



MYANMAR-CHINA RELATIONS (2003-2011)

BY

MR. THU REIN SAW HTUT NAING

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (ASIA PACIFIC STUDIES)

THAMMASAT INSTITUTE OF AREA STUDIES

THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

ACADEMIC YEAR 2018

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THESIS

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MR. THU REIN SAW HTUT NAING

ENTITLED

MYANMAR-CHINA RELATIONS (2003-2011)

was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts (Asia Pacific Studies)

on

Chairman

(Lecturer Takashi Tsukamoto, Ph.D.)

Member and Advisor

(Assistant Professor M.L. Pinitbhand Paribatra, Ph.D.)

Member

(Assistant Professor Pisanu Suntharaks, Ph.D.)

Director

(Associate Professor Suphat Suphachalasai, Ph.D.)


Thesis Title	MYANMAR-CHINA RELATIONS (2003-2011)
Author	Mr. Thu Rein Saw Htut Naing
Degree	Master of Arts (Asia-Pacific Studies)
Major Field/Faculty/University	Master of Arts (Asia-Pacific Studies) Thammasat Institute of Area Studies Thammasat University
Thesis Advisor	Assistant Professor M.L. Pinitbhand Paribatra, Ph.D.)
Academic Year	2018

ABSTRACT

Myanmar was under military regime after a coup in 1988 until 2011 and the United States led western countries imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar for human rights violation and non-democratization within the country-the toughest period was during 2003 to 2011. The pragmatic approach to China which became rising superpower after its economic reform in the 1980s was the right option for Myanmar to counter the US-led international pressure. The purpose of this study is to examine how Myanmar benefited from China during the international pressure especially the sanction period. The research question for this study, to be precise, is “How has the relationship with China during 2003 to 2011 benefited Myanmar’s national interest amidst the United States’ pressures and economic sanctions?”. It can be clearly seen that China was rising to become superpower and boost in their economy-finally became the second largest economy in the world after the United States in 2010; with the long-standing friendship “Pauk-Phaw” relationship between Myanmar and China and eventually reached the strategic partner in 2011, Myanmar’s pragmatic approach to China in terms of political as well as economic where all doors are closed from the western world. In order to achieve the findings of this study, the thorough examinations will be made upon all ties between Myanmar and China and the hedging theory, specifically Myanmar’s binding-engagement to China bilaterally and through regional fora, has to be carried out. The research methodology will be documentary analysis-study through the works of well-known

scholars as well as the primary resources like the leaders' speeches and studying the bilateral engagements such as bilateral agreements. The explanation of theories tested in this study will be helpful to prove Myanmar's approach to China amidst US-led international pressures. The possible outcomes of this study will probably confirm the hypothesis of economic pragmatism and binding-engagement of Myanmar towards China to achieve certain political and economic benefits while countering the US-led international pressures and economic sanctions. In the case of Myanmar-China relations-the economic sanctions on authoritarian states by the western democratic states and survival of regimes through these sanctions-the country played both sides with the neighbouring superpower to counter international pressures.

Keywords: Myanmar, China, hedging, economic pragmatism, binding-engagement



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The journey to the Master of Arts in Asia Pacific Studies (MAPS) was full of challenges and obstacles. So, please allow me to express sincere thanks to the ones who gave guidance and support to reach the finish line of this marathon.

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my late father who always supports my enthusiasm on doing further study and passed away during my study and my mother for their kind support. The generous offer of scholarship by the Government of Thailand (Thailand International Cooperation Agency - TICA) and the kind permission of my government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar to study at the prestigious Thammasat University in Thailand must put on the top of the list of appreciation.

From the beginning to the end of my thesis is all because of my respected and beloved thesis supervisor Assistant Professor Dr. M.L. Pinitbhand Paribatra. My utmost gratitude goes to his kind guidance and support. And, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to the thesis committee, namely Dr. Takashi Tsukamoto (Chair) and Assistant Professor Dr. Pisanu Sunthraraks (Member) for their useful comments and feedback which made my thesis become the useful literature in this field of study.

Without the support of Thammasat Institute of Area Studies (TIARA) Director Associate Professor Dr. Suphat Suphachalasai, MAPS Programme Manager Ms. Joy Thanyawee Chuanchuen, Programme Coordinator Mr. Mohammad Zaidul Anwar Haji Mohamad Kasim, Programme Officers Mr. Nathan Daniel V. Sison and Ms. Mook Kornchanok Nushkasem, the faculty, the Academic Support Unit (ASU) and Programme staff, the completion of my study and thesis will not be happened. Taking this opportunity, please allow me to express my sincere thanks to all of you for rendering guidance, help and support.

Last but not least, my sincere appreciation and thanks also goes to my MAPS classmates who shared best moments of my life, Thammasat University Myanmar Community who cheered me up for homesickness and my colleagues from the capital who shared the burden of my works during throughout my study.

Mr. Thu Rein Saw Htut Naing

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbol/Abbreviations	Terms
AFPFL	Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (of Burma)
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BSPP	Burmese Socialist Programme Party
CMC	Central Military Commission (of People's Republic of China)
CP (Burma)	Communist Party (Burma)
CPB	Communist Party of Burma
CPC	Communist Party of China
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CSO	Central Statistical Organization (of Myanmar)
DICA	Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (of Myanmar)
EAO(s)	Ethnic Armed Organization(s)
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross domestic product
JADE Act	Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts Act, 2003
KIA	Kachin Independence Army
KMT	Kuomintang Party
MoUs	Memorandum of Understanding(s)
NLD	National League for Democracy
NPC	National People's Congress (of PRC)
NUP	National Unity Party
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PLA	People's Liberation Army (of PRC)

PRC	People's Republic of China
RIT	Rangoon Institute of Technology
RMB	Ren Min Bi (official currency of China)
ROC	Republic of China
SCS	South China Sea
SEZ(s)	Special economic zone(s)
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council (of Myanmar)
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council (of Myanmar)
Tatmadaw	Myanmar Armed Forces
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USD	United States Dollar
USDP	Union Solidarity and Development Party



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Myanmar is the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948 after series of nationalist movement since the loss of independence in 1885. With the perspective of nationalism and the xenophobia, the country decided not to close with any superpower states in the world after independence and never joined Commonwealth of Nations. The foreign policy adopted immediately after the country became independent was and still is “Independent, Active and Non-aligned Foreign Policy” which makes itself in line with “Five principles of peaceful co-existence”. Myanmar fell under military regime fourteen years after independence followed by the socialist republic with military dominance until 1988 when the second military coup was happened. That was the start of international pressure led by the United States and the western allies where the deterioration of relations between these countries can trace back to the practice of socialism in Myanmar with “Burmese way to socialism”. At that time in 1988, the military government declared that democratisation in Myanmar will be undergone and the economy will be conducted with market-oriented economy. But the major turning point was happened when the military regime failed to handover the power to the National League for Democracy (NLD) party which won landslide in 1990 general elections which the international community pointed out as the anti-democratization behaviour of military government.

When the time 8888 Uprising was happened in Myanmar, the United States was under the Ronald Reagan Administration (1981-1989). After 8888 Uprising, the military coup was happened and the military was in the power until 2011 when the newly elected democratic government took office. Starting from the event of 8888 Uprising, United States kept putting pressure on Myanmar for the democratic reform. In 1988, as a reaction to military coup, United States stops all aid to Myanmar. Following Ronald Reagan administration, George H. W. Bush (Bush, Sr.)

Administration (1989-1993) also boycotted Myanmar's military government and start pushing pressures by economic means. Under Bill Clinton Administration (1993-2001), after the speech made by the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at United States Naval Academy in April 1997-because of the suppression on democratic forces made by Myanmar government and Myanmar became the world's largest heroin source (U.S. Department of State, 1997), the very first sanctions on Myanmar was imposed, issuing Executive Order 13047 and banned American persons making new investment in Myanmar. The toughest sanctions on Myanmar by the United States were imposed in July 2003 when the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA) was passed by the United States Congress and signed by the President of the United States. This was happened in the George W. Bush (Bush, Jr.) Administration (2001-2009). The follow-up actions, like prohibiting properties of Myanmar government officials and freeze the assets, were taken by the Bush Administration and also during Barack Obama Administration (2009-2017). The Obama Administration also imposed banned on Myanmar's jades and rubies in August 2013.

After the May 30 incident¹ was happened in Myanmar, the United States imposed the most serious sanctions ever on Myanmar, by enacting Burma Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA)², banning imports and financial services from Myanmar and freezing assets as well as visa restriction for Myanmar officials. The Bush Administration from 2001 to 2009 was the significant period for sanctions against Myanmar. Myanmar's government outlined roadmap for its implementation of democratic government in 2003 and the first elected government was sworn-in in 2011. Since democratisation in 2011, United States and international community

¹ Pro-junta mob happened in Depayin Township-central part of Myanmar, during the Aung San Suu Kyi's visit, which caused dangerous attacks to her (<https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/287924/myanmar-ex-pm-claims-he-saved-suu-kyi-s-life>)

² United States enacted Burma Freedom and Democracy Act on 28 July 2003 and urging Myanmar government to release Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/22851.htm>)

follow the development and decided to lift sanctions in 2016-five years after the democratic reform in Myanmar. (Please see Appendix G for detail list of United States' sanctions on Myanmar.) The sanction period from 2003 to 2011 will be examined in this research and how it effects the relations between Myanmar and the United States as well as Myanmar and China.

During the sanction period, Myanmar approached China to be their strong backing to counter the western pressure. China also is keeping close relationships with its neighbouring countries, especially within the region, South East Asia and East Asia as backyards of China (French et al, 2017).

Myanmar faced several pressures from the international arena and to counter these pressures, it is clearly seen that Myanmar needs some supportive power like China while Myanmar hands are tied. This is because, politically, China is a regional power which yields plenty of influence in the international forum, as well as economically a third largest economy prior to 2010.

Having said that, the researcher would like to explore the dynamic of Myanmar-China and Myanmar-US relations during international pressure in terms of economic sanctions during 2003-2011 especially to identify the factors of Myanmar's hedge toward China to counter the United States' pressure.

1.2 Research question

How has the relationship with China during 2003 to 2011 benefited Myanmar's national interest amidst the United States' pressures and economic sanctions?

1.3 Theoretical framework

In international relations theories, hedging is different from the full-scale balancing and bandwagoning strategy and stands in the neutrality point while maintaining the balance of risk contingency and returns-maximizing options in between the variation of degrees of power rejection and power acceptance (Kuik, 2016). Hedging is the term primarily used in economics and later adopted in

international relations theories. The literal meaning of hedging is to reduce the risk for getting more advantage. In that sense, the state becomes hedge when they are dealing with more powerful counterparts while maintain their mutual benefits. Using this hedging theory, Myanmar, the small and weak state, hedges towards China to counter the United States' pressure where there is no friend in international community and it is a must for Myanmar. Besides, it can be seen that almost all countries in the Southeast Asia region do the same hedging behaviours as part of their their foreign policies.

Kuik (2016) explore the hedging behaviours of small states in Southeast Asia and how they play both side with superpower states. Interestingly, most of Southeast Asia state never align with any of major alliance in the world and are likely to work with any countries big or small to gain maximum benefit for their countries. Myanmar was one of the leading countries established Non-Aligned Movement in 1950s after its independence in 1948. Soon after independence, Myanmar realised that it is important for the country not to align with any world order and to work as patron-client relations with dominant powers. This was the right decision to maintain the political independence and acquire a good relation with every country in the international community. Even though the country changed many political systems throughout its history since the independence from Britain, Myanmar steadfastly hold the same foreign policy and avoid bandwagoning strategy. Myanmar was never convinced by the balancing strategy either as the country's leaders did not trust the other country will stand with them to fight with other balancing power.




Figure 1. Power rejection/acceptance spectrum.

Figure 1.1 Balancing, Hedging and Bandwagoning Strategy

Source: Kuik (2016), pp.502.

According to the “Table” (asserted from Kuik, 2016, p.502), the country normally hedges to avoid practicing the full scale balancing or bandwagoning strategy with superpower states and to maximize benefits for their countries as well as minimize the risks to their countries by the superpowers. There may be two options namely, risk-contingency options and returns-maximizing options. The hedging behaviour of the weak states play between these two options not to reach the complete power rejection in the case of balancing with one superpower by another superpower or acceptance of power which falls under the control of superpower state. In order to achieve this situation, weak states may deny dominance from superpower as well as trying to engage with them. This has to say that in terms of three way of hedging, firstly, economic hedge; second, political hedge and; lastly military hedge; Myanmar plays mostly in terms of economic and

political hedge with China and avoid contact with the US not to enter into the game between the dominating US and the rising China.

According to Kuik (2016), in detailed analysis, there can be seen five variations of hedging behaviour in balancing, hedging and bandwagoning strategy, without reaching the full-scale Balancing or Bandwagoning Strategy. When these theories incorporate into the study of Myanmar-China relations during the period 2003-2011, it can be seen that there was 1) Indirect-balancing which is to minimize security risks by forging military alignment and increasing armament without directly targeting any power, at least explicitly. This can also be considered as military hedge; 2) The second one is Dominance-denial, in that case, it is to minimize political risks of subservience by cultivating balance-of-political-power in the region which is known as Political hedge; 3) The third one and most likely one of the theories that match to the situation between Myanmar-China relations (2003-2011) is Economic-pragmatism. In this theory, the country tries to maximize economic benefits by pragmatically forging direct commercial links-which is similar to Myanmar's situation after 1988 military coup. There is also another theory called Economic-Diversification which is to minimize economic risks of dependence by diversifying economic links. These theories are sort of Economic Hedge which is the middle way or Neutrality Point from the degree of power rejection and power acceptance; 4) Another theory is Binding-engagement which is to maximize diplomatic benefits by engaging & binding a big power bilaterally & multilaterally; 5) The final theory to be tested is Limited-bandwagoning which is to maximize political benefits by selectively giving deference and/or selectively forging foreign policy collaboration.

In the case of Economic Pragmatism, according to Kudo (2008), Myanmar's economy was unable to access the markets in many developed countries, especially to Europe and the United States where the economic sanctions started in 2003. Before 2003, Myanmar exported its products to those markets and also imported machinery and other products to Myanmar. But, after the economic sanctions, Myanmar's access to Europe and US markets are totally shut down and there were no imported products from these countries. It led Myanmar's only accessible markets are only within the region and the larger market is China.

Myanmar's top trading partners are Thailand, Singapore and China where China and Myanmar's trading behaviour is only asymmetric which Chinese imports amounted almost 30 to 40 percent every year while Myanmar's export amount only one-digit percentage. Nonetheless, China's market is always open for Myanmar or any country as China's policy is just to do trade and non-interference of domestic politics of other country which makes Myanmar to comfortable in dealing with China not only in economic aspects but also in political nature.

When there are uncertainties in both sides of the relations between the states, the Hedging behaviour emerged in the regional and multilateral context. In the case of regional hedging in the Southeast Asia, particularly in the context of ASEAN, it is to prevent the Chinese dominant in the region, the United States plays its role in the region and multilateral hedging occurs. During the abandonment time of the United States, the multilateral hedging of ASEAN states led to the political and economic maximization from both sides of global super power that is the United States and China and ASEAN has been gained from both sides. But ASEAN's core position is not to choose side and only prefer to gain benefit from both sides of superpower states and this kind of group hedging behaviour can be considered as hedging in multilateral level rather than hedging in bilateral relations of small states with a global superpower (Antanassova-Cornelis, 2016).

Myanmar, during 2003 to 2011 while suffering the United States' pressure for democratization, drew closer to China, especially in terms of politics in international forum. China, in this case People's Republic of China (PRC) (Mainland China) was admitted to the United Nations in 1971 after the original member Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) lost its seat and representation at the United Nations. China is one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) those who have the power to use veto in any decision made by the UNSC. China is the least veto using country in the UNSC while they used 11 times (10 times as PRC). But one of these is for rejection of draft resolution to take action on Myanmar's situation in 2007. This made crystal clear that China's obvious support for Myanmar's military government from international pressure. Besides, Myanmar's long-standing foreign policy is based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence

which is adopted together with China in 1950s. From this point of view, it can be witnessed that Myanmar's Limited Bandwagoning to China for political benefits, especially to counter the international pressures led by the United States during 2003 to 2011.

1.4 Literature review

1.4.1 Introduction

Myanmar is a multinational state located in the middle of South and South East Asia regions. It gained its independence from Britain in 1948 and until 1962, it practiced parliamentary democracy with two years under military led caretaker government from 1958 to 1960. Post 1962 military coup, the country has many changes but it is the start of military dominance in the country's politics that led to major military influence in domestic affairs since independence. Myanmar became socialist republic from 1974 to 1988 under 1974 constitution emphasising the "Burmese way to socialism". Myanmar has established a firm foreign policy at non-alignment with any superpowers and engages actively with every nation in the world. This is why Myanmar had friendly relations with both East and West worlds as well as superpower states like Soviet Union and the United States during Cold War. The very timing just before and after the cold war, Myanmar's domestic politics and economy has critical condition because of suffering economic decline during the socialist era and the 1988 uprising, although fall short of an outcome due to military coup by military backed socialist government. From that period until 2011, Myanmar was under military regime and the military leaders' Xenophobia led the country to isolation and postpone any sort of democratization and abuse of human rights drew the attention of international pressure especially from western democratic community led by the US. This is the brief background which described the pressure of US and the hedging towards China where China became rising as superpower in last two decades.

It is vital to study the Myanmar's political situation as well as the economy before 1988 to 2003 as it is the fundamental for growing tensions between

Myanmar and US and the close cooperation between Myanmar and China. Myanmar after 1988 when military coup has happened, the general elections were held in 1990 and the opened up the country's economy with market oriented economic policy from the socialist command economy by the military regime. Due to that fact, Myanmar's economy was growing from 1988 and the trading deals with many countries were established. Just before 2003 when the United States imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar, Myanmar's export to the United States was up to 13% while top export destination was Thailand with 33% and China covered only 2.3%. The main export commodities were Petroleum Gas (29%) and Dried Legumes (11%).

In this literature review, the researcher will study the scholar's work, especially books as many as possible to understand the background and to find out the literature gap for the thesis proposal as follows:

1.4.2 Precursor to Myanmar, China and US relations before 2003

In order to understand the nature of sanctions imposed on Myanmar, it is crucial to understand Myanmar's international standings, with specific regard to China and the US. The following are some literatures that discuss Myanmar relations with China and the US prior to the sanctions, with some anecdotes explaining about some reasons why the US decided to impose sanctions on Myanmar.

For example, Fink (2009) talks about how Myanmar fares before 2003 and go deeper into some incidents that attracts international criticisms. The book is the first edition published in 2001 and the second edition in 2009, the book covers almost every parts of Myanmar and its society, how the government rules people and how people survive within the control of authoritarian regime. The author also made certain prediction for Myanmar's reform. Like many other books wrote about Myanmar, this one is also a good book for Myanmar studies and will be benefited for those who interested in domestic politics of Myanmar. In 2003, the change in Myanmar has had happened because of Depayin Massacre and because of this, international attention became more and more focussed on regime change and the democratization of the country. Although this book is good for studies of internal

activities and domestic politics of Myanmar, it lacks in international relations area and not mention about foreign involvement in domestic politics of Myanmar.

Although Fink (2009) mainly focus on the domestic politics, in following year, Steinberg (2010) pointed out the importance of China's presence in Myanmar and Myanmar's position in US-China rivalry. The author explained what Myanmar is and how Myanmar becomes current situation. It illustrated the country from the precolonial period until 2010 when the first democratic elections were held and the end of military regime. It is elaborated era by era and pointed some significant issues within those eras. The most common issues are Myanmar's relations between US as well as China as those two countries are most influential to Myanmar not only in aspect of foreign relations but also in terms of domestic politics where two major groups existed namely democratic forces and the communists. Although the book mainly focused on internal affairs of Myanmar, its main intention includes for better understanding of international community on Myanmar and with that knowledge they can contribute some way somehow to Myanmar whenever it is needed. This book gives background knowledge about the politics of Myanmar as well as the future aspect of the country. Myanmar and China are like family as Chinese diaspora penetrate in Myanmar community. Myanmar's importance in China's foreign policy is also mentioned. But it is also important to point out the Myanmar's approach to China and Myanmar's counter to US as well as how Myanmar survived in toughest pressures and sanctions from international community led by US.

With regard to sanctions, Martin (2012) did a very good research on US's sanctions on Myanmar. In his book which is the report to the United States Congress for the effectiveness of its use of economic sanctions as a tool to keep the pressure on Myanmar (Burma) for the democratization and the violations of human rights in the country. United States, after the open up of Myanmar, reconsidered to change or lift the sanctions against Myanmar and it is important to figure out whether the sanctions work on Myanmar. The author mentioned that Myanmar used to had good relations with the United States and now also tried to re-establish the normal relations in terms of politics and economic. Because of this report, Myanmar's

suffering from the US's economic sanctions and impact of sanctions to Myanmar's economy. This report can be seen as factual report to the US Congress while considering lifting of sanctions of Myanmar when Myanmar's democratization was happened. It can be considered as one of the primary sources.

With respect to democratization in Myanmar after 2011 while US is considering to lift their sanctions, Egreteau et al (2013) wrote a book about Myanmar's diplomacy and the involvement of military in it. The authors are Myanmar experts and the book's focus is on the military regime and the culture of armed forces in Myanmar and its relations to the foreign relations of Myanmar in historical aspect to the present day until after the democratization in 2011. Xenophobia of Myanmar's military leaders is mentioned expressly in the book and it shaped the foreign policy of Myanmar in every area including multilateralism. Cold War era "National Security" is still maintaining in Myanmar's military core. The foreign policy doctrine of Myanmar and the development of its ideology within Myanmar's military are important for considering the Myanmar's isolation and approach to China to counter the US. The book is mostly mentioned about Myanmar's domestic politics and the Xenophobia of military leaders. It is also needed to figure out the diplomacy in practice especially between Myanmar and superpower states-US and China.

1.4.3 Myanmar's leaning towards China

After the study of trilateral relations between Myanmar, China and the US prior 2003, the importance of the research is to trace the justification of Myanmar's approach to China after 2003. In this regard, the following literatures help the researcher in finding the cause of Myanmar's leaning towards China. There are many reasons like political, economic and international relations and system which push this scenario to happen. In this section, Myanmar seem to be leaning towards China almost in every aspects to counter the US, while US and China are also competing with each other to dominate the region. The scholars' work related to this are discussed as the following.

It is important to studied Starr (1981) to understand more about US-China's relations and its future. As it is published in 1981 which is 18 months after

the normalization of the relations between US and China, it mostly mentioned about the possible future relations of these two countries in every aspect-political, trade, legal, etc. The important point is Soviet Union was the balance of power to the United States and China is part of US's policy on East Asia. After the China's economic reform in 1978 and the United States' recognition of the People's Republic of China and normalization of relationship and US's new engagement with China after thirty years and disregard the Taiwan's political and legal status, it is vital for the new political development to the Asia Pacific. It is also pointed out the international relations theory relevance to the real politics. The effect of US-China relations to the region and the US's policy towards East Asia including China will play a role in study of China's rise in the region. China becomes superpower in late 2010s but China was struggling like other Third World countries in Asia Pacific and the rise of China and influence within the region is also needed to explore more to understand the bigger picture of international politics as well as politics of US-China relations' effect to the region.

While the work of Starr (1981) includes predictions about future relations and scenarios with regard to US and China, in the work of Sokolsky et al (2000) which is the book prepared for the United States Air Force under the name of Project Air Force by well-known research institute RAND. The importance of the Southeast Asia SLOCs (Sea lane of communications) to the US and China are discussed. The meaning of rise of China to the ASEAN and countries in Southeast Asia SLOCs and some other regional issues like Taiwan issue are some considerable facts on US's strategy toward China. Developing hedging toward rising China among Southeast Asia countries are discussed and the geopolitics with the region is also touched in strategic point of view for the US. This book can contribute the US and China rivalry within the region and the hedging of Southeast Asian states toward rising China which is important for my research. This book is mostly focus on US side and only deal with the SLOCs in Southeast Asia and the gap is the importance of Myanmar because of its strategic location for China as well as Southeast Asia and South Asia.

As above two literatures focus on the relations between two superpower states, the work of Kaung Myat Soe (2011) who was the master student at Thammasat University is a comprehensive guide for Myanmar's stand with respect to China from 1988 until 2011 when the whole spectrum of Myanmar's military government seek out to survive the international pressure led by US and Myanmar's approach to China. In his master research paper which can consider as a good source in Myanmar-China relations, the book examined Myanmar's foreign policy in general with the focus on the relations towards China and how does it effect to Myanmar's domestic situation. The author also wrote about future prospects on the relations between Myanmar and China in two portions namely, current realities and future possibilities. According to the author, Myanmar is depending on China's aid which supported Myanmar in many ways and it is also needed to do reform in the country to attract foreign investment. It is identified that Myanmar has to choose China as it is needed to do so and Myanmar's foreign policy throughout the history is firmly holding the non-alignment principles. Myanmar's approach to China is not only because of the United States' pressure but also with other factors inside and outside the countries and international politics. As this research paper, with clearly stated in the title, is only focused on Myanmar's foreign policy and analysed Myanmar's domestic and institutional politics, in my work, I can find more on the side of China's on Myanmar as well as United States' involvement.

In another aspect observing Myanmar-China's relations, it is vital to study the work of Yun Sun (2013). It was the Issue Brief published by Stimson Center and there are series of briefs on Myanmar's politics and the reforms after open up in 2011 by the newly democratically elected government took office. Yun Sun pointed out that Myanmar enjoys many benefits from Chinese investments while China became rise in terms of economic in last decades. From this, the then military junta gained many profits in terms of economic from those investments. After the democratization in 2011, there were many protests happened around the areas of Chinese major investment projects such as Myitsone Dam and Letpadaung Copper Mine, etc. This led to the deterioration of Myanmar-Chinese relations. These incidents indicate clearly about Myanmar-China relations which were mainly built

between two governments but did not get support from Myanmar people. From this aspect, the relations between these two neighbouring countries cannot be seen as flawless what the outside worlds see. This literature mainly focus on Myanmar's needs of Chinese investments and it is needed to mention also about Chinese political support to Myanmar's government to survive during international pressure before the democratisation in 2011.

After studying the international relations and economics between Myanmar and China, it is important to look inside Myanmar to comprehend why and how Myanmar survives and the vital of Myanmar-China as well as Myanmar-US relations. With this aspect, when the author studied Steinberg (2015), it is found that elaborate about Myanmar's dynamism with various points of view. As the author is an expert and long-time studying researcher on Myanmar issues, this book is an update work of the author with the contribution from many scholars who have expertise on Myanmar's politics and economics. The book covers three main area namely, politics, socioeconomic and the international relations. Especially the international relations part of the book gave many insights on Myanmar's relations with superpower and dominant states, specifically, China and the US on Myanmar's reform and changing during the past decades and also covers the future relations. The hedging, or possibly balancing of Myanmar between US and China is mentioned in the book and the new development of the relations are also discussed. The book mentioned mostly related to current state of the country and the results of past decades are discussed. The years through the toughest pressure from international community led by the US and Myanmar's approach to China is needed to dig more for in-depth analysis.

Besides outsiders' views mentioned in the above literature of Steinberg (2015), one significant work is to study the work of inside scholars. Therefore, Malik (2016) can be considered as primary sources because he served as Indian Ambassador in Myanmar as well as Myanmar expert for the Government of India. He stated in his book which features Myanmar in its old days before 1988 as well as contemporary politics as the author was served as Indian Ambassador to Myanmar in 1990s. One of the crucial issues is the China's influence on Myanmar is

discussed and the India-China-Myanmar trilateral relations is also one of the considerations in the book. How Myanmar's foreign policy is being formulated and the India, China and Myanmar have common position on certain issues like non-alignment movement and this is the significant one. Myanmar and China become closer and closer is not only because of outside pressures but also because of commonalities such as foreign policy stands and economic ties. Myanmar's relations with other superpowers like the US and Soviet Union (now Russia) haven't been discussed in the author's work.

1.4.4 Myanmar's foreign standing between China and US

Finally, the author studied some literatures relating to Myanmar's positions with respect to hedge China to counter US which means Myanmar prudently play in between China and US. Most of the scholars and experts argue that Myanmar is self-isolated country since the beginning of first military coup in 1962. The following literatures help the author to figure out the abovementioned stance.

The term "self-isolation" mentioned in the work of Steinberg (2001) who stated in his book that Myanmar is the closed-door state and difficult to predict. The military junta is heavily guarded its power and the foreign relations are among within the region and China as only friends. United States and western allies are putting pressure for the democratization of Myanmar. This book explained the background knowledge of Myanmar and focus on its domestic and international politics and relations with countries among the regions. It is also stated that Myanmar doesn't have much friends. Myanmar's close relations to China is mentioned in this book and Myanmar's desire to stay away from the US led western allies and from their pressures for Human Rights violations and democratization of the country. Trilateral relations between Myanmar, China and the United States doesn't mention in the author's work which is important for Myanmar's hedging to China.

In another aspect, it is essential to look at the then and now superpower the US and then rising power China and especially its effects towards the region. Zhu (2006) in his book which is the extended version of author's doctoral thesis focused on China's rise and fall of US and the future relations between two superpower states as well as the historical analysis of former superpower relations. It

is analysed the domestic politics and international system concerning the superpower countries. The book also explains in comparison between US and China's in every aspect including Taiwan issue and tries to fit with international relations theories. The book explains about power transition from US to China when China's rise as a superpower state. It is also analysed how it affects the international system. The analysis is mainly focused on internal characters of superpowers in the history. It is good for foreign policy analysis in different levels. It makes clearer picture for relations between US and China and effects to international system and comparisons and contrasts studies between superpower states present-day and in history. The focus of the book the comparison and contrast and hypothesis for future relations between the rising China and the falling superpower United States and the study and theoretical framework is foreign policy analysis.

Last but not least, the perspective of scholar from Myanmar in relation to Myanmar-China relations-how it evolves and how it maintains-is a must for the author to understand the Myanmar-China relations through the history. In the work of Maung Aung Myoe (2011), it is stated that Myanmar's relations with China developed gradually and Myanmar managed to cope with neighbouring giant within the region. Finally, China became the strategic partner of self-isolated Myanmar. The book is developed in chronological history of the relations between two neighbouring countries which used to have on and off relations and the managed to make up as strategic partners. It is important to say that this book is one of the gap filler literatures for Myanmar-China's relations as there are not many chronological history work in relations between Myanmar and China. The vital finding is the relations between these two countries cannot be seen as friendly since the beginning and it takes time to overcome the clashes and incidents. Myanmar and China's close and friendly relations is important to study because Myanmar's approach to China or China's dominant to Myanmar doesn't happen in a day and it is an evolution as well as it needs to look as the emerging factors. Myanmar's foreign policy includes friendly relations with all its neighbouring countries and adopted the active and non-align foreign policy and normally, doesn't show very close relations with any superpower state.

1.4.5 Security, Economic and multilateral relations

It is also important to look at the other dimensions of two countries' relationship between Myanmar and China along the history as well as the certain period of study for this research. In order to achieve this, the security collaboration between Myanmar and China, Myanmar-China's economic relations and Myanmar-China's relations in multilateral level are also discussed as follows:

1.4.5.1 Security collaboration between Myanmar and China

According to Tin Maung Maung Than (2003), Maung Aung Myoe (2011) and Parameswaran (2018), Myanmar and China border each other more than 2,200 kilometres. It shown that both countries had huge amount of border relations and incidents throughout the history. Since the end of Second World War, Myanmar became an independent state in January 1948 and China changed their regime from presidential democratic republic to communist country by the revolution of Chinese Communist Party in October 1949. The first major military engagement was in 1950s when the Kuomintang (KMT)'s troops entered to Myanmar and it was considered as KMT invasion. Myanmar faced the then Republic of China (ROC), which seated as permanent member in the United Nations Security Council, in the United Nations forums as Myanmar's effort to settle this issue in international arena. The PRC troops helped and fought against KMT troops during that time. Overtime, Myanmar and China always cooperated to fight against drugs and illegal trade. One important fact is China considers Myanmar as the exit for Indian Ocean and that is why China's Belt and Road Initiative can also be regarded as part of China's national security policy and the involvement of Myanmar is strategic for both countries.

1.4.5.2 Myanmar-China's economic relations

After the China's economic reform in 1978, the rise of China also affected Myanmar's economy in some part. Myanmar imported many products from China in their 1980s and 1990s up to present-day. As Myanmar was and still is the agricultural country, Myanmar exported large amount of agricultural products to neighbouring countries as well as around the world, mainly to the countries in the region. But, Myanmar imported Chinese products since its independence and grew

larger since 1980s. From 1988 to 2003, Myanmar's export to the countries in the region became higher since the tighten pressures from the western world. Due to this scenario, Myanmar mostly exported Thailand and China while China's quota did not exceed two-digit percentages. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (n.d.-a), in 2003, Myanmar's export to the United States (13%) and the top export destination was Thailand (33%) while China amounted 2.3%. Myanmar's major export products in 2003 were Petroleum Gas (29%) and Dried Legumes (11%). The economic relations between Myanmar and China is asymmetric and it is totally unbalance. From that moment, China's investment in Myanmar grows larger and larger in both public and private sectors (Kudo, 2008).

1.4.5.3 Myanmar-China's relations in multilateral level

Maung Aung Myoe (2011), Kalimuddin et al (2018) and Parameswaran (2018) discussed about the relations between Myanmar and China in multilateral level. Myanmar and China share the common foreign policy values known as five principles of peaceful coexistence adopted in 1954 and both countries actively participated in Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to refrain from being ally to any superpowers rivalry-the United States and the Soviet Union during Cold War. This also made Myanmar close to China. After the 1988 Uprising in Myanmar and 1989 Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 in China, the two countries were targeted by the western countries with the violations of their democratic and human rights norms-made Myanmar and China closer than ever. China after economic reform, they tried to gain influence in the region and in international politics. On the other hand, China faced South China Sea disputes with its neighbours who are members Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). China's engagement with ASEAN is mainly economic relations and the China does not satisfy with ASEAN's intervention to the settlement territorial disputes in South China Sea. Myanmar does not show its clear standing in such matters which can make confrontation with China. One important thing is all ASEAN countries including Myanmar recognise the One China Policy and regard Taiwan as part of China. In the arena of the United Nations, China protected Myanmar with its utmost effort to prevent the western allied countries' desire to impose sanctions on Myanmar and to intervene Myanmar's domestic politics. In

2007, the attempt of United States and the United Kingdom to take action on the draft resolution of Myanmar was vetoed by the China and Russian Federation (United Nations, 2007). Myanmar government expressed their sincere gratitude on such measures of China and made two countries to become close in multilateral level.

1.4.6 Conclusion

In this literature review, the author studied key works related to Myanmar-China-US relations. It is difficult to find out the literature gap between the books while many of the scholars focus on the Myanmar-China's relations in similar approaches. The significant finding is, Myanmar is obviously hedging towards China as stated by Sokolsky et al (2000), Steinberg (2001 and 2015). In Fink (2009), it is clearly stated that the spark of international attention started in Depayin event in May 2003 and the timeline of study in the thesis proposal match with the author's work. The governments of Myanmar, China and US doesn't much change during 2003 to 2011 and it is the important fact to be able to get the stable condition to observe the relations between Myanmar and China with the US's pressure for democratization. Last but not least, it is agreeable that the Myanmar-China relations is not built by a day and it gradually becomes the strategic partner because of US pressure and commonalities between two countries according to Maung Aung Myoe (2011). Some literatures discussed about security collaboration, economic relations and relations in multilateral level between Myanmar and China. In those literatures, it is found out, in terms of theoretical approach, Myanmar's approach to China because the realities of Economic-pragmatism and Limited-bangwagoning.

The author found out, there are plenty of gaps in those literatures regarding to this particular aspect. For example, one major gap is, there is little or no reference as to why Myanmar leans or hedges towards China during the sanction years. It is important to notice that Myanmar also seeks to balance China influence in her country as can be seen in certain literatures. On top of that, these literatures do not get deeper into what has changed between Myanmar-China relations during those years. Therefore, with that in mind, the author convinces the proposed research will close the gap and add new literature to the already existing similar works. In addition, China's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia region including Myanmar is

mainly composed of mutual benefits for economic development as well as China as the rising power in the Asia Pacific region. There are some literatures discussed about the relations between China and the ASEAN or US and the ASEAN as a whole but not many literatures discussed about rivalry between the US and China effects to Myanmar's domestic politics. These are the reasons encourage the author to do research to fill the literature gap with this thesis.

1.5 Methodology

In order to answer the research question, it is intended to do documentary research. The documentary analysis is the one of the qualitative research forms and it is useful when the researcher is trying to interpret the documents to get the real idea for the topic. According to O'Leary (2014), there are three main categories of documents to be examined, namely, public records, personal documents and physical evidence. Among these, public record documents like policy statements and government memorandum will be reviewed in this research to get the proper intention of the United States' pressure, especially the economic sanctions, Myanmar's economy and Myanmar's hedging towards China.

The author did the literature review in a manner with utmost ability to find the literature gap of previous works by the well-known scholars as well as some researchers who did their analysis on Myanmar-China relations in many different aspects. The research design will be likely similar to the work of other researchers in finding the answer to the research question. There may be many ways to collect and analyse the data needed for the thesis. However, as mentioned in above paragraph, only the qualitative from of research will be conducted in this thesis and it is pretty sure for the researcher to get the in-depth analysis from the study of the works by others, official documents, academic and news articles, etc. Due to time constraint, it is difficult to carry out interviewing the scholars or officials concerning Myanmar-China relations in the focus of 2003 to 2011 in particular. Nonetheless, the author believes that the fieldwork surveys will unlikely getting the required data and supportive findings.

With documentary research and analysis, the author is planning to explore the books and works by the experts on relations and politics of Myanmar, China and the US. In terms of economic relations between these three countries, the study on certain trading statistics and the sanctions as well as the aid to Myanmar by the United States will be performed. In order to know the China's foreign policy and relations with its neighbours as well as small states like Myanmar, it is needed to study the China's go-out policy, China's foreign aid policy and China's economic preference toward Myanmar. And, another important matter to observe is about political relations between Myanmar and China whether bilaterally or in international arena. In that case, the official statements, government's documents and the news sources will play the role. By all means with document research method, the researcher eager to find the answers to the research question.

1.6 Chapter organization

The author plans to the thesis to be organised into five chapters in order to achieve the thorough examination on Myanmar's approach to China to counter the pressure from the United States from 2003 until the end of military regime in 2011. With this thesis, it is vital for answering the research question "Why did Myanmar hedge towards China during toughest period of the United States' pressure in terms of politics and economics from 2003 to 2011?" Therefore, the chapter organization can be seen as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction

- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Research question
- 1.3 Theoretical framework
- 1.4 Literature review
- 1.5 Methodology
- 1.6 Chapter organization

Chapter 2: Historical development of Myanmar-China relations (1948-2003)

- 2.1 Introduction

- 2.2 Before 1948: Bilateral relations in early history
- 2.3 1948-1962: Relations between Democratic Myanmar and Communist China
- 2.4 1962-1988: Socialist Myanmar and China's economic reform
- 2.5 1988-2003: Military government's relations with rising China
- 2.6 Conclusion

Chapter 3: Bilateral relations between Myanmar and China (2003-2011)

- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Bilateral relations from 2003 to 2008
- 3.3 Bilateral relations from 2008 to 2011
- 3.4 China's trade and FDI with Myanmar
- 3.5 China's involvement in the present-day peace process of Myanmar
- 3.6 Myanmar's relations with Yunnan Province
- 3.7 Relations with regional powers
- 3.8 Conclusion

Chapter 4: Myanmar and China relations at multilateral level (2003-2011)

- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 United Nations
- 4.3 ASEAN
- 4.4 Other multilateral forums
- 4.5 Conclusion

Chapter 5: Conclusion

- 5.1 Answering the research question
- 5.2 Future prospect

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MYANMAR-CHINA RELATIONS (1948-2003)

2.1 Introduction

Myanmar is the country located in the Southeast Asia with the land area of 676,000 square kilometres, which makes the country as the largest mainland country in the Southeast Asia region and has the long and continuous coastline of 2,200 kilometres in the southern part of the country. The country is bordered with five neighbouring countries, namely, from the west to east in the clockwise direction, Bangladesh, India, China, Laos and Thailand. The estimated population according to 2014 nationwide census was the home of 51.4 million people (Ministry of Immigration and Population, Myanmar, 2015). Since the independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, Myanmar adopted the independent active non-align foreign policy and engage bilateral as well as multilateral relations with members of international community including the neighbouring countries. (Tin Maung Maung Than and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2010)

China, with its long-standing history which can be traced back to 4,000 years ago (at least 1200 B.C.), has many different political systems, from imperial ages to the democratic government to the communist regime which rule the country since 1949 until present-day. With the 9,326,410 square kilometres land mass, China becomes the fourth largest countries after Russia, Canada and the United States. In terms of population, China hosts the largest population among the world-as of July 2018 estimate-nearly 1.4 billion people living in China. And, China is the second economy in the world in terms of GDP (nominal) after the United States. There are 14 countries which are neighbouring with China includes Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam (CIA-The World Factbook, n.d.).

As the neighbouring states, Myanmar and China shared all the good and bad things together along the history of existence since the beginning of statehood in

the early centuries. In this chapter, the historical development between Myanmar and China will be discussed in four main section of different eras, such as from 1948 to 1962, 1962 to 1988, 1988 to 2003 as well as the early history before the independence of Myanmar-based on Myanmar's modern history after the independence from the United Kingdom in 1948 as this research will be conducted on the perspective of Myanmar. In every section, the major events occurred in Myanmar and the reflection of China and the effect to bilateral relations will be touched, analysed and discussed.



Figure 2.1 Map of Myanmar

Source: United Nations (n.d.-a).



Figure 2.2 Map of China

Source: ReliefWeb. (n.d.)

2.2 Before 1948: Bilateral Relations in Early History

As mentioned earlier, Myanmar and China shared long borders and established relations since the imperial ages, it is needless to say, many background histories in time of early history could also be examined in order to understand the current realities. In that case, some of the scholars' views and analysis as well as author's comments on the bilateral relations of Myanmar and China in two significant eras, like relations in the time of imperial age and the relations during the colonial era under British and during the time of the Second World War will be touched in the following sections.

2.2.1 Relations in the time of imperial age

Myanmar, as a state, firstly came into existence in the time of A.D. 1044 at the central part of Myanmar as the Bagan Kingdom as the first Myanmar Empire. Since then, Myanmar has engagement with Chinese people as well as, as a state (Harvey, 1925). It is not a surprising fact that Myanmar and China had close relations as both shared more than 2,000 kilometres border-longest for Myanmar in its five neighbouring countries. More interestingly, even in the time of prehistory, Myanmar received Chinese cultural troops (Tin Maung Maung Than, 2003). Another issue was the China's attitude on Myanmar as they regard Myanmar as their tributary state in the ancient time and it was expressed stated by the Chinese leaders like Mao Zedong (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011, pp. 5). Myanmar and China also fought four high skill wars from 1765 to 1979 during the time of Myanmar's Konbaung dynasty and since then Myanmar bears in mind as China is the threat for Myanmar (Khaing Kyi Thit, 2018-a). As discussed above, Myanmar and China relations in the time of imperial age can be seen as similar to the situation happened as the neighbouring countries in the other part of the world and it is interested that Myanmar and China manage to become closest partner in the modern history without keeping past clashes.

2.2.2 Relations during colonial era and the Second World War

The Chinese community was long before inhibited in Myanmar even before the time of colonial era-before 1824 and it was increased in the involvement in the Myanmar's businesses in the British colonial era in the rivalry of Indian descents (Li, 2017). Due to the dominance of Britain as the colonising power, Myanmar's foreign relations with China is mainly as part of the province of the British Empire and the major relations was the economic relations and the growing of Chinese community in Myanmar. When the Second World War outbreake in the Asia Pacific region, the Burma Campaign of the allied forces led by the United States and the United Kingdom was came into importance to fight against Japanese occupation in Myanmar from 1942 to 1945. The helping of China-then Nationalist Chinese (Kuomintang) together with the allied US and UK forces and the military infrastructure development in the border area of China and Myanmar where mostly

covered with hilly region known as “Hump”. Because of this, the winning belligerent in the Second World War, China is one of the most credited by the allied powers in Southeast Asia theatre (Hickey, 2011).

2.3 1948-1962: Relations between Democratic Myanmar and Communist China

Myanmar gained independence from British on 4 January 1948 and since then Myanmar established diplomatic relations with the countries around the world as part of the state building criteria. China was one of the first countries Myanmar established diplomatic ties and Myanmar was one of first the non-Communist countries recognised Communist China. Since the very beginning of the first year of the diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China can be regarded as active cooperative relations as China, at the time of came into office, helped Myanmar in KMT invasion in 1949. The three significant developments in the time of 1948 to 1962 in the relations between Myanmar and China-the adoption of Myanmar’s foreign policy, the invasion of KMT and the conclusion of Sino-Burmese boundary agreement will be discussed in this section.



Figure 2.3 U Nu and Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1954. (Photo: Unknown)

Source: The Irrawaddy (2017)

2.3.1 Adoption of Myanmar's foreign policy

Interestingly, China is expressly mentioned in Myanmar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website on the emergence of Myanmar foreign policy and it is stated that Myanmar's foreign policy is based on the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" which emerged because of the effort of China and signed with India and Myanmar in two different occasion with the visit of Chinese Premier Chou En Lai³ in June 1954. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar (n.d.-a) stated that the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence are as follows:

- 1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- 2) To abide by mutual non-aggression;
- 3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- 4) Respect for mutual equality and to work for mutual benefit;

and

- 5) Peaceful co-existence.

The emergence of Myanmar's independent, active and non-align foreign policy is based on the provisions outline in all three constitutions existed in the history-1947, 1974 and the current one, 2008-as well as the declaration made by the then governments in 1971 and 1988. The main reason to adopt itself as non-align because, in the time of independence, Myanmar needed to refrain from the rivalry of Cold War superpowers and east and west blocs and also because of the location of Myanmar situated within two most populous countries, China and India.

According to Maung Aung Myoe (2016), when Myanmar gained independence from British, the then Prime Minister U Nu was expressly showing his interest to join to the western alliance. And, it is also because of the express provisions mentioned in the 1947 constitution of Myanmar and the period of exploratory during that. But after the invasion of KMT in 1949, the non-alignment foreign policy has inserted to Myanmar's foreign policy and firmly practiced up to present day.

³ The spelling of the name is according to the Myanmar MOFA's website.


2.3.2 KMT invasion

After the Communist Party of China came into power with the People's revolution in October 1949, the Nationalist government of Kuomintang Party moved to Formosa and formed a Republic of China (ROC) government as claimed the titled of China while the mainland China was named as People's Republic of China (PRC). Whilst this change happened, since Myanmar is the closest state to China among the Southeast Asian countries, every changes effect towards Myanmar (Bert, 2004). According to Taylor (1973), the high level of Kuomintang troops was invaded to the north-eastern area of Myanmar. The troops were from the 26th Army, 93rd Division and the 8th Army of Nationalist Chinese Army. This troops were supported by the United States and the Myanmar government showed proved of it. Myanmar government submitted complaint to the United Nations where at that time ROC is the full fledge member of the UN as well as the veto-power permanent member of the UN Security Council, and also discussed about this issue as a foreign invasion to Myanmar. That time was the closest among PRC China and Myanmar and it was the only foreign invasion throughout the modern history of Myanmar. That is why Myanmar allow intervention by the PRC China and it was the only Chinese intervention in Myanmar domestic issue. With the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression between Myanmar and China in 1960, both countries maintained their status quo of troops residing along the borders and to support each other in fighting against KMT Aggression in the territory of Myanmar. Besides, Myanmar and China agreed secretly to enter up to ten miles to pursue KMT troops during those years (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011).

2.3.3 Conclusion of boundary agreement


In 1950s, Myanmar were reported that many PLA troops mobilised in the territory of Myanmar which claimed by PRC which is their own land. Myanmar and China started boundary demarcation talks since 1954 during Myanmar's Prime Minister U Nu's visit to China. China was not satisfied with boundary agreement made by British which is Myanmar's predecessor state before gaining independence from them. Both Myanmar and China shuttled many delegations during those years including high-level Myanmar's military delegation to China to settle issues between

two countries including boundary demarcation (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011). China and Myanmar concluded its boundary agreement in 1960 and it is the very first boundary demarcation for Myanmar and China. It was the sign of good relations and can be considered as the achievement for newly independent state Myanmar as well as the newly formed Communist China. Since the early relations between two countries in December 1949, the boundary demarcation issue was addressed by Myanmar side and the series of negotiation were taken even at the highest level of two states and paid many back and forth visit to and from Myanmar and China until the conclusion of “Boundary Treaty of between the People’s Republic of China and the Union of Burma (1 October 1960)”. According to Whittam (1961), there were main issues in the demarcation of Myanmar-China boundary since the time of British colonial era. The main issues were the areas in the Kachin state; the Namwan Assigned Tract; and the Wa State boundary. With the attempt of both sides, finally, the boundary treaty was concluded and the both sides have being taken some and given some in the areas of each state-it has been criticised by some scholars and the general public-Myanmar’s main gave up were the Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang area in Kachin state and the China’s main gave up was the Wa State, nowadays the Wa Self-Administered Division of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011).



C—D: McMahon Line
 D—E: Irrawaddy-Salween Watershed
 F—G: 1941 Line
 Shaded areas indicate territory transferred under terms of Boundary Treaty
 Cross-hatched areas shown as Chinese territory in maps used by both Nationalist and Communist governments

Figure 2.4 The map showing Myanmar-China boundary before demarcation
 Source: Whittam, D. (1961).



© Xiaolin Guo 2007

Figure 2.5 Map showing the boundary between Myanmar and China

Source: Guo (2007).

2.4 1962-1988: Socialist Myanmar and China's Economic Reform

This period of 1862 to 1988 was experienced many heights and lows as well as the good and bad relations with China. Myanmar's positions towards China become different while China openly support Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which Myanmar considered as an insurgency group and their good relations among party level. The extreme influential of Chinese Community in Myanmar society created the concern for Myanmar government and its people and the anti-Chinese riot in 1967 was the drawback for Myanmar-China relations. Although being experienced some bad relations, the early relations between two countries has good start and the support of Chinese development assistance helped Myanmar's development in one way. In this section, the relations between communist parties of Myanmar and the Chinese Communist Party; the impact of 1967 anti-Chinese riot and; the role of Chinese development assistance in Myanmar will be discussed.



Figure 2.6 Gen Ne Win and Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En Lai are welcomed by an honor guard in this undated photo. (Photo: Unknown) (1965)

Source: The Irrawaddy (2017)

2.4.1 Myanmar's communist parties and Chinese Communist Party

There were two factions of communist party in Myanmar since the beginning of Myanmar's independence when both parties fought against the ruling AFPFL government as insurgent groups. One was known as Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which is the larger group and the other was the Communist Party (Burma)-CP (Burma) (informally known as Red Flag) which belongs to smaller members of the different faction with CPB. CPB was founded in 1939 and affiliated to Mao's thoughts and Chinese faction. Later CP (Burma) divided from the CPB with its different affiliated thoughts to the Soviet Union faction. Since the inception of CPB and the CPB has linked with the Communist Party of China (CPC) informally or formally (Lintner, 1990). After independence, China's style of three layers relations with Myanmar, namely, People-to-people, State-to-state and Party-to-party relations made Myanmar government uncomfortable as Myanmar government considered CPB as an insurgent group while CPC engaged CPB and support its activities inside China and Myanmar. After the anti-Chinese riot in 1967, Chinese government's overt relations with CPB created tension between Myanmar and China. Eventually, Myanmar's national peace process and the diplomatic approach to China regain the normalization of two countries' relations. (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011, pp. 17-21 and pp. 75-82).

2.4.2 The anti-Chinese riot in Myanmar (1967)

Since it came into office in 1962 with the military coup, the Revolutionary government of Myanmar aware of the influence of Chinese community throughout the country. And, since then, the government monitored the activities amongst Chinese community and tried to deter the influence of China in Myanmar (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011). In chronological events happened in 1967 anti-Chinese riot in Myanmar, the beginning of the spark is, the barring by issuing the official direction of the Ministry of Education, of the badge of Chairman Mao by the Chinese students in the schools operated by Myanmar government. Started from this, the Chinese community protested against Myanmar government and attacked to the state-owned buildings. Likewise, Chinese Embassy in Yangon was attacked by the Myanmar Community and according to press release of Myanmar and Chinese

government, from fifty to hundreds of people were killed during these protests (The Irrawaddy, 2017). Maung Aung Myoe (2011) stated that this is the drawback for Myanmar-China relations and the more than 1,500 Chinese left Myanmar in the first five months of the following year, 1968. After the Beijing government also attacked Myanmar government by issuing statements, the less frequent delegations were exchanged between two countries. Most unusual behaviours were happened in both states, where Myanmar allowed demonstrations in front of Chinese embassy in Yangon as well as China officially allowed many demonstrations in front of Myanmar embassy in Beijing which gathered more than 600,000 people. This kind of activity is extremely rare in dictatorial communist, socialist countries like China and Myanmar. China even branded then leader of Myanmar General Ne Win as “Chiang Kai-shek of Burma”. The most importantly, China decided to support Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which Myanmar considered as one of the insurgency group, openly because of this incident. The rapprochement and normalization of two countries were happened after several attempts by Myanmar sides in 1970s.

2.4.3 China's development assistance

China used their aid, also called development assistance, as a tool of their foreign policy to achieve their foreign policy goals. In this section, the role of Chinese aid in Myanmar in 1970s and 1980s will be mainly discussed. Myanmar was and still is one of the recipients of Chinese aid for its national development. After normalization between Myanmar and China after tension caused from Anti-Chinese riots in Myanmar in 1967, in the late 1970s, Myanmar reached an agreement with China signed by Myanmar Prime Minister U Maung Maung Kha and Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng for economic and technical cooperation which Myanmar will be received USD 64 million from China for their development projects (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011). China's development assistance is well known for its support to the Third World countries which itself aligned as a Third World member and which is also the largest outside of developed countries' development assistance. According to Zhang (2016), the nature and development of Chinese aid which is known as Chinese foreign assistance with historical backgrounds to the current status. Interestingly, it is noted that the root of Chinese foreign assistance to the “Five Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence” and the self-reliance principle. It is also used for the implementation of foreign policy with strategic purposes. And, the latest development of Chinese foreign assistance, is observed that dramatically increasing after the “Go Global” policy by China in 2005 and now can be regarded as one of the largest aid outside OECD⁴,’s DAC⁵. The current aid flow to the Africa region becomes the lion share of China’s foreign assistance and mainly focuses on infrastructure development. Since long time, China’s foreign assistance has been criticized as it is the support to the authoritarianism and corruption to the developing world. Maung Aung Myoe (2011, pp.151-168) stated that the development assistance of China to Myanmar helped Myanmar’s in many ways including the loan without interest but most of them are for the China’s strategy to influence Myanmar in one way of another.

2.5 1988-2003: Military Government’s Relations with Rising China

This section will be discussed the developing relations of two neighbouring states, Myanmar and China and how China became Myanmar’s closest ally. In 1988, the military coup was happened in Myanmar because of the civil unrest and series of protest across the country, commonly know as 8888 Uprising. And, in 1989, China also experienced the similar destiny with the Tiananmen square protests and both countries became closer after the western’s sanctions. After 1988 protests, the then military government of Myanmar held the general elections in 1990 and the unexpected results were happened and the response of China is also interesting. China’s involvement and its importance in the peace process of Myanmar will also be discussed in this section.

⁴ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

⁵ Development Assistance Committee

2.5.1 8888 Uprising

The worst in the history of Myanmar, the 8888 Uprising (commonly known as Four-eights Democracy Movement). The start of 8888 Uprising was in March 1988 where the students of Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) together with some other people protested against the ruling Myanmar's socialist party known as BSPP for the economic problems faced across the country. The police crackdown killed one student and the sparks of this spread throughout the country and it led to the pro-democracy movement marked with Four-Eights Democracy Movement to be initiated on 8 August 1988 (Tin Maung Maung Than and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2010). These protests can be considered as the start of the protests against the communist / socialist rule across the globe and the 1989 Tiananmen square protests in China was being flamed from the Myanmar's 8888 uprising (The Irrawaddy, 2018). Because of Myanmar's 8888 Uprising and brutal crackdown of the protestors as well as the China's 1989 Tiananmen square protests and its crackdown, the western countries imposed sanctions on these two countries and because of this, it can be considered as this made Myanmar and China becomes closer.

2.5.2 1990 General Elections and National Convention

On 27 May 1990, the ruling military held the general elections which the unexpected result for the military junta was happened as the party supported by the military National Unity Party (NUP) won only few seats in the parliament and the opposition NLD party won landslide. And then, the military announced that this election is not for forming the new government but for the drafting of new constitution (Steingberg, 2010). With the backing of military, the National Convention was held starting from 1993 up to 2007 when the new constitution was adopted in 2008, with one long time suspension of the convention from 1996 up to 2004 where the NLD boycotted the drafting when the 104 basic principles for the drafting of the new constitution was set out and the dominance of military rules were included in the said basic principles (Tin Maung Maung Than and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2010). Chinese government said congratulation to the winning party NLD when the results of the 1990 general election announced as the first foreign countries and the then Chinese Ambassador Cheng Ruisheng went to the party

headquarters of NLD and met with the NLD party leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and that was the very first meeting between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the high ranking Chinese official as well as Chinese Ambassador was the first person met with the then winning party NLD after the 1990 elections results were came to know (McLaughlin (2013). From this, it is learned that China always want work with any of Myanmar government for their own benefit. That is why, in 2015 general elections, since the result were uncertain whether the ruling USDP or opposition NLD will win, China remains vacant to the position of its Ambassador to Myanmar during the time of election (Sun, 2015).

2.5.3 Myanmar's peace process

While claimed independence from the United Kingdom during the nationalist movement after the Second World War, Myanmar had to prove the unity of mainland and frontier areas to pursue the independence together from the United Kingdom so that the 1947 Panglong Agreement was concluded among mainland Burma and the frontier areas. With the provisions of the Panglong Agreement, the separatist groups in Myanmar emerged since the gaining of independence from British in 1948. The very first armed group was the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which allied with the Communist Party of China in terms of ideology. Most of the separatist groups were the ethnic armed organizations (EAO) that fought for their autonomy from the mainland Myanmar (then Burma). Since most of the EAOs based in the border areas across Myanmar and neighbouring countries including China, it is important to get the full cooperation from the neighbouring countries to maintain the law and order in frontier areas as well as the accomplishment of the peace process between mainland and the EAOs. Across the border with China, Kachin, Shan EAOs and CPB armed groups bases were located and it made the cooperation of China became crucial for Myanmar but China ended its connection with CPB in 1990s.

The 1,500-mile long border created the strong tie between China and Myanmar and the historically closer than others. China has two different relations with Myanmar, one is the state to state relations and the other is party to party relations-which creates ambiguity for Myanmar side. Chinese Communist party

support Burmese Communist Party, which is the insurgency group in Myanmar, financially, militarily. Another factor is Myanmar military bought many arms from China in the modern relations and both militaries carry out the border security operations together (USIP, 2018). Sun (2017) state that for the ethnic armed groups, some ethnic groups live in both side of Myanmar and China border and when the boundary demarcation concluded between Myanmar and China after 1960s, it is difficult for those ethnic group to choose where to stay. And, because of the nature of living in both sides, the Chinese support to Myanmar peace process is crucial to accomplish. The peace process in the present-day Myanmar will also be discussed in the following chapter.



Figure 2.7 Myanmar's border with China

Source: USIP (2018).

2.6 Conclusion

As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, the relations between Myanmar and China from the time of independence of Myanmar in 1948 until the dramatic improvement of cooperation among two nations from 2003 towards 2011 when Myanmar changed its political system to democracy and open up its country to close cooperation with countries around the world which led to the decline of Myanmar-China relations to the worse situation compared to the last two decades although the strategic partnership agreement between Myanmar and China, which will be discussed in details in the following chapter, managed to conclude in 2011 which is signature of the peak of cooperation.

The early history section traced back the historical evidence of the early relations even in the era of imperial age among two nations-when it is difficult to state as the modern relations can be considered as the continuation of said early relations. However, the sentiment of the impact of the relations from the earlier time is enjoyed or suffered in the modern era. China used to be good friend and allied for the Burma Campaign of the United States and allied powers in the Second World War to fight against the invaded fascist Japanese forces from Myanmar. The legacy of the Second World War China factors still can be seen in Myanmar as many transport infrastructures.

Since Myanmar itself has full of ups and downs in the time of its independence in 1948 to the time of military coup d'état in 1962 with the declaration of "Burmese way to Socialism". First, it was prominent that Myanmar's independent and active foreign policy became the independent, active and non-align foreign policy with the adoption of "Five peaceful coexistence principles" which China also laid down as its basic for foreign policy as the foundation of the nation's foreign policy in relation with international community. When Chinese Communist Party came into power in 1949 with the October revolution, the then Nationalist government of KMT's military forces in China moved to Myanmar as an invasion and both Myanmar and Communist China fought against the KMT invasion during 1950s was significant in the two countries' initial bilateral cooperation. During this period,

Myanmar managed to conclude the very first boundary agreement for both China and Myanmar peacefully through negotiations among leaders of two countries.

Although the start of the two countries' relations was in good mood, the insurgency of Burmese Communist Party (BCP), the torn for the Myanmar's government, and the support of Chinese government to Myanmar's communist insurgency created the worse relationship. Moreover, the remarkable anti-Chinese riot happened in Myanmar in 1967 inflammatory to the worse relations between two countries-eventually managed to become normalization with the diplomatic achievement of Myanmar in 1970s. Since the 1978 economic reform in China, Chinese foreign assistance towards the Third World⁶ countries including Myanmar⁷ which was the Third World countries during that time, were received and it helped for the member of third world.

The similar scenarios and similar destiny happened both in Myanmar and China in 1988 and 1989 where Myanmar's democratic movement series of protests widely known as "8888 Uprising" and China's democratic movement "Tiananmen square protests of 1989" led to the boycott by the western democratic states led by the United States-made the two countries become closer. In 1990, Myanmar held the 1990 General Elections and the started of the convening of National Convention for the drafting of national constitution which seem to be the delay of handover power to the winning political NLD-created the unwillingness of democratization in the country. China's involvement in the nationwide peace process in Myanmar is also important because of the mediation of China affects in EAOs consideration.

The hedging behaviour of Myanmar towards China can clearly be seen in the time throughout the history and the Myanmar always thinks to gain political and economic benefit from the ancient time to the modern history-Chinese Empire, the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, etc. Although the balancing power state may vary from time to time in the case of Myanmar, Myanmar regards

⁶ Mostly composed of non-aligned states

⁷ Myanmar is still part of non-aligned movement and least developed countries (LDCs) in terms of economy.

China as the other side of balancing power and play the China card to hedge against the another power like the United Kingdom in the time of nationalist movement just before independence and the United States in the parliamentary and socialist era of Myanmar.

With the factors discussed in the above paragraphs, Myanmar-China relations from 1948 to 2003 experienced full of good and bad experiences ranging from the closest cooperation to the decline of good relationship. But both countries, especially Myanmar always bear in mind to become friendly with its neighbours and the common positions of foreign policy in non-interference domestic affairs of other countries maintain the normalization of the good relations among two states.



CHAPTER 3

BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN MYANMAR AND CHINA (2003-2011)

3.1 Introduction

After the incident of Debayin outbreak in 2003, the sparks of it spread to the reaction from the international community. The said incident claimed to be the pro military junta mob and attacked to the opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi during her visit to the central part of Myanmar. Because of this incident, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar and due to the economic sanctions and boycotted by the international community, the closer between Myanmar and China happened during this period of time from 2003 to 2011 where China also supported Myanmar during this difficult time.

Many prominent events occurred in this period. After the Debayin incident, the handover of Premiership from the head of the military government Senior General Than Shwe to the then active member of the ruling military council, State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), General Khin Nyunt. And, Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced the country's future plan for democratization, known as "Roadmap to Democracy" and reconvening of the "National Convention" for the drafting of a constitution and considered this period as the transition to democratization. The rising of oil prices and the protests against it by the monks in 2007 was also the prominent in the history of Myanmar. During that time, the economic cooperation between Myanmar and China has improved.

In 2008, the new constitution was adopted with more than 90 per cent of the population and some significant events has occurred until the focus period of this research, 2011. The international attention has reached to Myanmar when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in May 2008. The way Myanmar's government handled the situation was also criticised. The military backed general elections had held in 2010 and the winning party was the military backed USDP Party. But it led to the democratization of the country despite the criticism of semi military involvement in

the state structure. In this era of UDSP, the two most significant events for the relations between Myanmar and China has occurred as the conclusion of the “Strategic Partnership Agreement” between two countries in May 2011 and the suspension of the mega project of China “Myitsone dam hydropower project” halted by the then USDP government which deteriorated the good relations in September 2011 due to the series of protests by the general public. That period is the height of anti-Chinese sentiment after the long exploitation by the Chinese investment in Myanmar.

In this chapter, the period of 2003 to 2011 will be discussed chronologically and will be divided into two main sections-from 2003 to 2008, the time of difficulties with international sanctions, close to China and the series of democratization actions taken the ruling military government-and from 2008 to 2011-after the adoption of new constitution and the newly elected democratic government’s relations with China will also be discussed in another section.

3.2 Bilateral relations from 2003 to 2008

In this section, the four major events happened in Myanmar will be discussed, such as the Debayin incident and the economic sanctions by the United States; the announcement of the roadmap to democracy by the military government after the long suspension of “National Convention” for the drafting of new constitution with the elected Members of Parliament from the 1990 general elections-where mostly are from the leading opposition group, NLD; the common known in media as “Saffron Revolution” also called “September Revolution” protested by the general public led by the monks for the rising oil prices and the prices of commodities across the nation; and, the improvement of the economic relations between Myanmar and China with two subsection-Chinese investment and the military cooperation (military contractors from China) will be discussed in details.

3.2.1 Debayin incident and US’s economic sanctions

Myanmar pro-democracy leader and the leader of the opposition to the then military government Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was detained after the well

known Debayin incident occurred on 31 May 2003 in the area near the city of Debayin Township located in the central part of Myanmar during her tour of political campaign. And, it is widely believed that the pro junta mob was created by the military government to threaten the life of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the aftermath, the reason to prolong the detention of house arrest since then until the release in 2011 after the military back newly elected democratic government came into office where the military back USDP party won landslide without any major opposition (Global Times, 2009). It is the major turning point of Myanmar's relationship with the United States as international community become aware of the situation of human rights in Myanmar and the United States imposed the toughest sanctions throughout the history with the JADE Act of 2003. That is why all the United States' investment in Myanmar revoked their investment and no economic relations between Myanmar and the United States where the bilateral trade went to zero (Fink, 2009). Although the United States' intention of economic sanctions is to change the military regime but in reality with the support of China and some other countries with economic and financial relations and support, the then military government continue to survive from the United States and international community's economic sanctions (Martin, 2012).

3.2.2 Myanmar's roadmap to democracy

In 2003, Myanmar newly appointed Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced the plan of Myanmar to back on track, after eight years of postponement of the National Convention for drafting a new constitution, -which is named as "Road map to democracy". In this roadmap it includes the reconvening of the National Convention and finally to the newly elected democratic government with the discipline flourishing democracy in Myanmar (Tin Maung Maung Than and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2010). This roadmap is most criticised by the western counties including the United States. China explicitly welcome the Myanmar's effort to its democratization process which seem to be contradict to the political standing of China but it is the Chinese way to influence Myanmar which prefer the non-interference of its internal politics (Steinberg, 2011). Neighbours of Myanmar such as Thailand and China immediately showed their support to the "Road map to democracy" (Aung Zaw,

2003) and it made Myanmar military government's attempt to cool down international pressures succeed. Most of the critics believed that the announcement of Myanmar government during that time is only because of the spark of the Debayin incident which caused life threaten to the Pro-Democracy opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the sentenced of house arrest to her and because of this, the United States imposed toughest economic sanctions against Myanmar. Due to the relief of international pressure including the neighbouring friends from the region, it is widely said that Myanmar suddenly announced its roadmap (Taylor, 2004).

3.2.3 Saffron Revolution

The spark of the “Pakokkhu peaceful demonstration by the monks” on 5 September 2007, the nationwide series of protest led by the Buddhist monks from every corner of the monastery around the country was led to the national protest, commonly known as “Saffron Revolution” or “September Protest” of 2007. Almost one and a half month long protests were outbroken because of the rise of oil prices and the prices of basic commodities. First, the monk committed themselves to boycott the Myanmar government when they do donation to them and finally came to the street and did the peaceful demonstration across the nation (Tin Maung Maung Than and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2010). When in the end of September 2007, during the end of the protest before the brutal crackdown by the then military government, China joined the rest of the world to maintain peace and order in Myanmar and solve the problems in peaceful means (RFA, n.d.). This time, although China's position is not to interfere domestic affairs of another country, Chinese government show their concerns for Myanmar's domestic security issues; urged to settle with non-violent manner, and it is because the stability in Myanmar is very important for China in various aspects from economic to security point of view (Storey, 2007).

3.2.4 Economic relations with China

In this section of economic relations with China by Myanmar, the two main area of interest will be discussed as follows: the Chinese investments in Myanmar and the military contractors for building up strong army of Myanmar by Chinese military contractors. For doing business in Myanmar by Chinese companies-

both public and private ones-enjoy many privileges compared to other business entities. Myanmar government even sign MoUs directly with Chinese corporations and allow them to explore Myanmar's national resources in the country where Myanmar citizens' owned corporation did not get such chance (Kaung Myat Soe, 2011). In military contractors' section, it is obvious that China is the only source for Myanmar to get military equipment when western industrialized states block Myanmar's access to their military industry due to economic sanctions, besides, during that time, Myanmar and Russia does not have much cooperation.

3.2.4.1 Chinese investment

Chinese investment in Myanmar is not a strange thing for both China in Myanmar. It is very common as both share long border (longest for Myanmar) (Tin Maung Maung Than, 2003) and do the border trade as well as bilateral trade with having border trade agreement and the bilateral trade agreement. But, when it is studied in the export and import of Myanmar throughout the relations with China, it is totally unbalance (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.). China is the dominance trading partner for Myanmar and the trade balance is totally asymmetric (Kudo, 2008). After 1988, Myanmar's trade with China expand significantly in terms of the area of economic cooperation, doing investments as well as the receiving of development assistance from China. Chinese investors mainly invests on the financial sectors, infrastructure development which Myanmar needs the most and the energy sector which China's most wanted field of investment (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011, pp. 151-168). The current three major investments can be named as the "Myitson dam project", the "Letpadaung copper Mine" and the "Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines" which all these three suffered many protests and some are in suspension due to the postponement of contract by Myanmar side. It is needed to understand the situation in Myanmar and both China and Myanmar government has to reduce the tension with the local people and do with responsible manners in future (Sun, 2013).

3.2.4.2 Military contractors

After the economic sanctions imposed by the United States since the time of military coup d'état in 1988, Myanmar is unable to access the arm

trade market with the western bloc, especially with the United States. Besides, another main reason for Myanmar's approach to China is, during that time, the military leaders who are also the leaders of the nation, believe that it is needed to expand their army to achieve the goal of national defence strategy in the time of threaten by the wester bloc. Therefore, since early 1990s and mainly after 2000, the main military contractors for Myanmar Armed Forces which is also known as Tatmadaw became the Chinse military industry corporations. According to BBC Burmese (2018), Myanmar Air Force bought F-7 fighter jets during two decades and it seen to be not as benefit as assumed by the Myanmar side. Actually, China's F-7 fighter jets were made with the similar design of Soviet's MiG-29. These are the evidence that with China's support, Myanmar military was built to become the stronger national army. In that era, Myanmar did not have a choice to deal with during the time of economic sanctions and it was the only solution to do military cooperation with China where China also influence Myanmar for its Indian Ocean supremacy strategy (Tin Maung Maung Than, 2003).

3.3 Bilateral Relations from 2008 to 2011

Myanmar-China relations from 2008 to 2011 can be considered as the most dramatic period in the history as many unexpected things happened and China shows its utmost support to Myanmar even during the time of difficult and uneven relations started to happen. In this section, five main events have been chosen to discuss, such as the support of China during the disaster Cyclone Nargis; the effect between the bilateral relations, of 2010 general elections and Myanmar's transition to democracy; the conclusion of "Strategic Partnership Agreement" between China and Myanmar in 2011 after the newly elected democratic government came into office; the retrospective effects of the suspension of Chinese mega hydropower project "Myitsone dam project" the aftermath of it and; the rising of anti-Chinse sentiment in Myanmar after 2011.

3.3.1 Cyclone Nargis

The most severe storm and the destructive disaster in the history of Myanmar, Cyclone Nargis made the direct hit to Myanmar's delta region where the main producer of rice in Myanmar on 2 May 2008. The dead tolls rise to more than 140,000 people living in that delta region which is the 8th deadliest disaster in the world so far, effected nearly 2.4 million people in the region and the cost USD 4.1 billion in losses and damage (ReliefWeb, 2010). Before and after the storm hit Myanmar, the international community tried to provide early warning and after disaster assistance to Myanmar but Myanmar's denial to allow access to its country including the prestigious international institutions like the United Nations. During that time, most countries and international organizations criticised Myanmar's pre and post Nargis efforts as well as the denial of offering assistance to Myanmar and poor management of international aid. But, China publicly supported Myanmar government's effort to solve the problem domestically and they donated RMB 110 million for the reconstructive plan of Myanmar, together with the international community (NBC News, 2008).





Figure 3.1 Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in May 2008

Source: ReliefWeb (2010).



Myanmar 2009
 Table B: Total Humanitarian Assistance per Donor (Appeal plus other*)(carry over not included)
 as of 11-November-2009
<http://www.reliefweb.int/fts> (Table ref: R24)

Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by donors and appealing organizations.

Donor	Funding USD	% of Grand Total	Uncommitted pledges USD
European Commission (ECHO)	35,833,318	30.2 %	0
Japan	22,255,242	18.7 %	41,459
Allocations of unearmarked funds by UN agencies:	15,771,268	13.3 %	0
Sweden	15,748,898	13.3 %	0
United Kingdom	8,825,660	7.4 %	2,965,403
Germany	4,014,442	3.4 %	0
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	2,998,439	2.5 %	0
Switzerland	2,971,906	2.5 %	0
United States	2,850,000	2.4 %	0
Norway	2,225,802	1.9 %	0
Denmark	1,420,073	1.2 %	0
Australia	941,915	0.8 %	0
Finland	836,820	0.7 %	0
France	644,088	0.5 %	0

Figure 3.2 Fund pledges for Cyclone Nargis

Source: ReliefWeb (2010).

3.3.2 2010 General Elections and transition to democracy

On 7 November 2010, the first ever democratic general elections held in Myanmar after more than two decades under military rule since 1988 military coup. And, the result is as of widely expected, the military backed USDP won landside with more than 80 per cent of contested constituency and hold the absolute majority to control the both houses of the parliament and able to elect their choice of president and vice presidents together with the military proposed candidacy according to the 2008 constitution. When the new government came into office, their political reform towards democratic transition and the rebalance the influence of China with other superpowers like the United States and regional power like India and Japan made unhappy for China.

Steinberg (2011) stated that although China publicly endorsed the political reform of Myanmar and its “roadmap to disciplinary flourishing democracy” as well as the result of the 2010 general elections, the reform of Myanmar did not meet the China’s expectation, especially, Myanmar’s rebalancing with other powers created the concern for China’s string of pearls strategy. According to Sun (2012), also commented the similar conclusion with Steinberg (2011) as the Myanmar’s political reform highly displease China with the Myanmar’s approach to India and Japan which are the rivals for China in its supremacy over Indian Ocean. Besides, in the economic relations, Chinese investments were under extreme criticism and scrutinised by the people and the government of Myanmar-the implication of Myanmar’s political reform.

3.3.3 Strategic partnership agreement

During the first visit of President U Thein Sein in May 2011, after he came into elected office of the President of Myanmar in March 2011, Myanmar and Chin signed their China-Myanmar Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership Agreement in Beijing on 27 May 2011. And, it is the new step of the 60 years relations between two close neighbouring states (Gov.cn, 2011). According to LI (2012), the conclusion of the strategic partnership agreement between Myanmar and China cannot be considered as the treat to the region and it is just the formality of the relations between two countries’ long-term relations. The only possible intention of China is to create the stable and harmonious relations with Myanmar where China already concluded similar strategic partnership agreement with some other fellow ASEAN member countries like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, in last few years. Moreover, it cannot be regard as China’s attempt to dilute the role of ASEAN in regional issues like South China Sea or weaken its unity. With the applause from official statements of two countries, the conclusion of the strategic partnership agreement between Myanmar and China made two countries’ relationship to the new level of cooperation.

3.3.4 Suspension of Myitsone dam and its aftermath

“Myitsone dam” which is Chinese investment in Myanmar over the northern Myanmar’s junction of two rivers for mega hydropower project where China

will take 90 per cent of the produced electricity. With the openness in the government after the elected democratic government came into office in 2011, the series of protests occurred throughout the country to shut down the said project. With responding to this, President U Thein Sein decided to suspend this project during his tenure that means up to the end of 2015 (Fuller, 2011). According to Sun (2014-a), this really effects the relations between Myanmar and China wish maintain good throughout the past decade. Because not only the Myitsone dam project, but also many Chinese investments were suspending during that time and the anger of China lies to Myanmar. Chinese style self-gaining investments harm Myanmar local people and it become counter to China itself and therefore China needs to reconsider its behaviour in Myanmar on their investments to maintain long prospects. Although officials from both countries never publicised the details of the agreement made between Myanmar and China for the Myitsone dam mega project, many speculations were made that the Myitsone dam project cost multi billion US dollars to compensate Myanmar to Chinese company. China also counted on Myanmar for their huge investments within the country and the result of the suspension of the hydropower projects created difficulties for their needs of energy. This issue is still unresolved and the most important issue effected the two good relations neighbouring countries to worse.

3.3.5 Anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar

The anti-Chinese sentiment is not a new topic in Myanmar. It was happened once in the history of relations started in 1949 as the anti-Chinese riot initiated by the protest of the decision made by the Myanmar Ministry of Education not to wear the Chairman Mao's badge to Chinese descent students in Myanmar. According to USIP (2015), it is stated that the recent anti-Chinese sentiment can be traced back to the suspension of Myitsone dam mega hydropower project invested by the Chinese national company. It is highly unpopular among Myanmar people and even within the Myanmar elected leader and afraid for being unpopularity. This ignite the anti-Chinese sentiment among general public which suffered long in the time during the military government.

3.4 China's Trade and FDI with Myanmar

Myanmar's trade with China is mainly through border trade and according to Table 3.1, Myanmar's border trade with China is rapidly increasing but the trade deficit for Myanmar is still high. So does the same in Table 3.2, the whole figures of two countries' bilateral trade exceed USD 1 billion in later years of 2000s and still remain the deficit side in Myanmar. China invests in Myanmar in many different ways and through FDI, China ranks first in last fifteen years. (Please see Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3) From this quantitative approach, the importance of China place at the top of Myanmar for both economically as well as political as this two cannot be differentiated. Kubo (2016) stated that the two countries' trade is concentrated mainly in trading cross border, mostly through Yunnan province of China. Although, the border trade amount huge numbers, there are also many illegal trades are being happened in border which implemented by the traders-those who want to avoid formal procedures. The currency exchange rate and the cost of transaction created certain institutional barriers for smooth border trade.

Table 3.1

Myanmar's border trade with China

Myanmar's Border Trade with China (US\$ million)						
<i>Year (Apr–Mar)</i>	<i>Export</i>	<i>Import</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Balance</i>	<i>TBT</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
1991–92	52.52	54.47	106.99	-1.95	139.27	76.82
1992–93	58.50	131.24	189.74	-72.74	257.93	73.56
1993–94	27.04	90.23	117.27	-63.19	248.04	47.28
1994–95	29.96	65.08	95.04	-35.12	231.87	40.99
1995–96	22.03	229.31	251.34	-207.28	335.95	74.81
1996–97	29.82	158.68	188.50	-128.86	357.13	52.78
1997–98	86.44	59.37	145.81	-27.07	257.06	56.72
1998–99	94.88	99.41	194.29	-4.53	300.27	64.71
1999–00	96.39	94.90	191.29	+1.49	344.39	55.54
2000–01	124.38	100.11	224.48	+24.28	411.74	54.52
2001–02	133.12	115.85	248.96	+17.27	505.83	49.22
2002–03	158.17	132.57	290.74	+25.60	460.57	63.13
2003–04	177.26	163.84	341.10	+83.42	531.80	64.14
2004–05	246.46	176.37	422.83	+70.09	687.88	61.47
2005–06	315.02	203.63	518.66	+111.39	716.73	72.36
2006–07	453.12	296.64	749.76	+156.48	1092.61	68.62
2007–08	555.48	421.95	977.43	+133.53	1329.53	73.52
2008–09	490.85	495.75	986.60	-4.9	1348.48	73.16
2009–2010	500.16	576.65	1076.81	-76.49	1383.68	77.82

Source: Ministry of Commerce (Myanmar) TBT (Total Border Trade)

Source: Maung Aung Myoe (2011). (pp.156)


Table 3.2

Myanmar's bilateral trade with China

Sino-Myanmar Bilateral Trade (1996–2005) (US\$ million)						
<i>Year (Apr–Mar)</i>	<i>Export</i>	<i>Import</i>	<i>Volume</i>	<i>Balance</i>	<i>Border</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
1996–97	56.87	188.87	245.74	-132.00	188.50	76.71
1997–98	134.51	244.98	379.49	-110.47	145.81	38.42
1998–99	91.37	279.31	370.68	-187.94	194.29	52.41
1999–00	135.68	251.20	386.88	-115.52	191.29	49.44
2000–01	175.44	285.12	460.56	-158.33	224.48	48.74
2001–02	229.40	307.91	537.31	-78.51	248.96	46.33
2002–03	472.23	362.89	835.12	+109.34	290.74	34.81
2003–04	224.87	471.23	696.10	-246.36	341.10	49.00
2004–05	290.90	489.65	780.55	-198.75	422.83	54.17
2005–06	367.91	465.18	833.09	-97.28	518.66	62.26
2006–07	972.84	754.35	1727.19	+218.49	749.76	43.41
2007–08	1345.57	1016.70	2362.27	+328.87	977.43	41.38
2008–09	1130.42	1240.62	2371.04	-110.20	986.60	41.61
2009–2010	1582.68	1268.77	2851.45	+313.91	1076.81	37.76

Source: Directorate of Trade (Myanmar)

Source: Maung Aung Myoe (2011). (pp.157)



Source: DICA

Figure 3.3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Myanmar (2000-2014)

Source: DICA-Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (n.d.).

Table 3.3

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Myanmar by country (2000-2014)

Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar by Country (2000 - 2014)

(US\$ million)

Sr. No	Country	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	Total
1	China	28.98	3.3		2.8	126.6	0.7	281.2		856	2.5	8269.2	4,345.73	231.77	56.92	516.90	14722.6
2	Thailand	25.75			22	29	6034.4		16.2	15	15.3	2146		1.30	489.07	165.68	8959.7
3	Singapore	36.915		6.1				81	38		39.2	226.2		418.23	2,340.12	4,297.19	7482.955
4	Hong Kong	13.229	1.5	12.9	3						6	5798.3		84.84	107.10	625.56	6652.429
5	Republic of Korea	47.222	5	0.3	34.9			37	12	-4		2676.4	25.27	37.94	81.21	299.59	3252.832
6	United Kingdom	30.612	1.5		27			273				799	99.83	232.70	156.86	850.76	2471.262
7	Malaysia	9.832	1.5	62.2							237.6	76.8	51.86	4.32	616.11	6.72	1066.942
8	Vietnam									20			18.15	329.39	142.00	175.40	684.94
9	India							47.5	137				73.00	11.50	26.04	208.89	503.93
10	The Netherland													10.30		302.40	312.7
11	Japan		4.7			2.7			1.4	3.8	-12	7.1	4.32	54.06	55.71	85.74	207.53
12	Canada	21.95			1.5									2.10		153.92	179.47
13	Russia									94							94
14	France								-1.4						5.36	67.25	71.21
15	Liberia															64.60	64.6
16	Brunei			2										1.00	2.27	43.87	49.14
17	UAE										41				4.50	1.69	47.19
18	Luzibut														5.20	40.15	45.35
19	Mauritania						30.6										30.6
20	Switzerland			3.4												27.00	30.4
		214.49	17.50	86.90	91.20	158.30	6,065.70	719.70	203.20	984.80	329.60	19,999.00	4,618.16	1,419.45	4,088.47	7,963.52	46,959.99

Source: Central Statistical Organization

Source: CSO-Central Statistical Organization (n.d.).

3.5 China's involvement in the present-day peace process of Myanmar

China appoints Mr. Sun Guoxiang, as a special envoy for Myanmar peace negotiation process between government and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), who also serves as Chinese special envoy for Asian affairs. China has tremendous interest in Myanmar, mostly in Rakhine and Kachin states which are incident-prone-mostly armed conflict and terrorist attacks. Rakhine state is strategic important for China's Belt and Road Initiative projects and it is the main door for accessing the Indian Ocean which can counter balance India in the region. Kachin state is important for "Myitsone dam" hydropower project and it is also a headquartered state for the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). With these reasons above, China also stays in touch with Myanmar government as well as ethnic armed groups, even the local people, formally or informally, using their good offices, to gain the peaceful solution in said areas. So far, China always shows concerned over such two states and besides, also for other Myanmar states where bordered with China and outbroken armed conflicts (Htet Naing Zaw, 2017). According to Green (2016), the United States' foreign policy shift made by the then President Barrack Obama, commonly known as "U.S. Pivot to Asia" made the closer relations between the U.S. and the countries in the region, which also includes Myanmar. To counter this, China appoints their special envoy for Asia to actively engage with countries in the region including Myanmar. Nowadays, the special envoy of China for Asia also serves as special envoy for Myanmar peace process. Indirectly or directly, China's engagement with Myanmar for peace process is also for their own benefit as many China's mega projects including projects for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) falls within the territory of conflict zones; and, also to balance the influence of the U.S. in the country after rapprochement of Myanmar with the U.S.

3.6 Myanmar's Relations with Yunnan Province

Myanmar opens its diplomatic missions across China, in Beijing, the capital city, for embassy and the three other cities, namely, Hong Kong, Kunming and Nanning, for consulates-general. Myanmar places China as great importance for its foreign relations as well as economic relations and that is why opens the greatest number of diplomatic missions abroad in one country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar, n.d.-b). Myanmar's relations with Yunnan Province of China is of the most importance compared to other provinces because it is located the border area of Myanmar and the role of Yunnan province is indispensable not only for Myanmar but also for other Southeast Asian countries. Singh (2016) stated that Yunnan is the bridge for China and the Southeast Asia relations. Yunnan province has the long-standing historical relationship with Myanmar and China regards it as the politically important for its relations with Myanmar. Myanmar does its economic relations mostly with Yunnan province and Yunnan's is the third fastest growing GDP in China which amounted USD 209 billion in 2015. China's relations mainly with Mekong region countries including Myanmar, Yunnan province plays a major role. Myanmar and Yunnan maintain good political and economic relations throughout the history whether the relations between capitals has full of ups and downs.

3.7 Relations with Regional Powers

After discussing the pull factors which made Myanmar closer with China, it is important to study about push factors which created Myanmar-China bigger ties. There are many other regional power states in the region, namely, India, Japan and the European Union (EU), etc. The relations with such countries and international organizations can cause a major push factors to become closer Myanmar towards China.

3.7.1 Relations with India

Both Myanmar and India were the colonies of the United Kingdom for more than a hundred of years from 19th to 20th century until after the Second World War. Long before this, the original root of the Myanmar's culture and religion can be traced to the ancient Indian tradition and history. With these facts, Myanmar's close relations with India is undeniable that it has certain effect on Myanmar's foreign policy and country's political and socio-economic situation throughout the history where India is one of five neighbouring countries of Myanmar. There are some other reasons which push Myanmar towards China during the time of military government but the uneven relations with India was also one of the main reasons. One obvious difference between Myanmar and India was India is proud to be the largest democratic state in the world while Myanmar has been criticised due to its military junta. Some salient points of Myanmar-India relations will be discussed in this section.

Myanmar and India had close relationship since both countries belonged to the British Empire and had certain flow of movement among people to people level relationship. Besides, the then prime ministers of Myanmar and India after independence, namely, U Nu and Jawaharlal Nehru were close friends and established a good relationship, even in assistance in terms of military, bilaterally as well as multilaterally. But, after the then leader of Myanmar military government in 1960s, General Ne Win's stance of anti-Soviet created the uneven relationship between two neighbouring countries (Kanwal, 2010). According to Jha & Banerjee (2012), Myanmar's post-colonial relations with India deteriorated due to Myanmar's deviation from democracy and mistrust with India on the support of democracy as world largest democratic country. India's reluctant to support Myanmar military government created push factor for Myanmar to depend on China in most sectors-economic, politics and military. The worst period of relationship were in 1990s where Myanmar democratic activist lived in India to protest against Myanmar government. After the open of Myanmar in 2011, Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh's visit to Myanmar in 2012 start a new chapter of Myanmar-India relations.

3.7.2 Relations with Japan

Myanmar and Japan relations can be traced back to the Second World War and Japan helped Myanmar to fight against Britain but occupied for three years until Britain came back from India. Myanmar's military was built upon the basic of Japanese military and Japan and Myanmar has closer tie during those years. The isolationist government led by General Ne Win from 1960s until 1980s, the relationship between Myanmar and Japan were cooled down but Japanese ODA played a major role for development of Myanmar in years after the Second World War. The time of military government from 1988 until 2011, Japan, aligned with the western countries, restricted its support to Myanmar but after the open up by Myanmar, Japanese investment and assistance to Myanmar dramatically increased and Japan got many projects in Myanmar development programme, like special economic zones (SEZs). The most important hindrance in Myanmar-Japan relations is the Japanese priorities to stable Myanmar political institutions even before the economic relations begins (Seekins, 2015).

There is the passion among Myanmar people to go to Japan for study and work throughout modern history after the Second World War due to Japan's rapid growth of its economy and Myanmar maintain people-to-people contact with Japan for long time. Japan's aid was the main source of development for Myanmar in pre-1988 before the military government took power. In recent years, Japan and Myanmar become closer with better economic relations, starting major investment in Myanmar's SEZs and motor industry, etc. This is the significant proof Myanmar-Japan's good relations after the democratization made real after 2015 general elections (Moe Thuzar, 2018) It can be clearly seen the relations between Myanmar and Japan is purely a normative approach by Japan for Myanmar's democratization and because of this approach, it pushed Myanmar towards China which adopted its foreign policy not to interfere other state's domestic affairs and only focus on economic relations.

3.7.3 Relations with the European Union (EU)

European Union's ambition towards Myanmar is to development of democracy in the country and the core belief of EU is without democracy, the development is not fruitful. Bear in mind with this principle, EU's approach to Myanmar was "carrot and stick" since 1988 when Myanmar turned to the military government until 2011 when the new democratic government was elected from nationwide elections. Since then, EU lifted its sanction even before the United States which lifted its economic sanctions in 2016 only after first full term of elected democratic government has served, and, also provide many aids to Myanmar democratic transition and institutional reforms. Before 2011, the relations between EU and Myanmar was worse as EU's position was based on normative approach, democracy (Dosch and Jatswan, 2015). This can be considered as one of the push factors for Myanmar to depend on China.

EU as a whole itself is the third largest investor in Myanmar and after 2012 incidents in northern Rakhine state in Myanmar, the reestablishment of targeted economic sanctions over Myanmar military officials is the drawback of Myanmar-EU relations. Before that, EU seen to be one of the best contributors to Myanmar democratization and Myanmar and EU were close enough to cooperate in many issues including domestic security-Myanmar Police Force, etc. The only answer to become long term friend with EU, Myanmar has to follow the norms of EU, especially the human rights (Kyaw Win, 2018). Myanmar and EU were never the close friends but Myanmar enjoys certain benefits from EU in democratic transition period when Myanmar was looking for a new partner apart from China.

In relating to the Myanmar's relationship with China, it is vital to know how Myanmar react with others countries apart from China. It is because Myanmar has been reached by many other states, apart from China, like neighbouring India and regional power, Japan and global player supranational institution, E.U. As discussed above in the sections, relations with India, Japan and E.U., it can be seen that all those countries' priority for Myanmar is the democratization which the then military government was not willing to fulfil. That is why, although Myanmar engaged with countries within the ASEAN and the region as well as neighbouring countries,

China became the best option for Myanmar to engage with, as China and Myanmar share common values of non-interference of one country's domestic politics. The support of democratization and engagement with certain norms by the India, Japan and E.U. pushed Myanmar toward China. Despite having many choices to make to do hedging to counter international pressures and sanctions led by the United States, China became good friend of Myanmar due to push factors from other regional players.

3.8 Conclusion

Myanmar's destiny after Debayin incident changed dramatically with the sparks of it led to the international attention to Myanmar's democratization and the imposed of economic sanctions-eventually led to the closer relations with China ever in the history. The two major sections of this chapter examined how China becomes Myanmar's closet partner among any countries in the world, not only because of being a neighbour but also a China's then status of rising superpower as well as the commonalities of foreign policy standings in relations to the non-interference of domestic affairs. After 2008 with the democratization has come to Myanmar and the rapid change of Myanmar's internal politics created the shock to the Chinese side and the anti-Chinese sentiment of Myanmar's general public has revealed during the time of democratic government starting from 2011.

The two main events in 2003 were the Debayin incident, the pro junta mob and the announcement of the "7-Step Roadmap to Democracy" by the then newly appointment Prime Minister of Myanmar General Khin Nyunt. Due to the Debayin incident, the United States cut all of its economic relations and revoke its investments in Myanmar immediately. Besides, it imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar government as well as the business close to the military government. Likewise, all other member of OECD imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar which made Myanmar become isolated in the international community and the only trading partners left to the regional trading partners including China. Actually, the roadmap to democracy works for Myanmar's way of discipline flourishing democracy

although the US led international community mostly criticised on its genuine of democratization. In contrary, China continues support on Myanmar's own effort to democratization and it made closer cooperation among two neighbouring countries.

From 2003 until 2008 when the new constitution is adopted, other significant events happened which come to the attention of international community were the series of protests occurred in September 2007 where named by the media "Saffron Revolution" or "September Revolution" which happened due to the rise of oil prices and the prices of commodities. The strange fact of these protests is the leading protestors were the monks who normally do not involve in political affairs of the state. The brutal crackdown of the military government was highly criticised among the international community and China's continued support with its positions not to intervene one country's domestic politics made Myanmar way out during international pressures. The period of 2003 to 2008 was also rising of Chinese investment in Myanmar, mainly in the sector of infrastructure development and energy. The military contractors from China were also the main source of military equipment for Myanmar military under sanctioned during that time.

When in 2008, the newly drafted constitution of 2008 was adopted which can be considered as the door to the democratization although the constitution still has flaw with heavily involvement of military in the leading role of state's politics. Once again in 2008, the international attention was drawing towards Myanmar as the deadliest Cyclone Nargis hit the country which cost hundreds of thousands of lives in May 2008 and the government's incompetency of handling such huge impact of situation. The coincidence was the nationwide referendum for the adoption of 2008 constitution was set during the time of Cyclone Nargis hit the country. Finally, in 2010, the first ever democratic general elections were held within 20 years after the 1990 general elections and the transition to military backed newly elected democratic government came into power.

During the era of first ever democratic government in half of century, the height and low of Myanmar-China relations were occurred. Myanmar and China can conclude the "Strategic Partnership Agreement" in May 2011 with the democratic government. The worst situation for Myanmar-China bilateral economic relations was

the suspension of “Myitsone dam” in September 2011 which China invest with tremendous amount of money worth billion of dollars in Northern part of Myanmar due to the protests of general public. Since then, Myanmar people showed their anti-Chinese sentiment and the deterioration of Myanmar-China relations started from this.

This is the main event of the research timeframe and during this time, Myanmar showed its hedging behaviour towards China to counter the United States in all aspects, politically, economically, militarily as well as in social manners. Because of Chinese strong political and military support, Myanmar’s military government survive from the toughest sanctions from the international community led by the United States. Myanmar’s foreign policy in this time did not expressly mention to align with any state in the world but it is needless to say that Myanmar and China became the closest partner using the common ground of same principle of foreign policy namely, “Five principles of peaceful coexistence”. Besides, the relations with other regional powers were the push factors for Myanmar to close with China.

Myanmar-China relations from 2003 to 2011 is very rapid in growing to become the strategic partner to the damage of certain economic ties which China placed high hopes. The discussion of this chapter explained the Myanmar’s approach to China in the time of difficult situations helped the stability of Myanmar.

CHAPTER 4

MYANMAR AND CHINA RELATIONS AT MULTILATERAL LEVEL (2003-2011)

4.1 Introduction

In multilateral relations, both Myanmar and China are actively participating in international organizations as well as regional and supranational organizations, such as United Nations, for instance in international level and ASEAN in regional. Both of the countries' main focus on joining international organizations and engaging with international community is mainly based on the economic purposes as Myanmar and China, to be in line with their foreign policies which is based on "Five principles of peaceful coexistence", to be non-align, always do not participate in the political aligned group and military alliances with any of the world superpowers' bloc throughout their modern histories.

United Nations can be seen as the world's leading organization in international area since its establishment in 1945 with its respected holy aims to maintain peace and security of the world and put in the first place of territorial integrity and non-aggression of the domestic affairs of one country unless such country violates the internationally recognised norms and threatens the regional peace and security which is firmly asserted in the Charter of the United Nations and agreed and abided by every state in the global family. In the time of establishment, the predecessor state of current People's Republic of China-Republic of China, became the founding member of the United Nations with the special status of right to veto in the Security Council of the United Nations while Myanmar joined immediately after the gaining of independence in 1948. It is important to study the relations and interactions of Myanmar and China in the United Nations arena to reach the objective of this research.

Likewise, ASEAN is the prominent regional organizations in Asia Pacific region as well as the global player in present-day since inception in 1967. Myanmar did not participate in ASEAN at first but eventually became the full fledge member in

1997 during the 30th anniversary of ASEAN together with Laos. China which is the rising superpower in the Asia Pacific region and the economic giant engaged with ASEAN in the early years-officially enter into engagement in 2000s-finally became the regular dialogue partner with ASEAN and the trade partner. Although ASEAN's main objective is not for politics, it is needless to say politics is behind everything. In that case, the relations between China and ASEAN is also politically important for both sides. Therefore, how Myanmar lean towards China in regional level through ASEAN will also be discussed in this chapter.

4.2 United Nations

As mentioned above, United Nations plays a huge role in the world politics and vital for both Myanmar and China, it is necessary to investigate the details of it and how its effects to Myanmar-China relations for the period of study from 2003 to 2011. In this section, firstly, will explain briefly about the United Nations and the historical background and details positions of both China and Myanmar will be examined in the first part and then, the major event-which can be considered as benchmark victory in international relations for Myanmar's military government in 2007-will be discussed.

4.2.1 UN, its objectives and functions

United Nations can be considered as the legacy of the Second World War which last for six years from 1939 to 1945 and took millions of lives from the world inhabitants. With this tragic experience, leaders around the world gathered to established an international organization maintain international peace and security with its foremost aim which led to the creation of the United Nations. United Nations with its Charter, is the first defender of international peace and stability. The fundamental principles of the United Nations are to respect the territorial integrity of each state and do not practice threat or use of force to another state. The United Nations was founded in 1945 with 51 member states which includes China as a founding member-nowadays, there are 193 UN members-while Myanmar joined as its

58th member state when gained independence from British. The membership application is considered by the powerful UN Security Council, where China is holding the permanent member seat, which can also decide whether one state need to be intervened by the international community. There are six main organs in the United Nations, namely, 1) General Assembly where all members has one seat and equal right of voting; 2) Security Council which composed of five permanent members plus ten elected members based on the geographical regions of the world; 3) Economic and Social Council which made up of elected 54 member states with focus on economic and social matters of the international affairs; 4) Trusteeship Council-caretaker of the territories which were not yet gain the status of independent state-suspended the operations after the last colony was attained independence in 1994; 5) International Court of Justice with nine elected judges and; 6) the Secretariat headed by an elected Secretary General-which one Myanmar, U Thant, used to serve for two consecutive terms from 1961 to 1971, for maintaining international peace and security, protecting human rights, delivering humanitarian aid, promoting sustainable development and upholding international-for the betterment of the world (United Nations, n.d.-b; United Nations, n.d.-c).

4.2.2 China and the United Nations

China's predecessor state, known as Republic of China, after the Second World War, became the founding member of the United Nations since its inception in 1945. China and the United Nations' brief history as well as the main political positions and priorities of China will be discussed in this section.

4.2.2.1 Historical background

United Nations has the long and prominent history in modern era after the Second World War and mostly regard as the legacy of it. China, the winning party of the belligerents in the Second World War, got a good role in the United Nations and, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the permanent members of the Security of the United Nations which is one of the six main organs of the United Nations are starting with China, in alphabetical order, followed by France, Russia (then Soviet Union), the United Kingdom and the United States. But, China, after the people's revolution in October 1949, when the Communist Party of China

came into office, the Nationalist government of China-moved to Formosa island-received the official status of the UN membership, did not enjoy the privilege which they used to have until 1970s. Anyhow, China's role in the United Nations after regaining the official status in 1971 until today, play a major role in the world's stage.

The People's Republic of China regain its original status of membership in the United Nations was on 25 October 1971 with the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 2758 (XXVI) at its twenty-sixth session titled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI)). Since then China (PRC) started participating in the affairs of the international community as a full-fledge UN member state-as well as the permanent member of the UN Security Council which holds the right of veto power to any draft resolution discussed in the UN Security Council agendas. During the 1971 session of UN General Assembly, the United States submitted a dual representation resolution to let the Republic of China (then member of the UN, now known as Taipei) to participate in parallel with the People's Republic of China, but vain eventually with Albania's move first attempt for PRC's restoration of membership was voted in favours and the motion made by the US was rejected (Cheung, 2015).

According to Lei (2014), in the capacity of permanent member of the UN Security, China upholds its consistent policy throughout its membership to be pragmatic in viewing world issues and focus on the consequences of the interventions to one state's domestic politics whether would be for the worse or the better. Chinese contribution to the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations used to be as considered as some sort of hegemonic powers' project towards the weaker states. In the recent decades, China's view on the peacekeeping missions changed and dramatically participated in many UN peacekeeping forces but it still stands on the positions that these missions must be for positive performance of the receiving states. In that way, China maintains its positions in the UN Security Council consistently after its membership restatement in 1971.

4.2.2.2 Positions and priorities

China, like every other country in the world-practicing their foreign policy to achieve their national interest both in bilateral as well as multilateral level of international relations. As United Nations is regarded as the norm setting forum in the world, China always asserted its positions to the international community whether public or in the manner of imply. It is important to understand the political grouping in the multilateral diplomacy and China is also practicing this for its own benefit.

Like other countries in the United Nations circle, especially for those of superpower states, China places certain priority and positions for its own national interest as well as for the good of the international community by means of setting international norms-to create better international legal instruments. Chianelli (n.d.) stated that Ambassador Liu Jieyi mentioned the four major trends of the global community and China's contribution as follows: Decolonization which started since the creation of the United Nations in 1950s; End of the Cold War which led to the end of arm race among superpowers-led to the non-traditional security challenges; Multi-polarization which means the collective rise of developing countries including China and the rising developing economies like India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, etc. and; Globalization which created trade and interpersonal relations among the world but also led to the new challenges such as pandemic diseases, terrorism, trans-boundary crimes, climate change, etc.

According to Permanent Mission of China to the UN (n.d.), China's current priorities in the area of the United Nations is stated as seven different categories as follows: Highlights of the Security Council, Economic Affairs and Development, Social Development and Human Rights, Disarmament and Arms Control, Legal Affairs and Treaties, Administrative and Budgetary Issues and finally, UN Reforms-which covers current main issues for discussion in the United Nations plus issues at the Security Council and the agenda for the reform of the United Nations. As mentioned in the above paragraph, China's view on the United Nations today is to reform in certain aspect to be in line with the current realities of the changing world. China's always asserted its foreign policy standing in multilateral

forums of the United Nations to be in line with its priorities and to become the influencer of the world politics.

China can be seen as the rising superpower since its economic reform in 1978 and it really became the rising economy in early 1990s and eventually became the second largest economy after the United States in 2010. China's priorities in the past is to elevate its economy the social and economic development of its citizens and currently, after the gaining of economic superpower, its intention is to gain global superpower in terms of both politics and economy. Therefore, it is important for China to maintain the strong positions and play with a good diplomatic strategy in multilateral relations not only at the United Nations but also in other international and regional institutions like the World Trade Organization and ASEAN to get more trade and economic benefits.

4.2.3 Myanmar and the United Nations

After independence in 1948 from the United Kingdom, Myanmar as the state and member of international community, it is important to participate in the international organizations which proves the de jure statehood of every country because the membership of the United Nations requires the consent of the member states, especially the agreement of the Security Council. Myanmar, unlike China, after joining the United Nations in 1948, the continuity of participation since then up to present day. Myanmar used to play a major role in the United Nations in terms of a country as well as an individual which means the third Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, came from Myanmar (then Burma), from 1961 to 1971 which is the tough period for the United Nations.

4.2.3.1 Historical background

Myanmar has long and prominent history with the United Nations, led many internationally recognized conventions with the personal capacity of brilliant individual citizens of Myanmar as well as the capacity of country itself throughout the United Nations history. It can be pointed out one of the major achievements for Myanmar in the United Nations was then Myanmar's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, U Thant, was elected unanimously by the all 15 members of the Security Council with full support from the permanent member

states which comprise of both then superpowers of eastern and western bloc. This can be considered as Myanmar's political success in international relations.

According to the United Nations Security Council Resolution S/717. (1948), Myanmar became the member of the United Nations. After becoming the full-fledged member of the United Nations, Myanmar (then Burma) attended the Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly and delivered the statement at the General Debate for the first time. In that statement by the Myanmar (then Burma) Representative, it is stated that Myanmar will belong to only one block⁸, the United Nations-not to align with anything and affirmed the concrete principle of Myanmar's foreign policy since then (U Ohn, 1948). Since then, Myanmar actively participates in the affairs of international politics in the area of the United Nations whenever or whichever the government is.

One of the main history attachments between Myanmar and the United Nations was the third Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant who served in this capacity from 1961 to 1971 as two-term elected Secretary General who came from the Asian region for the first time. Before serving as the Secretary General, U Thant was Myanmar Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1957 to 1961 (United Nations, n.d.-d). Although it is long forgotten in the present-day by many people including its own Myanmar community what U Thant had done many good things for the United Nations as well as to become the better and safer world, he led the peaceful solution of the global nuclear war and the power confrontation in the time of height of the cold war between the two superpower states, the United States and the Soviet Union (May Sandy, 2011). When someone talk about the United Nations and Myanmar, it is needless to say brilliant Myanmar individuals including U Thant have served as the good citizens of the world community throughout the history.

The historical footsteps of Myanmar and the United Nations is long and firm through ages. Concerning with the name of the country has certain issue with the states from the western group which prefers continue to use the old

⁸ As the usage mentioned in the statement

name of the country known as Burma when the then military government changed their country's name from Burma to Myanmar. According to UNCTC (n.d.), it was happened since 17 June 1989 after they came into power by coup d'état. Despite many cooperation between Myanmar and the United Nations, it is also happened to be contradict within members among the United Nations on the issues of human rights and the situation of Myanmar after the military government came into power. For that reason, some sort of tension has also experience between Myanmar and the United Nations.



Figure 4.1 UN Secretary General U Thant, 1961-1971

Source: Dag Hammarskjold Library. (n.d.-a).



Figure 4.2 Secretary General U Thant sworn in for his first term in 1961

Source: May Sandy (2011).

4.2.3.2 Positions and Priorities

Myanmar, which always bear in mind and proud of its independent, active and non-align foreign policy based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” adopted by third world countries in 1950s when the storms of eastern and western power blocs are stormed over the small states during that time of power rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, carefully stands in the international forums not to damage its own national interest. And, it became the assertion of Myanmar’s foreign policy and priorities in the United Nations.

Historically, Myanmar always perform its foreign policy to be non-align and refrain from following any superpower states, especially during the cold war era. That is why, Myanmar’s top priority in the context of the United Nations was happened to be the disarmament in complete manner to both sides of world superpowers bloc. This foreign policy stance is reaffirmed in many Myanmar’s statements delivered in the United Nations General Assembly. According to U Thein Sein (2009), Myanmar mentioned its positions to the world and mostly touched upon the world’s situation in arm race. Besides, Myanmar criticised the worse outcomes of the economic sanctions which Myanmar also suffered by the United States led international sanctions towards Myanmar’s economy. Finally, Myanmar also unveil the world on its enthusiasm on democratization in the country and showed their unwavering spirit on it.

The major problem faced by Myanmar from 1991 is the United Nations resolutions adopted to call for Myanmar’s immediate action to uplift the situation of human rights within the country-which last for more than two decades until 2015. It was due to the military government’s delay of democratization and the human rights violations-which also led to the economic sanctions by the United States and western countries. But, Myanmar always rejected the points highlighted in the UN resolutions which can even lead to the charge of the state leaders before the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a war criminals or the criminals committing genocides-which considered as great deprivation of statehood and the state leaders (Burma Link, n.d.).

Come from the above two discussions, it can be clearly stated that Myanmar is unhappy with the United Nations' priority on democratization within Myanmar and the accusation of the violations of human rights within the country which Myanmar always denied. Myanmar's top priority in the context of the United Nations is to maintain and show its independent and non-align foreign policy and urging the world to the fight against grouping and bullying with groups, that is why the steadfast position is the disarmament and refrain from participating in power blocs in the United Nations meetings.

4.2.4 Cooperation among China and Myanmar at the United Nations

Both Myanmar and China shared the common foreign policy standing in general as "Five principles of peaceful coexistence" as a based policy for the formulation of own's foreign policy although each country may put their national interest in the first place. In this reason, one country's policy may differ from another in details aspect in engaging international issues. Anyhow, the main common foreign policy standing is steadfastly holding the principle of non-intervention and refrain from the interference of others' domestic affairs. By this mean, these two countries coincide in their positions in viewing the international issues at multilateral level, especially at the United Nations.

It is difficult to see the obvious alignment between Myanmar and China as both of them refrain from participating in any blocs and always mentions not to bully with groupings. It is the rare occasions of Chinese positions mentioned once in their position paper for 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (which includes 9 sections and Myanmar issues was part of "Security Sector") and stated that putting pressures to Myanmar issue is not a solution and the international community should help Myanmar to find the way by itself. China also mentioned about the role of the ASEAN in Myanmar's issue and China's position to support Myanmar's effort to solve its own domestic problems which implied the democratization and violations of human rights which accused by the western states (Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, 2008).

Therefore, Myanmar's rely on China cannot be questioned because of China's unwavering support to Myanmar and its firm position not to interfere in

the affairs of Myanmar's domestic politics as well as the recognition and encouragement of Myanmar's effort to the goal of democratization and the national reconciliation-which refers to the split between the then current government led by military junta and the opposition group which claimed the restoration of democracy to the nation, backed by the western countries. With the strong support of China and close friends of Myanmar mostly from ASEAN and countries with anti-western sentiment, Myanmar enjoys the less pressures from the international community in every meeting at the United Nations fora.

4.2.4.1 UNSC's draft resolution on the situation in Myanmar (2007)

As United Nations Security Council is one of the main organs of the United Nations, it creates the ground-breaking outcomes which can affect to the destiny of its member states, even can influence the politics of non-member states, according to its charter. Since the military coup in 1988, the deterioration of relations between Myanmar and the western democratic states led by the United States become worse after 2003 when the pro-government riot outbreak in the Debayin township-the result of its was the economic sanctions imposed by the United States and international community for Myanmar's violation of human rights and to encourage democratization. The attempt to raise Myanmar issue in the eyes of global community, the United Kingdom which is the permanent member of the UNSC table the draft resolution with the titled "Situation of human rights in Myanmar" at the Security Council to legalise the international intervention to Myanmar's domestic affairs and the stance of China and Russia hindered the UK's attempt to vain.

On 12 January 2007, Myanmar's situation has been discussed by the United Nations Security due to the attempt of UK to table the draft resolution to take action on Myanmar's current situation of instability which can cause bad effect to the region and considered as the threat to the regional peace and stability and need the attention of UN Security Council to intervene and impose international sanctions against Myanmar. The decision was called for vote and the result was the 9 members out of total 15 member UN Security Council voted in favour while 3

against and 3 abstentions where in 3 abstentions surprisingly includes fellow ASEAN member state, Indonesia while only 3 countries, namely, China, Russia and South Africa vote against the tabled draft UNSC resolution. That is why, both China and Russia used their veto power to make it failure for the attempt of western bloc led by US and UK not to take action on the draft resolution on Myanmar (United Nations, 2007). Although both China and Russia used veto in this matter because of their stance as non-interference of domestic affairs, for Russia, it is not an extraordinary case when they used veto in the UN Security Council meeting, but for China, it is an extremely rare case as China uses veto for only 11 times up to 2017 including the vetoes used by the predecessor member state of China in the United Nations, the Republic of China which was member of the United Nations from the beginning of the inception of the UN in 1945 until 1971 where PRC China became full fledged member replacing ROC China (Kessel, 2017). In Myanmar's state-owned media, it was written as the great achievement and the diplomatic victory for Myanmar.

Table 4.1

Meetings conducted by Security Council in 2007 (Myanmar issue)

Meeting Record	Date	Press Release	Topic	Security Council Outcome / Vote
S/PV.5777	13 November	SC/9168	Myanmar	--
S/PV.5757	11 October	SC/9139	Myanmar	S/PRST/2007/37
S/PV.5753	5 October	SC/9136	Myanmar	--
S/PV.5619	12 January	SC/8939	Myanmar	Draft resolution S/2007/14 vetoed by China and Russian Federation 9-3-3

Source: Dag Hammarskjöld (n.d.-b)

China, United States and Myanmar's position on the vote: Chinese representative did his explanation on the vote before the action was taken on the draft decision and he stressed that the matters of Myanmar is the only the internal affairs of a sovereign state and it did not bring attention to the international community as mentioned in the draft resolution of the UN Security Council and it did not threaten the international or regional peace and security. He even mentioned that UN Security Council action was exceeded its limit. When the vote has been casted, the Chinese and Russian delegations casted vote with veto which led to the unsuccessful attempt by the United States and the United Kingdom's delegation. After the voting, the United States representative explained their position and, in his statement, he disappointed the failure to take action on Myanmar's issue and their stance is Myanmar's military government made the situation in the country worse. Myanmar representative as the country concerned although it is not a member of the UN Security Council, made a statement and he expressly said Myanmar owe China and Russia on this matter and it was the landmark decision. He blamed the UN Security Council's unnecessary action on this matter and also to the insurgents in the country which created the unstable situation within the territory. With this view, China and Myanmar openly against the United States and western attempt on posing pressures on Myanmar in the UN Security Council and Myanmar regarded China as its *savoir* (United Nations, 2007).

The support of China and Russia and the use of double veto to bar the attempt of the United Kingdom and western powers to impose international pressures and sanctions on Myanmar was vain. It was one of the clear and obvious support of China to Myanmar in international meetings because China, normally, never uses the power of veto for any occasions except in the case of supreme importance of its own national interest. The use of China's veto power in the UNSC can be seen in the Figure 4.3 as shown in the following.




Figure 4.3 Chart showing the uses of veto by five permanent member states of UNSC
Source: Kessel (2017).

4.3 ASEAN

Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN became the key player in the Asia Pacific region as well as eventually became the global player in terms of economy and politics. The engagement between ASEAN and China are mainly in the area of economic relations. But there are certain political issues discussed among China and ASEAN-one of which was and still is the issue in the territorial disputes among the South China Sea area where many ASEAN members claimed their entitlement when China stated the rightful ownership of the whole piece them. It is interesting to look up how Myanmar deal with China in the fora of ASEAN.

4.3.1 ASEAN and its evolution

ASEAN is established on 8 August 1967 with Bangkok Declaration adopted by the five founding member states of ASEAN, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Since then, ASEAN expanded overtime- Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999- up to today's ten member states. The ASEAN Charter is unanimously adopted in 2008 where all ASEAN leaders signed which makes the emergence of a charter for the first time after 40 years of history. It led the ASEAN to become the deeper regional integration and eventually became the global key player in terms of both politics and economic.

According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar (n.d.-c), the objectives of ASEAN include the acceleration of economic growth and social and cultural development in the region, as such. With this, ASEAN tends to be organised as a regional institution for mainly of economic purposes. ASEAN laid down the principles enshrined in Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) of 1976 as a basic, mutual respect and the non interference of domestic affairs as their fundamental principles. Since 2008, ASEAN has its own charter to found the ASEAN community to be effective with ASEAN Vision 2020. In short, ASEAN is the economic cooperation among Southeast Asia region and with this aim, it tries to promote economy as a whole and the economy of member states.

4.3.2 ASEAN and China

ASEAN as a whole need to trade with large market like China and it became one of the reasons that the ASEAN-China relationship started. China also needs ASEAN as their backdoor neighbours for politics as well as market access. Besides, the geopolitically strategic locations of ASEAN member countries bring China in the game to influence in the region to compete with the United States as well as some other regional powers such as India and Japan. The study of ASEAN-China relations will also contribute more for this research.

According to Khaing Kyi Thit (2018-b), ASEAN and China faced three stages of relations in the history and it is stated as follows:

1) The first phase was the “Phase of Hostility” and during that time, China and ASEAN are under the bad relations due to the policy differences as ASEAN lean towards US led western bloc while China favour the eastern bloc. It was from the inception of ASEAN in 1967 until end of 1970s;

2) From 1980s to 2000s was the second phase named “Falling In Love Phase” where ASEAN enjoyed the trade deal with China where China was looking for the new markets when they started open their economy in 1978;

3) Finally, the current period is considered as the “Period of Uncertainty” due to the tension arising out of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

ASEAN-China relationship not a flawless but it is still workable and both China and ASEAN can manage to overcome the difficulties in their relations.

4.3.3 ASEAN and Myanmar

Myanmar did not join ASEAN in the first place when it is created by friendly neighboured countries in the Southeast Asia region in 1967. It was because Myanmar’s strong foreign policy standing not to favour in the regional or international grouping to participate expressly or implied which in Myanmar’s definition can be considered sort of alignment. Eventually, Myanmar became a full-fledged member of ASEAN in 1997 together with Laos which made 9 member states except Cambodia in the Southeast Asia region. Being part of ASEAN, Myanmar can achieve many diplomatic goals and have access to international community through ASEAN as Myanmar was isolated from being sanctioned by the US led international community during that time of military government.

ASEAN promoted Myanmar’s change in 2000s after joining to ASEAN family in 1997 together with Laos. Before joining ASEAN, Myanmar was being treated by ASEAN as “Constructive Engagement” for improvement of political situation within the country (Acharya, 2012, pp.1). After 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, ASEAN’s approach toward Myanmar has been shifted to “Flexible Engagement” (the term used by the then Thailand’s Foreign Minister Mr. Surin Pitsuwan, partly borrowed from the then Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s idea of “Constructive Intervention”) (Acharya, 2012, pp.1), which made positive approach to Myanmar for improving its

domestic situation and led to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in September 2001. In 2000s, Myanmar issue was one of the priority topics for ASEAN meetings and had discussed and also have being done constructive intervention in Myanmar's internal politics (Acharya, 2012). Moe Thuzar (2017) stated that being a member of ASEAN, Myanmar opened its new chapter in international relations. In recent situation, the reformist approach of USDP government created many opportunities with the ASEAN in the age of booming economy and ASEAN members also welcome it. General Aung San, father of current Myanmar de facto leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had vision on the close cooperation with Indo-China neighbours-long before the inception of ASEAN and it is workable for Myanmar to have a good environment when encounter with so called "bullies". Myanmar also enjoys the economic benefits from ASEAN as Myanmar's share of intra-ASEAN trade double from 1 per cent to 2.08 per cent from 2010 to 2015. Last but not least, Myanmar's foreign policy alignment is just with ASEAN where ASEAN place non-interference as their number one objective.

4.3.4 COC on South China Sea (2002)

The territorial disputes among South China Sea is one of the most difficult issues to get the best solutions among the claimant states where China is one of them. Myanmar normally supports the legal and technical evidence of boundary demarcation and believes in peaceful solution of every disputes. Here in the case of China versus the rest of the claimant which all except Taiwan are the majority of Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar did not express show support to China but always make the way for China to save the face and support the rule based approach which refers to the successfully adopted Code of Conduct on the South China Sea in 2002.

China's position on South China Sea is clear that everything in the South China Sea region is owned by China with their historical claim of "nine dotted line". The COC on South China Sea made comfortable for China especially because it is non binding nature of the document. During the ASEAN summit in 2014 when Myanmar was served as the Chairman of the ASEAN, many has expectation that Myanmar would favour China on South China Sea issue. In reality, at first-it found difficulty to negotiate to include the South China Sea issue in the outcome

document-finally, Myanmar's neutral tone of language pleased both China and the fellow ASEAN members to have common ground (Desker, 2015). Although it is said Myanmar's neutrality in South China Sea issue, actually, it is the continued position of ASEAN to be neutral in territorial disputes in South China Sea but have critics on China's illegal construction sites and expansion of disputed islands (Bi, 2014). However, it can be considered as one of Myanmar's diplomatic achievement in dealing with China and ASEAN in such a difficult issue like South China Sea and must give credit on it (Sun, 2014-b). And, it can also be considered as Myanmar returns to China for its support in other multilateral forum like the United Nations.

4.4 Other Multilateral Forums

There are many international forums both Myanmar and China are engaging actively in the region as well as with universal nature. To some extent, it is found out that Myanmar expressly or impliedly show her desire to stick together with China's foreign policy towards the region which can be considered as Myanmar's hedging behaviour to China. In order to examine this, another important regional forum known as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which the United States and many other global and regional powers are involved, will also be discussed in this section.

4.4.1 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is created with the idea came up from the Twenty-Sixth Ministerial and Post Ministerial Conferences of ASEAN held in Singapore in July 1993. The inaugural meeting of ARF was held in Bangkok, Thailand in July 1994 and as of today, there are 27 members in ARF where all ten ASEAN members and 17 others global and regional players are sitting together to solve the issues in the region. It is established for the regional network for national security, defence and military dialogues among the countries in the region as ASEAN as the driven seat. Normally, the ASEAN country taking the position of ASEAN Chair host the meeting of ARF. From this regional forum, the global powers like the United States,

China and Russia can have a casual talk on all matters relating to the region (ASEAN Regional Forum, n.d.).

According to Beeson (2016), ASEAN style diplomacy that is the decision making process is based on consensus and through negotiation, the ARF will take the leading role in the region to solve the issues in the region such as Korean peninsula issues, Taiwan issues (which has never discussed in the ARF meeting) and South China Sea (SCS) issues. In the time of rise of China, this multilateral forum created the venue for side-line dialogues for two super power rivals in the region-the United States and China. It can also create the minimisation of tension between the two countries as well as some other conflicted issues like disputed island issues between Russia and Japan. Myanmar as a core member of ASEAN and as a chair of ASEAN in 2014, AFR is important forum to show the multilateral hedging of Myanmar toward China and to be in line with her own foreign policy for benefit of its national interest. Myanmar can engage the United States as well as China through this forum to balance their power rivalry in the region.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter tried to examine thoroughly in the area of the United Nations and the ASEAN at the world's stage where both Myanmar and China plays their diplomatic performance in multilateral level. Although there was some other engagement between Myanmar and China at the multilateral relations, the study of the two prominent international institutions-United Nations and ASEAN-may give certain idea to see the bigger picture of Myanmar-China's close cooperation at the multilateral.

At first, it is discussed that both China and Myanmar placed their priorities in international forums especially at the organization like the United Nations to achieve their foreign policy goals. The common position between the two countries is putting the United Nations as the global player to maintain international peace and stability after the bad experience suffered from the Second World War. The major focus in the United Nations arena for Myanmar as well as China is not to

align with any grouping or bloc and to stand in the right direction for the best of the international community. With this stance, Myanmar places their foreign policy focus on disarmament and China on the reform of the United Nations. Nonetheless, China's present in the United Nations Security is for a good sake when Myanmar faced numerous pressures from western blocs with the accusation of violations of human rights and the delay of democratization during the era of military government, especially from 2003 to 2011.

Myanmar was the target of the western bloc in the time of 2006 with the accusation of the threat to the peace and stability of the region because of the spread of internal conflicts and drug dealing issues happened in Myanmar which caused the international attention and the United Kingdom, the coloniser of Myanmar, tabled the draft resolution on the situation of Myanmar in 2006 and were decided among the members of the United Nations Security Council in early 2007. Only because of the double vetoed by China and Russia to deter the attempt of western bloc superpowers led by the United States in the UNSC, Myanmar exempted from imposing international sanctions. Although it is difficult to witness the obvious cooperation between Myanmar and China in the arena of United Nations, both stand united to defend their foreign policy.

ASEAN used to have the reputation of the alignment with western bloc led by the United States and because of this reputation, Myanmar and China did not participate with the activities of the ASEAN since its inception in 1967. But after the open up of economic and start practicing of one country two system economic policy of market-oriented economy by China, China started to engage with ASEAN countries for the market access. On the side of ASEAN states, China became the reliable partner for economic relations as well as the counter power for the United States in the Asia Pacific region. Myanmar, eventually, became the full fledge ASEAN member in the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN in 1997 and it is the start of self-isolated military regime to reach out the world stage through ASEAN door. Through ASEAN, many regional economic as well as political issues are trying to solve and this becomes the place for both Myanmar and China to deal with each other among the governments within the region.

The prominent and difficult issue to sort out is the South China Sea territorial dispute which China and many ASEAN member states are the claimant to the area of most part of the South China Sea. In 2002, ASEAN addressed this issue to be solved in peaceful mean and the Code of Conduct to deal the South China Sea disputes in rule-based approach, although the Code of Conduct is non-binding instrument but it is the way forward for the deadlock of the unproductive negotiations and claims among the states-China and ASEAN members. China pleased to agree the 2002 Code of Conduct and follows its provisions to settle the disputes and Myanmar supports the Code of Conduct with the reason of settling territorial disputes in peaceful way. Some ASEAN member wish to find the more workable solution for this issue and it is always the difficult agenda for every ASEAN summit and foreign minister meeting whenever address this issue. During the Chairmanship in 2014, Myanmar managed to include the South China Sea issue in the Chairman statement with agreeable term for both China and ASEAN and it is one of the prominent multilateral achievement for Myanmar which saved the face of China.

It does not appear to be the express behaviour of hedging towards China in any of international forum, but, Myanmar's clear position showing hedging with China can be found in the ASEAN and the United Nations arenas. Without Chinese support in the United Nations, Myanmar can face the big problem from the pressures of international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom. Likewise, the support of Myanmar in ASEAN and other regional forum also play some extent of usefulness in China's desire to dominate the Asia Pacific region as its backyard.

Last but not least, it is found that both Myanmar and China work together in multilateral forums, especially, in the United Nations and ASEAN meetings where both help each other not to fail each other's foreign policy goals. Myanmar has received many supports from China in the United Nations chapter while Myanmar always in favour of China in the chapter of ASEAN, vice versa. In this way, Myanmar and China cooperate throughout the difficult times to overcome the obstacles and struggles.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

After thorough examination on the relations between Myanmar and China in every possible aspects-historical development of the two countries' relationship from the beginning of the independence of Myanmar from the United Kingdom in 1948 as well as the Communist Party of China came into power in after October revolution in 1949 and the main focus study of the relations between Myanmar and China from 2003 up to 2011 in the bilateral point of view as well as from the point of view in terms of multilateral, the concluding analysis will be discussed in this chapter in two main different categories, i.e., first, how these findings and analysis answer the main research question of this thesis, and secondly, the future prospect of Myanmar-China relations will also be discuss which means the relations after 2011.

Since this research is mainly based on the perspective of Myanmar side, the discussion will be explaining the events occurred in Myanmar and the reaction on the said events by China with their foreign policy as well how Myanmar cope with the results of those effects in order to gain maximum political, diplomatic and economic benefit for its own. It is important to bear in mind that Myanmar and China are neighbouring countries and both of them experienced the long-standing relations, in a good as well as evil way not only because of domestic issues but also the external influences like ideological positions or foreign powers. In that case, the ongoing relations between two countries is also important to discuss and difficult to left out in this research. Therefore, in the second part of concluding findings and analysis, the possible scenarios on the relations between Myanmar and China after the democratization and open up in Myanmar in 2011 will be touched in three major aspects from Myanmar perspective such as the relations with China when the USDP and NLD parties became government of Myanmar, and also from the Chinese perspective of the string of pearls theory in the Indian Ocean.

5.1 Answering the Research Question

The very beginning of the research mentioned its main research question as follows:

How has the relationship with China during 2003 to 2011 benefited Myanmar's national interest amidst the United States' pressures and economic sanctions?

The author always bears in mind throughout the process of writing this thesis to find the solution for the research question. With this regard, the three main findings were analysed in three different chapters, namely, historical development of Myanmar-China relations (1948-2003), bilateral relations between Myanmar and China (2003-2011) and Myanmar and China relations at multilateral level (2003-2011). In each chapter, the series of issues, events and incidents were discussed in Myanmar perspective and China's reaction on such issues, events and incidents as well as Myanmar's efforts to deal with China for gaining the best of her own national interest in the tough situation from the economic sanctions imposed by the United States.

The common political position among Myanmar and China is putting the national interest at the top priority of the country. Nationalism is overwhelm influenced within its citizens.

The most direct answer to the research question and the main argument of the thesis can be noted as Myanmar got pretty well what was expected from China during the tough time with international pressures led by the United States and everything received from China including political support has to be returned by Myanmar's national resources and Myanmar's economy was totally based on China. Myanmar's hedging behaviour towards China is not only to counter the United States' pressures but also that there is no other choice for Myanmar to find the balance of superpower like China-good rival for the United States in the Asia Pacific region.

In the time of early history, Myanmar-China relations were nominal. The fresh start of Myanmar-China relationship starts in the 1950s when Myanmar gained its independence in 1948 from British and China became the communist country in

late 1949 when Myanmar started its diplomatic relations with China which makes one of the very first non-communist countries recognised the communist China after it came into power. There have been several events both China and Myanmar shared the good and bad things together such as KMT invasion which Myanmar and China fought together and; the conclusion of very first boundary agreement between two countries through amicable negotiation were the major milestone of the earlier period of Myanmar-China relations.

From 1962 when the second military coup d'état occurred in Myanmar which claim to establish the socialist country until the 1988 when another military coup led the over two decades long military regime, the inconsistent relations with China has experience when certain incidents happened due to the communist insurgency in Myanmar and the occurrence of anti-Chinese riot in 1967 which created tensions between China and Myanmar. Nonetheless, China offered foreign assistance in its change of economic policy in 1978 to open up its market and try to trade with foreign countries. When the outbreak of 8888 uprising, the crack-down of military and the military coup created the international pressure on then Myanmar military government. Moreover, the delay of handing over state power to the winning opposition NLD party in 1990 general elections and the postponement of the National Convention convened to draft the new constitution led to the initial sanctions by the international community led by the United States. These events made Myanmar to get distance to the western countries and closer to China. Besides, the Chinese factor in Myanmar's peace process is also important in Myanmar-China relations. These were the precursor of closer cooperation during the United States sanctions against Myanmar from 2003 to 2011.

From 2003 to 2011 period was the main focus of this thesis and in the bilateral relations, it is divided into two major intervals such as from 2003 to 2008 and from 2008 to 2011 based on the main events occurred in Myanmar and reflected to China's response on such issues. The first examination of issues was the Debayin incidents happened in May 2003 which mostly believed that the military junta's attempt to threaten the life of pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. This led to the economic sanctions by the United States and international attention

and that is why Myanmar military government announced their plan to democratization called “Road map to disciplinary flourishing democracy” in 2003 to reconvene the “National Convention” to draft the new constitution. But during that time in 2007, due to the rise of oil prices and the prices of basic commodities fuel the series of protests called “Saffron Revolution” in Myanmar led by the monks and in this issue, China showed its concern on Myanmar where they prefer the stability of their neighbour. Myanmar increased its economic relations with China during that time and China also increased its investments in Myanmar as well as the improvement of military weapons and equipment support from China was also witnessed.

Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar Ayeyarwady delta on 2 May 2008 and the China continued support Myanmar’s poor effort on the reconstruction from Cyclone Nargis although international community criticised on Myanmar. That time was the adoption of 2008 constitution and with that constitution, 2010 General Elections were held by the then military government where military backed USDP won landslide over 80 per cent across the country. It was the transition to democracy in Myanmar happened nearly half of century and it is the start of Myanmar’s foreign policy shift to rebalance China’s influence. The 2011 was the mix of good and bad events between Myanmar-China relations as Myanmar managed to conclude the “Strategic Partnership Agreement” with the first visit of the then President U Thein Sein in May 2011 where the worst-case scenario of suspension of “Myitsone dam mega hydropower project” in September 2011 which made China angry. Growing of anti-Chinese sentiment around Myanmar, because of Chinese neglect of local people and looking only benefit mind-set, spread nationwide and it became the drawback of Myanmar-China’s growing relationship.

At multilateral level relations between Myanmar and China from 2003 to 2011 is not very obvious but two special events is noted to study. One in the United Nations forums where Myanmar has been criticised by western bloc and China is the superpower state with holding the veto power in the UN Security Council. In such a situation, Myanmar was blamed and shamed by the US led international community and in 2007, UK tabled the draft resolution to the UN Security Council to intervene

Myanmar and impose sanctions due to the threat of regional peace and security because of Myanmar's situation domestically. With the stance of China and Russia not to interfere one country's domestic affairs, both voted against to the draft resolution and vetoed it where even the fellow ASEAN country Indonesia abstain during voting procedure. As it is studied above, China's support at the UN forum was very beneficial for Myanmar and it was a milestone in the history of two countries relations.

Meanwhile, in ASEAN, the South China Sea issues was crucial to many ASEAN member countries where Myanmar does not have much concern as it is not a claimant state. But China has many concerns on the South China Sea issue as it is the battle with one and many. ASEAN's collective effort to address this South China Sea issue with the Code of Conduct on South China Sea was agreed upon all ASEAN members and China where many them are claimed against China in 2002. For instance, in 2012, it is unprecedented that the ASEAN ministerial meeting did not result any outcome document due to the disagreement on South China Sea issue, especially with China. With these bitter experiences, Myanmar during its tenure as the Chair of the ASEAN in 2014, prudently managed to conclude the outcome Chairman statement with the neutral language on South China Sea with endorsement of using Code of Conduct as it is the rule base approach and save the China's face as well as the fellow ASEAN member's wants.

Answering the research question, Myanmar did hedge China to counter the pressures from the United States and international community and it is true that Myanmar gained certain benefit from China in many ways, politically, economically, militarily, socially, etc. Myanmar's survival in the time of hardest sanctions on Myanmar by the United States from 2003 to 2011, China supported Myanmar by doing investment in Myanmar and also taking care of Myanmar's diplomatic efforts to counter the pressure in regional and international arenas. Without China, Myanmar's survival is out of question while many countries in the region is unrivalled to the United States in every aspects unlike China for Myanmar. It can be undeniable that Myanmar is playing "China card" throughout the history of their foreign relations

and with the support of China in international arena, the international pressures are relieved.

5.2 Future Prospect

The relations between Myanmar and China, after 2011 when the newly elected civilian government has come into power, became different from the existing good relations during the time of military government, especially from 2000s up to the end of military regime with the 2008 constitution which can be considered as a hybrid system. In the era of military government, which did not have many friends from outside world and isolated in the international community, it was not a surprise that Myanmar was close with China. But, after the opening up in 2011, Myanmar's rapprochement with the United States and desire to re-join the international community as an active member were the unexpected elements for China to cope with changing Myanmar. Besides, other regional powers like India, which is naturally a rival of China, also tries to convince Myanmar to become their strategic partner is also one of the reasons behind for the new chapter of Myanmar-China relationship after 2011.

After 2011, there are two governments, elected democratically, held the office, namely the government led by USDP and the NLD government. Since USDP government, Myanmar's new approach in their foreign policy was to become close with the United States and balance the influence of China, which made the reduction of close cooperation happen. In the time of NLD government which came into office in 2016, many expectations had made that the NLD government will become closer with the western world and oppose to China. In reality, after the series of incidents happened in Rakhine State of western Myanmar, being criticised by the western world to Myanmar government and military, the drawback happened and there has been many ongoing cooperations with China still implementing.

Most importantly, to understand the Myanmar's political desire to do engagement with any other countries including China, it is important to note that how the leaders of political parties, Tatmadaw (Armed Forces) as well as State

leaders act toward China in their own capacity or as with official designation. The reason is Myanmar is a country dominated by the military and after democratization in 2011, the two major political parties rule the country as a bipartisan state. That is why, in the following sections of this chapter, the views from the leaders of two major political parties, namely the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and National League for Democracy (NLD) as well as the view of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (Tatmadaw Chief) will be discussed in details for better understanding of future relationship between Myanmar and China.

5.2.1 Myanmar's nationalism and the satellite state of China

During the visit of Myanmar President U Thein Sein to China in May 2011, both leaders agreed to the access of Myanmar's strategic Bay of Bengal for Chinese energy hunting in the region as well as dominating the geopolitical importance of the maritime route in the Indian Ocean. Besides, Myanmar also signed the "Strategic Partnership" Agreement with China which elevated the highest level of cooperation among two countries. It made Myanmar's the satellite state of China although Myanmar's self-claim non align and independent to any foreign powers. It also led Myanmar the Anti-Chinese sentiment as it has come out since the early 1960s in the country because of attempt to influence the Myanmar community by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Aung Zaw, 2011). According to Laur Kiik (2016), the suspension of Myitsone Dam which is the Chinese largest hydropower project abroad did not come from the power play in the geopolitical nature of US-China rivalry in the region but it came out from the nationalist mind of ethnic groups living in the areas of construction as well as the people across the country, even inside the leaders. In a long run, this Myitsone Dam project is difficult to restart because of Myanmar's Anti-Chinese sentiment which rooted in the mind of Myanmar people.

5.2.2 String of pearls and Myanmar

Indian Ocean supremacy is the dream of both India and China which are the long-time rivalry in the Asia Pacific region and which are also consider as regional power and both has the potential to become the world superpower in near future both in terms of politic, economic, military, etc. The string of pearls

theory is developed in the near past in 2000s when China's implementation of gaining the maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean region by building civilian used seaport infrastructure along the coastline of Asian and African states located in the Indian Ocean. The bigger picture includes the connection from the mainland China to the Horn of African which covers the two physical continents besides from the east coast of China to the backyard of it including South China Sea as well as the Indian Ocean region. The launch of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is part of the plan and in this plan, Myanmar is one of the main point of pearls which the deep seaport in the western part of Myanmar-Rakhine State. However, after the series of protests and anti-Chinese sentiments in Myanmar made difficult to handle and the competition by India and Japan to access new Myanmar is one of the issues for China to be solved (Roy-Chaudhury, 2018).

However, Myanmar is wise enough to see the hook behind the Chinese generous investment in the infrastructure development in the country as the long-term friendship and neighbourhood's behaviour and its national interest. In this case, the solution will be the Myanmar's foreign policy how to deal with China's ambition into the benefit of Myanmar's own national interest by playing both side of China, India, Japan and United States-the regional dominant superpowers.

5.2.3 USDP government and China

Myanmar's realisation to reduce dependency on China as well as the growing of anti-Chinese sentiment around the country after the open up in 2011-many protests in the areas where Chinese projects were doing across the country-made the new chapter of relations between two countries. On the other hand, Myanmar cannot stay away with China because of its border and bilateral trade as well as the most importantly the peace process within the country is mainly relied on the Chinese mediation towards the ethnic armed organizations especially the frontier areas near to China. The shutdown of Myitsone dam because of huge protest faced by the newly elected government in 2011 was the major drawback of two neighbours which regard themselves as "Pauk-Phaw" (aka) kinsfolk. (Maung Aung Myoe, 2015)

One more thing which needed to consider is the shift of Myanmar's foreign policy in the time of USDP government which eager to reengage with the international community and the rapprochement with the United States when the United States showed the willingness to cooperate in the democratization of Myanmar and the recognition towards the newly elected civilian government were the another reasons of drawback of relationship between Myanmar and China which most of the scholars and the international community including ASEAN colleagues did not foresee.

5.2.3.1 U Thein Sein's view on China

President U Thein normally does not express his view on other country and only work through diplomatic ways. However, according to Wilson (2014), President U Thein Sein was seen to approach the United States to open up the country and lower the dependency towards China. And, his decision to suspend the Chinese largest hydropower project "Myitsone dam" made everyone including China and people of Myanmar were shocked. Since then, China keep pressuring Myanmar to restart the Myitsone dam project and the successor government of U Thein Sein, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi also resist to restart it. During the earlier time of President U Thein Sein, it seen to be the best in the history of Myanmar-China relations but in reality, it turns worse although Myanmar still count on China for international political pressure as well as for national economy.

5.2.3.2 Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's view on China

During the interview with Asahi Shimbun News Agency of Japan, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services of Myanmar, expressly mentioned that neighbouring countries including China give certain help and support to Myanmar and especially to the peace process of the country. And, he showed his desire to cooperate with every country. He, this time, explained the importance of China to Myanmar (Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, 2019). Senior General Min Aung Hlaing also cautious in meeting media personnel and also in making comments on other countries but his main focus is internal security of the nation.

5.2.4 NLD government and China

The most important thing to do with China for the landslide victory NLD government which came into office since 2016 is to normalise the relationship between two countries as the shakeup of the bilateral relations from the newly elected civilian government from 2011 until 2015. The foreign policy of NLD government does not seem to be the major change from any other government of Myanmar which mainly and steadfastly hold the position of non-align with any superpowers around the globe-the NLD government also maintain the good relationship with China, likewise China take the lead since the NLD leaders participated the by-election in 2012 and entered the parliament which was convened according to 2008 constitution-opposed by the NLD party in the earlier years of adoption of the constitution. And, therefore, working with Chinese government will not find many difficulties for NLD government. (Sun, 2015).

Besides, China holds the major cards for the game of Myanmar domestic politics such as peace process, the investment for infrastructure development in the country where western developed countries refrain from doing investment in Myanmar which were mostly expected, due to the outbreak of Rakhine issue and the growing tension with the international community like the United Nations for the continuous accusation to Myanmar government for the violation of Human Rights in the country. Another major development between Myanmar-China relations is the active participation of Myanmar in the Belt and Road Initiative of China and the implementation of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which can make the better cooperation between Myanmar and China.

5.2.4.1 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's view on China and Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI)

As the leader of the ruling party in Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, like her predecessors, she always speaks with cautious in making comments about China. Her foreign policy goal is to maintain the position of Myanmar in uniformity with the "Five principles of peaceful coexistence" and engage with outside world based on these principles. In the meeting of Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI)'s projects implementation in Myanmar, she expressly mentioned that all projects should be benefited in mutual nature and all cooperation should base on the root principles of Myanmar foreign policy "Five principles of peaceful coexistence" which also in line with China's foreign policy as well as the founding principles of the Belt and Road Initiative (Office of the State Counsellor, 2019). According to this, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has the cautious mind on cooperation with China and she also understands very well that Myanmar cannot stay without Chinese assistance.

In answering the research question, Myanmar manage to get as much as they can from China during the close cooperation among two countries from the toughest sanctions imposed by the United States from 2003 until 2011 when Myanmar open up and come out of self-isolation. In the bilateral relations, Myanmar and China has enjoyed as well as suffered certain good and bad experiences of events throughout the history of bilateral relations from 1948 up to 2003. Both maintain the peaceful solutions and the amicable means to lessen tensions between two countries. In the time of the closest period during the international sanctions created difficulties for Myanmar, China's help and support in both political and economic ways were the best solution for Myanmar as an isolated country. During that time of 2003 to 2011, Myanmar carefully deal with China and Myanmar gain many supports from China although received many criticisms for issues arising out of the country. The major draw back was the anti-Chinese sentiment coming out of the general public whilst investments of China do not create much benefits to the grassroot people of local community. The newly elected democratic government's action to suspend the Myitsone dam hydropower project in 2011 and Myanmar's effort to engage with western countries to rebalance the influence of China create the worsen in the relations in late 2011 which is also needed to address.

When looking at the future prospect of Myanmar and China, it can clearly be seen that Myanmar is located in the strategically important place like the back door of China and the land bridge towards the easy access to the Indian Ocean which is vital for the rivalry with India and the maritime supremacy of

China in the region-known as string of pearls theory. To this aim, China also put its main focus on Myanmar and increase its cooperation in every aspect such as politics, economic, military, etc. Although China's efforts to close with Myanmar, after the open up in 2011, the series of incidents occurred because of social phenomenon in the country commonly known as anti-Chinese sentiments in Myanmar. The USDP government's decision to suspend the China's huge project "Myitsone" dam in the area close to northern border of Myanmar with China was the major drawback but the NLD government, after the tension with western states and continuity of non-align foreign policy, the relations between Myanmar and China is trying to normalize, politically, economically, as such.



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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

List of high-level visits between Myanmar and China (1948-2017) (in chronological order)

Myanmar's high-level visits to China

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
1.	1953 November	U Nu	Prime Minister (in his capacity as AFPFL President)	Met Premier Zhou Enlai; China agreed to withdraw all its forces from disputed border areas in Kachin State
2.	1953 December	U Nu	Prime Minister	Held more talks about the border question and the question of nationality of Chinese residents in Myanmar
3.	1960 September-October	U Nu	Prime Minister	Attends China's National Day celebrations in China (400-people delegation)
4.	1961 October	U Nu	N/A	N/A
5.	1955 November	General Ne Win	Commander-in-Chief	
6.	1960 January	General Ne Win	Prime Minister, Caretaker Government	
7.	1960 September	General Ne Win	Commander-in-Chief	Member of U Nu's delegation
8.	1961 October	General Ne Win	Commander-in-Chief	Member of U Nu's delegation
9.	1965 July	General Ne Win	Chairman, Revolutionary	A joint communique is issued;

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
10.	1971 August	General Ne Win	Chairman, Revolutionary Council	Reaffirming the 1961 treaty and five principles of peaceful coexistence
11.	1975 November	U Ne Win	President	Agreement on “no aggressive acts” between two nations
12.	1977 April	U Ne Win	President	
13.	1977 September	U Ne Win	President	
14.	1981 October	U Ne Win	President	
15.	1985 May	U Ne Win	Chairman, BSPP	
16.	1989 October	Lieutenant General Than Shwe	Member, SLORC; Vice Chief of Defence Staff (Army)	24-member senior Myanmar military delegation
17.	1991 August	General Saw Maung	Chairman, SLORC; Prime Minister; Defence Minister; Chief of Defence Staff Myanmar	Met President Yang Shangkun, Premier Li Peng; Got promise for more political and military aid to Myanmar
18.	1994 September	Lieutenant General Khin Nyut	Secretary-1, SLORC	
19.	1994 September	Lieutenant General Thein Win	Commander-in-Chief (Air)	In Kunming; Oversaw the delivery of military aircraft from China

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
20.	1994 November	Lieutenant General Tin Oo	Secretary-2, SLORC	
21.	1996 January	Senior General Than Shwe	Chairman, SLORC	First visits as Chairman, SLORC
22.	1996 October	General Maung Aye	Vice Chairman, SLORC; Deputy Commander-in- Chief of Defence Services	
23.	1997 December	Senior General Than Shwe	Chairman, SLORC	Met President Jiang Zemin in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (at 2 nd ASEAN Informal Summit)
24.	1999 June	Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt	Secretary-1, SPDC	
25.	1999 December	U Win Aung	Foreign Minister	
26.	2000 June	General Maung Aye	Vice Chairman, SPDC	Met President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji on separate occasions in Hong Kong and China; Held talks with Vice President Hu Jintao and signed a joint statement on the framework of the future bilateral relations and cooperation
27.	2000 October	Lieutenant General Win Myint	Secretary-3, SPDC	Goodwill visit to Chinese Association for International Understanding

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
28.	2003 January	Senior General Than Shwe & wife	Chairman, SPDC	Met President Jiang Zemin
29.	2005 October	General Soe Win	Prime Minister	Attend China-ASEAN Expo and China-ASEAN Economic and Investment Summit (in Nanning, China)
30.	2007 June	Lieutenant-General Thein Sein	Secretary-1, SPDC	Invited by NPC Standing Committee
31.	2008 August	General Thein Sein	Prime Minister	Attended Beijing Olympic 2008; Met President Hu Jintao, Premier Wan Jiabao
32.	2009 June	Vice Senior General Maung Aye	Vice Chairman, SPDC	Met Vice President Xi Jinping, Premier Wan Jiabao
33.	2011 May	U Thein Sein	President	USDP; First visit by President U Thein Sein; Met President Hu Jintao, Premier Wan Jiabao; Signed Strategic Partnership Agreement
34.	2011 October	Thiha Thura U Tin Aung Myint Oo	Vice President	Attended 8th China-Asean Expo in Nanning; First high-level visit after the suspension of the Chinese-backed Myitsone dam project on 30 September 2011
35.	2012 September	U Thein Sein	President	Attended 9 th China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
36.	2013 April	U Thein Sein	President	Met President Xi Jinping
37.	20013 September	U Thein Sein	President	Attended 10 th China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning; Met Premier Li Keqiang
38.	2013 October	Senior General Min Aung Hlaing	Commander-in-Chief	Met President Xi Jinping (also Chairman of CMC)
39.	2014 April	Thura U Shwe Mann	Speaker, Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House)	Met President Xi Jinping
40.	2014 June	U Thein Sein	President	Attended 60 th Anniversary of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (aka Bandung Principles (together with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, Indian Vice President Mohammad Hamid Ansari)
41.	2015 April	U Thein Sein	President	Met President Xi Jinping [Sideline meeting at Asian-African Summit (aka) Bandung Conference in Jakarta, Indonesia]
42.	2015 April	Thura U Shwe Mann	Speaker, Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House)	Met Vice Chairman, CPPCC; Met Director, International Liaison Department, CPC
43.	2015 June	Daw Aung San Suu Kyi	NLD Chairperson; Leader of opposition	Met President Xi Jinping; Invited by CPC
44.	2015 October	U Thein Sein	President	Attended 70 th Anniversary of Victory of the World Anti-Fascist War at Tiananmen Square in Beijing

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
45.	2016 August	Daw Aung San Suu Kyi	State Counsellor; Foreign Minister	Invited by Premier Li Keqiang; Signed MoUs
46.	2017 April	U Htin Kyaw	President	First goodwill visit; Met President Xi Jinping; Signed Kyaukphyu-Kunming Oil Pipeline Agreement
47.	2017 April	Thura U Shwe Mann	Chairman, Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission	Met Zhang Dejiang, Chairman, Standing Committee, NPC; Member, CPC Politburo Standing Committee; Met Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Foreign Minister
48.	2017 May	Daw Aung San Suu Kyi	State Counsellor; Foreign Minister	Attended Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing; Met President Xi Jinping; Premier Li Keqiang
49.	2017 November	Senior General Min Aung Hlaing	Commander-in-Chief	Met President Xi Jinping; Invited by and met General Li Zuocheng, Chief of the Joint Staff, PLA (Member, CMC)

- Source: 1) Maung Aung Myoe (2011). (pp. 210);
 2) The Irrawaddy (2017);
 3) Wai Moe (2011).

China's high-level visits to Myanmar

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
1.	1954 June	Zhou Enlai	Premier	
2.	1955 April	Zhou Enlai	Premier	
3.	1956 December	Zhou Enlai	Premier	
4.	1960 April	Zhou Enlai	Premier	
5.	1961 January	Zhou Enlai	Premier	The border agreement is ratified; Exchanged of treaty
6.	1964 February	Zhou Enlai	Premier	
7.	1964 July	Zhou Enlai	Premier	
8.	1965 April	Zhou Enlai	Premier	
9.	1965 April	Zhou Enlai	Premier	
10.	1979 November	Huang Hua	Foreign Minister	
11.	1991 January	Luo Gan	State Councillor; Secretary General of the State Council	
12.	1991 November	He Qizong	Deputy Chief of General Staff	
13.	1993 February	Qian Qichen	State Councillor; Foreign Minister	
14.	1994 December	Li Peng	Premier	Invitation by Senior General Than Shwe
15.	1995	Chi Haotian	Defence Minister	
16.	1997 March	Li Ruihuan	Chairman	
17.	1997 October	Wu Bangguo	Vice Premier	

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
18.	2000 May	Ismail Amat	State Councillor	Met Senior General Than Shwe, Secretary-1 Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt
19.	2000 July	Hu Jintao; Wang Guangya	Vice President; Deputy Foreign Minister	Met Senior General Than Shwe, General Maung Aye, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, Lieutenant General Tin Oo
20.	2000 August	N/A	Deputy Foreign Minister	Met Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, Foreign Minister U Win Aung and Deputy Foreign Minister U Khin Maung Win
21.	2001 January	Jia Chunwang	Minister of Public Security	Met Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, Secretary-1, SPDC
22.	2001 April	General Fu Quanyou	Chief of General Staff Headquarters, PLA	Met Senior General Than Shwe, General Maung Aye
23.	2001 December	Jiang Zemin	President	Signs economic and border agreement
24.	2002 January	Wang Zhongyu	Secretary General, State Council, PRC	Met Senior General Than Shwe; Invited by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, Secretary-1, SPDC
25.	2003 November	Bai Enpei	Secretary, Yunnan Province CPC	Met Senior General Than Shwe
26.	2003 December	General Wu Quanxu	Deputy Chief of the General Staff	Met Senior General Than Shwe

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
27.	2004 February	Luo Haocai	Vice Chairman, CPPCC	Met Senior General Than Shwe
28.	2004 December	General Ge Zhenfeng	Deputy Chief of the General Staff, PLA	Goodwill visit
29.	2005 November	Wang Zhaoguo	Vice Chairman, NPC Standing Committee; Member, CPC Politburo	Met Senior General Than Shwe
30.	2006 October	General Liang Guanglie	Chief of the General Staff, PLA	Met Senior General Than Shwe
31.	2007 January	Li Tieying	Vice Chairman, NPC	Met Senior General Than Shwe
32.	2008 October	General Zhang Li	PLA	Met General Thura Shwe Mann
33.	2009 March	General Chen Bingde	Chief of the General Staff, PLA	Met Senior General Than Shwe
34.	2009 March	Li Changchun	Member, CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Met Senior General Than Shwe
35.	2009 December	Xi Jinping	Vice President	Met Senior General Than Shwe, Vice Senior General Maung Aye
36.	2010 June	Wan Jiabao	Premier	Met Senior General Than Shwe
37.	2011 April	Jia Qinglin	Chairman, CPPCC	
38.	2011 May	General Xu Caihou	Vice Chairman, CMC	Met President Thein Sein, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing
39.	2012 March	Li Ji Heng	Governor, Yunnan Province	Met President U Thein Sein

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
40.	2012 July	Meng Jianzhu	State Councillor; Minister of Public Security	Met President U Thein Sein
41.	2013 January	Chen Jian	Deputy Commerce Minister	Met Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (then MP; NLP Chairperson)
42.	2013 January	Fu Ying	Deputy Foreign Minister	Special Delegation; Met President U Thein Sein in Yangon
43.	2013 June	Yang Jeichi	State Councillor	
44.	2013 July	General Fan Changlong	Vice Chairman, CMC	Met President U Thein Sein
45.	2014 May	General Chang Wanquan	State Councillor; Defence Minister	Met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing; Met President U Thein Sein
46.	2014 November	Li Keqiang	Premier	State visit
47.	2014 December	Li Yuanchao	Vice President	Met President U Thein Sein
48.	2015 December	Liu Zhenmin	Vice Foreign Minister; Special Envoy of Chinese Government	Met President U Thein Sein
49.	2016 April	Wang Yi	Foreign Minister	Met Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Myanmar Foreign Minister; De facto Leader); Invited by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; First Foreign Minister visited after NLD became government in March 2016

Sr.	Date	Name	Designation	Remark
50.	2016 July	Sun Guoxiang	Special Envoy on Asian Affairs	Addressed the Summit of Ethnic Armed Organizations in Mai Ja Yang, Kachin State
51.	2017 June	General Fang Fenghui	Chief of the Joint Staff Department, PLA; Member, CMC	Met State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
52.	2017 August	Song Tao	Director, International Department, CPC	Met State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
53.	2017 September	Sun Guoxiang	Special Envoy of Asian Affairs, Chinese MFA	Met Vice President-1 U Myint Swe; Met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing
54.	2017 November	Wang Yi	Foreign Minister	Met President U Htin Kyaw, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing; Discussed about peace process with EAOs and Rakhine issue

Source: 1) Maung Aung Myoe (2011). (pp. 211);
2) The Irrawaddy (2017).

APPENDIX B

List of Myanmar and Chinese Ambassadors (1948-2011) (in chronological order)

From 1950 to 2010, altogether 16 Myanmar ambassadors were accredited to China based in Beijing and 15 Chinese ambassadors were accredited to Myanmar based in Yangon.

Myanmar to China			China to Myanmar		
Sr.	Date	Name	Date	Name	Name
1.	08-06-1950	U Myint Thein	05-09-1950	Mr. Yao Zhongming	
2.	17-09-1951	U Hla Maung	30-04-1958	Mr. Li Yimang	
3.	17-02-1959	U Maung Maung Kyaw Win	20-09-1963	Mr. Geng Biao	
4.	05-12-1964	Samar Duwah Sinwah Naung	01-04-1971	Mr. Chen Zhaoyuan	
5.	16-11-1970	U Thein Maung	08-06-1973	Mr. Ye Chengzhang	
6.	11-11-1974	Thakin Chan Tun	23-11-1977	Mr. Mo Yanzhong	
7.	27-12-1976	U Myint Maung	03-08-1982	Mr. Huang Mingda	
8.	18-05-1978	U Tha Tun	13-08-1985	Mr. Zhou Mingji	
9.	30-06-1982	U Aung Win	25-08-1987	Mr. Cheng Ruisheng	
10.	21-01-1984	U Hla Shwe	10-07-1991	Mr. Liang Feng	
11.	05-07-1986	U Tin Maung Myint	27-09-1994	Mrs. Chen Baoliu	
12.	07-04-1989	U Tin Aung Tun	10-09-1997	Mr. Liang Dong	
13.	22-02-1993	U Sett	13-03-2001	Mr. Li Jinjun	
14.	01-04-1998	U Ba Htay Chit	31-10-2005	Mr. Guan Mu	
15.	08-11-2011	U Sein Win Aung	22-01-2009	Mr. Ye Dabo	
16.	18-06-2003	U Thein Lwin			

Source: Maung Aung Myoe (2011). (pp. 211).

APPENDIX C

Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the
Government of the Republic of China
(United Nations General Assembly, Seventh Session, First Committee)
(New York, 21 April 1953)

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**
SEVENTH SESSION
Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 610th

MEETING

Tuesday, 21 April 1953, at 3 p.m.

Headquarters, New York

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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China (A/2375, A/C.1/L.42, A/C.1/L.43, A/C.1/L.44/Rev.1) (continued)

[Item 77]*

1. Mr. LAWRENCE (Liberia) observed that the Committee was confronted with a problem as old as history—the problem of the strong man taking advantage of the weak.

2. At the 605th meeting, the representative of Burma had clearly and convincingly presented his Government's complaint against the Government of the Republic of China in Formosa. He had charged that that Government had committed acts of aggression against and violated the territorial integrity of Burma by the establishment and maintenance of armed forces within the country, and that those forces had the avowed intention of attacking a neighbouring country with which Burma was in friendly relations.

3. It would seem that a small remnant of the Chinese Nationalist Army had fled across the border from China, and that those troops had refused to submit themselves to Burmese authority, to be duly disarmed and interned, in accordance with international law. On the contrary, they had offered resistance to the Burmese armed forces. As a consequence, the Burmese forces had been obliged to engage the Chinese Nationalist forces in defence of Burma's independence. The representative of Burma had asserted that the Burmese forces would have easily expelled the Chinese Nationalist invaders were it not that the invaders received outside aid in the form of arms and other material from the Government in Formosa. The representative of Burma had further asserted that the invading forces had been exacting tribute from local inhabitants and using them in the construction of airfields, roads and other military establishments. The original band of 1,700 men had increased to 12,000 well equipped men. During the three years of fighting, the Burmese believed that the increased equipment had been supplied by the

Government in Formosa, a conclusion which appeared inescapable.

4. In his statement at the 605th meeting on 17 April, the representative of China had admitted that the original force which had entered Burmese territory had been composed of units of the Nationalist Army of China, but that General Li Mi, who was an officer of the Nationalist Army in Formosa, and his forces were not completely subject to the orders of the Government of the Republic of China.

5. The Liberian delegation urged that the Government in Formosa should exercise all possible influence over those troops, in the most unequivocal manner. Moreover, every directive and every possible coercive measure should be used to cause those forces in Burma to surrender and submit to internment or withdrawal. That would constitute evidence of the goodwill and desire of the Formosa Government to have General Li Mi and his forces leave Burmese territory.

6. The representative of China had stated, on 17 April that about 200 men of the Chinese Nationalist Army had accepted internment in Burma at the beginning of 1950. Those men had complained of maltreatment and poor food and housing. The Chinese representative had concluded that the current problem would not be so great or so difficult had the treatment accorded by the Burmese Government been better. Mr. Lawrence felt that that was a novel argument for the refusal to disarm and to be interned in accordance with international law. That argument appeared to him to strengthen rather than to refute the charges made by the Government of Burma.

7. The evidence submitted by the Burmese delegation was most cogent, adequate and forceful. Mr. Lawrence hoped that the great majority of the delegations had been convinced by that proof and that they would acknowledge the fact that hostile foreign armed forces were present on Burmese soil, and that the territorial integrity of Burma had been violated, with a resultant threat to its independence and to world peace. The Liberian delegation was convinced that aggression had been carried out against Burma and considered that the United Nations should unhesitatingly condemn

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

that aggression in unequivocal terms. Aggression had now taken place in Burma, yet tomorrow it might take place anywhere else.

8. In conclusion, Mr. Lawrence hoped that the United Nations would now, as in the past, continue to uphold the principles of the Charter, which called for the respect of the political independence and territorial integrity of all Member States. He would support any draft resolution which would bring to Burma the relief to which it was entitled.

9. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the representative of Burma had given ample evidence in support of his Government's complaint concerning aggressive action by the Kuomintang group in Formosa. The presence of foreign troops in Burma had been discussed in the international Press during the last three years, and world public opinion had been concerned that a new centre for military operations was being established in Burma for purposes of political blackmail and pressure against the Far East in general and the People's Republic of China in particular. From the statement made by the representative of Burma and various Press reports, it was possible to arrive at a good picture of the situation in that part of the world.

10. The remnants of the Kuomintang armed forces which had been defeated in 1950 and which had constituted the nucleus of the Kuomintang group in Burma, had grown in size and now had even airfields at their disposal. It was General Li Mi, a Kuomintang general, who conducted the over-all operations. The marauding forces in Burma acted as though they were in conquered territory. They terrorized the population, plundered, looted, stole and even killed members of the Burmese Government and local authorities. They forced the local population to build roads, runways and other military installations for them.

11. The Government of Burma had called on the commander of those forces to surrender and leave Burma immediately. When General Li Mi had refused to comply, and instead had engaged in military operations against the Burmese armed forces, the latter had attempted, without success, to force the bandits to comply with the legitimate claims of the Burmese Government. Military operations were still continuing, and the efforts to achieve a solution by diplomatic means had not succeeded. There was no doubt, in the light of evidence, that the Kuomintang armed forces in Burma were directed by the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan (Formosa). General Li Mi was undoubtedly a subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek. General Li Mi appeared to be the official commander of these armed forces and maintained a constant liaison with the authorities in Taiwan about his military operations in Burma. Moreover, the representative of Burma had cited many facts showing that General Li Mi acted under the direct instructions of the Chiang Kai-shek group, thus proving that the entire responsibility for the aggression against Burma must be borne by the authorities in Taiwan and their supporters.

12. The fact that the Taiwan authorities supplied the armed forces in Burma with military equipment was admitted by Chiang Kai-shek himself. Furthermore, the various exhibits submitted by the Burmese representative had proved conclusively that the armed forces in

Burma were subject to the authorities in Formosa, and that those forces were equipped with the latest weapons, provided by air from Formosa. It was quite clear that technical equipment could only be supplied from Formosa, a fact which was also confirmed by the American Press. It was clear, however, that there must be some way other than the air-lift to transport the tremendous amount of arms, and there was no doubt that Thailand was this transportation link. Press reports stated that such substantial arms and ammunition could only be sent with the approval and assistance of the Government of Thailand, and that the territory of Thailand was used by the aggressors in Burma as a route for the transportation of their military supplies.

13. Some representatives had sought to gloss over such facts, and to cite others, without disproving those which had been adduced, confining their statements to generalities. Yet the aforementioned facts disproved the contentions of the Kuomintang representative that the Kuomintang group in Taiwan did not bear responsibility for the aggression committed against the Union of Burma.

14. Moreover, the aggressive activities of the Kuomintang-directed bands in Burma were also aimed against the People's Republic of China. It would be recalled that those forces had invaded the Chinese province of Yunnan, but had been crushed and forced back into Burma. That invasion had been designed to undermine the peaceful and constructive work of the liberated people of China. It was obvious that the tremendous task of rehabilitation and reconstruction which was being successfully carried out in China had aroused hatred and rage among General Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang group, who had been expelled from China by the Chinese people. That group's attempts to return to China in order once again to oppress the Chinese people were undoubtedly doomed to failure.

15. In conclusion, Mr. Kiselyov urged the Committee to condemn those acts of aggression and to take all the necessary steps to put an end to them. Such a decision would be welcomed by world public opinion. His delegation fully supported the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.42) submitted by the Burmese delegation.

16. Mr. BAKR (Iraq) expressed his gratification at the way the debate had developed in the First Committee, without heat or rancour. The discussion, as a result, had elicited the facts of the situation and had allowed the delegations to look clearly into the present complaint. He hoped that the happy atmosphere which had followed the unanimous vote in the General Assembly on Korea (427th plenary meeting) would continue to the benefit of the United Nations.

17. The complaint of the Government of Burma was precisely the type of problem which the Organization was equipped to study, with a view to finding a solution. It was a case which provided an opportunity for applying the precepts of the Charter. It would be most unfortunate if the United Nations failed to find a solution, and the Committee should therefore make a special effort in that regard.

18. The principle involved was of the greatest importance. A marauding army had violated Burmese territory, waged war and engaged in lawlessness. The Government of Burma had been fully justified in com-

plaining of the violation. No State could tolerate a position where a foreign army, having violated its frontiers, continued to wage war with the help of foreign governments or groups. Such a situation was fraught with ugly possibilities. It would make it possible for another government to smuggle large numbers of its troops under some disguise and use them as a hostile element to carry out acts of aggression or subversion. Most dangerous of all would be the fact that such a force was armed and supplied by a foreign government. No matter what justification there might be for such a situation, the fact remained that it was extremely dangerous, particularly since it might lead to circumstances which would invite the intervention of foreign Powers.

19. The facts of the case proved indisputably that the Chinese Nationalist Army in Burma had committed an act of aggression and that that army had been supplied with arms and equipment by some foreign source. An army could not fight for four years without receiving continuous supplies of arms and ammunition from an outside source. The Iraqi delegation considered that the argument concerning the degree of control exercised over that army by the Government of the Republic of China was somewhat open to question. The representative of China had denied that his Government had control over the army, but had admitted that it had some influence over its commander. If it had some influence with General Li Mi, the commander, that meant at least some control over his army. Hence it should not be difficult to get General Li Mi to refrain from his activities, if the Government of the Republic of China so desired.

20. The conclusion as to what should be done appeared inescapable: the United Nations should require that the Chinese troops in Burma submit to the requirements of international law. They should either be disarmed and interned or leave the country. Moreover, the United Nations should call upon all Members concerned to co-operate along those lines. In the circumstances, that relatively small army could not be expected to invade any territory around it. The Members of the United Nations could surely not allow a foreign military base to be established illegally on the soil of a sovereign and independent country. The United Nations could surely not remain idle while a dangerous and explosive situation was developing which might turn into an insoluble world problem. Nor was it possible to condone the principle that some Powers supplied arms to a foreign army in a foreign country, whose frontiers and sovereignty had been violated.

21. In conclusion, Mr. Bakr asserted that his Government was friendly both to the Government of the Republic of China and the Union of Burma. His delegation, however, had viewed the facts of the situation in the light of the Charter and international law and hoped that the United Nations would not shirk its duty.

22. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) wished to join in the tribute already paid to the representative of Burma, who had presented his Government's case with restraint and eloquence. His statement had actually consisted of two parts. In the first part, he had submitted evidence to establish that about 12,000 Chinese troops were on Burmese territory, that they were living off the country and that they refused to withdraw or to be

disarmed and interned. In the second part of his statement, he had endeavoured to demonstrate that the Chinese troops were under the direct control of the Government of the Republic of China.

23. The representative of China had denied that his Government had effective control over General Li Mi's troops, but he had made no real effort to challenge the main allegations contained in the first part of the statement of the representative of Burma. Hence there appeared to be little doubt that General Li Mi's forces had, contrary to international law, maintained themselves in Burma for the past few years and had refused to withdraw or to be disarmed and interned. Indeed, the Burmese Government was in an intolerable situation, and the restraint it had shown in bringing the case to the United Nations only after years of negotiations had produced no solution was all the more commendable.

24. It was another matter, however, for the Assembly to declare that the Government of the Republic of China was wholly responsible for the activities of General Li Mi's forces. There now seemed to be a good chance of reaching agreement with the Government of the Republic of China to use its influence to secure the withdrawal of Chinese troops in Burma, and the Canadian delegation therefore hoped that the Burmese Government would not press for a formal condemnation of the Government of the Republic of China as an aggressor.

25. A more appropriate draft resolution would be one which, while recognizing the established facts of the case and the principles of international law, would place the main emphasis upon the paramount hope of reaching a practical solution by negotiation between the parties directly concerned, with such assistance as could be rendered by third parties. Such a draft resolution was more likely to provide a solution to the current difficulty than an outright condemnation of the Government of the Republic of China, whose direct control over General Li Mi's forces was doubted by several representatives. The Canadian delegation would, however, vote for a draft resolution deploring the activities of General Li Mi's forces on Burmese soil.

26. Mr. JOHNSON hoped, therefore, that the Burmese representative would respond to his appeal to accept some modification of his draft resolution; by so doing, he would be contributing to the speedy and peaceful withdrawal of Chinese forces from Burma. The Canadian delegation would examine all draft resolutions in the light of those considerations.

27. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) considered it his duty to state clearly that the presence of foreign troops on Burmese territory should in no way be condoned, but on the contrary should be forthrightly condemned, and that effective measures should be taken which might lead to the surrender or eventual evacuation of those troops.

28. If the United Nations did not denounce and condemn the presence of such alien forces on Burmese soil, nothing would prevent the occurrence of similar adventures in other parts of the world. The adoption of an appropriate resolution by the United Nations would undoubtedly greatly facilitate the task of Member States which maintained friendly relations with the Government of the Republic of China in Formosa in

prevailing on it to take all the steps which would lead to a satisfactory solution for Burma. He would consider an appropriate resolution to be one containing positive elements, such as were embodied in the draft resolution submitted by Mexico (A/C.1/L.44/Rev.1). Any draft resolution couched in weaker terms might encourage those who had so far abetted the Chinese forces to relax their efforts to bring about a solution.

29. As an Asian country, Saudi Arabia was highly concerned about the Burmese question, particularly since, if such incidents were to be allowed to occur, they might lead to a series of conflicts or possibly civil wars, to the detriment of the economic, social, and cultural development of Asia.

30. It was fortunate for the United Nations that it was two small Member States that were involved in the present conflict. Otherwise, the Organization might have become involved in a situation far more grave. However, aggression was aggression regardless of whether it had been launched by a big or a small nation, and it could plunge the world into a global conflict. The Saudi Arabian delegation would therefore give its support to Burma, which was a victim of aggression.

31. Mr. LUDIN (Afghanistan) declared that the representative of Burma had clearly and convincingly established the fact of the presence in Burma of 12,000 Chinese troops, professing allegiance to the Chinese Nationalist cause and receiving moral encouragement as well as material aid from the Government of the Republic of China in Taiwan. Those troops had been engaged for the past three years in continuous conflict with the Burmese armed forces and had inflicted suffering and deprivation on the peace-loving people of Burma. They had levied taxes and exacted forced labour and had exercised the functions of a foreign occupation army. Instead of abiding by international law and submitting to disarmament and internment, they had engaged in subversive activities against the Burmese Government, with a view to overthrowing it.

32. All those acts constituted a clear-cut case of aggression which was thoroughly unjustifiable. Even to the most ardent believer in the cause of Nationalist China, which those forces professed to promote, it must have become obvious that these bands preferred the sanctuary of the Burmese soil to the obvious trials and tribulations which might await them on the soil of China. On the other hand, even from the strictly Nationalist Chinese point of view, the irregular armed forces operating on the soil of Burma did not offer any justification for their continued existence.

33. The Chinese representative, in his statement on 17 April, had paid a touching tribute to the armed forces under the command of General Li Mi, stating that those forces were regarded as heroes by all free Chinese everywhere. Mr. Tsiang presumably viewed with disfavour the activities of those irresponsible armed forces on the soil of Burma and disclaimed any visible relations existing between his Government and those armed forces, yet at the same time, he had ventured to praise them as heroes and patriots. In fact, General Li Mi had even been designated as the Garibaldi of China.

34. Furthermore, Mr. Tsiang had stated that his Government had some degree of influence over those armed forces and that that influence varied from time

to time. The Afghan delegation hoped that the degree of that influence was commensurate with the amount of moral and material assistance rendered by the Government of the Republic of China to those forces. The ties between the Nationalist Chinese elements in Burma and the parent organization on Formosa were real and demonstrable. Formosa could undoubtedly exercise a considerable measure of influence over those forces.

35. The picture which had emerged from the statements of the Burmese and the Chinese representatives was a sinister and ugly one, involving international dangers and complications, and hence deserved the most serious and urgent attention of the General Assembly. The real problem was the disarming and internment of the Chinese forces in Burma. That could be brought about by bringing to bear on those forces all moral influences which could be rallied for a peaceful settlement of the problem.

36. The Afghan delegation hoped that every kind of moral censure and disapprobation would be used to discourage the aggressors and to compel them to desist from their wrongdoing and to persuade them to submit to the due process of international law. The Government of the Republic of China and the neighbours of Burma might be called upon to render every assistance to realize the United Nations objective.

37. The delegation of Afghanistan was prepared to give whole-hearted support to the Burmese draft resolution, while it would carefully study the other draft resolutions submitted on the item.

38. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the complaint of Burma of aggression against it by the Kuomintang group in Formosa deserved the most serious attention of the United Nations.

39. The remnants of the Kuomintang bands led by Chiang Kai-shek, which had been routed by the armies of the People's Republic of China, had fled into Burma and, instead of surrendering their weapons in accordance with international law, had opposed the Burmese armed forces. Those bands would clearly have been easily liquidated by the armed forces of Burma but for the assistance and direct support given to them and their aggressive activities by the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan. Judging by the official documents submitted by the Government of Burma, that group, notwithstanding the contentions of its representative in the Committee, led and directed the operations of the marauding bands against the Union of Burma, for which aggressive acts the Taiwan authorities bore full responsibility. The Kuomintang group, through General Li Mi, controlled the operations, and the general maintained liaison between the two areas by moving back and forth between them. For two years, the Kuomintang bands had received equipment and supplies from Taiwan, which had enabled them to build up their strength and widen their constant criminal operations against the population of Burma.

40. It had been contended that the Kuomintang bands which had invaded Burma were not under the control and direction of the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan. In that connexion, the United Kingdom representative had referred (608th meeting) to the distances involved, apparently to prove that the Taiwan group could not physically exert a sufficient amount of influ-

ence over the predatory forces in Burma. But there was a wealth of evidence which left no room whatever for doubt as to the control and direction exercised by the Kuomintang group in Taiwan. Despite the attempts to portray the matter otherwise, the facts proved that the Kuomintang units in Burma had been grouped in regular army units under the sole command of General Li Mi, who had been appointed by the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan. The documents submitted by the Government of Burma showed that the Kuomintang units in Burma were disposed in military districts, just like regular army. Those units were none the less bandits, as the Government of Burma contended, since no other name could be given to regular army units which engaged in crimes such as they had committed in Burma.

41. It was clear that the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan controlled the operations of the bandits in Burma. Even were there no other evidence to that effect—such as, for instance, exhibit 10 of the file of documents submitted by Burma¹ which quoted the commander of one of the Kuomintang divisions in Burma as saying that those forces constituted the army of the National Republic of China, under the direct command of Chiang Kai-shek, or such as the letter from Chiang Kai-shek's son, which the Kuomintang representative had misinterpreted—the appeal made by Chiang Kai-shek to the forces in Burma sufficed to reveal the true relationship between the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan and the Kuomintang bandits in Burma.

42. Mr. Baranovsky was surprised that some delegations refused to open their eyes to the obvious aggression which the Kuomintang group was guilty of committing against the Union of Burma. His delegation, on the basis of the convincing documents made available by the representative of Burma, as well as the additional facts adduced in that representative's statement, considered as fully proven the charge of aggression committed by the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan against Burma. It was also established beyond any doubt that that group was guilty of gross interference in the domestic affairs of Burma, and that the Kuomintang bands were guilty of crimes against the Burmese people.

43. The Union of Burma had every reason to consider the situation as one which gave rise to a threat to international peace and security. The General Assembly could not ignore the dangerous situation which had developed in Burma and must take all the necessary steps, in accordance with the Charter, to end the Kuomintang aggression against Burma.

44. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR unconditionally supported the complaint of the Union of Burma and endorsed the draft resolution submitted by that country.

45. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) considered that the picture as it had emerged from the debate was quite clear, and that there was a definite trend in the views of the majority on the matter.

46. Before discussing that, he wished to refer to Mr. Tsiang's assertion on 17 April, in connexion with certain statements reported in *The Times* of London as having been made by Mr. Soong in Bangkok, that Mr. Soong had requested that the account of those

¹ Not issued as United Nations documents.

remarks should be corrected. In the short period of time available, the Indonesian delegation had searched through all the recent copies of *The Times* of London, but regretted that it had been unable to find either a correction or a letter requesting a correction. He emphasized that his interest in the matter stemmed from the importance and the nature of the statements made by Mr. Soong.

47. There were certain basic facts which Mr. Palar thought the Committee was generally agreed upon: in the first place, all had been impressed by the facts adduced by the representative of Burma, as well as by the manner in which that representative had presented his case; secondly, there had been an invasion of Burmese territory by alien forces; thirdly, those forces should either be removed or interned; and, fourthly, the presence and actions of those forces should not be condoned, but should be condemned.

48. There remained the question of whether the forces on Burmese soil were linked with the Formosa Government. It was the considered opinion of the Indonesian delegation that the representative of Burma had proved the existence of such a link and that the aggression in Burma must therefore be considered as aggression carried out by the Taipei Government. The delegation of Indonesia therefore supported the Burmese draft resolution.

49. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) observed that the dispute regarding the presence of foreign armed troops in Burma was not one of those to which the world had become accustomed, and which separated the world into two groups, one communist and the other non-communist. On the contrary, the dispute appeared to be one between two countries which were regarded as belonging to the free world. The fact that the discussion was taking place immediately after the achievement of unanimity among the two world groups on the Korean issue gave a foretaste of what the United Nations could accomplish in solving specific problems once the cold war was concluded.

50. A further point to be noted was that the dispute was not between an under-developed country and a developed one, between an Asian or African country, for instance, and a European country, or one of the Western Powers to which imperialism was imputed. Nor was the dispute one between two countries with a history of antagonism; it was one between two Asian countries which had suffered together and which had participated together in the same struggle. The words of the representative of China concerning the friendly feelings which his country had for Burma had been most reassuring in that connexion. While it was true that there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries, there was no question of expansion or imperialism involved.

51. The question did not seem to be a difficult one to settle, since Burma wanted the troops to be either interned or evacuated, and the representative of China had not sought to justify the presence of the troops on Burmese soil, but, on the contrary, had stated that his Government had tried and would continue to try to get the troops to withdraw from Burma. All agreed on the need for a solution. The discussion had been one of the most fruitful and sober in the Organization, and its tone had been due especially to the moderation and

wisdom shown by the representative of Burma. There were two difficulties. The first related to the practical means for ending the situation. The large numbers involved might perhaps make disarming and internment difficult. In the second place, there was the problem of how to reach and persuade the forces to retire or to submit to internment.

52. In a sense, the Lebanese delegation would have liked to identify the government responsible for the troops as that of the Republic of China, because in such an event evacuation would have been made so much easier. The Lebanese delegation understood the Burmese desire that the Government of the Republic of China should be branded an aggressor. But the evidence was too varied in nature and the question of responsibility would require a much more profound inquiry for such a verdict.

53. An important aspect of the situation was that the fact of the presence and increase in number of the troops was a consequence of the armed struggle between communist and anti-communist forces in the world in general and, in the instance under discussion, in China. The entry of the Chinese Nationalist forces into Burma had been due to their retreat in that struggle. Their subsistence and expansion in Burma had likewise been due to that conflict. In any case, it was clear that the troops were regarded by many people as the champions of anti-communism in that part of the world.

54. Mr. Azkoul could only deplore, however, the theory that the struggle against communism justified the violation of international law and of the independence and territorial integrity of other countries. That frame of mind had undoubtedly encouraged the forces to push on into Burmese territory. In that connexion, Mr. Azkoul cited the letter which the Burmese representative had quoted as having been addressed by General Li Mi to the Commander of the Burmese Army, to the effect that, in view of the fact that the Southeast Asian countries constituted an anti-communist group and that the men of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army were anti-communist, there must be no fighting. Implicit in that letter was the obvious assumption that the presence of those forces on Burmese soil was considered justified because they were anti-communist. It was that frame of mind which constituted the danger. Mr. Azkoul was happy to note that none of the representatives who had spoken, not even the representative of China, had manifested any support for that way of thinking.

55. That frame of mind was not confined to the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army, but was to be found also in other and much more important countries. A characteristic manifestation was that the occupation and use of a given country was considered justified if regarded as necessary in the cold war. It was the duty of the General Assembly to issue a clear condemnation of such ideas in order to help weaken and eliminate them.

56. Mr. TSIANG (China) reserved his right to reply, if necessary, to points that might be raised by the two representatives who were to follow him on the list of speakers.

57. With the exception of a few delegations, the majority of the members of the Committee had approached the problem in a constructive manner. Mr. Tsiang

wished to do likewise. He had noted one central misunderstanding in the course of the debate, due perhaps to his not having made quite clear in what capacity he was speaking in the Committee. He emphasized that he was speaking as the representative of his Government, and not as the representative of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army. The representative of Pakistan, perhaps because of that misunderstanding, had tried to construe the fact of Mr. Tsiang's not having commented on certain parts of the statement of the Burmese representative as constituting agreement with those parts. That was not the case. His silence had been due to the fact that he was not in a position either to affirm or deny what the representative of Burma had said about that army. He suggested that the Committee might withhold its verdict in that respect, since only one side had presented its case.

58. It was true that Mr. Tsiang had compared General Li Mi to Garibaldi, but that was not because there appeared to him to be a resemblance on all counts. He had studied history sufficiently to know the pitfalls of historical judgments on contemporaries. But he had foreseen that one of the difficulties that would face the Committee was the psychological factors underlying the problem; he had meant to show that General Li Mi and his followers were popular in China and among Chinese everywhere in the same way as Garibaldi and his followers had been considered heroes by the Indian people. The government of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour had experienced considerable difficulty in handling Garibaldi, and the same type of difficulty was faced by the Government of the Republic of China in the case under discussion. The important thing was a correct appreciation of the psychological situation.

59. The representative of Burma had furnished the Committee with a number of documents which showed quite clearly the nature of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army. For example, the reference in one of the documents to discussions and decisions taken in a battalion "sub-committee" indicated unmistakably that the army was not centrally controlled or supplied. While Mr. Tsiang was not a military man, he could not imagine any regular army going about things in such a manner. The Burmese representative's evidence concerning appeals for supplies and money was also hardly characteristic of a regular army. Again, the document in which a unit had demanded the release of Chinese merchants also illustrated his point; the protection of citizens abroad was one of the functions of a diplomatic service, and it was inconceivable that such a step should be carried out in that manner by a force under the control of a regular government. The reference in that document to the friendly diplomatic relations between the two countries lent further support to his argument: his Government had no diplomatic relations with the Government of Burma, and therefore would not have referred to them. In fact, all the documents contained unmistakable evidence as to the nature of the movement.

60. Mr. Tsiang considered it significant that only one representative had referred again to the message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to General Li Mi. As he had pointed out, that message had been addressed only to forces in Yunnan province and therefore was not related in any manner to any aggression against Burma.

61. The situation was that the Government of Burma faced difficulties. A number of draft resolutions had been submitted, and he had already indicated that the one submitted by Burma (A/C.1/L.42) was not just, helpful or acceptable to his Government. With regard to the draft resolutions submitted by Argentina (A/C.1/L.43) and Mexico (A/C.1/L.44/Rev.1), Mr. Tsiang said that he appreciated the constructive intentions of those proposals, whose sole aim was to find a settlement in accordance with the principles of the Charter. He was not prepared to deal with the provisions of those draft resolutions at that stage, but wished to repeat what he had said in the General Committee (86th meeting), namely, that in so far as his Government had any influence over the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army, it would exercise that influence so as to further the wishes of the Government of Burma. His Government had already

notified the United States Embassy in Taipei that it would try to prevent any supplies from being sent from Taipei to that army; further, his Government had tried to stop collections on that army's behalf. His Government had never sent any supplies and had never allowed any of its aircraft to be used to take supplies to that army. Any supplies that had been flown over had been taken in chartered and private aircraft, to which his Government would now refuse clearance for such purposes.

62. In conclusion, Mr. Tsiang referred to the deep interest which the Committee had shown in getting the troops in question out of Burma. He was authorized to say that his Government would give the United Nations the utmost co-operation to achieve that objective.

The meeting rose at 5.5 p.m.

APPENDIX D

Sino-Burmese Agreement on Boundary Question

(28 January 1960)

**SINO-BURMESE AGREEMENT ON
BOUNDARY QUESTION****28 January 1960**

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Burma,

With a view to promoting an overall settlement of the Sino-Burmese boundary question and to consolidating and further developing friendly relations between China and Burma,

Have agreed to conclude the present Agreement under the guidance of the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence and have agreed as follows:-

Article I

The Contracting Parties agree to set up immediately a joint committee composed of an equal number of delegates from each side and charge it, in accordance with the provisions of the present Agreement, to discuss and work out solutions on the concrete questions regarding the Sino-Burmese boundary enumerated in Article II of the present Agreement, conduct surveys of the boundary and set up boundary markers, and draft a Sino-Burmese boundary treaty. The joint committee shall hold regular meetings in the capitals of the two countries or at any other places in the two countries.

Article II

The Contracting Parties agree that the existing issues concerning the Sino-Burmese boundary shall be settled in accordance with the following provisions:

(1) With the exception of the area of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang, the entire undelimited boundary from the high conical peak to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary shall be delimited along the traditional customary line, that is to say, from the high conical peak northward along the watershed between the Taiping, the Shweli, the Nu (Salween) and the Tulung (Taron) Rivers on the one hand and the Nmai Hka River on the other, up to the place where it crosses the Tulung (Taron) River between Chingdam and Nhkumkang, and then along the watershed between the Tulung (Taron) and the Tsayul (Zayul) Rivers on the one hand and all the upper tributaries of the Irrawaddy River, except for the Tulung (Taron) River, on the other, up to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary. The joint committee shall send out joint survey teams composed of an equal number of persons from each side to conduct surveys along the above mentioned watersheds so as to determine the specific alignment of this section of the boundary line and to set up boundary markers.

(2) The Burmese Government has agreed to return to China the area of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang which belongs to China. As to the extent of this area to be returned to China, it is to be discussed and determined by the joint committee in accordance with the proposals put forward and marked on maps by the Governments of Burma and China on February 4, 1957 and July 26, 1957 respectively. After determining the extent of this area to be returned to China, the joint committee shall send out joint survey teams composed of an equal number of persons from each side to conduct on-the-spot survey of the specific alignment of this section of the boundary line and to set up boundary markers.

(3) In order to abrogate the "perpetual lease" by Burma of the Meng-Mao triangular area (Namwan assigned tract) at the junction of the Namwan and the Shweli Rivers, which belongs to China, the Chinese Government has agreed to turn over this area to Burma to become part of the territory of the Union of Burma. In exchange, the Burmese Government has agreed to turn over to China to become part of Chinese territory the areas under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes, which are west of the boundary line from the junction of the Nam Ting and the Nampa Rivers to the Number One marker on the southern delimited section of the boundary as defined in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments of June 18, 1941. As to the extent of these areas to be turned over to China, the Chinese and the Burmese Governments put forward proposals marked on maps of July 26, 1957 and June 4, 1959 respectively. The area where the proposals of the two Governments coincide will definitely be turned over to China. Where the proposals of the two Governments differ as to the area

under the jurisdiction of the Panhung tribe, the joint committee will send out a team composed of an equal number of persons from each side to ascertain on-the-spot as to whether it is under the jurisdiction of the Panhung tribe, so as to determine whether it is to be turned over to China. After the extent of the areas under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes to be turned over to China has been thus determined the joint committee will send out joint survey teams composed of an equal number of persons from each side to conduct on-the-spot survey of the specific alignment of this section of the boundary line and to set up boundary markers.

(4) Except for the adjustment provided for in paragraph (3) of this Article, the section of the boundary from the junction of the Nam Ting and the Nampa Rivers to the Number One marker on the southern delimited section of the boundary shall be delimited as defined in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18, 1941. The joint committee shall send out joint survey teams composed of an equal number of persons from each side to carry out delimitation and demarcation along this section of the boundary line and set up boundary markers.

Article III

The Contracting Parties agree that the joint committee, after working out solutions for the existing issues concerning the Sino-Burmese boundary as enumerated in Article II of the present Agreement shall be responsible for drafting a Sino-Burmese boundary treaty, which shall cover not only all the sections of the boundary as mentioned in Article II of the present Agreement, but also the sections of the boundary which were already delimited in the past and need no adjustment. After being signed by the Governments of the two countries and coming into effect, the new boundary treaty shall replace all old treaties and notes exchanged concerning the boundary between the two countries. The Chinese Government, in line with its policy of being consistently oppose to foreign prerogatives and respecting the sovereignty of other countries, renounces China's right of participation in mining enterprises at Lufang of Burma as provided in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18, 1941.

Article IV

(1) The present Agreement is subject to ratification and the instruments of ratification will be exchanged in Rangoon as soon as possible.

(2) The present Agreement will come into force immediately on the

exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall automatically cease to be in force when the Sino-Burmese boundary treaty to be signed by the two Governments comes into force.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the 28th day of January 1960, in the Chinese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNION OF BURMA

(Signed) Chou En-lai.

(Signed) Ne Win.

Source: Maung Aung Myoe (2011). (pp. 193-196).

APPENDIX E

Sino-Burmese Agreement on Boundary Question

(28 January 1960)

**TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL NON-
AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE UNION OF BURMA AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

28 January 1960

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Burma,

Desiring to maintain everlasting peace and cordial friendship between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Burma,

Convinced that the strengthening of good neighbourly relations and friendly co-operation between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Burma is in accordance with the vital interests of both countries,

Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty in accordance with the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence jointly initiated by the two countries, and have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Contracting Parties recognize and respect the independence, sovereign rights and territorial integrity of each other.

Article II

There shall be everlasting peace and cordial friendship between the Contracting Parties who undertake to settle all disputes between them by means of peaceful negotiation without resorting to force.

Article III

Each Contracting Party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression against the other and not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other Contracting Party.

Article IV

The Contracting Parties declare that they will develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the two states in a spirit of friendship and co-operation, in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and of mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Article V

Any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation of the present Treaty or one or more of its articles shall be settled by negotiations through the ordinary diplomatic channels.

Article VI

(1) The present Treaty is subject to ratification and the instruments of ratification will be exchanged in Rangoon as soon as possible.

(2) The present Treaty will come into force immediately on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and will remain in force for a period of ten years.

(3) Unless either of the Contracting Parties gives to the other notice in writing to terminate it at least one year before the expiration of this period, it will remain in force without any specified time limit, subject to the right of either of the Contracting Parties to terminate it by giving to the other in writing a year's notice of its intention to do so.

In witness whereof the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and the Prime Minister of the Union of Burma have signed the present Treaty.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the 28th day of January 1960, in the Chinese and English languages, both text being equally authentic.

For the Government of the
People's Republic of China

For the Government of the
Union of Burma

(Signed) Chou En-lai

(Signed) Ne Win

APPENDIX F

Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the
Union of Burma
(1 October 1960)

**BOUNDARY TREATY BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA AND THE UNION OF BURMA**

1 October 1960

The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and the President of the Union of Burma,

Being of the agreed opinion that the long outstanding question of the boundary between the two countries is a question inherited from history, that since the two countries successively won independence, the traditional friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries have undergone a new development, and the fact that Prime Ministers of the two countries jointly initiated in 1954 the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence among nations with different social systems as principles guiding relations between the two countries has all the more greatly promoted the friendly relations between the two countries and has created conditions for the settlement of the question of the boundary between the two countries;

Noting with satisfaction that the Government of the People's Republic of China and the successive governments of the Union of Burma, conducting friendly consultation and showing mutual understanding and mutual accommodation in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, have overcome various difficulties, and have eventually reached a successful and overall settlement of the question of the boundary between the two countries; and

Firmly believing that the formal delimitation of the entire boundary between the two countries and its emergence as a boundary of peace and friendship not only represent a milestone in the further development of the friendly relations between China and Burma, but also constitute an important contribution to the safeguarding of Asian and world peace;

Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty on the basis of the agreement on the question of the boundary between the two countries signed by Premier Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Ne Win on January 28th, 1960 and appointed their respective plenipotentiaries as follows:

Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council, for the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and

U Nu, Prime Minister, for the President of the Union of Burma,

Who, having mutually examined their full powers and found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

Article I

In accordance with the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and in the spirit of friendship and mutual accommodation, the Union of Burma agrees to return to China area of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang (measuring about 153 square kilometres, 59 square miles, and as indicated in the attached map) which belongs to China; and the People's Republic of China agrees to delimit the section of the boundary from the junction of the Nam Hpa and the Nam Ting rivers to the junction of the Nam Hka and the Nam Yung rivers in accordance with the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18th, 1941, with the exception of the adjustments provided for in Articles Two and Three of the present Treaty.

Article II

In view of the relations of equality and friendship between China and Burma, the two parties decide to abrogate the "perpetual lease" by Burma of the Meng-Mao triangular area (Namwan assigned tract) which belongs to China. Taking into account the practical needs of the Burmese side, the Chinese side agrees to turn over this area (measuring about 220 square kilometres, 85 square miles, and as indicated in the attached map) to Burma to become part of the territory of the Union of Burma. In exchange, and having regard for the historical ties and the integrity of the tribes, the Burmese side agrees to turn over to China to become part of Chinese territory the areas (measuring about 189 square kilometres, 73 square miles, and as indicated in the attached map) under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes, which belong to Burma according to the provision in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18th, 1941.

Article III

For the convenience of administration by each side and having regard for the intratribal relationship and production and livelihood of the local inhabitants, the two parties agree to make fair and reasonable adjustments to a small section of the boundary line as defined in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18th, 1941, by including in China Yawng Hok and Lungnai villages and including in Burma Umhpa, Pan Kung, Pan Nawng and Pan Wai villages, so that these boundary-line-intersected villages will no longer be intersected by the boundary line.

Article IV

The Chinese Government, in line with its consistent policy of opposing foreign prerogatives and respecting the sovereignty of other countries, renounces China's right of participation in mining enterprises at Lufang of Burma as provided in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18th, 1941.

Article V

The Contracting Parties agree that the section of the boundary from the high conical peak to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary, with the exception of the area of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang, shall be fixed along the traditional customary line, i.e., from the high conical peak northwards along the watershed between the Taping, the Shweli and the Nu rivers and the section of the Tulung (Taron) river above western Chingdam Village on the one hand and the Nmai Hka river on the other, to a point on the south bank of the Tulung (Taron) River and then further along the watershed between the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above western Chingdam Village and the Tsayul (Zayul) River on the one hand and all the upper tributaries of the Irrawaddy River excluding the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above western Chingdam Village on the other, to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary.

Article VI

The Contracting Parties affirm that the two sections of the boundary from the high conical peak to the junction of the Nam Kha and the Nam Yung rivers to the south eastern extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary at the junction of the Nam la and the Lanchang (Mekong) rivers were already delimited in the past and require no change, the boundary being as delineated in the maps attached to the present Treaty.

Article VII

1. In accordance with the provisions of Articles I and V of the present Treaty, the alignment of the section of the boundary line from the high conical peak to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary shall be as follows:

- (1) From the high conical peak (Mu-lang Pum, Manang Pum) the line runs

northwards, then southeastwards and then northeastwards along the watershed between the Taping River (Ta Ying Chiang), the Lung Chuan Chiang (Shweli) and the Nu (Salween) River on the one hand and the Nmai Hka river on the other, passing through Shuei Cheng (Machyi Chet) Pass, Panwa Pass, Tasamin Shan, Hpare (Yemawlaunggu Hkyet) Pass and Chitsu (Lagwi) Pass to the source of the Chu-I Ta Ho (Chu-Iho Ta-Ho).

(2) From the source of the Chu-I Ta Ho (Chu-Iho Ta Ho) the line runs northwestwards along the Chu-I Ta Ho (Chu-Iho Ta Ho) to its junction with its tributary flowing in from the north, thence northwards along this tributary to a point on the watershed between the tributaries of the Hpim (Htang-kyam Kyaung) River on the one hand and the Wang Ke (Moku Kyaung) river and its tributary, the Chu-I Ta Ho (Chu-Iho Ta Ho), on the other, thence westwards along this watershed, passing through Ma Chu Lo Waddy (2,423 metres 7,950 feet), thence northwards till it crosses the Hpimaw (Htang-kyam Kyaung) River west of Hpimaw Village; thence northwards along the ridge, passing through Luksang Bum and crossing the Gan (Kang Hao) River to reach the Wu Chung (Wasok Kyaung) River; thence westwards along the Wu Chung (Wasok Kyaung) River to its junction with the Hsiao Chiang (Ngawchaung Hka) River; thence northwards up the Hsiao Chiang (Ngawchang Hka) River to its junction with the Ta Hpawte (Hpawte Kyaung) River. Thence the line runs north of Kangfang Village generally eastwards and then southeastwards along the watershed between the Hsiao Hpawte (Phawshi Kyaung) river and the Wu Chung (Wasok Kyaung) River on the one hand and the Ta Hpawte (Huawte Kyaung) River on the other, to a point on the watershed between the Nu (Salween) and the Nmai Hka Rivers.

(3) From the above-mentioned point on the watershed between the Nu (Salween) and the Nmai Hka Rivers, the line runs generally by northwards along the watershed between the Nu (Salween) river and the section of the Tulung (Taron) river above western Chingdam Village on the one hand and the Nmai Hka River on the other, passing through Kia Ngo Tu (Sajyang) Pass, Sala Pass, Ming Ke (Nahke) Pass, Ni Chi Ku (Gi Gi Thara) Pass, Jongit L'ka and Maguchi Pass; thence the line continues to run northwards and then generally westwards, passing through Alang L'ka, Mawa L'ka, Pang Tang Shan (Pum-tang Razi), Lonlang L'Ka, Hkora Razi to Tusehpong Razi.

(4) From Tusehpong Razi, the line runs generally northwestwards along the ridge, passing through height 2,892 metres and height 2,140.3 metres, to a point on the south bank of the Tulung (Taron) River west of Western Chingdam Village. Thence it crosses the Tulung (Taron) river to its junction with its tributary on its northern bank, and thence northwestwards along the ridge to Kundam Razi (Lungawng Hpong).

(5) From Kundam Razi (Lungawng Hpong) the line runs generally northwards and northwestwards along the watershed between the section of the Tulung (Taron) river above Western Chingdam Village on the one hand, and the upper tributaries of the Irrawaddy River [excluding the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above Western Chingdam Village] on the other, passing through Thala Pass, Sungya (Amansan) L'ka to Yulang Pass.

(6) From Yulang Pass the line runs generally southwestwards along the watershed between the Tsayul (Zayu) River on the one hand and the upper tributaries of the Irrawaddy River on the other, passing through Gamlang L'ka to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary.

2. In accordance with the provisions of Article I, II, III, and VI of the present Treaty, the alignment of the section of the boundary line from the High Conical Peak to the southeastern extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary shall be as follows:

(1) From the High Conical Peak, the line runs generally southwestwards along the watershed between the upper tributaries of the Taping River, the Mong Ka Hka and the upper tributaries of the Ta Pa Chiang (Tabak Hka) river on the one hand and the lower tributaries of the Nmai Hka River on the other, passing through Ta Ya Kuo (Lunghkyen Hkyet), and thence northwestwards to Hsiao Chueh Pass (Tabak-Hku Hkyet).

(2) From Hsiao Chueh Pass (Tabak-Hku Hkyet), the line runs down the Ta Pa Chiang (Tabak Hka), the Mong Ka Hka and up the Shih Tzu (Paknoi Hka) River (the upper stretch of which is known as the Hkatong Hka River) to its source.

(3) From the source of the Shih Tzu (Paknoi Hka) River, the line runs southwestwards and then westwards along the watershed between the Monglai Hka on the one hand and the Pajao Hka, the Ma Li Ka river and the Nan Shan (Namsang Hka) River on the other, to the source of the Laisa Stream.

(4) From the source of the Laisa Stream, the line runs down the Laisa Stream and up the Mu Lei Chiang (Mole Chang) and the Ga Yang Hka (Cheyang Hka), passing through Ma Po Tzu (A-law-Hkyet), and then runs southwards down the Nan Pen Chiang (Nampaung Hka) to its junction with the Raping river; thence eastwards up the Taping to the point where the Taping River meets a small ridge west of the junction of the Kuli Hka Stream with the Taping River.

(5) From the point where the Taping River meets the above-mentioned small ridge, the line runs along the watershed between the Kuli Hka Stream, the Husa (Namsa Hka) River and the tributaries of the Namwan River west of the Kuli Hka Stream on the other, up to Pang Chien Shan (Pan Teng Shan).

(6) From Pang Chien Shan (Pan Teng Shan), the line runs southwards to join the Kindit Hka, then down the Kindit Hka and the Nam Wa Hka (Pang Ling) River to a point on the south bank of the Nam Wa Hka (Pang Ling) River southeast of Man Yung Hai Village and north of Nawng Sa Village, thence in a straight line southwestwards and then southwards to the Nan Sah (Manting Hka) River; then it runs down the course of the Nan Sah (Manting Hka) River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, to its junction with the Namwan River, thence down the course of the Namwan River as it was at that time, to its junction with the course of the Shweli River as it was at that time.

(7) From the junction of the courses of the Namwan River and the Shweli River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, to the junction of the Shweli and the Wanting (Nam Yang) Rivers, the location of the line shall be as delineated on the maps attached to the present Treaty. Thence the line runs up the course of the Wanting (Nam Yang) River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, and the Weishang Hka, then turns northwestwards along a tributary of the Nam Che Hka (Nam Hse) River to its junction with the Nam Che Hka (Nam Hse) River, thence eastwards up the Nam Che Hka (Nam Hse) River, passing through Ching Shu Pass, and thence along the Monglong Hka and the course of the Mong Ko (Nam Ko) River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, thence up the Nam Hkai and the Nam Pang Wa Rivers, passing through a pass, and then along the man Hsing (Nam Hpawn) River [Whose upper stretch is known as the Nam Tep (Nam Lep) River] to its junction with the Nu (Salween) river, thence eastwards up the Nu (Salween) River to its junction with the Ti Kai Kou (Nam Men) Stream.

(8) From the junction of the Nu (Salween) River with the Ti Kai Kuo (Nam Men) Stream, the line runs southwestwards along the Ti Kai Kuo (Nan Men) Stream, then southwestwards, then southwards along the watershed between the Meng Peng Ho (the upper stretch of the Nam Peng River) on the one hand and the tributaries of the Nu (Salween) River on the other, up to Pao Lou Shan.

(9) From Pao Lou Shan, the line runs southeastwards along the Wa Yao Kou Stream, the ridge south of the Mai Ti (Mai Ti Ho) river, the Pan Chiao Ho and the Hsiao Lu Chang (Hsin Chai Kou) Stream up to the source of the Hsiao Lu Chang (Hsin Chai Kuo) Stream. From the source of the above stream to the junction of the nam Hpa and the nam Ting Rivers, the location of the line shall be as delineated on the maps attached to the present Treaty. The line then runs eastwards for about four kilometres (about three miles) up the Nam Ting River and thence southeastwards along the

northwest slope of Kummuta Shan (Loi Hseng) to the top of Kummuta Shan (Loi Hseng).

(10) From the top of Kummuta Shan (Loi Hseng), the line runs southeastwards along a tributary of the Kung Meng Ho (Nam Loi-hsa) river to its junction with another tributary flowing in from the southeast; thence up the latter tributary to a point northwest of Maklawt (Ma-Law) Village. Thence, the line runs in a straight line to a point southwest of Maklawt (Ma-Law) Village, and again in a straight line across a tributary of the Yun Hsing (Nam Tap) River to Shien Jen Shan, located east of the junction of the above-mentioned tributary with another tributary of the Yun Hsing (Nam Tap) River; thence along the watershed between the above two tributaries of the Yun Hsing (Nam Tap) River to the source of the one to the west and then turns westwards and southwestwards along the Mong Ling Shan Ridge, up to the top of Mong Ling Shan. Thence it runs eastwards and southeastwards along the Nam Pan River to its junction with a tributary, northeast of Yakaw Chai (Ya Kuo Sai) Village, which flows in from the southwest; thence in a southwesterly direction up that tributary, to a point northeast of Yakaw Chai (Ya Kou Sai) Village, from where it turns southwards passing through a point east of Yakaw Chai (Ya Kou Sai) Village, and crosses a tributary of the Nam Pan River south of Yakaw Chai (Ya Kou Sai) Village, thence westwards to the source of the Nam It River a little east of Chao Pao (Taklyet No) Village. Thence the line runs southwards along the Nam It and the Nam Mu Rivers, and then turns eastwards along the Nam Kunlong and the Chawk Hkrak Rivers to the northeast source of the Chawk Hkrak River.

(11) From the northeast source of the Chawk Hkrak River, the line runs southwards and eastwards along the watershed between the upper tributaries of the Nam Kunlong River on the one hand and the southern tributaries of the Chawk Hkrak River and the Nan Tin (Nam Htung) River on the other, to a point on the west side of Umhpa Village. Thence it runs eastwards passing a point 100 metres north of Umhpa Village, and thence eastwards up to the source of a small river on the above-mentioned watershed; thence along the ridge eastwards to the source of a tributary of the Mongtum (Nam Tum) river (the upper stretch of which is called the Ta Tung River), which it follows in an easterly and north-easterly direction to its junction with another tributary of the Mongtum (Nam Tum) River flowing in from the southeast; thence it follows this tributary to its source on the watershed between the Mongtum (Nam Tum) and the Lung Ta Hsiao Ho (Nam Lawng) Rivers. It then crosses the watershed in an easterly direction to the source of the Lung Ta Hsiao Ho (Nam Lawang) River which it follows to its junction with its tributary flowing in from the north, thence in a northerly direction along

the above-mentioned tributary, passing through a point on the Kanpinau Ridge, thence generally eastwards along a valley, crossing the junction of two subtributaries of a tributary of the Lung Ta Hsiao Ho (Nam Lawng) River, then northeastwards to the watershed between the Mongtum (Nam Tum) River on the one hand, and the Nam Ma River on the other, until it reaches height 1,941.8 metres (6,370 feet). Thence the line runs eastwards, then southwards and then northwestwards along the watershed between the Mongtum (Nam Tum), the La Meng (Nam Meng Ho), the Ku Hsing Ho (Nam Hka Lam) and the Nam Hka Hkao (Nam Hsiang Ho) Rivers on the one hand and the Nam Ma River on the other, up to a point on this watershed northwest of La Law Village.

(12) From the point on the above-mentioned watershed northwest of La law Village, the line runs down the nearest tributary of the Nam Hka Khao River and thence down the NamHka Hkao River to its junction with a tributary flowing in from the southwest. Thence the line runs generally in from the southwest up that tributary to its course, which is northeast of and nearest to height 2,180 metres (7,152 feet). Thence it crosses the ridge at a point 150 metres (492 feet) southeast of the above-mentioned height and then turns southwards to the source of the nearest tributary of the Nam Lung (Nam Sak) river, from where it proceeds along the Nam Lung (Nam Sak), the Nam Hse and the Nam Hka Rivers to the junction of the Nam Hka and the Nam Yung Rivers, and thence up the Nam Yung River to its source.

(13) From the source of the Nam Yung River the line runs in a southeasterly direction to the watershed between the Na Wu (Nam Wong) and the Nam Pei (Nam Hpe) rivers; thence generally eastwards along the above-mentioned watershed, and then eastwards along the Na Wu (Nam Wong) River, which it follows to its junction with the Nan Lai (Nam Lai) River, thence along the watershed between the Na Wu (Nam Wong) and the Nan Lai (Nam Lai) Rivers to the Anglang Shan (Loi Ang Lawng) river; thence northwards along the ridge to the top of Anglang Shan (Loi Ang Lawng), thence generally eastwards along the ridge, crosses the Nam Tung Chik (Nam Tonghkek) River and then follows the watershed between the tributaries on the west bank of the Nam Lei (Nam Lwe) River at the north of the La Ting (Hwe-Kye-Tai) River and the Nam La Ho [a tributary of the Nan Ma (Nam Ma) River] on the one hand and the tributaries on the west bank of the Nam Lei (Nam Lwe) River at the south of the La Ting (Hwe-Kye-Tai) River on the other, up to the top of Pang Shun Shan (Loi Pang Hsun).

(14) From the top of Pang Shun Shan (Loi Pang Hsun) the line runs generally eastwards along the La Ting (Hwe-Kye-Tai) River, the Nam Lei

(Nam Lwe) River, the course of the Nam Lo (Nam Law) Stream as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, and the Nan Wo (Nambok) River at Nan Wo Kai Nam Shan (Loi Kwainang).

(15) From the source of the Nan Wo (Nambok) river at Nan Wo Kai Shan (Loi Kwainang) the line runs generally eastward along the watershed between the Nan La (Nam Lak) [a tributary of the Nam Lei (Nam Lwe) River], the Nan Pai (Nam Hpe) and the Nan Hsi (Nam Hok) Rivers on the one hand and the Nan Ping (Nam Hpen), the Nan Mau (Nam Mawng) and the Nan Hsi Pang (Nam Hsi Pang) Rivers on the other, up to San Min Po (Loi Hsammong).

(16) From San Min Po (Loi hsammong) the line runs in a general northeasterly direction to a point on the west bank of the Nam Lam River. Thence it descends the Nam Lam river to the foot of Chiu Na Shan (Kyu Nak) on the south bank of the Nam Lam River and then runs in a general southeasterly direction passing through Hue Ling Lang (Hwe Mawk Hkio), La Ti (La Tip), Nan Meng Hao (Nam-mong Hau) to Mai Niu Tung (Mai Niu Tawng); thence the line runs in a general northeasterly direction passing through Lung Man Tang (Long Man Tang) to the Hui La (Hwe La) Stream, which it follows northwards to its junction with the Nam Lam River. Thence the line runs eastwards and southwards along the Nam Lam, the Nan Chih (Nam Se) Rivers and the Nam Chia (Hwe Sak) Stream, to Lei Len Ti Fa Shan (Loi Len Ti Hpa). The line then follows the Nam Mot (Nan Mai), the Nan Tung (Nam Tung) and the Nam Ta Rivers to Hsing Kang Lei Shan (Loi Makhinkawng).

(17) From Hsing Kang Lei Shan (Loi Makhinkawng) the line runs eastwards along the watershed between the Nam Nga River and its upper tributaries on the one hand and the Nam Loi River (including its tributary the Nam He River) on the other, to the top of Kwang Pien Nei Shan (Kwang Peknoi).

(18) From the top of Kwang Pien Nei Shan (Kwang Peknoi) the line runs generally northeastwards along the Hue Le (Nam Luk) river and the course of the Nam Nga River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, to the junction of the Nam Nga and the Lanchang (Mekong) Rivers; thence down the Lanchang (Mekong) River up to the southeastern extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary line at the junction of the Nam La and the Lanchang (Mekong) River.

3. The alignment of the entire boundary line between the two countries described in this Article and the location of the temporary boundary marks erected by both sides during joint survey are shown on the 1/250,000 maps

indicating the entire boundary and on the 1/50,000 maps of certain areas, which are attached to the present Treaty.

Article VIII

The Contracting Parties agree that wherever the boundary follows a river, the mid-stream line shall be the boundary in the case of an unnavigable river, and the middle line of the main navigational channel (the deepest watercourse) shall be the boundary in the case of a navigable river. In case the boundary river changes its course, the boundary line between the two countries shall remain unchanged in the absence of other agreements between the two sides.

Article IX

The Contracting Parties agree that:

1. Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Meng-Mao Triangular Area to be turned over to Burma under Article II of the present Treaty shall become territory of the Union of Burma;

2. The area of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang to be returned to China under Article I of the present Treaty and the areas under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes to be turned over to China under Article II shall be handed over by the Burmese Government to the Chinese Government within four months after the present Treaty comes into force;

3. The area to be adjusted under Article III of the present Treaty shall be handed over respectively by the Government of one Contracting Party to that of the other within four months after the present Treaty comes into force.

Article X

After the signing of the present Treaty, the Burmese-Chinese Joint Boundary Committee constituted in pursuance of the Agreement between the two Parties on the Question of the Boundary Between the Two Countries of January 28, 1960, shall continue to carry out necessary surveys of the boundary line between the two countries, to set up new boundary markers, and shall then draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and the location of all the boundary markers, with detailed maps attached showing the boundary line and the location of the boundary markers. The above mentioned protocol, upon being concluded by the Governments of the two countries, shall become an annex to the present Treaty and the detailed maps attached to the present Treaty.

Article XI

The contracting Parties agree that any dispute concerning the boundary, which may arise after the formal delimitation of the boundary between the two countries shall be settled by the two sides through friendly consultations.

Article XII

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and the instruments of ratification will be exchanged in Rangoon as soon as possible.

The present Treaty shall come into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty, all past treaties, exchanged notes and other documents relating to the boundary between the two countries shall be no longer in force, except as otherwise provided in Article X of the present Treaty with regard to the Agreement between the two Parties on the Question of the Boundary Between the Two Countries of January 28, 1960.

Done in duplicate in Peking on October 1, 1960, in the Burmese, Chinese and English languages, all three texts being equally authentic.

Plenipotentiary of the
Union of Burma
(Signed) U NU

Plenipotentiary of the
People's Republic of China
(Signed) CHOU EN-LAI

Source: Maung Aung Myoe (2011). (pp. 199-209)

APPENDIX G

United States' Sanctions against Myanmar (Burma) (1988-present)

Sr.	Name of Sanctions	Executive Orders / Laws	Date of Sanctions	United States Administrations	Reasons of Sanctions	Banned products by Sanctions
1.	n/a Note: This can be considered as very first step of the series of sanctions in following years until termination of sanctions in 2016.	n/a	23 September 1988	Ronald Reagan Administration (1981-1989)	- In response of S.Res. 464 (11 August 1988) and H.Res. 529 (7 September 1988); - 8888 Uprising	US stops all aid to Myanmar. (including counter narcotics programs, and stopping all arms sales-starting the gradual progress of sanctions on Burma.) - Starting the gradual progress of sanctions on Burma.
2.	n/a	Presidential Proclamation 5955	13 April 1989	George H. W. Bush (Bush, Sr.) Administration (1989-1993)	- follows the first step sanctions by stopping aid and this can be seen as second action taken by U.S. Administration.	- U.S. decertifies Myanmar from the list of states co-operating in counter narcotics programmes - stops development aid - excludes the country from General System of Preferences privileges

Sr.	Name of Sanctions	Executive Orders / Laws	Date of Sanctions	United States Administrations	Reasons of Sanctions	Banned products by Sanctions
3.	n/a	Customs and Trade Act of 1990	20 August 1990		- if the stipulations with regard to human rights and drugs are not met	US Congress passes the Customs and Trade Act which calls for economic sanctions on Myanmar
4.	n/a	n/a	22 July 1991			President refuses renewal of the bilateral textile agreement which expired in Dec 1990 invoking provisions of the Customs and Trade Act, 1990
5.	n/a	n/a (City level)	February 1995	Bill Clinton Administration (1993-2001)	n/a	(City level) Berkeley city (California) decides not to do business with any corporation trading in Myanmar
6.	n/a	n/a (Corporate level)	January 1997		n/a	(Corporate level) An MNC <i>Pepsi</i> announces withdrawal from Myanmar, joining others like Apple, Walt Disney, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard, Eastman Kodak, Heineken, Carlsberg and apparel

Sr.	Name of Sanctions	Executive Orders / Laws	Date of Sanctions	United States Administrations	Reasons of Sanctions	Banned products by Sanctions
7.	Speech made at U.S. Naval Academy ¹	n/a	15 April 1997		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - democratic movement - political expression - largest source of heroin in the world - respect for human rights 	<p>companies like Levi Strauss, Macy's, and investment companies like Peregrine, ("Pepsi forced out of Myanmar", <i>Hindu</i>, January 30, 1997).</p> <p>US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright speaking at the US Naval Academy threatens sanctions unless "clouds of repression" are lifted. ("Myanmar faces US investment sanctions". <i>Tribune</i>, Chandigarh, April 17, 1997).</p>
8.	Prohibiting New Investment in Burma	EO 13047	20 May 1997		Government of Burma has committed large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma after	President issues order prohibiting American persons and entities from making new investment in Myanmar. Existing contracts were

Sr.	Name of Sanctions	Executive Orders / Laws	Date of Sanctions	United States Administrations	Reasons of Sanctions	Banned products by Sanctions
					<p>September 30, 1996, and further determine that the actions and policies of the Government of Burma constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and declare a national emergency to deal with that threat (Preamble of the Executive Order 13047)</p>	<p>allowed to be fulfilled.</p>
9.	n/a	n/a (City level)	30 May 1997		<p>(City level) New York becomes the 11th US city to introduce the Burma law which imposes sanctions on Myanmar.</p>	<p>It bars contracts with companies operating in Myanmar. ('Another US city signs Burma Sanctions bill', Khaleej Times, June 1, 1997).</p>

Sr.	Name of Sanctions	Executive Orders / Laws	Date of Sanctions	United States Administrations	Reasons of Sanctions	Banned products by Sanctions
10.	Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003	Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003	June 2003 (President signed on 28 July 2003)	George W. Bush (Bush, Jr.) Administration (2001-2009)	US Senate passes the <i>Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act</i>	
11.	Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003	Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003	28 July 2003		President signs into law the <i>Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act</i> (BFDA) passed earlier by the Congress which...	bans imports from Myanmar, bans export of financial services to Myanmar, freezes assets of certain financial institutions and extends visa restrictions on officials.
12.	Blocking Property of the Government of Burma and Prohibiting Certain Transactions	EO 13310	29 July 2003			Assets, Properties
13.	Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Burma	EO 13448	19 October 2007			Assets, Properties
14.	Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Burma	EO 13464	1 May 2008			Assets, Properties

Sr.	Name of Sanctions	Executive Orders / Laws	Date of Sanctions	United States Administrations	Reasons of Sanctions	Banned products by Sanctions
15.	Executive Order Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability Of Burma	EO 13619	11 July 2012	Barack Obama Administration (2009-2017)		Assets, Properties
16.	Prohibiting Certain Imports of Burmese Jadeite and Rubies	EO 13651	7 August 2013			Jade and Ruby
17.	Termination of Sanctions	EO 13742	7 October 2016		(Termination of Sanctions) Progress in democratic reform	- All the Executive Orders and Statues imposed sanctions on Myanmar has been waived by this EO 13742
18.	-		-	Donald Trump Administration (2017-present)	-	-

Note: Excerpt from “U.S. Sanctions on Burma”:

There are some distinct patterns in the history of U.S. relations with Burma.

- First despite the general decline in relations following World War II, the imposition of sanctions did not begin until after the suppression of the 8888 Uprising in 1988.

- Second, subsequent U.S. sanctions have generally been imposed after Burma’s military has severely violated the human rights and civil liberties of political opponents and/or the Burmese people.

- Third, Congress has been more proactive in pushing for the imposition of sanctions on Burma than the White House.

- Fourth, it is unclear if the imposition of sanctions has had a demonstrable effect on the SPDC or its predecessors.

- Fifth, it is equally unclear if the absence of U.S. sanctions on Burma would have led to improvement in the political situation in Burma.

Source: 1) Martin (2012);
2) U.S. Department of the Treasury. (n.d.);
3) Singh (2006).

APPENDIX H

**Myanmar's export and import to/from top trading partners
including China (1988-2016)**

Myanmar's export to top trading partner including China (1988-2016)

Sr.	Year	Top 3 trading partner (%)	China
1.	1988	China (32%) Thailand (15%) India (13%)	#1 (32%)
2.	1989	China (27%) Thailand (19%) India (12%)	#1 (27%)
3.	1990	Thailand (27%) China (22%) Singapore (13%)	#2 (22%)
4.	1991	Thailand (32%) China (18%) Singapore (15%)	#2 (18%)
5.	1992	Thailand (20%) China (18%) Singapore (15%)	#2 (18%)
6.	1993	China (18%) Thailand (17%) India (13%)	#1 (18%)
7.	1994	Thailand (16%) China (15%) Singapore (15%)	#2 (15%)
8.	1995	Thailand (17%) Singapore (16%) India (12%)	#4 (11%)

Sr.	Year	Top 3 trading partner (%)	China
9.	1996	Singapore (17%) India (14%) China (11%)	#3 (11%)
10.	1997	India (17%) United States (17%) Singapore (12%)	#6 (6%)
11.	1998	India (17%) United States (17%) Singapore (12%)	#6 (6%)
12.	1999	United States (23%) Thailand (10%) China (9.4%)	#3 (9.4%)
13.	2000	United States (26%) Thailand (13%) India (9.1%)	#4 (6.4%)
14.	2001	Thailand (29%) United States (17%) India (12%)	#4 (4.7%)
15.	2002	Thailand (33%) India (13%) United States (13%)	#4 (4.9%)
16.	2003	Thailand (33%) India (13%) United States (11%)	#4 (6.3%)
17.	2004	Thailand (43%) India (13%) China (6.5%)	#3 (6.5%)
18.	2005	Thailand (48%) India (13%) China (7.4%)	#3 (7.4%)

Sr.	Year	Top 3 trading partner (%)	China
19.	2006	Thailand (52%) India (15%) China (5.4%)	#3 (5.4%)
20.	2007	Thailand (47%) India (17%) China (7.8%)	#3 (7.8%)
21.	2008	Thailand (54%) India (14%) China (10%)	#3 (10%)
22.	2009	Thailand (48%) India (20%) China (11%)	#3 (11%)
23.	2010	Thailand (44%) India (17%) China (15%)	#3 (15%)
24.	2011	N/A	N/A
25.	2012	N/A	N/A
26.	2013	N/A	N/A
27.	2014	N/A	N/A
28.	2015	N/A	N/A
29.	2016	China (41%) Thailand (19%) India (9%)	#1 (41%)

Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (n.d.-b).

Myanmar's import from top trading partner including China (1988-2016)

Sr.	Year	Top 3 trading partner (%)	China
1.	1988	Japan (32%) China (23%) Singapore (12%)	#2 (23%)
2.	1989	China (34%) Japan (19%) Singapore (16%)	#1 (34%)
3.	1990	Singapore (25%) China (21%) Japan (11%)	#2 (21%)
4.	1991	Singapore (32%) China (22%) Japan (9.9%)	#2 (22%)
5.	1992	Singapore (27%) China (27%) Japan (9.9%)	#1 (27%)
6.	1993	Singapore (26%) China (25%) Thailand (12%)	#2 (25%)
7.	1994	Singapore (25%) China (23%) Thailand (15%)	#2 (23%)
8.	1995	Singapore (26%) China (25%) Thailand (14%)	#2 (25%)
9.	1996	Singapore (27%) China (19%) Thailand (12%)	#2 (19%)

Sr.	Year	Top 3 trading partner (%)	China
10.	1997	China (22%) Singapore (19%) Thailand (15%)	#1 (22%)
11.	1998	China (22%) Singapore (19%) Thailand (15%)	#1 (22%)
12.	1999	Singapore (19%) China (19%) Thailand (18%)	#1 (19%)
13.	2000	Thailand (20%) China (20%) Singapore (17%)	#1 (20%)
14.	2001	Singapore (22%) Japan (13%) China (13%)	#2 (13%)
15.	2002	China (30%) Singapore (22%) Thailand (14%)	#1 (30%)
16.	2003	China (33%) Singapore (24%) Thailand (16%)	#1 (33%)
17.	2004	China (31%) Singapore (22%) Thailand (20%)	#1 (31%)
18.	2005	China (30%) Thailand (23%) Singapore (19%)	#1 (30%)
19.	2006	China (35%) Thailand (22%) Singapore (16%)	#1 (35%)

Sr.	Year	Top 3 trading partner (%)	China
20.	2007	China (34%) Thailand (20%) Singapore (16%)	#1 (34%)
21.	2008	China (32%) Thailand (21%) Singapore (21%)	#1 (32%)
22.	2009	China (36%) Thailand (25%) Singapore (14%)	#1 (36%)
23.	2010	China (26%) Singapore (23%) Thailand (15%)	#1 (26%)
24.	2011	N/A	N/A
25.	2012	N/A	N/A
26.	2013	N/A	N/A
27.	2014	N/A	N/A
28.	2015	N/A	N/A
29.	2016	China (38%) Thailand (14%) Japan (9.1%)	#1 (38%)

Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (n.d.-c).

APPENDIX I

Joint Statement between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
and the People's Republic of China on Establishing a
Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership
(Beijing, 27 May 2011)

Myanmar, PRC issue joint statement on establishing comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership

NAY PYI TAW, 28 May-At the invitation of President Mr Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar U Thein Sein paid a state visit to China from 26 to 28 May.

During the visit, a joint-statement on establishing a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership was issued. The following is the full text of the joint statement.

Joint Statement Between The Republic of the Union of Myanmar and The People's Republic of China on Establishing a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership

At the invitation of President Mr. Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, President U Thein Sein the Republic of the Union of Myanmar paid a state visit to the People's Republic of China from 26 to 28 May 2011.

During the visit, President Mr Hu Jintao held talks with President U Thein Sein. Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council and Chairman Mr Jia Qinglin of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference met with President U Thein Sein. The two sides had in-depth exchange of views on bilateral relations and international and regional issues of common interest in a friendly atmosphere.

The two sides agreed that since the establishment of diplomatic relations on 8 June 1950, the good neighborly friendship and cooperation between China and Myanmar have been developing smoothly. Especially since the beginning of the new century, the leaders of the two sides have maintained close contact, friendly cooperation in political, economic, cultural, scientific, and technological areas have kept expanding, and the traditional Paukphaw friendship between the two peoples has been growing from strength to strength. The two sides are satisfied with the development of the bilateral relations.

The two sides stressed that China-Myanmar relations, which are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly initiated by the two sides, have stood

the tests of the changes in the international situation and in the respective domestic situation and enjoy broad prospects for development.

The two sides agreed that the world today is undergoing great development, great changes and great adjustment, and the trend towards multipolarity and economic globalization have gained momentum. Countries have become more interdependent. Peace, development and cooperation not only represent the trend of the times, but also serve the common interests of the countries and peoples in the region. Under the new circumstances, further promoting China-Myanmar relations on the basis of the existing friendly cooperation meets the need of the two countries to realize common development, serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and their people, and is conducive to peace, stability and prosperity of the region. On the basis of the above-mentioned common political will, the two sides agree to establish China-Myanmar comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and reached the following agreement:

1. The two sides will maintain close high-level contacts, continue to promote strategic mutual trust and further enhance friendly exchanges and cooperation between the parliaments, governments, judicial departments and political parties of the two countries.
2. The two sides will continue to carry out consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries on an irregular basis, have timely exchange of views on bilateral relations and international and regional hotspot issues, and hold regular meetings on bilateral and multilateral occasions to strengthen strategic communication.
3. The two sides will follow the principles of equality, mutual benefit, drawing upon each other's strengths and emphasizing practical results, further enhance the size and level of the economic cooperation and trade between the two countries, work to strengthen healthy, stable and sustainable business ties, make joint efforts to create a favourable environment for trade and investment cooperation, enhance the closer economic and trade exchanges between the two countries in accordance with their economic and trade policies.
4. The two sides will continue to conduct friendly cooperation in such areas as education, culture, science, and technology, health, agriculture and tourism on the basis of mutual benefit, strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges, increase mutual visits, and deepen mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples.

5. The two sides will strengthen border management cooperation, conduct timely communication on border management affairs, and strive to maintain peace, tranquility and stability in border areas.

6. The Chinese side reaffirms its respect for Myanmar's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and its support for Myanmar's pursuit of its development path suited to its national conditions. Myanmar reiterates that it adheres to one China policy, recognizes that the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory, will continue to support the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and China's cause of peaceful reunification.

7. The two sides will further enhance coordination and cooperation in the United Nations and other multilateral areas, jointly safeguard the interests of developing countries, strengthen cooperation in such mechanisms as the ASEAN Plus China, Japan and the ROK, ASEAN plus China and Greater Mekong Sub regional Economic cooperation, and promote common development and prosperity of the region.

Beijing, 27 May 2011

Source: New Light of Myanmar, 29 May 2011, pp.10.

APPENDIX J

Admission of the New Members to the United Nations (Burma)
(UNSC, New York, 10 April 1948)

THE HYDERABAD QUESTION

LA QUESTION D'HAIDERABAD

Decisions

Décisions

At its 357th meeting, on 16 September 1948, the Council decided to invite the representatives of India and Hyderabad to take places at the Council table.

A sa 357^e séance, le 16 septembre 1948, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants de l'Inde et de l'Haïderabad à prendre place à la table du Conseil.

At its 360th meeting, on 28 September 1948, the Council decided to invite the Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung (Hyderabad) to make a statement concerning the validity of his credentials.

A sa 360^e séance, le 28 septembre 1948, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter le Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung (Haïderabad) à faire une déclaration concernant la validité de ses pouvoirs.

At its 384th meeting, on 15 December 1948, the Council decided to invite the representative of Pakistan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

A sa 384^e séance, le 15 décembre 1948, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter le représentant du Pakistan à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question.

**Part II. Other matters considered by the
Security Council**

**Deuxième partie. Autres questions exami-
nées par le Conseil de sécurité**

**ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE
UNITED NATIONS ⁴⁵**

**ADMISSION DE NOUVEAUX MEMBRES
A L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES ⁴⁵**

45 (1948). Resolution of 10 April 1948

45 (1948). Résolution du 10 avril 1948

[S/717]

[S/717]

The Security Council,

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Having received and considered the report submitted by the Committee on the Admission of New Members regarding the application of the Union of Burma,⁴⁶

Ayant reçu et examiné le rapport que le Comité d'admission de nouveaux Membres lui a présenté au sujet de la demande d'admission de l'Union birmane⁴⁶,

Having taken note of the unanimous approval of the members of the Council of the application of the Union of Burma for membership in the United Nations,

Ayant pris acte de l'approbation unanime manifestée par les membres du Conseil à l'égard de la demande d'admission de l'Union birmane au sein des Nations Unies,

Recommends to the General Assembly that the

Recommande à l'Assemblée générale d'admettre

⁴⁵ Resolutions or decisions on this question were also adopted by the Council in 1946 and 1947.

⁴⁶ *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for April 1948, document S/706.*

⁴⁵ Question ayant fait l'objet de résolutions ou décisions de la part du Conseil en 1946 et en 1947.

⁴⁶ *Procès-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sécurité, troisième année, Supplément d'avril 1948, document S/706.*

APPENDIX K

Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China
in the United Nations
(UNGA, New York, 25 October 1971)

- 2** General Assembly—Twenty-sixth Session
- 2751 (XXVI). Admission of Bhutan to membership in the United Nations**
- The General Assembly,*
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 10 February 1971 that Bhutan should be admitted to membership in the United Nations,¹
Having considered the application for membership of Bhutan,²
Decides to admit Bhutan to membership in the United Nations.
- 1934th plenary meeting,
21 September 1971.*
- 2752 (XXVI). Admission of Bahrain to membership in the United Nations**
- The General Assembly,*
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 18 August 1971 that Bahrain should be admitted to membership in the United Nations,³
Having considered the application for membership of Bahrain,⁴
Decides to admit Bahrain to membership in the United Nations.
- 1934th plenary meeting,
21 September 1971.*
- 2753 (XXVI). Admission of Qatar to membership in the United Nations**
- The General Assembly,*
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 15 September 1971 that Qatar should be admitted to membership in the United Nations,⁵
Having considered the application for membership of Qatar,⁶
Decides to admit Qatar to membership in the United Nations.
- 1934th plenary meeting,
21 September 1971.*
- 2754 (XXVI). Admission of Oman to membership in the United Nations**
- The General Assembly,*
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 30 September 1971 that Oman should be admitted to membership in the United Nations,⁷
- Having considered the application for membership of Oman,⁸*
Decides to admit Oman to membership in the United Nations.
- 1957th plenary meeting,
7 October 1971.*
- 2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations**
- The General Assembly,*
Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,
Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,
Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.
- 1976th plenary meeting,
25 October 1971.*
- 2763 (XXVI). Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency**
- The General Assembly,*
Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1970/1971,⁹
Aware that the statement of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 8 November 1971¹⁰ brings up to date major developments since the report was published,
1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
 2. *Appreciates* the constructive role that the International Atomic Energy Agency is playing in the peaceful application of nuclear energy for the welfare of Member States;
 3. *Commends* the work being undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet its safeguards responsibilities;
 4. *Further commends* the co-operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with the United Nations in organizing the Fourth International Con-
- ¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda item 25, document A/8278.*
² A/8275. For the printed text of this document, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1970, document S/10050.*
³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda item 25, document A/8359.*
⁴ A/8358. For the printed text of this document, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1971, document S/10291.*
⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda item 25, document A/8381.*
⁶ A/8373. For the printed text of this document, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1971, document S/10306.*
⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda item 25, document A/8449.*
⁸ A/8320. For the printed text of this document, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1971, document S/10216.*
⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971* (Vienna, July 1971); transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/8384).
¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1979th meeting, paras. 15-45.*

Source: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI).

APPENDIX L

United Nations Security Council's draft resolution on the
situation in Myanmar (S/2007/14)
(New York, 12 January 2007)

United Nations

S



Security Council

Distr.: General
12 January 2007

Original: English

**United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
United States of America: draft resolution**

The Security Council,

Recalling resolutions 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and Security, 1612 (2005) on Children and Armed Conflict, and 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, and the statement of its President of 28 November 2006 (S/PRST/2006/48),

Recalling action by the General Assembly to establish the "good offices" mission of the Secretary-General, and in this regard expressing strong support for the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and his representatives,

Welcoming the visits of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to Myanmar in May and November 2006 at the invitation of the Government of Myanmar, and expressing its full support for the requests the Under-Secretary-General made to the Government of Myanmar for release of political prisoners, a more inclusive, transparent and meaningful political process, free and unhindered humanitarian access, the cessation of hostilities in Karen State, and an agreement with the International Labour Organization to address forced labour complaints,

Welcoming the efforts of United Nations agencies engaged in Myanmar, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, UNAIDS, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, the United Nations Office of Drug Control, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization,

Welcoming efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to expedite a peaceful transition to democratic rule, and noting the call for early release of political detainees in Myanmar contained in the Joint Communiqué of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of 25 July 2006 and reiterated at the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM VI) in Helsinki in September 2006,

Expressing deep concern at the slow pace of tangible progress in the process towards national reconciliation in Myanmar and at the continuing detention of political prisoners, including the prolonged house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and emphasizing that an inclusive National Convention offers an opportunity for effective dialogue,

Deplores the continued attacks by members of the Myanmar military in ethnic minority regions on civilians, including women and children, and in particular the attacks on civilians in Karen State that have led to increased numbers of internally displaced people and refugee flows,

Recalling A/RES/61/232 (2006) of the General Assembly, and in this regard expressing deep concern at large-scale human rights violations in Myanmar, as cited in the report of the Special Rapporteur of 21 September 2006, including violence against unarmed civilians by the Myanmar military, unlawful killings, torture, rape, forced labour, the militarization of refugee camps, and the recruitment of child soldiers,

Expressing deep concern that the restrictions by the Government of Myanmar on humanitarian actors contribute to increased hardship for the civilian population, particularly those who are most vulnerable and live in remote and conflict-ridden areas,

Expressing deep concern also at the transnational risks posed by the situation in Myanmar, in particular, HIV/AIDS, Avian Flu, and trafficking in narcotics and people,

Welcoming the establishment of the Three Diseases Fund to tackle the problems of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria,

Welcoming also the progress made by the Government of Myanmar in reducing opium production, and encouraging Government efforts to reduce the production and cross-border shipments of all illicit narcotics, including heroin and methamphetamines,

Underlining the need for tangible progress in the overall situation in Myanmar in order to minimize the risks to peace and security in the region,

1. *Expresses* strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his representatives to implement his "good offices" mission, and welcomes the continuing efforts of all relevant United Nations agencies in this regard;

2. *Urges* the Government of Myanmar to respond in a concrete, complete and timely manner to the efforts of the Secretary-General to enable him to fully implement his "good offices" mission;

3. *Calls on* the Government of Myanmar to cease military attacks against civilians in ethnic minority regions and in particular to put an end to the associated human rights and humanitarian law violations against persons belonging to ethnic nationalities, including widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence carried out by members of the armed forces;

4. *Also calls upon* the Government of Myanmar to permit international humanitarian organizations to operate without restrictions to address the humanitarian needs of the people of Myanmar;

5. *Further calls on* the Government of Myanmar to cooperate fully with the International Labour Organization and its representatives in the eradication of forced labour;

6. *Calls on* the Government of Myanmar to begin without delay a substantive political dialogue, which would lead to a genuine democratic transition,

to include all political stakeholders, including representatives of ethnic nationality groups and political leaders;

7. *Also calls on* the Government of Myanmar to take concrete steps to allow full freedom of expression, association, and movement by unconditionally releasing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, lifting all constraints on all political leaders and citizens, and allowing the National League for Democracy (NLD) and other political parties to operate freely;

8. *Requests* that the Secretary-General report to the Council within six months from date of adoption of this resolution on the situation in Myanmar.



APPENDIX M

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002)

DECLARATION ON THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China, **REAFFIRMING** their determination to consolidate and develop the friendship and cooperation existing between their people and governments with the view to promoting a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust;

COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region;

COMMITTED to enhancing the principles and objectives of the 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and President of the People's Republic of China;

DESIRING to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned;

HEREBY DECLARE the following:

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;
2. The Parties are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect;
3. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.

Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including:

- a. holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials;

- b. ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress;
 - c. notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military exercise; and
 - d. exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.
6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the following:
- a. marine environmental protection;
 - b. marine scientific research;
 - c. safety of navigation and communication at sea;
 - d. search and rescue operation; and
 - e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.
- The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior to their actual implementation.
7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues concerning relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed by them, including regular consultations on the observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them;
8. The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Declaration and take actions consistent therewith;
9. The Parties encourage other countries to respect the principles contained in this Declaration;
10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.


Done on the Fourth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Two in Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia.

For Brunei Darussalam



Mohamed Bolkiah
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the People's Republic of China



Wang Yi
Special Envoy and
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Kingdom of Cambodia




H.E. Namhong
Senior Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

For the Republic of Indonesia




Dr. Hassan Wirayuda
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Lao People's Democratic Republic



Somsavat Lengsvad
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For Malaysia




Datin Seri Syed Hamid Albar
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Union of Myanmar



Win Aung
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of the Philippines



Blas F. Ople
Secretary of Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of Singapore




Prof. S. Jayakumar
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Kingdom of Thailand



Dr. Surakiat Sathirathai
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam



Nguyen Dy Nien
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand (n.d.).

APPENDIX N

Chairman's Statement of the 24th ASEAN Summit:*"Moving forward in Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community"*

(Nay Pyi Taw, 11 May 2014)

(Paragraphs included South China Sea issue)



Chairman's Statement of the 24th ASEAN Summit: *"Moving forward in Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community"*

Nay Pyi Taw, 11 May 2014

1. The 24th ASEAN Summit, under Myanmar's Chairmanship theme, *"Moving forward in Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community"*, was held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar from 10 to 11 May 2014. The Summit was chaired by the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, His Excellency U Thein Sein. The Summit was attended by the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member States and the Secretary-General of ASEAN. Thailand was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister of its caretaker government as special envoy.
2. We, the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member States had productive discussions during the 24th ASEAN Summit, focusing on the timely realization of the ASEAN Community by 2015, strengthening ASEAN Institutions and envisioning a strategic direction for the ASEAN Community post-2015. We also exchanged views on regional and international issues and discussed ways to further deepen and strengthen ASEAN's external relations.

Towards a Peaceful and Prosperous ASEAN Community

3. Reflecting the Chair's theme of *"Moving forward in Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community"*, we underscored the importance of ASEAN unity as a foundation for all our efforts in promoting regional peace, stability and enhancing economic development. ASEAN unity was recognised as the core foundation for realising a politically cohesive, economically integrated and socially responsible ASEAN Community.

61. Stressing the important role of culture in the ASEAN Community and ensuring ASEAN's sustainable development, we noted the need for enhanced cooperation in the area of arts and culture. We emphasised the importance of developing a common ASEAN identity and raising people's awareness of the ASEAN Community. In this regard, we welcomed the success of the 6th Meeting of the ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Culture and Arts (6th AMCA) and the Inaugural Meetings between ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Culture and Arts and Japan, and Republic of Korea held in Hue, Viet Nam from 19 to 20 April 2014.

62. We commended Indonesia's efforts to promoting harmony among civilizations with the hosting of the 6th the United Nations Alliance of Civilization (UNAOC) Global Forum in Bali, Indonesia from 29 to 30 August 2014.

ASEAN in the Regional and Global Context

63. We exchanged views on regional and international issues and stressed the importance of maintaining peace, stability and security not only within the region but also throughout the world.

64. We expressed serious concerns over the on-going developments in the South China Sea. We reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace and stability, maritime security, freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea. We called on all parties to the DOC to undertake full and effective implementation of the DOC in its entirety in order to create an environment of mutual trust and confidence; to exercise self-restraint, not to resort to threat or use of force, and to resolve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We emphasized the need for expeditiously working towards an early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). In this regard, we noted the importance of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on the current developments in the South China Sea issued on 10th May 2014 at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

Source: ASEAN (n.d.-a).

APPENDIX O

Chairman's Statement of the 25th ASEAN Summit:
 "Moving forward in Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community"
 (Nay Pyi Taw, 12 November 2014)
 (Paragraphs included South China Sea issue)



**Chairman's Statement of the 25th ASEAN Summit: "Moving Forward
 in Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community"**

Nay Pyi Taw, 12 November 2014

1. The 25th ASEAN Summit, under Myanmar's Chairmanship theme, "***Moving forward in Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community***", was held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, from 12 to 13 November 2014. The President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, His Excellency U Thein Sein chaired the Summit. The Summit was attended by the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member States and the Secretary-General of ASEAN.
2. We, the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member States had productive discussions during the 25th ASEAN Summit, focusing on strengthening ASEAN institutions and ASEAN-led mechanisms in the evolving regional architecture, maintaining and enhancing ASEAN centrality, developing the ASEAN Community's Post-2015 Vision. We also exchanged views on regional and international issues and strengthening external relations and partnerships.

Realisation of the ASEAN Community

3. We welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009-2015) and reiterated our commitment to expedite the implementation of the remaining action lines by 2015 with a view to creating a politically cohesive, an economically integrated and a socially responsible ASEAN Community that will effectively respond to current and future opportunities and challenges, in line with ASEAN's motto, "***One Vision, One Identity, One Community***". We looked forward to the celebration of the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 31st December 2015 through a meaningful activities that will provide greater opportunities for ASEAN citizens from all sectors of society to understand

advantage of these meetings to further ASEAN-UN interaction. We looked forward to working with the UN to develop the next phase of our cooperation, which will incorporate sustainable development objectives, in line with the ASEAN Community's Post-2015 Vision and the UN's Post-2015 Development Agenda. We welcomed the presence of a UN Liaison Officer in Jakarta to strengthen joint activities and to implement the ASEAN-UN Comprehensive Partnership.

83. We noted with satisfaction ASEAN's engagement with regional groupings such as the Pacific Alliance and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). We looked forward to strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation between ASEAN and these regional groupings as well as with other potential groups. We encouraged enhanced engagement between the CPR and Ambassadors of regional groupings to ASEAN in Jakarta. We welcomed increased cooperation between ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and looked forward to the 4th ASEAN-GCC Ministerial Meeting in Myanmar in 2015.
84. We welcomed the Guidelines for ASEAN's External Relations as a basis for developing and widening ASEAN's relations and cooperation with other potential countries and organisations. In this respect, we welcomed the adoption of the Joint Statement on ASEAN-Norway Partnership which would pave way for forging closer cooperation between ASEAN and Norway, issued in the sidelines of the 47th AMM in Nay Pyi Taw in August 2014.

Regional and International Issues

85. We reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace and stability, ensuring maritime security and safety, and freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea. We further underscored the principles as contained in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea, the Joint Statement of the 15th ASEAN-China Summit on the 10th Anniversary of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea, and the related ASEAN Statements adopted during the 24th ASEAN Summit. We welcomed the positive progress in the consultations for implementing the DOC and the agreement to work towards the early conclusion of the Code of Conduct (COC) based on consensus. In this regard, we agreed to intensify consultations with China on measures and mechanisms to ensure and further enhance the full and effective implementation of the DOC in its

entirety, and on the early conclusion of COC. In this respect, we looked forward to seeing more early harvest measures to promote and enhance trust and confidence in the region.

86. We remained concerned over the situation in the South China Sea. We reaffirmed the collective commitments to ensuring the resolution of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, without resorting to the threat or use of force, while exercising self-restraint and avoiding activities that further complicate the situation or escalate tensions in the region. We further stressed the importance of the collective commitments of ASEAN Member States to peace, stability, maritime security and mutual trust in the region and the need to create conditions conducive for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
87. We were encouraged by recent high-level meeting between DPRK and ROK officials. We underlined the importance of peace, security and stability in the Korean Peninsula and reiterated calls for full compliance with all obligations under relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions under the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. We reiterated our support for all efforts to bring about the denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula in a peaceful manner.
88. We expressed concern over the rise of violence and brutality committed by terrorist/extremist organisations and radical groups in Iraq and Syria, noting that these groups not only pose a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, but also to all countries in Middle East, and if left unchecked, to the rest of the world. We denounced all acts of destruction, violence, and terror in all its forms and manifestations and expressed our support for the UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014). We reiterated our commitment to work with the international community to fight against extremism, radicalism and terrorism and address its root causes, including through the promotion of the Global Movement for Moderates (GMM), to prevent further violence and brutality, in accordance with international law and the UN Charter.
89. We recognised that moderation has a role in the pursuit of long lasting peace as a tool to counter extremism and terrorism, diffuse tensions and negate radicalisation. We further affirmed support for the Global Moment of Moderates in moving the moderation agenda forward to counter intolerant, violent and militant extremism; deliver economic, political and social

Source: ASEAN (n.d.-b).

BIOGRAPHY

Name	Thu Rein Saw Htut Naing
Date of Birth	August 2, 1987
Educational Attainment	<p>2017-2018: Master of Arts in Asia Pacific Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand</p> <p>2012-2013: Master of Research (Law), Department of Law, University of Yangon, Myanmar</p> <p>2008-2010: Master of Laws, Department of Law, University of Dagon, Myanmar</p> <p>2003-2007: Bachelor of Laws, Department of Law, University of Dagon, Myanmar</p> <p>2004-2005: Diploma in English, Department of English, University of Yangon, Myanmar</p>
Scholarship	2017: Thailand International Cooperation Agency (TICA) Scholarship Recipient
Work Experiences	<p>2016-Present: Assistant Director, International Organizations and Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar</p> <p>2013-2016: First Secretary/Second Secretary, Permanent Mission/Embassy of Myanmar, Geneva</p> <p>2010-2013: Head of Branch (I)/Head of Branch (II), Consular and Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar</p> <p>2007-2009: Volunteer, Myanmar Anti-Narcotic Association (MANA)</p> <p>2007-2008: Internship, U Than Aung Law Office, Yangon, Myanmar</p>