicants.


Figure 4.3: SRRV Product Line



Source: PRA, 2015

With sustained efforts of promoting retirement migration to the country, the SRRV garnered an annual gross enrolment of 53,933 new retirees, with an aggregate net enrolment of 41,123 retirees that corresponded to a cumulative revenue generated at PHP 6,368,689,039.42 in the year 2017 (PRA, 2018). Of the new residents, 37 per cent were from China (PROC), 21 per cent were from South Korea, 7 per cent were from Taiwan, 5 per cent were from Hong Kong (SAR), and 3 per cent were from Japan. From these, the PRA produced a net income after tax of PHP 3,016,573,911.59. The retiree visa deposits, personal and business investments, and daily spending and consumption add up to contribute to the economy of the Philippines.

Figure 4.4: SRRV Enrolment



Source: PRA, 2018

2.5 Local Government – Tagaytay City

Considering the business and investment opportunities that the capital and business districts can offer, the National Capital Region received the majority of the SRRV grants to the Philippines. Coming second to it is the Region IV-A or CALABARZON, comprising five provinces namely Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon. Within this region that garnered eight per cent of the total SRRV grantees, lies the small city of Tagaytay located in the province of Cavite.

In the early 2000s, Tagaytay City was identified as one of the best retirement places by the Europeans and Asians alike, together with Dumaguete City which is located further south of the country. In line with this, this study finds that the PRA had offered to aid and funding for construction of retirement facilities to entice international retirees. However, the project did not materialize as the City's direction and targets are geared more towards targeting Filipinos. Despite the national government encouraging the local government units to give out investor incentives, Tagaytay does not find the need to. Tagaytay does not promote nor give out

This article is part of a master's degree thesis entitled Harvesting Gold from Neighbors' Golden Years: A Case Study of International Retirement Migration in Tagaytay City, Philippines

incentives to encourage investments to the City since businesses and investors automatically come. Moreover, high taxes are imposed on investors to control their influx to the city.

Figure 4.5: Distribution of Active Retirees per Region

REGION	COUNT	%
LUZON	33,600	81.71%
National Capital Region (NCR)	25,070	60.96%
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)	654	1.59%
Region 1 (Ilocos Region)	391	0.95%
Region 2 (Cagayan Valley)	310	0.75%
Region 3 (Central Luzon)	2,973	7.23%
Region 4A (CALABARZON)	3,461	8.42%
Region 4B (MIMAROPA)	394	0.96%
Region 5 (Bicol Region)	347	0.84%
VISAYAS	3,703	9.00%
Region 6 (Western Visayas)	790	1.92%
Region 7 (Central Visayas)	2,750	6.69%
Region 8 (Eastern Visayas)	163	0.40%
MINDANAO	2,231	5.43%
Region 9 (Zamboanga Peninsula)	138	0.34%
Region 10 (Northern Mindanao)	712	1.73%
Region 11 (Davao Region)	1,151	2.80%
Region 12 (SOCCKSARGEN)	115	0.28%
Region 13 (Caraga)	92	0.22%
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)	23	0.06%
OTHERS		
No Local Address	1,589	3.86%
TOTAL	41,123	100.00%

Source: PRA, 2018

2.6 Retirees

Findings from this study validate what retirees look for in a place of destination— compatibility and availability of a familiar language whether that be for communication with locals or for drive and read signs; an ideal location that has high elevation away from flood-prone areas, is neither polluted nor noisy; offers comfortable levels of temperature and humidity; the location’s proximity to major transportation, medical, and food sources; good local accommodation and reasonable cost of living that is ideal and workable depending on one’s financial capacity; the area’s cleanliness and availability of natural forest and fauna; organized and efficient local government functions; and integrity of service providers. On the basis of

the case study done, Tagaytay City notably ticks off all these requirements that retirees look for in a place of destination for retirement.

2.7 Retirement Homes

Looking at the business side, this study finds that international retirement migration's development over the years in Tagaytay City has not yet proved itself to be as enticing and as lucrative a business venture as it is thought out to be. Retirement homes that cater to the ageing population and international retirees, at least those in Tagaytay, are not yet abundant as it seems to be more of an endeavor for a noble cause. Nevertheless, they serve as training ground for medical and allied care professionals.

2.8 Medical and Allied Care Professionals

With regard to considering the impact to employment creation, the ageing population and international retirement migration do open up opportunities for the locals-- whether one is a medical and allied health professional or a job seeker who is literate but under-educated, retirement businesses offer employment in a number of ways. These come in the form of organizing the activities and opportunities around the retirees' needs from the basic ones such as driving, gardening, massage therapy, laundry, and housekeeping, to complex tasks that require professional administration. As for how the local Filipino health care workers adopted to this phenomenon in their community, this study finds that they use it as a springboard to advance their personal and professional growth. With medical and allied care professionals staying only in the Philippines to bank on experience, their ultimate goal is still to move and work overseas.

From what this study gathered, medical and allied health professionals in the Philippines accept either an insufficient amount for compensation or a minimum daily allowance to start with. Furthermore, circumstances where the workers' pay their employers occur, just so they can work and gain experience. If the Philippine public and private sectors value the nurses' and caregivers' work as they do at present, given a choice to pursue opportunities elsewhere,

these professionals will continue to choose to leave home to better their chances for survival and a better life.

3 Conclusion


The findings of this study reveal that though there is a national level vision and roadmap, there seems to be a dearth of effort in terms of aligning them with and trickling them down to the local level and the private sector. At the national and government agency level, the outlook is positive with the vision and mechanism in place. With what growing the SRRV holders could do, the PRA expects to reap rewards in the coming years and is optimistic that the Authority will be one of the government agencies that will generate significant revenue to drive the economy of the country. With the continuous growth of the ageing population, the potential of the retirement industry is huge. This direction of the PRA makes sense, as capturing a significant percentage from the world market will have its economic contribution.

However, on ground, the same cannot be said for its local level and private sector counterparts just yet. Reasons could include the phenomenon still being relatively new in the country and much can be done to build a case on it. At the onset, it is already presenting economic opportunities for retirement and nursing homes-- generating jobs for local nurses and caregivers. One key finding though is that because of the inherently low pay scale given to nurses and caregivers in the field, they end up using the opportunity as their springboard instead-- to gain experience and expose themselves caring for people in different walks of life and in a multicultural setting and to buy time before they transition to still work abroad. Re- evaluation of salary levels for related jobs may be considered.

With the rise and development of international retirement migration in the country signaling the shift in the predominant trend where the movement flow comes from developing countries to developed countries, there is a need to establish alignment and coordination among facilitators and institutions in setting up the roadmap and strategy in developing the retirement and elderly care industry if this is something that will be pursued in the long run. Moreover, policymakers can consider this opportunity to complement labor migration and

employment creation efforts. Since this study finds that the lure of perceived better economic prospects abroad still continues to be a promising factor for Filipino medical and allied care professionals, the government could encourage and entice them to periodically return home and conduct knowledge transfer—with the skills and know-hows they get to acquire through their experience working in more developed health systems abroad.

Figure 5.1: The author’s framework in examining the flow of support and resources that facilitate employment creation and revenue generation in the context of international retirement migration



Source: Author’s own analysis and interpretation

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The Role of Thai Military Leaders in Thai Politics: A Case Study of General Prem Tinsulanonda

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General Prem Tinsulanonda is a significant statesman of Thailand. In his 98-year legendary life, he was in charge of many vital positions of Thailand such as the prime minister, minister of defense, regent of Thailand, and president of the Privy Council. He had great influence on Thailand, even shaped the country to some extent. However, the existing literature had provided no systematic historical studies on him. To fill this gap, this research aims to explain Prem's role in Thai politics in a vertical way, with the hypothesis that Prem had special influence on Thai politics than other military leaders. Thus, the thesis referred to Prem's political performance during both his premiership and royal advisor periods. Meanwhile the paper also analyzed other military leaders such as Plaek Phibunsongkhram and Sarit Thanarat, who served as the prime minister before Prem's premiership. The author utilized a combination of both historical and empirical approaches, based on existing literatures research, as well as newspaper and documentary analysis. The outcome expected to provide a comprehensive understanding of Prem's special role in Thai politics, and includes a discussion on the reasons why the military always stayed strong in Thai history, trying to find a path to change the military ruled Thailand from other countries' experiences.

Keywords: Thai politics, military leaders, Prem Tinsulanonda

7. Introduction

On 26 May 2019, Thai statesman, former prime minister, former minister of defense, former regent of Thailand, president of the Privy Council and former commander in chief of The Royal Thai Army (RTA), Gen Prem Tinsulanonda has passed away. In his 98 years life, he has played an extremely important role in Thai politics, and even shaped Thai politics to some extent.

Prem is both an influential military leader and a towering politician. Born in a southern province of Thailand, Songkla in 1920, Prem was firstly a soldier then relatively easily to the top of the army. He first entered politics in 1959, as a member of the Constitution Drafting Committee. In 1977, Prem fully entered politics as deputy interior minister in Kriangsak Chomanan government, after the Thanin Kraivixien government was toppled by Adm Sangad Chaloryu. Then he became the minister of defense from 1989 to 1986, and prime minister from 1980 to 1988 with three tenures. After he stepped down in 1988, he designated a Statesman and a Privy Councilor by His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej, and became the president of the Privy Council in 1988. He also served as country's regent for two years after the King passed away in 2016. Apart from his rich and honored political career, he also suffered two coups himself during his tenures and was accused by deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his supporters of intervening in politics by masterminding coups.

As a statesman with such a glorious history, it is undoubtable that Gen Prem has had a great impact on Thai politics. This thesis investigates the role Prem plays in Thai politics by comparing Prem's political career with that of the two earlier military leaders i.e., Plaek Phibunsongkhram and Sarit Thanarat. The political career of Prem will include both his premiership and royal advisor tenure. The research applies a combination of both the historical approach and an empirical approach to better research methodology, to give a comprehensive understanding of Prem's role in Thai politics.

8. Problem Statement

Even though the literature references to Prem Tinsulanonda are relatively rich and numerous, there are still some gaps in the research about Prem. First, before 2000s, many books recorded clear details about Prem's personal and political life, especially his experience as prime minister from 1980 to 1988. Some of the books are biographies; others are interviews with people relevant to Prem. However, even though they had provided sufficient information, their flaws are obvious. For example, their works are biased, always favorable to Prem, telling the story with very few critical arguments. For supplementation, the author reviewed the work of some researchers which had specifically analyzed power groups under Prem's premiership with the case studies of military factions or political parties. The two specific researchers provided an understanding of how Prem was balancing the political power during his premiership. They are important references about how Prem influenced Thai politics under his governance. After 2000s, there are very few particular biographies on Gen Prem, yet most of the information about Gen Prem could be found in newspapers such as The Bangkok Post and The Nation. Compared to the very detailed writings about Prem in the last century, that source of news is relatively thin, yet they make lots of critical comments on Prem in both positive and negative ways.

The research in this paper investigates the impact of Prem on Thai politics, and what is the role he played in Thai politics. Second, it seeks to fill the gap of systemic historical research on Prem.

8.1. Research Objectives:

The objectives of this study, therefore, are to:

- 1) Investigate the impact of Prem on Thai politics, and what is the role he played in Thai politics.

- 2) Even though the literatures are already relatively rich, there are still a gap of systemic historical research on Prem. Thus, this research tried to give a more comprehensive understanding of Prem by using historical approach.

8.2. Research Questions:

Main Research Question:

What is Prem's role in Thai politics and how did he play the role?

Sub Research Questions:

Did Prem play more role than other military leaders?

9. Literature Review:

Gen Prem Tinsulanonda is an extraordinary statesman of Thailand. In his 98 years legendary life, he has been in charge of many vital positions of Thailand such as the prime minister, minister of defense, regent of Thailand, and president of the Privy Council.

Undoubtedly, as honorable figure whose funeral was at the state manner, Prem could have great influence on Thailand, even shaping the country to some extent. Thus, it is necessary to understand Prem's role in Thai politics, and how he influenced Thai politics.

There are plenty of research literature about Prem. For works about Gen Prem himself, existing literatures provides plenty of details of Prem's experience during his premiership before the 2000s. Many newspapers also have recorded Prem's behavior after the 2000s. While for the political theories referred to Prem, there are also a variety of works which are relevant to Prem's role from different periods of time and points of view. However, the existing researchers are lacking of systemic historical perspectives of Gen Prem.

Actually, there are some gaps among the researches about Prem. First, before the 2000s, there are many books that recorded clear details about Prem's personal and political life, especially his experience as the prime minister from 1980 to 1988. Some of the books are biographies, while others based on interviews with people connected to Prem. However, even though they had provided sufficient information, their flaws are obvious. For example,

they were mainly written in a positive way, telling the story with very few critical arguments of Prem. For supplementary perspectives, the author reviewed the works of some researchers which had specifically analyzed power groups under Prem's premiership, particularly with the case studies of military factions or political parties. Two specific researches provided an understanding of how Prem balancing the political power during his premiership. They could be important references about how Prem influence Thai politics under his governance. After the 2000s, there are very few specific biographies on Gen Prem, yet most of the information about Gen Prem could be found in the newspaper such as The Bangkok Post and The Nation. Compare to the very detailed writings about Prem in the last century, that news is relatively thin, yet they are making lots of critical comments on Prem in both positive and negative ways.

Second, the author reviewed theories of Thai politics especially those that are considered relevant to Prem. For the first basic theory of Thai politics, Riggs (1966) has demonstrated a concept of "bureaucratic polity", showing that the military is the central component. A strong host of forces that has been combined by the military leaders and the elite class for modifying the traditional Thai monarchy system has restrained the further improvement of democracy of Thailand. However, Chai-Anan (1989) argued that there existed a "semi-democracy", especially under the premiership of Gen Prem. This is the polity pattern, under which governance is neither pure democracy nor bureaucracy. It is a pattern with military, monarchy and civilian interest groups making compromises.

The review above shows that the political theories involving Prem are varied from periods and angles of research. For example, Chai-Anan gives the understanding of Prem shaping "semi-democracy" under his premiership from 1980 to 1988.

10. Methodology

This thesis uses a combination of both a historical approach and an empirical approach research methodology to give a more comprehensive understanding of Prem's role in Thai politics. And the data sources are both primary and secondary. For example, first, the primary data is mainly based on Thai and English newspapers of Thailand, such as Khaosod and The Bangkok Post. Some important speeches of Prem or government documents could also be applied as the primary data as supplementary. Second, the secondary data used here is based on previous works such as biographic books, collection of interviews and journeys.

The reasons for applying the combination of historical and empirical methodology is, first, there is still a gap in systematic historical research on Prem. Moreover, for defending the research hypothesis i.e. that Prem has special influence on Thai politics, the research requires large amounts of historical evidence. Given the nature of the study, the historical approach appears to be the most suitable way of doing it.

10.1. Methods of data collection

To prove the hypothesis i.e. that Prem Tinsulanonda had greater influence on Thai politics than other military leaders, the author needs to investigate the role Prem plays in Thai politics by comparing Prem's political career with that of other military leaders. The political career of Prem will include both his premiership and royal advisor tenure. Given the nature of the study, the author has decided to employ an extensive study of both primary and secondary data.

Primary Data

The primary data of this study will mainly focus on newspapers with some important speeches as supplementary. The newspapers shall be in both Thai and English, such as Thai newspaper Khaosod and English newspapers The Bangkok Post and The Nation. The author has explored the archived newspapers from the National Library of Thailand. The newspapers

with Prem's engagement in some political issues or Prem's important speeches are important sources for the research on Prem's premiership, and main sources for his royal advisor period.

Secondary Data

For assessing the political influence of Prem, especially during his premiership, the research needs to be based on many previous works. The previous biographic books, interviews and journeys shall be the main sources of the secondary data. It helps the author to understand Prem's political behaviors during his premiership and royal advisor tenure, learning the statements of different views towards Prem.

11. The military leaders' role in Thai politics before General Prem

Tinsulanonda

5.1 Introduction

For understanding General Prem Tinsulanonda's special role in Thai politics, the author believes that the comparison with the former military leaders who ever served as the prime minister was needed. Thus, this chapter makes the introduction and comparison over four distinguished military leaders i.e., Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (who served as the prime minister from 1938 to 1944 and 1947 to 1957), Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (who served from 1959 to 1963), Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (who served in 1958 and from 1963 to 1973) and General Kriangsak Chamanan (who served from 1977 to 1980).

The main comparison indicators are their propaganda, national-building policies, and their attitude towards the monarchy, democracy and communism. However, because of the differences in situation and time of premiership, they were not perfectly comparable with the same standard. Each premiership has its own characters that the others may not have, and their legacies towards Thai politics were varied. For example, Field Marshal Phibun had strong propaganda on nationalism, whereas Marshal Sarit and Thanom had firmly stood by the "Nation-Religion-King" doctrine, while General Kriangsak was credible on the political reconciliation.

5.1 Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram

Field Marshal Phibun is one of the most important and controversial Thai politicians in Thailand's history since the country transferred to constitutional monarchy from 1932 Siamese coup d'état. The coup was headed by the first formed political party of Thailand i.e., Khana Ratsadon (People's Party), with some high-ranking western-educated military officers and civilian servants who were not satisfied with the social economic situation took part in. While Field Marshal Phibun was one of the main leaders of the coup and the key figure of military wing in the coup.

Phibun implemented many specific policies with his strong leadership style. It refers to three main aspects: 1) Phibun's ultra-nationalism policies with Fascism influences. 2) Phibun's de facto absolutism and hypocritical formal democratization 3) Phibun's opposed attitude towards communism and the monarchy.

5.2 Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat

Compared to Field Marshal Phibun, Sarit was a more respected political figure for many Thais. He ruled Thailand effectively without active opposition, strongly emphasizing the economic development, elevating the monarchy and providing national security²⁴.

For understanding Sarit's national-building policies, his views towards monarchy, democracy and Communism, the following sections will divide into three parts to introduce. First, Sarit's reviving of the political slogan "Nation-Religion-King" showed his pro-monarchy and paternalistic status. Second, Sarit's promoting of Thai-style democracy, which was totally different from western democracy and absolutism in fact. Third, Sarit's following of anti-communism.

²⁴ Nuechterlein, D. E. (1964). Thailand after Sarit. *Asian Survey*, 842-850.

5.3 Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn

Thanom had shortly served as the prime minister for once within the interim government after the 1957 coup. As a long-term friend and deputy in the National Socialist Party of Sarit, Thanom was asked by Sarit to assume the position of prime minister in 1957, because of the poor health Sarit did not attempt to stand again for office.

Similar to Sarit, Thanom imposed strong executive control and focused on economic development. He staunchly stood with anti-communists, maintaining close relations with the United States. In 1968, with the purpose to please its Western democratic allies, Thanom promulgated a new constitution in order to legitimise and “democratize” the martial law. The constitution allowed elections for National Assembly representatives in 1969, Thanom’s new-formed United Thai People’s Party won 35 percent of the seats and was able to forge a coalition government²⁵. However, Thanom found the elected government was hard to rule compared with the governance under the martial law. Soon, the polity became factionalized, and the conflicts among different power groups were exposed. In 1971, Thanom observed the competing groups could possibly pose threats to the ruling elites dominance; thus, he allied with the interior minister General Prapat to stage a coup against their own government. Therefore, Thanom declared a martial law again, banned political parties and dissolved the parliament. However, in 1973, the extraordinary students-led uprising, calling for more democratic government overthrew Thanom’s military government. As the result, Thanom, Prapat and Sarit’s powerful son Narong were forced to exile.

²⁵ Neher, C. D. (1992). Political succession in Thailand. *Asian Survey*, 32(7), 585-605.

5.4 General Kriangsak Chamanan

Kriangsak Chamanan was born in 1917, he had rich experiences serving in wars such as the Franco-Thai war, Vietnam war and Korean war, and became the full general in 1973²⁶. However, he commanded no significant military forces by himself. Kriangsak was asked to serve as the prime minister in 1977 with the support of a powerful military fraction i.e., Young Turk which mainly consisted of 1960 graduates from class seven of Phra Chulachomklao Army School²⁷.

Much different from the three preceding military leaders, when Kriangsak came to power, the military-dominated political climate of Thailand already experienced some significant changes. From 1973 to 1976, known as the Democratic Interregnum era, Thailand had first taken seriously the democratic reform initiatives under the king. The Democratic Interregnum era soon ended in 1976, when Admiral Sa-ngad headed a coup, because of the wide anxieties of communists expanding concerns among the military. Specially, after the military staged the coup in 1976, it had not asked the senior general to serve as the prime minister as usual, but appointed a civilian prime minister instead. Thanin Kraivichien, who was a royalist judge and lawyer and had close ties with the monarchy. However, Thanin's government seriously failed to function, because of his ivory-toweredultra-rightest moves, hislackofflexibility towardsthe drug issue, andoverprotection of his own clique in the cabinet. The pattern of military appointed civilian leader to serve the prime minister showed to be futile. Thus, a group of military leaders again staged another coup in 1977, ousting Thanin, and appointing general Kriangsak Chamanon to serve as the primeminister.

²⁶ The Associated Press (2003). Kriangsak Chamanand, Thai General, Dies at 86. The Bangkok Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/25/world/kriangsak-chamanand-thai-general-dies-at-86.html>

²⁷ Niyom Rathamarit. (2006). Re-establishing democracy: how Kriangsak and Prem managed political parties. King Prajadhipok's Institute, p. 91

5.5 Conclusion

The “bureaucratic polity” by Fred Riggs (1966) could well explain Thai politics from 1932 to 1973. In his statement, the 1932 coup which changed Thailand from the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy system was only a bureaucratic uprising rather than a popular uprising. The politics changes only involved small groups of the top military and civilian bureaucrats.

In the bureaucratic polity, the military had played the dominant role, being stronger far than the civilian. From 1932 to 1973, the military government ruled Thailand for 36 out of 41 years, accounting for more than 80 percent of the time. The civilian leadership was never able to be fully independent from military dominance. Once the government moved towards being too liberated, or threatened the interests of the elite class, it was soon replaced by a coup²⁸. Phibun, Sarit and Thanom were in power during this stage; they had more or less performed governance by dictatorship in way that dominated the bureaucratic polity.

Since 1973, however, a new pattern of political participation appeared. The extra-bureaucratic forces exercised by the citizenry, such as the students, labor and farmers, became active on the historical stage. The power switches of the government were not only influenced by the top but also by the citizenry. The 1973 students uprising overthrew the bureaucratic government through street politics, Thailand then reached a short lived three years democratic interregnum era from 1973 to 1976. These series of important social political changes did have an impact on the way of the later military rule. When General Kriangsak came to power in 1977 with the support of the coup, he could no longer rule as the former military leaders had done with absolutism.

²⁸ Neher, C. D. (1992). Political succession in Thailand. *Asian Survey*, 32(7), 585-605.

Table 1: The comparison over Phibun, Sarit, Thanom and kriangsak

Leader Indicator	Phibun	Sarit	Thanom	Kriangsak
Background	Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, Study artillery tactics in France / Field Marshal	Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy / Field Marshal	WatKoak Plu Municipal School, Army Cadet Academy / Field Marshal	Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, Thai Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Thailand National Defense College / General
In office	(1)1938-1944 (2)1947-1957 / 15 years	1959-1963 / 5 years	(1)1958 (2)1963-1973 / 11 years	1977-1980 / less than 3 years
Character	Nakleng	Nakleng	Nakleng	Khunna
Propaganda	Rattaniyom	"Nation-Religion-King"	"Nation-Religion-King" / "Do good, do good, do good"	--
Monarchy	Anti-	Pro-	Pro-	Pro-
Democracy	Absolutism/ Constitutional Monarchy	Absolutism / Thai-style democracy	Absolutism / Thai-style democracy	Semi-democracy
Communism	Anti-	Anti-	Anti-/Readjust the relationship with communist regimes	Anti- / Improve the relationship with communist regimes

As the table above shows the comparison over the four military leaders, the three Marshals, Phibun, Sarit and Thanom are different. While Kriangsak is much more different from them. In conclusion, they have the following similarities and differences:

For educational background, they were all trained at the Military Academy. Phibun, Sarit and Kriangsak were from the same military school- Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, which is the military academy of Royal Thai Army (RTA). Particularly, Marshal Phibun had western- trained experience, having studied artillery tactics in France.

For their leadership patterns, according to Thak, Field Marshal Phibun, Sarit and Thanom are all "nakleng", while General Kriangsak is "Khuna". The nakleng is a type of leader who is tough, has charisma and loyalty to friends. This type of leadership usually refers to the manliness, and the law-abiding behavior exercised by the leader is not emphasized. Compared to the other two leaders, Thanom was considered to be a lesser degree nakleng, because he was more willing to listen to his dissidents. Thak believed that the nakleng style leadership works well with more rigid structures of loyalties, in which the patron-client ties are close²⁹. However, when Kriangsak came to power, Thailand suffered the great factionalism, the patron-client ties were quite loose. Thus, he must balance the demanding of different clients from different interest groups. The hardline leadership of nakleng was no longer suitable for the situation. For mediating and reconciling the complicated factional conflicts, Kriangsak therefore based his legitimacy more on Khuna, which refers the moral image, "well manner" good people in general.

For the national-building, the most prominent policy by Phibun is "Rattha Niyom" (nationalism), which largely prompted the Thaification process, made the minority ethnic groups assimilated into Thais (exclude the South Muslim). While the reviving of

²⁹ Ockey, J. (1996). Thai society and patterns of political leadership. *Asian Survey*, 36(4), 345-360.

“Nation-Religion-King” since Sarit’s era, made the doctrine to be the core principle to accord for most of Thais, no matter in the elite class or citizenry.

For the relation with the monarchy, only Phibun had openly shown an anti-monarchy attitude. The following leaders were all pro-monarchy and protected the traditional “ Nation-Religion-King” doctrine. Specifically, Phibun sought to end the royal dominance in the highest levels of government. In order to build up a constitutional monarchized “ modern state” (but with de facto absolutism), Phibun had taken many measures to marginalize the role of the royalists in the government and to keep the military power growing in politics. Because of his lack of respect towards the monarchy, the royal family opposed him, and this also resulted in his downfall. In contrast, Sarit fully acknowledged the fact that the Thai monarchy was still widely believed by most Thais as the legitimate institution of politics. Therefore, he strongly supported the monarchy, meanwhile gained the support from the monarchy. Sarit had tied the military-monarchy relations, the long-term ally of military- monarchy had first formed in his era. Following Sarit’s way, Thanom continued to support the king, but the king did not always stand by him. In 1973 the students-led popular uprising which finally resulted in the Thanom government’s collapse. The king provided moral support for the students. While for General Kriangsak, he was formally protected the “ Nation-Religion-King”. However, his government was full of compromising by different power groups, therefore he showed no particular support to the pro-royal power.

For democratization, none of the four military leaders sincerely sought to promote it. Their democratic liberalization acts were mainly in order to (1) please the western allies, (2) legitimize the military government, and (3) gain civilian politicians’ supports. Democratic liberalization happened when the power of incumbent military governments went down, thus it had to compromise with the opponents to strengthen its ruling status. Phibun, Sarit and Thanom had all ruled in de facto absolutism. In the second tenure of Phibun, and the later stage of Thanom, they both allowed political party participation and the elections.

However, for Phibun, he was widely criticized by the public for the corrupt acts in the 1957 election to ensure his victory. For Thanom, who found the elected government more difficult to run than being under the martial law, staged a coup against his own government in 1971 and moved back to absolutism. While for Kriangsak, the social-economic situation had already experienced significant changes, much different from that before 1973. Martial law was impossible to run as in the past, therefore the democratic process had been taken in his premiership. However, for keeping the incumbent's power, Kriangsak also imposed many undemocratic measures to obstruct the rise of political parties.

For the attitude towards communism, Phibun, Sarit and Thanom were all strict anti-Communist leaders, while Kriangsak tried to apply the moderate way to conciliate the Communist insurgency. In the late years of the Thanom government, because of the Sino-U.S. relation change, Thanom had attempted to readjust Thailand's relationship with the Communist regimes following the U.S., while Kriangsak had improved Thailand's relations with the Communist regimes with a balanced status that was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-China. However, the Vietnam invasion into Cambodia had broken Thailand's diplomatic balance. The Kriangsak government was unwelcoming of the Vietnamese invasion which was backed by the Soviets, but it tried to explain badly to the Soviet Union that the country had not turned to China.

The following chapter builds on the argument of this chapter, picturing the next prime minister after Kriangsak, General Prem Tinsulanonda's political performance in comparison with these four military leaders.

12. Prem Tinsulanonda's role in his premiership (1980- 1988)

6.1 Historical Background

Prem was born in Songkhla province. In his early years, he studied in Mahavajiravudh Songkhla School, and Suan Kularb Wittayalai School. After he graduated from high school, he came to

Bangkok and continued his study in Chulachomkloao Cadet School which was the military academy of the Royal Thai Army (RTA)³⁰.

Prem always served as a professional soldier. In 1941, he was appointed to be a second lieutenant of an Armored Corps unit. In 1974, he became a Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army Region. Subsequently, Prem was promoted to be the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army in 1977 and 1978 respectively.

For his political career, Prem first became a member of the Constitution Drafting Committee and later a Senator in 1968, during Thanom's premiership. Under Kriangsak's government, Prem was appointed as a Deputy Minister of Interior in 1977. While in 1979, Prem also became the Minister of Defense. Succeeding Kriangsak, Prem became the 16th Prime Minister of Thailand, meanwhile continuing to serve as the Minister of Defense.

Before Prem came to serve as the Prime Minister in 1980, the Kriangsak government faced a series of economic and political crises. Politically, the general gained weak support from the elected members in parliament. Also, the military fraction, especially the Yong Turks withdrew their supports for him. Economically, the Kriangsak government confronted the serious oil crisis. Due to the increasing demanding of oil consumption in Thailand, the government had to import oil. The government budget and the public debt increased largely. The Kriangsak government therefore had to raise the oil price to ease the debt burden. However, the rising of oil price resulted in the civil protesting and opposition parties' attacks against Kriangsak government. Finally, Kriangsak resigned because of the economic failure and his loss of military and parliamentary supports.

³⁰ Warren, W. (1997). Prem Tinsulanonda : soldier & statesman. Eastern Printing Public Co.,Ld. Retrieved from <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat07387a&AN=mfu.43510&site=eds-live>

6.2 Prem's Political performance during his premiership

General Prem Tinsulanonda's government also experienced serious factionalism as the former governments all faced. But he carefully balanced the power from different interest groups. With the strong support by the monarchy, he had successfully defused the political crisis several times.

Table 2: Prem's Premiership

Prem Tinsulanonda government	Cabinets	Establishment/ Dismiss
Prem I: 42nd Administration (13 March 1980 – 19 March 1983)	1st Cabinet (3 March 1980 – 11 March 1981)	Establishment: Conciliation among the Social Action, Chart Thai, Democrat, Siam Democrat and National People's Party Dismiss: Conflicts between Chart Thai and Social Action Parties, SAP withdrew from the cabinet
	2nd Cabinet (11 March 1981 – 8 December 1981)	Establishment: Prem's close associates, controversial political figures, conciliation among the Democrat, the Chart Thai, the Mass Line, the United Thai and the United Parties Dismiss: SAP rejoined the cabinet
	3rd Cabinet (9 Dec 1981 – 30 April 1983)	Establishment: Conciliation among Social Action, Democrat, Chart Thai and a number of smaller parties Dismiss: The 1983 General Election
Prem II: 43rd Administration (30 April 1983 – 5 August 1986)	4th Cabinet (30 April 1983 – 11 August 1986)	Establishment: Conciliation among Social Action, Democrat, Prachakorn Thai and National Democrat Dismiss: The 1986 General Election
Prem III: 44th Administration (5 August 1986 - 28 April 1988)	5th Cabinet (11 August 1986 – 28 April 1988)	Establishment: Conciliation among Democrat, Chart Thai, Social Action, Rasadorn Dismiss: Prem's resignation

As the table shows, Prem served as the Prime Minister for three terms from 1980 to 1988, including Prem I from 1980 to 1983, Prem II from 1983 to 1986 and Prem III from 1986 to 1988. The general hosted the general election for three times in 1983, 1986 and 1988 respectively. Prem confronted great political instabilities during his premiership, but finally he solved the problem. He set up cabinet five times, and dissolved the House of Representatives three times. Also, he suffered two coups in 1981 and 1985 separately.

During his first term in office, Prem faced serious political instability. In the government, his first cabinet failed because of the crack between Chart Thai Party (CTP) and Social Action Party (SAP) which were the two main political parties of Thailand at the time. The two parties quarreled bitterly on the oil issue. SAP blamed CTP interfering their responsibility of oil purchasing when Chartchai flew to Riyadh to negotiate an oil deal. Then the party asked Prem to grant it full economic portfolios including the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture which posts were held by CTP. However, this request was refused by Prem. As a consequence, SAP withdrew from the government on March 4, 1981. This act directly led to the collapse of Prem's first cabinet³¹.

On March 11, the second cabinet of Prem formed. It included largely the rightist and conservative parties and some technocrats. Democrat, the Chart Thai, the Mass Line, the United Thai and the United Parties conciliated in this cabinet. However, the cabinet list was not welcomed by people. First, it contained many of Prem's own close associates from his native southern region or from the cavalry division, the Prime Minister even appointed one of his classmates in the Suan Kularb Wittayalai School. The Prem I government suffered a coup d'état in the 1981. The coup d'état was led by the Young Turks, which used to support Prem before when Prem succeeded power from Kriangsak.

³¹ Niyom Rathamarit. (2006). Re-establishing democracy : how Kriangsak and Prem managed political parties. King Prajadhipok's Institute, P168.

Nevertheless, Prem's government still faced instability after the coup. In the military, General Arthit Kamlang-ek who sided with Prem before in the Commander-in-Chief tenure extending issue and the Young Turks coup, was increasingly powerful and threatened Prem's status. Apart from Arthit, the former Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand also attempted to re-entre Thai politics. To contain Arthit and Kriangsak's rising power, and to solve the economic difficulties, Prem decided to re-invite SAP into the cabinet, seeking the party's supports for broadening its power base in the lower house, containing the military's rising power and asking for economic advices. M.R. Kukrit, the party leader of SAP and the former Prime Minister of Thailand, approved Prem's plan and decided to rejoin the cabinet. On 9 Dec 1981, Prem's third cabinet therefore emerged with the return of SAP.

As the interim clauses of the 1987 constitution were reaching the point of expiration in 1983, the military started worrying that it would lose power. Gen. Arthit therefore campaigned for an amendment to the constitution, trying to make the clause more beneficial to the military. However, the military-backed amendment bill was finally killed, because the military and bureaucrats could not reach a consensus. The military then pressured Prem to dissolve the lower house, hosting the general election in advance of schedule when the 1978 constitution still work. Prem agreed, he dissolved the lower house and set the election date just three days before the constitution expired. The result of the election on 18 April was appreciated by Prem. No single party won a majority of seats in the House of Representatives³². Thus, Prem had successfully kept his Prime Minister post.

Another coup detat against Prem government happened in 1985. The coup was namely headed by General Serm Na Nakorn, but the real leader was Colonel Manoon Roopkajorn who headed the Yong Turks coup in 1981 before. Even the coup was violent, with some high-ranking officers involved resulting in bloodshed. It brought limited influence to Prem's government.

³² Niyom Rathamarit. (2006). Re-establishing democracy : how Kriangsak and Prem managed political parties. King Prajadhipok's Institute, p. 199

The real political crisis for Prem was the government's defeat in 1986 for a parliament bill. In January of 1986, Prem removed Boontheng Tongasawadi from office, who was the deputy prime minister and a leader of SAP. Boontheng therefore organized a dissident SAP faction against Prem. On May 1, the government's land transportation bill, which involved taxes on gasoline and diesel vehicles, gained poor support from the parliament. Apart from the defeat in the parliament, Prem's power in the military was challenged by General Arthit. The General increasingly showed his ambition to assume the premiership, and the dissident also supported him. Arthit mobilized some high-ranking officers to pressure Prem on his term extension issue, and put his man into regimental and battalion commander posts, attempting to form an Arthit-centered power base. At that time, his four-year premier tenure would finish by 1987, and the parliamentary election has already been scheduled in 1986. Facing the political crisis in both parliament and the military, some people especially opponents in the government, expecting he may resign and transfer his power to General Arthit. However, Prem chose to dissolve the parliament and called for a new election. In dealing with General Arthit, Prem blocked Arthit's move of serving longer in the military post, and dismissed him as the army commander-in-chief.

The result of the 1986 election showed the Democrats won 100 seats, Chart Thai won 63 seats, Social Action won 51 seats (it became less popular because its respective leader, Kukrit Pramoj had resigned, soon the inner-conflict within the party was exposed) and the military-backed Rassadorn party won 18 seats. Prem himself did not join the party, seeking to keep his status as a consensus leader. The Democrat, Chart Thai, Social Action and Rassadorn parties set up a conciliation government, and appointed Prem to serve as the prime minister again. After the difficult negotiation with the four parties for cabinet positions, Prem had kept his rights for appointing the important defense, finance and interior ministers³³. The biggest

³³ Neher, C. D. (1987). Thailand in 1986: Prem, Parliament, and Political Pragmatism. *Asian Survey*, 27(2), 219-230.

Democrat Party could control over four minister posts i.e., the ministries of agriculture, education, public health and science³⁴.

However, after Prem just established his fifth cabinet, the Democrats soon split. The party leader was criticized by its members. Bichai Rattakul, who was the leader of the Democrats during that time, was blamed for only negotiating four minor portfolios. The party's harmony was broken, even worse was to come in the coming year. The deputy interior minister, Veera Musigapoong from Democrats was accused of disloyalty, while the Democrats refused to support the SAP minister³⁵. As the inner-conflicts was escalating, it was very difficult to mediate. At this time, Prem's rule with apparent integrity was also criticized by dissidents, his tactic of power-balancing became unpopular. Faced with serious attacks in the parliament, Prem decided to dissolve the parliament on April 29 and scheduled the election on 24th July, 1988.

The result of the 1988 election saw an apparent decline of the Democrat's seats, with only 48 declining from 100 three years ago. Chart Thai, Social Action, Democrat and Rassadorn formed a conciliation government again, and supported a Prem-led government. However, Prem refused this time, finally, he stepped down after his eight years premiership.

13. Conclusion

going Back to the research question that set before, did Prem Tinsulanonda plays a special role in Thai politics? Compared with the four former military leaders, Phibun, Sarit, Thanom and Kriangsak, the answer is Yes.

To conclude, the five Prime Ministers with military background could be divided into two groups. First group includes Phibun, Sarit and Thanom, while the second includes Kriangsak and Prem.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

As the penultimate chapter mentioned before, the leadership patterns for Sarit and Thanom are all nakleng, while for Kriangsak and Prem is Khuna. The first group of leaders ruled the country with de facto absolutism. Their governments were military-dominated, when the civilian power challenged the interest of the military, the military would usually stage a coup to regain its absolute power. And their promotion of democracy was not sincere, mainly with the pragmatic purpose such as satisfying Thailand's western allies to gain their material support, legitimating a de facto absolutism government or gain civilian supports. In deal with the relation with the monarchy, apart from Phibun's anti-monarchy attitude which was an important reason that finally led to his downfall, Sarit created the long-going close tie between the military and the monarchy, and Thanom followed it, while Prem practiced it the best. For their attitude towards Communism, the group one leaders were strict on anti- Communism.

For the group two leaders, the socioeconomic and the international politics environment already experienced dramatic changes. In Kriangsak's era, the absolutism law no longer suited Thailand. People were more open and well-educated, sharing a basic awareness of democracy. The new pattern of political participation appeared. The extra-bureaucratic forces exercised by the citizenry such as the students, labor and farmers became active on the historical stage. Internationally, the US eased its relationships with some Communist regimes, it had established diplomatic relations with Communist China. For Indochina, the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea created tension among Southeast Asian countries.

After Thanin's rightist government, Thai society faced serious splits. Kriangsak had no choice but to reconcile different power groups on both the military and civilian sides. Therefore, Kriangsak had to promote the process of democratization to meet civilian's demands. However, Kriangsak still obstructed the development and participation of political parties. Finally, Kriangsak lost their support. Compared to Kriangsak, Prem was cleverer, building a balance between the military and civilian. The general demonstrated flexible leadership, he

was always trying to balancing power, not allowing either side to enjoy power beyond limits that he could control. He also continued to strengthen his own power base in the military, and had the monarchy always siding with him. Prem's skillful means for power balancing made the general always gain military, monarchy and party supports. For communist defusing, both generals achieved a lot. Prem applied moderate and flexible methods to deal with the communist insurgency which was rampant in the Northeast.

To sum up, Prem has contribute to Thailand a lot. His close alliance with the monarchy helped provide great stability for Thailand, and it paved the way for the development of democracy. General Prem also should be memorized for his successful solution of the communist insurgency, extraordinary leadership for social recalcination, balancing of power, together with his incorruptibility and modest manner.

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STEM Pathways: How Thai Culture and Gender Stereotypes Affect Female Career Experiences In STEM Occupations

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Despite Thailand ranking first in Asia for the highest proportion of females working in the STEM industry — the number of females working in STEM occupations still remain low in comparison to other occupational fields. This paper aims to examine the impacts of Thai culture and gender stereotypes on female career experiences in Thailand as well as the factors that encourage and discourage them to pursue a career in STEM. The importance of this study is that it will fill in the gap in previous researches by providing more insights into the experiences of Thai women working in STEM occupations within various career levels. The paper also incorporates the Self-affirmation Theory and Social Cognitive Career Theory to examine the career development of the participants. Based on the gathered data and theoretical frameworks, the paper argues that Thai culture have influenced the constructed gender stereotypes in Thailand through the passed down beliefs and societal norms, which in turn have an impact on female career experiences. Comparatively, the extent of the impact also depends on the individual's degree of positive self-affirmation, with individuals who depicted higher positive self-affirmation being less affected by the influence of Thai culture and gender stereotypes. Family and supportive parental guidance also plays a crucial role in helping participants develop positive self-affirmation and career aspirations in STEM. Thus, the encouraging factors for them to pursue a career in STEM stemmed from the outcome expectation on the monetary benefits and job security rewards, personal interests, and family encouragement. Whereas the discouraging factors mostly stemmed from the work conditions, the constructed gender stereotypes and the nature of the STEM work that contradicts with the societal expectation that in turn created a work-life balance problem for females in the workplace.

Keywords: *Thai culture, gender stereotype, STEM, Thailand*

1. Introduction

The topic of gender has long been an issue in Thailand that can be traced back to the historically conservative social norms and beliefs women are expected to conform to. Hence, one area that has consistently been linked to female's barriers in workplaces is the effect of gender stereotyping. For instance, women in Thailand are often associated with the image of grace, beauty, and neatness, which usually sets the guideline for the 'ideal' careers women are expected to participate in (Remya & Arasu, 2017). Therefore, one might contribute the factor of gender stereotype to the problem of lack of female representations in top management levels and male dominated occupations. One major occupational field that is considered to be male-dominated is STEM — an occupational field that includes careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). The acronym STEM has been adopted by worldwide institution and organisations. However, there is no standard definition to what career is accounted for as a STEM job. Despite that, this study focuses on every career that is considered to be STEM related such as scientific researchers, financial analysts, and every type of engineer and computer support works. However, careers such as doctors and psychologists will not be counted as a STEM occupation within this study as these careers are categorised under a secondary STEM domain due to its health-related aspects (Breiner & Harkness, 2012).

Similarly, Thailand seem to have revealed a reverse trend when it comes to proportion of men and women working in STEM. According to UNESCO's recent study, only three countries

in Asia have an equal or above proportion of males and females working in the STEM industry with Thailand ranking as number one for the highest percentage of female workers in STEM (53 percent), followed by the Philippines (51 percent) and Kazakhstan (50 percent). This phenomenon of the unbalance of gender representation in the workplace were also shown in countries such as Japan and Korea, where it was found that only 14 to 17 percent of female are working in the field of science and technology (Royal Thai Embassy, 2018). In addition, Thailand's Ministry of Education had also recently adopted the U.N policy toolkit to promote STEM education amongst Thai girls, with 53 percent of the students in sciences higher education being female, but less than 24 percent are majoring in engineering, construction or manufacturing studies (Bangkok UNESCO Organisation, 2017). Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine factors that inspire females to pursue a career in STEM, as well as examine how gender stereotyping and culture can affect their decisions and experiences within the STEM fields. Additionally, this paper aims to fill in the gaps of previous literatures by taking into account two main factors: 1) the influence of Thai culture and 2) gender stereotype for the purpose of examining the factors involved in contributing to Thai women's STEM pathway choices and experiences. Hence, the importance of this study is that it will contribute to the existing researches on the issues of gender in Thailand as well as provide more insights into the specific field STEM — covering women from various career levels as previous researches was mostly focused on Thai women within the upper management levels and other career fields.

1.2 Research Questions

1. How does Thai culture have an impact on female experiences working in STEM occupations?
2. What are the factors that encourage and discourage females in pursuing a career in STEM?
3. How does gender stereotyping in Thailand play a role in STEM industries?

1.3 Research Objectives

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the impact of Thai culture and gender stereotyping and how they have an effect on women in STEM occupations. Additionally, the objective is to improve the understanding of gender stereotyping effects on women in male-dominated STEM occupations in order to pave way for future program developments to eliminate any gender barriers or gender bias culture that may limit female career options. This study will also examine factors that encourage and discourage Thai women in pursuing a career in STEM.

2. Literature Review

There have been many researches in the past on the topic of gender stereotypes. However, most of the literatures were related to the issue of glass ceiling and career advancement within the workplace. Furthermore, there are limited literatures on the effects of gender stereotype on female career experiences especially within the STEM fields and generally limited researches within the context of Thailand on gender stereotypes, Thai culture and its effects on women.

The first part of the literature review defines and explores the concept of gender stereotyping and related researches on the topic of gender such as the topic of gender role, stereotype threats and sexism. Hence, gender stereotype is defined as the qualities ascribed to men and women based on their gender and beliefs that hold to make assumptions about members of a particular gender group that can be both positive and negative as the stereotype can often lead to biased assumptions about an individual based on their gender (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). On the other hand, gender roles are the societal norms of how one is expected to act, speak and conduct themselves based on their sexual orientation that are constructed through culture and close relations. Thus, stereotype threat is where an individual feels the pressure to conform to a certain behaviour or try to avoid being judged out of fear that they could confirm the negative stereotype, which can increase anxiety, create negative thoughts and reduce task confidence (Kamonkan & Jaruntanakul, 2018).

Subsequently, a study by Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) revealed that exposure to sexist environment can have a direct effect on women's career aspirations with another study revealing the two possible causes of gender disparities, one being the traditional role in family that distract women from career devotions and second being the deep-rooted male- dominant culture that discourage women in academic and career advancement (Sodha, Özbilgin, and Connolly, 2010).

Following, are the reviews of the literatures on STEM pathways of men and women based on previous Thai and Western researches that studied the different factors that sparks an

interest in STEM as well as the barriers that discourage or prevent both genders in pursuing a career in STEM. Consequently, it was revealed that there were slight differences in the barrier factors that discourage both sexes to pursue a study in STEM. While females experience more barriers that stem from lack of teachers support and lack of support from parents — males' barriers comes mainly from lack of peer interests in STEM and minimal support from close family members (Fouad et al., 2010; Maltese & Cooper, 2017).

Comparatively, two more studies also employed theory and frameworks in related to interest developments in order to investigate the career paths of both genders (Renninger, 2016; Lent et al., 2000). Nevertheless, both literatures only examined the factors that triggered interests in STEM, whereas Maltese and Cooper (2017) filled the gaps in the previous literatures by further investigating the factors that not only initiate, but also maintain STEM interest overtime within the different gender. The research concludes that females' interest in STEM relied more heavily on the support from interpersonal relationships such as family, peers, and teachers in comparison to males, whose interest in STEM depends more on self-motivation and persistence.

Meanwhile culture is the collective programming of the mind, values, beliefs, languages, and traditions which distinguishes the members of one group from another — it is the foundation of how ones formed behaviour and expressed ideas and identities (Hofstede, 1994; Spencer-Oatey, 2008). However, this study focuses on the particular aspects of the Thai culture that may contribute to females' experiences working in the STEM occupations. Therefore, culture in this study refers to the environmental factors that play a role in

shaping oneself such as traditions, beliefs, languages, and values. For instance, the Thai culture of high place and low place. This refers to the Thai hierarchical system of people being in a high or low status according to their age, occupation, or family background.

Hence, the importance of status can be seen in the Thai pronominal system as the choice of pronouns are employed to identify the sex, status and the overall identification of oneself. For instance, the Thai word 'pee', which is used to refer to an older individual before calling out their names to show respects (Vongvipanond, 1994). Nevertheless, passed down Thai norms and beliefs still expects women to conform to a certain behaviour of motherhood or as Thais refer to as 'phayt mae', including characteristic of nurturance, respectful and obedience. Hence, this in term had become one of the barriers for women in workplace settings due to societal expectations of a women's duties at homes as traditionally women in Thailand are expected to conform to the gender role expectation of being the 'good wife' while the men is the only bread winner of the family (Remya & Arasu, 2017).

Following are the related literatures on glass ceilings, gender pay gap and STEM occupations within the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, glass ceiling is defined as "the intangible barrier within a hierarchy that prevents women or minorities from obtaining upper level positions" (Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 2012). This refers not only to the interpersonal relationships, but also the interpersonal skills of the women and minorities as well. A qualitative research was conducted on successful Thai women in higher education career paths — exploring the strategies they used to overcome the glass ceiling barriers within their workplace setting for the purpose of helping Thai women breakthrough barriers in their career advancement

pathways (Cheaupalakit, 2014). The information obtained suggested that even though it is hard for females to break through the glass ceiling in the society — it is even difficult to shift from the image of an obedience employee to a decision-making position within an organization due to the norms of a male-led culture. The research then concludes that the underlying causes of glass ceiling were the long-term result from lack of access to mentoring, the legacy of male domination, and the work-life balance burden that the society often puts more pressure on females. Consequently, this leads to the issue of gender pay gap as Thai female workers are revealed to be more productive in comparison to male workers, but instead was receiving lower wages with stronger wage gap in younger labor forces due to gender discrimination (Khorpech & Kulkolkarn, 2011; Mutsaklisana, 2011)

Lastly, the theoretical frameworks which are comprised of the Self-Affirmation Theory and Social Cognitive Career Theory (SCCT). First, the Self-affirmation Theory is a psychological theory that focuses on the way individuals incorporate experiences that are threatening to their self-concept into their sense of self. The theory proposed that people are fundamentally driven to maintain self-integrity and a good perception of themselves and will employ defensive response mechanisms in order to lessen the effect of information that contradicts their sense of self to preserve those positive perceptions. Claude Steele (1998) posits that the self can be constructed as a child through positive support and domains such as family, values, and beliefs system (Steele, 1988). To boost, a research conducted by Cohen, Apfel, Garcia, and Master (2006) also revealed that self-affirmation was successfully used to reduce negative racial stereotypes on students in a classroom setting as the result of the study revealed that

positive self-affirmation resulted in improved grades of the students and reduced the effects of racial achievement gap.

On the other hand, the Social Cognitive Career Theory (SCCT, 2002) was developed by Robert W. Lent, Steven D. Brown, and Gail Hackett in 1994 was based on Albert Bandura's Social Cognitive Theory (SCT, 1986) that was used to study areas such as performing behaviours, academic performances and organisational development. In the same way, the SCCT focuses on human performance and development as well by emphasising on three aspects of career development (1) what influence basic academic and career interests, (2) what determines educational and career choices, and (3) how academic and career success are obtained. Similar to the Self-affirmation theory, SCCT examines factors such as abilities, values, and environmental factors that with are linked with the main variables of this theory, which are divided into three models: 1) Interest model, 2) Choice model and Performance model in which all three models explore self-efficacy, outcome expectations and goals.

3. Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research method using both primary and secondary sources. A semi-structured interview was conducted on volunteered female participants working in a career within the STEM fields such as; industrial engineers, IT personnels, and scientific researchers. The number of participants was limited to 15 participants due to time limitations and requirements. Moreover, the participants must belong to the age group of 25-60 years

old, and is required to have at least 3 years of experience in STEM careers. One reason for this restriction on age and job experiences is because 3 years of experiences working in STEM would give a more reliable information compare to someone who only have 1 or 2 years experience, in which that experience could be unreliable, unstable or bias. Moreover, the restriction on age is to narrow down the sample size and focus on those who is still currently working and is not retired as well as those who have already graduated, but also have sufficient previous experiences working in STEM. Subsequently, there were no restriction on provinces or area of Thailand in which the participants were recruited. Following, secondary data are collected and reviewed from reports published by previous researchers within Thailand as well as western literatures. Secondary resources that were used are such as the study conducted by Nuanthip Kaewsri and Tanit Tongthong (2014) on Thai female civil engineers career developments, and a study by Napasr & Yukongdi (2015), which focused on Thai female executives experiences of barriers to career advancement in their respective fields. In addition, the study also required previous literatures on the SCCT and Self-affirmation Theory to examine the career developments of the participants. The interviews was then recorded using voice recordings and conducted via phone calls interview in English or Thai depending on the preference of the participants with an informal approach in order to make process more comfortable for the participants. The recording was then transcribed into written form, which was then analysed using thematic analysis approach.

Semi-structured interview questions to be used in interviewing participants:

Main topics:

1. Biographical information
2. Educational Background and family upbringing
3. Encouraging and discouraging factors in pursuing STEM
4. Influence of Thai culture on their career choices
5. Experiences of gender stereotypes

4. Findings

The interviews with women working in Thailand's STEM occupations have revealed significant factors that influenced their academic and career path. Consequently, the interviews also shine light on the three research questions which the findings can be divided into the following sections:

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Impact of Thai culture on women working experiences

4.2.1 Family values

4.2.2 Importance of hierarchy and social status

4.3.2 Thai culture's influence on the constructed idea of gender in Thailand

4.3 Encouraging factors

4.3.1 Job stability and wages

4.3.2. Personal interests

- 4.3.3. Family support
- 4.4 Discouraging factors
 - 4.4.1 Work conditions
 - 4.4.2 Company culture
 - 4.4.3 Barriers due to gender
 - 4.4.4 Work-life balance
- 4.5 Experiences of gender stereotype
 - 4.5.1 Negative gender stereotypes
 - 4.5.2 Positive gender stereotypes
- 4.6 Other observations

From the gathered data it was revealed that family institution and supportive parental guidance played a crucial role in helping participants develop positive self-affirmation and self-efficacy as it later influences their career aspirations. On the other hand, majority of the gender stereotypes were found to be experienced in the form of passed down beliefs and gender role expectation which is influenced by the Thai culture. Hence, gender stereotyping was found to have played a major role in female career experiences in STEM as it was revealed that gender stereotyping started early on in life and had influenced how Thai women are expected to carry themselves in the social settings. Majority of the participants reported previous experiences of negative gender stereotype through the form of expression or Thai idiom that was used as a form of teaching specifically for female in the past with the degree of negative gender stereotypes in the workplace revealed to be more prominent in the engineering field. However, experiences of positive gender stereotypes were found to be

reported lesser in comparison to reports of experiences of negative gender stereotypes. Subsequently, encouraging factors for females to pursue a career in STEM stemmed from the outcome expectation on the monetary and job security rewards, personal interests which development was found to be consistent with the SCCT and family support. On the other hand, factors that discourage them mostly arise from the workplace environment such as hazardous workplaces, long working hours and conflict with co-workers. Following is the issue of company culture that of the Thai-led company culture and the unfair treatment of employees. Consequently are the reports of barriers due to gender such as the physical limitation of being a woman itself. Lastly, the issue of work-life balance, which relates back to the issue of long working hours especially in the field of engineering. As the majority of the participants in this field reported that the nature of the STEM work still contradicts with the societal expectation for women, as being a woman is still limiting in terms of separating work from family life since women still have to invest more time and energy in the parental role, which in turn can create a work-life balance problem.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

In conclusion, upon the completion of this research with the aim of answering the three main research questions: 1) How does Thai culture have an impact on female experiences working in STEM occupations? 2) What are the factors that encourage and discourage females in pursuing a career in STEM? And 3) How does gender stereotyping in Thailand play a role in STEM industries? The author has uncovered the following findings by incorporating the two theoretical frameworks of the Self-affirmation Theory and the SCCT into the study:

- 1) The Thai culture had impacted female career experiences through the passed down beliefs and teachings that in turn shape the gender role expectations. Thai culture still expects women to conform to the traditional concept of the desired 'female qualities' that anchored them to the idea that family needs must come before their own needs and wants. Thus, creating the problem of work-life balance where they feel pressured to choose between their career and creating a family. Furthermore, Thai culture emphasis on the importance of hierarchy and culture of saving face further created the obstacles for women in pursuing a career in STEM. This is because it restrains females to speak back to those in higher rankings, as it would only result negatively for them. Subsequently, culture also affects the work environment in STEM as well since it had created the culture of the old boys' network, which norms were constructed through media and gender role expectations of the Thai society. Likewise, males in certain STEM jobs are expected to follow these roles and gender stereotypes to be included in the network due to the passed down traditions and beliefs.

- 2) There are both encouraging and discouraging factors for women to pursue a career in STEM. The main encouraging factors that were found were job and wage stability, personal interest, and family support. Additionally, the three encouraging factors were found to be consistent with the SCCT as it fits into the three models of SCCT: 1) Interest model, 2) Choice's model, and 3) Performance model. Consequently, family support had played a significant role in shaping females self-affirmation and self-integrity, which in turn affected their career aspirations and persistency when faced with life obstacles. Moreover, personal

interests in STEM tends to develop in females who had previous experiences with STEM related activities or closer relationships with people who work in the field and encourage them to pursue the path. Likewise, job and wage stability are consistent with the SCCT theory of goals and outcome expectation where individuals tend to engage in certain actions in order to achieve a specific outcome. On the other hand, the majority of the discouraging factors stemmed from the influence of gender stereotypes such as work environment, company culture, other barriers due to gender, and work-life balance. Hence, these discouraging factors comprise the issue of long working hours, gender role expectations, and the old boys' culture that stemmed from the Thai culture itself.

- 3) Lastly, every participant had reported previous experiences with gender stereotypes. However, experience of positive gender stereotypes or lack of negative gender stereotypes as a child was often found to be linked to an individuals' higher career aspiration and better career experience. Comparatively, negative gender stereotype experiences that were found among many participants were in a form of beliefs or mindsets that were taught to them that males are inferior to females in subjects such as maths and sciences. Hence, these negative gender stereotypes were found to be particularly stronger in the field of engineering compared to other STEM fields such as IT and lab works. The factor that stood out the most was the differences in how the participants internalise the stereotypes they previously experienced as a child and its impact on their current job. For participants who experienced negative gender stereotype but do not internalise those negative comments, it was found that the participants felt proud and more confident in their line

of work and did not feel discouraged, but rather challenged to prove themselves strong. However, for participants who previously experienced negative stereotypes as a child from close relationships and internalised those experiences did not disagree with the negative stereotypes — it was found that they felt excluded and stuck in their careers. Each participant had their own concept of 'gender stereotype'. For instance, a big portion of the participants associated the idea of gender and gender stereotype to the Thai culture. Therefore, the two key factors of gender stereotypes and Thai culture are intertwining as they play a role in the STEM industries in Thailand. This is because the Thai culture had constructed idea and image of roles and traits females should possess, which are then ascribed on them through family and school institutions. However, it also depends on how the families raise their daughters. For instance, it was found that females who were not pressured with the gender stereotypes as a child were more self-affirmed, had more aspirations and positive outlook on their jobs as well as better self-defence mechanism when faced with gender stereotype threats in the workplace.

4) Self-affirmation Theory & Social Cognitive Career Theory

The two theoretical frameworks of this study had assisted with the construction of questionnaires as well as gave insight into the career development of females working in STEM fields. For instance, females with high and positive self-affirmation were seen to continuously display persistence, positive outlook and aspiration in their careers. Majority of the self-affirmed females also expressed early interests in STEM and with the support and encouragement from the close relationships they had, developed a self-defence mechanism

when faced with gender stereotypes in the workplace. However, the females who choose to pursue an education and career in STEM that were mainly influenced by the outcome expectation of having a stable job and wages were found to have lower career aspirations. In addition, females who received gender stereotypes from close relationships when they were younger also internalized gender stereotypes in the workplace more and were found to feel discouraged when faced with these gender stereotypes. Consequently, Thai culture and gender stereotypes in the context of Thailand are intertwining as traditional beliefs; values and languages are the base of the constructed gender stereotypes in the Thai society. On the other side, questionnaires that were constructed specifically based on the SCCT also gave insight into the career path of the women who chose to pursue a career in STEM. It shined light on the factors that affected the female's development of self-integrity, personal interests, goals, and educational and career choices.

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